The political economy of rural poverty in Bangladesh. by Siddiqi, Kamal Uddin
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
RURAL POVERTY IN BANGLADESH
by
KAMAL UDDIN SIDDIQUI
Thesis submitted for the Degree of PhD in the Department of 
of Economic and Political Studies, School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London
May 1980
ProQuest Number: 10672719
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10672719
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
1ABSTRACT
Poverty studies in the Third World, in general, and in Bangladesh, 
in particular, have been mostly concerned with the measurement of 
poverty, and far less with its explanation* In this study, the 
explicit concern has been to delineate the processes which cause, 
aggravate and maintain poverty in rural Bangladesh. The analysis that 
follows has been conducted at three levels. It seeks, firstly, to 
delineate the forces within the agrarian structure responsible for rural 
poverty. Secondly, it examines the urban forces contributing to rural 
poverty. Finally, it tries to establish the international dimensions 
of rural poverty. For the first set of forces, primary data were 
generated through a single village intensive study (lasting for more 
than a year), while for the latter two levels, secondary data have been 
used. The analytical framework of the study has been based on the 
Marxist concepts of "mode of production" and "socio-economic formation".
The major findings of the study are as follows: Firstly, natural
disasters and lack of resources as causes of poverty are untenable. 
Secondly, there is no simple, one-way relationship between poverty and 
population growth. Thirdly, and most important, there is a strong 
convergence of interests among the rural rich, the urban rich and 
metropolitan forces; and it is this chain of forces, which, despite 
the expressed objectives of the Bangladesh state and its international 
aid donors, not only accounts for extremely inequitable distribution 
of the available social product but also militates against productive 
utilisation of the surplus generated. Finally, the existing super­
structure, both local and central, also stands in the way of any change 
taking place in the existing economic relations in the rural society.
The implications of the study are quite clear, namely that without 
fundamental changes in the existing power and property relations and 
surplus extraction and utilisation characteristics, it is well-nigh 
impossible to eradicate poverty of the scale and dimensions that 
engulfs contemporary rural Bangladesh. However, it was found that the 
ingredients required to bring about such a change were lacking, and in 
particular, the consciousness and activities of the rural poor were 
as yet far removed from the idea and practice of such a change.
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6CHAPTER ONE 
TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF POVERTY
To put it explicitly, our principal concern in this study is the 
delineation of the processes which cause, maintain and aggravate poverty 
in rural Bangladesh,, However, as demanded of any serious exercise in the 
realm of social science, it is only proper to begin by attempting to 
define the main parameter of our study, namely poverty, especially since 
it has different connotations with different social scientists,, On the
other hand, since aggravation of poverty (or lack of it) is also within
the purview of our analysis, the problems associated with poverty
measurement have also to be dealt with, even if only in passing„ Also,
in order to justify the appropriateness of our framework for explaining 
poverty, it is crucial first to review critically the existing 
explanations of poverty. The present chapter is, therefore, devoted to 
a general discussion of the three interrelated aspects of a poverty 
study, namely, definition, measurement and explanation,, Finally, in 
order to bring out our point of departure in sharper relief, it is 
essential to scrutinise closely the poverty literature in the specific 
context of rural Bangladesh, This we take up in Chapter 2„
A, Definition of Poverty
Poverty is generally defined in the following two ways: (i) lack
of "means" in relation to "needs" (i0e0 "absolute poverty"), and
(ii) lack of "means" in relation to "means" of others (i„e0 
"inequality" or "relative poverty")„
Absolute Poverty
The most important problem in defining absolute poverty lies 
in identifying "needs" and quantifying them. In this
respect, two criteria are encountered in the existing 
poverty literature: "minimum" needs and "acceptable" needs.
Thus, for example, Booth’s (1899) definition is based on 
minimum needs. He examined one week's expenditures of 30 
poor households of East London, and from these derived the 
average expenditure of the poor on food, rent and clothes.
It was then assumed that all households with income above 
this figure would be able to cope (Fried and Ellman, 1969, 44) 
Such a poverty definition is unsatisfactory in several ways. 
Firstly, the sample poor families were subjectively selected; 
secondly, the possibility that the needs of some households 
may be greater than this average is ignored in this definition 
and thirdly, it takes for granted that the households studied 
were "coping" (Holman, 1978, 8-9),
The second approach, developed mainly by UN and ILO experts, 
and which has now gained wide currency, defines poverty in 
terms of lack of "basic human needs". Thus, for example, 
Drewonski and Scott (1966, 44-5) draw up an hierarchically 
arranged list of such needs:
1, Basic Physical Needs: 1, Nutrition
2, Shelter
3, Health
2, Basic Cultural Needs: 4, Education
5, Leisure and recreation
6. Security
3, Higher Needs: 7. Surplus income.
Curiously, clothing is excluded from this list of basic 
physical needs, although this is of utmost importance in most 
Third World countries.
Jackson (1972, 13-5) distinguishes two features of poverty: 
"want11 and "deprivation". These are defined respectively as 
failure of "flows" and failure of "stocks". According to him 
"stocks" are services derived from material goods and "human 
capital" (e.g. education, housing, security, etc,), whereas 
"flows" are simply immediate consumption goods (e,g, food), 
"Stocks" are thus unimportant only in primitive societies, but 
in advanced societies there is no point distinguishing between 
"want" and "deprivation" since "stocks" and "flows" are 
dynamically related to one another. As may be clearly seen, 
such an approach does not constitute any improvement upon 
Drewonski and Scott, except that it classifies needs into 
services and immediate consumption goods. The inadequacy of 
the hierarchy approach lies elsewhere: anyone who has
inadequate food will be termed poor even if he is well clothed 
and housed, or conversely, if he is well fed, then he is 
termed poor only if he has inadequate clothing, etc,
(Srinivasan, 1977, 11), An alternative to the hierarchy 
approach is to define a bundle of basic goods, and then quantify 
the acceptable requirement for each of these. Thus, for 
Bangladesh, Khan (1977, 80) lists the following as "core 
basic needs": food, clothing, shelter, health, education,
drinking water and contraception, and for each of these 
quantifies independently the "acceptable" per capita requirement. 
Thus, the cost of the "acceptable" bundle of these basic needs 
constitutes the poverty line, and persons with incomes 
inadequate to meet the cost of this bundle are regarded as poor.
However, as Srinivasan (1977, 11) points out, the quantification 
of basic needs, if feasible at all, should be in terms of a 
bundle of things together, rather than specific requirements 
independently derived from the elements constituting such a 
bundle, because of their complementarity and substitution 
possibilities. Finally, poverty is also defined in relation 
to only nutritional norms, such as the "acceptable" intake of 
calories and proteins, to the exclusion of other basic needs.
Two considerations seem to have influenced this choice, namely 
that food is the most basic of human needs, and that thanks to 
advances in nutritional science, acceptable standards for 
calorie and protein intakes are now measurable region- and 
countrywise, However, the usual estimates are based on a 
comparison, for the population as a whole, of the actual 
consumption with the single number estimate of the calorie 
requirement for the population as a whole. There are two 
problems with such an approach. Firstly, it does not take 
into account intra-household variations in actual intakes 
(household survey-based data generally provide per capita 
calorie consumption of each household, thus averaging out 
introrhousehold variations). Secondly, and more importantly, 
calorie norms vary from person to person depending on age, 
sex, normal activity, etc., so that the average norm may not 
reflect the deficiency/sufficiency of calorie intakes in a 
population. In some studies, it has been observed that 
calorie intake-based estimates of the proportion of population 
in poverty can be substantially different from the proportion 
obtained when malnourishment is defined in terms of body
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weight in relation to some suitable standard. All this 
suggests that perhaps the most reliable way of estimating the 
extent of malnourishment-based poverty is anthrometric 
measurement, and only recently this has come to be extensively 
adopted in poor countries (Srinivasan, 1977, 10). Finally, 
as suggested by Townsend (1962; 1970, 6) and Franklin (1967)
it is difficult to define nutritional needs without taking 
account of the kinds and demands of occupations and leisure 
time pursuits in a society,. On the other hand, the official 
Indian poverty norm (i0e0 Rso20 per month per capita at 1960-61 
prices) included only, food, shelter and clothing, but 
explicitly excluded education, health care and services that 
were sought to be provided through the public budget (Pant, 
1974,13).
Relative Poverty
Relative poverty is concerned with the relative position of 
income groups to one another (with money income generally taken 
as the proxy for all "means" in this concept). The argument 
here is that poverty cannot be understood by isolating the poor 
and treating them as a special group. Society is seen as a 
series of stratified income groups and poverty is concerned 
with how the bottom layers fare relative to the rest of the 
societyo In other words, this concept looks at poverty in the 
context of the society as a whole0 The study of the poor 
then depends on an understanding of the level of living of the 
rich, implying that to understand the poor, the affluent must 
be equally studied.
Evaluation of Absolute and Relative Poverty Concepts
In the absolute concept, a value judgment necessarily enters 
into the choice of a poverty cut-off line (or lines), for there
can be no single international norm for either nutrition or 
other basic needs. In effect, despite the objective basis 
claimed for even nutritional requirements, all these are 
ultimately culturally determined in terms of not only some 
notional subsistence minimum, but also expenditures and small 
luxuries that are part of a culturally determined way of life 
(Beutel, 1977, 47). Even within a culturally homogeneous 
region, notions on at least some of basic needs will vary over 
time, so that intertemporal poverty comparisons, based on the 
absolute concept of needs, may not be all that realistic0 
Also, there is a further problem that prices for the same set 
of commodities vary depending on the location of transaction 
(rural, urban, metropolit .an, etc.), time of year, and, more 
importantly, on the economic status of the buyer,, Thus, it 
is often the case that the poor pay more than the rich and get 
an inferior variety or brand of the same commodity0 These 
issues become extremely important if one makes comparisons over 
time or space of the proportion of the poor in a population 
(Srinivasan and Bardhan, 1974,\21-‘W) „ More important, in such 
a concept, there is no attempt to relate poverty with non-poor 
segments of the society,, In other words, it treats the poor 
in isolation from the rest of the society, thereby precluding 
the possibility that the genesis of poverty may lie well 
outside the purview of the poor themselves„ Obviously such 
a concept is convenient for anti-poverty policy measures, 
which consider the poor as a special group and which are not 
directed towards any fundamental changes in society. However, 
this concept is not without merit, in so far as it is able to 
highlight the deprivation of a vast number of people with
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respect to certain basic necessities of life, in the context 
of growing disparities in levels of living within and among 
nations. Also, it has been argued that in so far as minimum 
requirements in the absolute poverty concept can be and are 
determined in relation to the general standard of living in 
the society as a whole, the inequality concept of poverty is 
not entirely avoided in the absolute concept (Osmani, 1978, 177)0
Inasmuch as it places poverty in the context of affluence, the 
relative concept is certainly more appropriate than the 
absolute concepto However, it is not without its short­
comings o Firstly, it cannot tell us whether even the most 
basic needs (such as freedom from hunger, safety from exposure 
to nature, etc.) are being fulfilled in a society, and this 
inadequacy would appear magnified for countries where the vast 
majority of the population are known to be denied theseQ Thus, 
it may be argued that in some cases at least, greater equality 
may simply mean a more equal distribution of poverty, and that, 
on the contrary, it is possible to obtain two societies (or 
the same society at two different points in time) with similar 
degrees of inequality and yet differing degrees in the 
fulfilment of basic human needs, the latter depending on the 
nature of resource utilisation by those who.own and control 
resources. In other words, while degree of inequality in 
income (and assets) may be a very crucial symptom of poverty, 
it is inequality in (and the nature of) total socio-economic 
relations that needs to be incorporated into the definition 
of poverty in order to make it more meaningful„ Secondly, 
in this concept there is no objective way of determining the
13
cut-off point which separates poor from the non-poor.
Generally, this is done by defining the poverty line as the 
median, or some other percentile, of the overall income 
distribution. (As an example of this approach, see Bressler, 
19690) This is obviously bound to be an arbitrary exerciseo 
Thirdly, income is a derivative of wages, profits, rents, etcos 
and in the last analysis stems from ownership and control of 
the means of production, exchange and distribution. Also, 
income alone may not adequately reflect the access to non­
economic conditions, like security, power, etc0, so that 
income inequality as an index of poverty may be no more than 
the tip of the iceberg. Finally, since most inequality 
measures are concerned only with money incomes, certain 
problems cannot be avoideda We may identify these. The 
first is that while it is correct to assert that money incomes 
should not be the basis of inequality measurements, a suitable 
price index for converting money incomes into "real" incomes 
is difficult to arrive at (Osmani, 1978, 123-4)^the second that 
since poor people generally pay higher prices for the same 
commodities than the rich, a single price index may not be at 
all suitable in this regard; and the third that in societies 
where the economy is not sufficiently monetised, money incomes 
fail to reflect the reality adequately.
Subjective Poverty
Anybody can express judgment on whether he considers his needs 
to be satisfied to a sufficient or insufficient degree. He may 
be considered poor or not poor, depending on that judgment 
(Jan Drewonski, 1977)„ The difficulty with this concept is 
that such judgment at times may have little correspondence with 
the objective reality of the person expressing the judgment.
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Other Concepts of Poverty
We may consider the following.
Externality
This concept is concerned with the social consequences of 
poverty for the rest of the society, rather than the needs 
of the poor. According to this concept, the poverty line 
should serve as an index of the disutility to the rest of 
the community of the persistence of poverty; people must not 
be allowed to become so poor that they offend or are hurtful 
of the society <> It is not so much the misery and plight of 
the poor, but the discomfort and problems caused to the rich 
as a consequence of poverty that is at the core of this 
concept (Smolenski, 1966; Rein, 1971) „ In this view, 
improving the living of the poor without reducing the 
disutility to the rest of the community is insufficient.
This is, then, looking at poverty from the point of view 
of the affluent without the slightest pretence: by
implication, it not only absolves the rich of"' any 
responsibility for causing poverty, but also holds the poor 
responsible for causing disutility to the rich, and thereby 
provides the basis for taking steps against the poor rather 
than povertyo 
Natural Poverty versus Artificial Poverty
PoCo Joshi (1979) draws a distinction between "natural 
poverty" associated with underdeveloped productive forces, 
and "artificial poverty", associated with man’s growing 
control over nature„ This distinction is important in 
that it implies that modern-day poverty may be the outcome 
of the socio-economic system.
Mass Poverty versus Minority Poverty
Galbraith (1979) and Tussing (1975, 1) distinguish between 
poverty afflicting the minority in some societies (such as 
in the Western world) and poverty afflicting the vast 
majority in other societies (such as in the Third World), 
This is a useful distinction in so far as it highlights the 
condition of the Third World poor in absolute terms,
However, in terms of the relative poverty concept, the 
majority of both kinds of society could be considered as 
poor. Moreover, comparison between the poor of two widely 
different societies may not be legitimate on the argument 
that the poor of individual societies can and should be 
compared only with their respective affluent classes.
Moral Poverty
This places poverty in the value system of a society or of 
its subgroups and institutions; that is, it defines whether 
poverty is morally acceptable, and what status it confers 
or prevents the poor man from enjoying. In stratified 
societies, several values of poverty will normally co-exist; 
for example, it may confer "shame", or be regarded as a 
punishment for sin for some, a cause of pride for others, or 
both at the same time (Hobsbawm, 1977, 399),
Poverty as Inequalities in other (than income) economic and
non-economic Endowments
Townsend (1970, 24-5) defines poverty as inequities in the 
distribution of five resources, including cash income, 
capital assets, occupational fringe benefits, current public
services* and private income in kind.** This is then an 
an attempt to include assets and less tangible incomes along 
with tangible incomes. Going a step further, it has also 
been suggested that inequalities in "economic power" rather 
than inequalities in income and assets is a more appropriate 
definition of poverty,*** Srinivasan (1977,2) also argues 
on the same lines, "One should be concerned not with observed 
inequalities in income and wealth distributions, but whether 
institutional structure provides equality of 'access',,,, 
and not necessarily with the equality of 'success1, iQe. 
what different individuals make of the opportunities as long 
as the system is 'fair'.,,,If this view is accepted, one 
would want to measure the degree to which equality of 
'access' and fairness of the operation of the system is 
observed rather than the extent of inequality in the end 
results", Tussing (1975, 2) goes beyond the economic 
concept of poverty and associates poverty not only with 
’Voneylessness", but also dependency, helplessness and lack 
of political influence, though admitting that this type of 
poverty is less easily measurable. He attributes this 
poverty to powerlessness. He expounds his concept thus:
"We are talking about power not in the sense of authority 
over others, but in the sense of freedom, the ability to 
make choices vitally affecting one's own life,.,,the concept
* I,e, government subsidies and services in health, education, 
housing, etc,
** I,e, home production, gifts, value of personal supporting services, 
etc,
*** Memorandum of dissent by a minority of the Royal Commission on 
Taxation, Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation,
Cmnd, 9474, 1955, p,8.
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of poverty as powerlessness underlies the importance of 
economic vulnerability0 The poor are separated from the 
non-poor not only by their current standard of living, but 
by their greater vulnerability to economic catastrophe, a 
vulnerability that limits their choices and hence their 
freedom (p04-5)o Similarly, Hobsbawm (1977) distinguishes 
non-material poverty from material poverty„ He considers 
inferiority of rights, opportunities and status of the poor, 
their sense of such inferiorities and the entire syndrome 
of their frustration, resentment and underprivilege as some 
of the important non-material aspects of poverty„
To sum up, these alternative concepts of poverty bring out the 
shortcomings of absolute and income inequality approaches to 
poverty, and attempt to reflect the genesis and non-economic 
dimensions of poverty in its definition In the words of Coates 
and Silburn (1970, 45), "Poverty has many dimensions, each of which 
must be studied separately, but which, in reality constitutes an 
interrelated network of deprivations". As pointed out earlier, it 
is our cpntention that this network of deprivations can be understood 
only in the context of inequality in (and specificities of) the sum 
total of economic and extra-economic relations in the society in an 
1^^ ^^li§f'ictive, i0e, what are described as class relations in the
Marxist approach. In the subsequent chapters^it is in the light 
of the above conceptualisation of poverty that we intend to explore 
it determinants in the concrete conditions of rural Bangladesho 
However, despite the innumerable measurement problems (as will be 
outlined in a later section) the absolute and income inequality 
approaches to poverty are more easily measurable than the other 
concepts, and together these can serve a useful purpose so long as 
their shortcomings are borne in mindc.
I S
Bo Measurement: of Poverty 
Indices of Absolute Poverty
As has been pointed out in the previous- section, there are 
serious conceptual difficulties in identifying either a 
nutritional norm or a bundle of basic needs0 However, even if 
these issues are settled and a "poverty level" is arrived at, 
the problem of determining an appropriate poverty index 
remainso Most studies use the proportion of people below the 
poverty line as the index of poverty.* Called the Headcount
Ratio, it is expressed mathematically as follows:
q* ...
H “ — Q 0.00000 (l)
where q* = number of persons (households below the poverty line 
a = poverty line
n - total number of persons (households)
In particular, as Sen (1976) has pointed out, it violates two 
principles of rather general appeal» One is the so-called 
Monotonicity axiom which states that, given other things, the 
measure of poverty should go up if a poor person becomes poorer. 
The other principle akin to the Pigou/Dalton condition of 
transfer (see later), requires that, other things remaining the 
same, a pure transfer from the poorer to the less poor, should 
increase the degree of poverty0 If the first axiom is 
violated, poverty cannot be said to have increased even if all 
the poor become poorer. This is surely unacceptableo The 
second axiom requires the index to be sensitive to 
redistribution among the poorQ It does not clearly meet this 
requirement, in fact, its rise in practice may even be perversely
See, for instance, Rowntree (1901), Minhas (1971), Dandekar and 
Rath (1971), and Orshanski (1968).
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responsive0 In their eagerness to impart respectability to 
the poverty index, planners may feel more inclined to rescue 
those immediately below the poverty line rather than those 
further below, simply because the former are relatively easier 
to salvageo
One way of overcoming the above difficulty is to construct 
two or more poverty lines. Thus Khan (1976) identifies two 
poverty lines, the line of "absolute poverty" and the line of 
"extreme poverty", for Bangladesh. Similarly, the Indian 
Institute of Public Opinion (1978) draws five lines (i.e. first, 
second, third, fourth degrees of destitution, poor but not 
destitute, etc0) in measuring poverty for South Asian countries. 
Thus, in a rough and ready manner, these improvisations attempt 
to differentiate the various layers among the poor.
Another measure that has sometimes been used is the so-called 
poverty gap. It measures the degree of poverty by the short­
fall of all the poor's incomes from a poverty line
I = ..oo... (ii)
L*t
where y^ = income of the i th poor
(i = 1, ..... q*)
It satisfies the monotonicity axiom, but violates the principle 
of transfer.
On the other hand, Sen (1976) suggests a measure which is 
sensitive to the gaps in the incomes of the poor, and which 
also gives more weight per unit to lower incomes: expressed
mathematically, Sen's measure is given by
(iii)
Sen (1976) also shows that for large numbers of the poor, Ps 
can be approximated as follows:
Ps =. w £ r +  . (iv)
V
where I = t*. ~ )j u) /  . ,0...0 (v)
L-t
G = Gini coefficient of income distribution 
below the poverty line0
From (v) I = q* = \ _ y /2    (vi)
H.
where y = mean income of the poor 
Substituting (i) and (vi) in (iii)
Ps = q(1- 2  +_g_&)
Thus the dependence of Ps on q, y and G is quite evident. In 
other words, Ps is a composite measure of poverty based on the 
recognition that the extent of poverty depends on a number of 
factors, namely the proportion of the poor, their income gaps 
and the relative distribution of their incomes.
Measures for Subjective Poverty
Measurement of subjective poverty may be done in two says 
(Drewonski, 1977). The first is a measurement of the degree of 
satisfaction of needs as declared by the subject in question,,
He may describe his position as being poor, satisfactory, 
well off, etc0 The essence of the approach may be illustrated 
by a diagram:
where Y = actual income
P = poverty measures in terms of income 
p'p" = poverty line 
Poverty depth (in terms of income) is measured along the 
ordinates of points which constitute p 1 p"„ People at various 
levels of income are asked to state their poverty point (i.e. 
minimum income for not feeling poor) 0 A poverty line is then 
plotted representing their replies0 This method of assessing 
poverty by the declaration of the concerned raises serious 
misgivingso Firstly, the veracity of such declarations cannot 
always be beyond question. Secondly, their declarations refer 
to hypothetical situations and not to positions in which 
respondents find themselves here and nowQ Answers to such 
questions may reflect their mentality, but may be hardly relevant 
for assessment of their actual situation^ The second measurement 
approach tackles the problem by observing behaviour of 
individuals rather than obtaining their responses. However, 
this may not be a very practicable method*, Moreover, observed
behaviour, unless explained properly (for which further 
investigation would be necessary), may at times be very 
misleading.
Relative Poverty (Inequality) Measures
There are two types of inequality measures: positive measures 
which make no explicit use of any concept of social welfare; and 
normative measures, which are based on an explicit formulation 
of social welfare and the loss incurred from unequal distribution 
There are two principles against which evaluation of the various 
inequality measures will be done. The first is the Pigou-Dalton 
condition of transfer, according to which any transfer from a 
poorer to a richer person, other things remaining the same, must 
increase the degree of inequality. The second is the principle 
of regressive sensitivity to transfer, which states that mere 
sensitivity to transfer is not sufficient0 A transfer of the 
same magnitude should be given different weights at different 
positions of the income scale. More specifically, a transfer 
from a poorer to richer person deserves more weight at the lower 
end of the income scale than at the upper one, because the loser 
at the lower end is poorer than the loser at the upper end, 
although both losers are poorer relative to their respective 
gainers.
Positive Measures:* Let y. = income of the ith individual where 
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See Sen (1973, 24-35) for details.
3) Variance
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where
to.
x^ = share of income going ith person.
The Range does not satisfy even the Pigou-Dalton condition,, It 
is obviously a very crude measure. Relative Mean Deviation 
satisfies the Pigou-Dalton condition only so long as the 
transfer takes place between two sides of the mean. However, 
it does not at all satisfy the second condition. Both Variance 
and Coefficient of Variation satisfy the Pigou-Dalton condition 
over the entire income scale. This is so because by squaring 
the deviations from the mean, they ensure the crucial property 
of concavity. Coefficient of variation is sometimes preferred 
between the two, as variance is positively related to mean, so 
that even if ..two distributions have some relative interpersonal 
distribution, variance will be higher for the one with higher 
mean. Neither of them, however, satisfied the second principle 
of transfer.
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Standard Deviation of Logarithms satisfies the stronger second 
condition. However, at very high levels in the income scale, 
it gives almost no weight to transfers.
The Gini coefficient is the most widely used measure of
inequality. One reason for this perhaps is that it has a very
close relationship with the Lorenz curve, which is a particularly
expressive diagrammatic representation of income distribution:
M
L
Percentage of population 
Percentages of the population arranged froiji the poorest to the
richest are represented on the horizontal axis and the
percentages of income enjoyed by the bottom 5c. per cent of the
population is shown on the vertical axis. Obviously, 0 per
cent of the population enjoys 0 per cent of the total income,
and 100 per cent of the population enjoys all the income. If
everyone has the same income, the Lorenz curve will simply be
the diagonalo But in the absence of perfect equality, the
bottom income groups will enjoy a proportionately lower share of
income. It is obvious, therefore, that any Lorenz curve must
lie below the diagonal (except the one of complete equality,
which would be the diagonal), and its slope will increasingly
rise - at any rate not fall, as we move to richer and richer
sections of the population. In the above diagram, Gini
JQO
Percentage
Income
of
coefficient is given as follows:
G = Shaded area in the Diagram
Triangular region underneath the Diagonal
Another reason why G is widely used is that it measures
inequality by taking note of the difference of everybody’s
income from everybody else's income, rather than from the mean 
which may be nobody’s income, and as such corresponds to a more 
natural meaning of equalityo G satisfies the Pigou-Dalton 
condition, but does not satisfy the principle of regressive 
sensitivity to transfer. It attaches more weight to transfers 
in the middle range (Atkinson, 1970)0
Theil’s Entropy measure is derived from the concept of entropy 
in the Second Law of Thermodynamics. It satisfies the Pigou- 
Dalton condition, but it is basically an arbitrary formula and 
has not gained much currency so far0 
Normative Measures
Dalton’s Measure: Dalton’s Q92Q) basic premises were:
a) social welfare is an unweighted sum of individual 
utilities, and
b) social welfare is maximised when total income is 
equally divided. Accordingly, he defined the 
following index of equality:
Atkinson’s Measure: Atkinson (1970) defines what he calls
,Tthe equally distributed equivalent income” of a given 
distribution of a total income as that level of per capita 
income which if enjoyed by everybody, would make total welfare
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exactly equal to the total welfare generated by the actual 
income distribution. Putting Ye as the "equally distributed 
equivalent income1’, we see that
M = ^ |puvL(.'d)= £ W-OjOJ
U \
Atkinsonfs measure of inequality is given by 
A = 1 - QLe/jj)
Thus, if income is equally distributed, then Ye is equal to 
and A will be Q. For any distribution the value of A must 
lie between 0 and 10
In both the Atkinson and Dalton measures, the utilitarian 
framework is unnecessarily restrictive,, But both can be 
generalised by using a more general welfare function,. Thus, 
Aigner and Heins Cl967) have generalised the Dalton Index.and 
Sen (1973 ) suggests similar improvements for the Atkinson Index,,
Combined Indices of Absolute and Relative Poverty
a) Alamgir (.1975) took Sen’s Ps as a welfare index of the
poor and Gini coefficient (G) as a welfare index for the 
entire society, and argued that overall social preference 
be judged by the composite index IIP„
The difficulty of this index is that it performs a ratio 
scale operation to ordinal magnitudes„ Thus, if the 
values of Ps and G change by the same amount, but in 
opposite directions, then the IIP value remains unchanged, 
and so does the overall ranking of two social states0 
But since in view of ordinality, equal change in values of 
Ps and G cannot be interpreted as equal change in the
S7
welfare of the two groups, unchanged social preference 
cannot really be deduced, even if we wish to give equal 
weights to component groups, as has been done above.
The IIP index, therefore, has no conceivable correspondence 
with overall social preference0
b) Bhatty Q974) uses the same Ps and G, but in recognition of 
their ordinal nature has relied on their direction of 
change rather than the amount by which they change, The 
central idea of this strategy is that a fall in Ps will be
valued more if it is accompanied by a reduction in G,
Accordingly, society1s preference among different types of 
change can be expressed by the following ordering:
1) Decline in Ps with a decline in G
2) Decline in Ps with no change in G
3) Decline in Ps with rise in G,
The trouble with this strategy is that it is not possible
to impart to it relative weighting of the two components
c) Sen (1976) suggests transformation of his Ps into a
relative poverty measure in the following way (see also 
Anand, 1977)
P* = P
s
(q*+l)n JUi'Z
C
If the income of a person above the poverty line falls 
without taking him below the poverty line, and if everything 
remains the same, the value of P* will rise, through a 
reduction in the value of/tt . The modified poverty index 
thus reflects the wellbeing of the non-poor.
In the light of the above discussion, the following general comments 
may be offered in regard to the various poverty measures. Firstly, 
despite the apparent sophistication of some of the poverty measures, 
their sensitivity may be rendered meaningless by the poor quantity 
and quality of the in come-expenditure data available (or what can 
be made available) in most Third World countries,* It thus seems 
that only two measures, namely the Gini coefficient from relative 
poverty measures and the poverty line-head count rafcio from absolute 
poverty measures, are of any practical relevance to our purpose. 
Secondly, and more important, these measures carry with them the 
shortcomings of the poverty concepts on which they are based. Thus, 
they are capable of measuring deprivations in certain limited aspects 
only, for example, nutrition, income, assets, etc. But they are 
unable to capture the entire network of deprivations, both economic 
and non-economic, i.e, what we have earlier defined as poverty. It 
is our contention that it is this shortcoming which calls for a 
fundamentally different exercise, namely class analysis of the 
society in an historical perspective, an exercise which attempts to 
combine poverty measurement with the genesis of poverty. We 
elaborate this alternative approach in Chapter 3 and present it 
comprehensively in Chapter 5 in the concrete conditions of rural 
Bangladesh. However, shortcomings notwithstanding, some of the 
poverty measurements discussed above can serve a useful purpose when 
combined with class analysis, for example, as in Chapter 6 , the 
combination brings out the correspondence between consumption pattern 
(i,e0 what we have earlier defined as symptoms of poverty) and class 
position.
* See Chapter 2 for the validity of this point in the context of
Bangladesh,
Explanations of Poverty
Explanations of poverty in bourgeois social science may be divided
as follows:
a) explanations in terms of individual attributes;
b) cultural explanations,, and
c) explanations in terms of the role of public social services.
Before proposing our own framework of poverty explanation, it is
important that we first critically review these.
General Explanations
1. Explanations emphasising the relationship, between
individuals and poverty regard poverty as stemming from
limitations, maladjustments and deficiences of individuals, ands
look at poverty in terms of their biological endowments, 
economic capacities and psychological qualities. Explanations 
attributing poverty to biological endowments are distinguished 
generally by one or more of the following features. Firstly, 
some inadequacy or "pauper syndrome" is biologically 
transmitted through genes of one person to another (Meade and 
Parkes, 1965, 112). Secondly, intelligence determines income, 
and intelligence is largely an inherited attribute (Herrnstein, 
1973, 129). Thirdly, mental illness or unstable temperament 
are inherited capacities, and these precipitate individuals 
towards social deprivation (Rutter and Madge, 1976, 202-3), 
There is certainly a genetic element in intelligence and some 
mental disorders, but for three main reasons this does not 
constitute an explanation of poverty. Firstly, biological 
mechanisms promote differences as well as similarities. 
Secondly, even if genetics do predispose individuals towards 
poverty, they do not explain why poverty is tolerated by
society. Thus Eysenck (1973, Ch.6) who leans heavily towards 
biological accounts, discusses a range of social interventions 
designed to save from poverty those whose limitations propel 
them towards it; and yet society has not made such inter­
ventions, Moreover, as Holman (1978, 56, 66) has pointed out, 
there is no justification for regarding "pauper syndrome" 
conditions approximating to any specific gene. Thirdly, 
genetics alone cannot wholly explain intelligence and 
psychiatric disorders. They are also moulded by outside 
pressures, Thoday (1965) points out that every human 
characteristic depends initially on having the necessary genetic 
endowment and on the environmental stimulus to develop it or 
allow it to function. Understanding of poverty must, therefore, 
be pursued by asking why the stimuli are provided for some 
sections of the society, but not others.
An influential contribution to poverty explanation derives from 
a school of writers who emphasise the role of individuals in a 
"free market" economy. Such an economy is considered to be 
distinguished by:
a) free competition in the market place between various 
sellers and buyers, thereby stimulating further 
specialisation in manufacture and distribution in 
order to improve efficiency in the struggle for success;
b) existence of the cash nexus as the means through which 
competitors are related to each other and the market, and
c) acceptance of the laws of demand and supply as determining 
not only prices of goods, but also the supply of land, 
labour and capital.
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The forces of such a free market economy are considered to 
allocate monetary rewards to those with talent, initiative and 
effort, and those who fall into poverty have only their own 
moral and physical limitations to blame0 Poverty is thus 
chiefly attributable to individual laziness0 R0 Bremmer 
C1974i 64) summarises this outlook as follows: "Indigence
was simply the punishment meted out to the improvident by 
their own lack of industry and efficiency. Far from being 
a blessed state, poverty was the obvious consequence of sloth 
and sinfulness". Such opinions, as Bremmer shows, were 
typical in the Victorian era„ But these still persist today. 
Thus Page Cl971) blames the unemployment of some on their 
dislike of work and their willingness to live off the state 
and "leisure preference"„ Similarly, according to Friedman 
(1963, 188), some people choose not to save and must thus be 
individually responsible for their "penurious old age"0 
Implicit in this explanation is that the rich are thrifty, 
talented, hard-working, etcQ But as Holman (1978, 79) points 
out, in the context of the UK, "00c.amongst the rich and 
powerful in the 19th century (i.e. in the peak period of free 
market economy) were some who appeared lazy, feckless, immoral 
and lacking talents. But market forces did not necessarily 
bring them to poverty any more than take Booth's hard workers 
out of it"0
If this connection between poverty on the one hand, and 
thriftiness and hard work on the other, is tenuous in Western 
society with a highly developed market economy, then its 
prospects of holding good in the weakly developed market economy
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of Third World countries must be even bleaker. Indeed, the 
usual picture emerging from such societies is one in which the 
poor toil relentlessly while the rich are given to a life style 
consisting of leisure, wasteful consumption and general divorce 
from the risk and responsibility of production., Secondly, as 
brought out vividly by Engels (1844) in his classic work 
The Condition of the Working Class in England, it was precisely 
during the heyday of the free market economy that widespread 
poverty made its impact on public notice in England0 Thirdly, 
in most Third World countries the market economy is yet highly 
undeveloped, and in any case its course has been quite different 
from that of the Western experience„ However, even in Western
societies, the theory of the free market, of the perfect balance 
between demand and supply, of the appropriate rewards for 
effort, is based on a hypothetical situation because of a number 
of external factors. Thus, Atkinson (1974) shows how crucial 
is the part played by inherited resourceso Its possessors not 
only have an immediate economic advantage over others, but they 
are also able to avoid poverty even if they do not wish to be 
thrifty and hard-working. Similarly, education and training 
are unequally distributed, and this distribution has little 
relationship to ability. Consequently, some persons are unable 
to develop their talents so as to offer them to the market<,
Since use of the market both in regard to obtaining work and 
purchasing the cheapest and best goods requires information, 
the less-educated are always at a disadvantage, regardless of 
their hard work, thrift and willingness to work. More important, 
there are the large-scale economic and social trends like 
international and national trade recessions, uneven capital
development9 growth of monopoly capital, etc., dictating 
prices, level of employment, wages, location of industries, 
etc., against which individuals have no control over as 
individuals, however thrifty and hard working they may be. 
Therefore, the freedom in the developed market economy is no 
more than a myth, for the vast majority of the population with 
little or no ownership and control over the mecovs of 
production.
Explanation of poverty in terms of the individuals psyche was 
quite popular in the UK and Western countries in the 1950s and 
1960s. This rested on three premises: (a) poverty is not
necessary in a welfare state; (b) those who are poor tend to be 
individuals or families with multiple problems, and (c) the 
reason for their problems tends to be psychological. However, 
subsequent empirical evidence has completely exploded such 
explanation. Thus, Rutter and Madge (1976, 249-51) show that 
the poor are not the only ones to have a multitude of over­
lapping personal problems; the rich are also equally afflicted 
with problems of delinquency, child behaviour, drunkenness and 
marital disharmony. Similarly, Rein (.1970, 347) shows that 
amongst slum residents of Detroit and New York, 85 per cent 
had no emotional, personal or behavioural problems that 
inhibited their ability to make the transition into decent 
physical accommodations. On the contrary, their greatest need 
was adequate housing and income rather than therapy, thus 
dismissing the thesis that poverty was another personal problem. 
Moreover, even in the UK with extensive welfare services, 
certain studies put the figure of persons in poverty between
7 and 13 million (Holman, 1978, 96). To explain the plight of 
such a large number of persons as a consequence of psychological 
deficiencies would indeed sound nonsensical. And any attempt 
to extend such explanation to Third World countries, where the 
scale of poverty is far more staggering, would no doubt lend 
psychic distortion to the reputation of their exponents!
Cultural Explanation
The most important among the cultural explanations of poverty is 
the "culture of poverty" thesis due to Oscar Lewis’ (1959,
49-53) work on Mexican and Puerto Rican families. Its salient 
features are as follows. Firstly, the poor are characterised by 
a lack of participation and integration into the major 
institutions of the large society, such as trade unions, 
voluntary societies, hospitals, departmental stores, etc.
They bear hatred and mistrust for the police, the government 
and the church, and refuse to share the values of the larger 
society. Secondly, the poor are marked by a minimum of 
organisation beyond the level of the nuclear and extended 
family. Thirdly, among the poor, family and sexual practices 
are at variance with outside culture: for example, short and
unprotected childhood, early initiation into sex, free unions 
or consensual marriages, a relatively high incidence of wife 
and children abandonment, etc. Fourthly, the poor are 
characterised by helplessness, dependence, inferiority, 
resignation, fatalism, little motivation for work and 
advancement, a strong here-and-now orientation, little desire 
or ability to plan for the future, etc. Fifthly, as a 
consequence of these characteristics, poverty becomes inevitable.
Unmotivated and helpless people do not work their way out of 
poverty. Those unwilling to postpone pleasures do not save. 
Change will never come if they are unwilling to organise. 
Resignation and fatalism enable them to live with their 
plight. Finally, these characteristics are also transmitted 
to succeeding generations through family norms, especially 
their child-rearing and socialisation practices.
The Lewis study was also echoed by those of Reissman (1962,
26-7), Mo>)nihan and Glazer (1963) and Matza (1966, 317).
However, their findings may be challenged on several grounds. 
Firstly, these studies suffered from imprecise definitions of 
the poor, dubious methodology and quality of the material 
collected (Roach and Gurslin, 1967; Valentine, 1968, 5;
A^len, 1970, 373). Secondly, alternative empirical evidence 
suggests (Goodwin, 1973,; Davidson and Gaitz, 1974) that the 
poor are not, after all, as different from the non-poor as it is 
portrayed by Lewis and his supporters, in matters of work 
attitude, motivation, values, language and skills, and that, on 
the contrary, they, are quite akin to non-poor and that they 
are distinguished mainly by their poverty and social 
deprivations. Some poor persons may show some variations, but 
the differences are of degree rather than kind. In short, the 
poor are not participants in a separate culture, nor are they 
behind the attitudes and morals of the larger society. Thirdly, 
investigations by Rossi and Blum (1968) revealed that there was 
no support for the claim that poverty is passed from generation 
to generation by cultural processes. Finally, even if some of 
the characteristics as described by Lewis and others, are
particularly true of the poor, these do not at all explain 
what causes poverty in the first place; what it explains at 
most is that once poverty appears, there is a strong tendency 
for it to be perpetuated/augmented through the peculiar culture 
it gives birth to.
Explanation in Terms of the Role of Government Social Services 
There are two diametrically opposite views on governmental 
anti-poverty measures in relation to their implications for 
poverty explanation and alleviation. The first holds that 
if only (a) technical inefficiencies within certain anti­
poverty agencies were removed; (b) there existed proper 
co-ordination and co-operation among different anti-poverty 
services, and (c) the key anti-poverty service could function 
properly, poverty and deprivation could be banished from 
society (McCashin, 1976, 4). In other words, society already 
possesses a framework of welfare services capable of combating 
poverty, so that poverty exists only because this framework is 
not fully operational owing to certain technical constraints. 
However, as Holman (1978, 183) lucidly points out, such an 
explanation ignores the following: (a) the causes of poverty
and the profundity of reforms that can be attained to benefit 
the poor; (b) the external forces which are outside of the 
social services, but which influence the distribution of 
resources, and (c) the conflicts between different sections of 
society, some of whom may benefit from others being in poverty. 
Moreover, the extent of governmental anti-poverty measures in 
the Third World being far less than what exists in some of the 
Western countries, the assumption that society already possesses 
an adequate framework for social services appears grossly 
unrealistic for the former countries.
A very different view is held on government anti-poverty 
measures by the advocates of the free market economy. They 
argue that large-scale state involvement in social services 
has adverse implications for accentuating poverty in a number 
of ways. Firstly, the poor become content to enjoy the free 
benefits of social services rather than work hard, so that 
neither can they escape poverty individually, nor are they able 
to increase the resources of society. Secondly, the welfare 
state holds back both individual and social progress by 
weakening the family, the basic economic unit of society.
Thus Kristol (1974, 242) argues that social services promote 
family breakdowns and work ethic rejection, which in turn leads 
to social deprivation. Similarly, according to M. Bremmer 
(1966, 11), social services render families dependent not upon 
their members, but on the state, and this dependency takes away 
the qualities of drive and initiative necessary to increase both 
the family’s lot as well as national resources. Also, such 
dependency can create family traits of aggression and apathy, 
which, in turn, render family members unsuitable for employment 
and cause family breakups, thereby accentuating poverty.
Thirdly, extensive social services raise income tax, dampen 
private enterprise and lower efficiency (the assumption being 
that private enterprise is more efficient than public 
enterprise). In other words, public services not only imperil 
the individual and family motivations to work their way out of 
poverty, but also simultaneously harm national economic powers 
which could have been used for the benefit of all income groups.
The above view of governmental social services may be criticised 
on a number of points. Firstly, extensive research among the 
poor and the unemployed by Goodwin (1972), Daniel (1974) and 
Hill (1973) clearly show that the talk of modern social 
services destroying work motive, initiative and moral fibre has 
little basis. Secondly, the Kristol thesis does not stand up 
to statistics. Thus, there is no relationship between divorce 
rates and the degree of state involvement in welfare. In 
fact, divorce rate in the USA is higher than that in Sweden, 
although state social services are more extensive in the latter. 
Similarly, there is no substantial evidence to show that 
marriage and the family unit are declining with the growth of 
the welfare state (Fletcher, 1966). Thirdly, the Bremmer 
thesis has not only methodological flaws, but also its findings 
can also be strongly questioned. As argued by Titmus (1971) 
and Townsend (1968), social services promote healthy family life 
and prevent family breakups by alleviating gross social 
deprivations. Other studies (Middleton, 1971, 30; Wilmont 
and Young, 1960) confirmed such findings. M. Bremmer used 
Haggerstorm’s (1964) work to argue that social services lead 
to dependency and hence poverty. A closer look at Haggerstorm’s 
work shows that he in fact argued the opposite, namely that it 
was poverty that promoted dependency and the poor can break out 
of their dependency only by pressing for social reforms.
Fourthly, Titmus (1971) and Townsend (1968) provide a number of 
arguments and evidence in favour of public social services:
1) a combination of private welfare for the affluent and 
public welfare just for low income persons usually entails 
low status and inferior services for the latter, and so 
reinforces their functioning at the bottom of society;
2) extensive public services such as health and education 
offer a more evenly spread resource to all the nation, and
3) state services are not necessarily less efficient than 
private.services.
Finally, especially in many Third World countries, the 
distinction between private and public enterprise may be a 
false one, in that despite the higher costs and inefficiency of
the public services, these may be preferred because while
actually benefiting the rich in society, these provide an 
impression of public ownership and control.
To sum up, the available bourgeois explanations of poverty are
inadequate for a number of reasons. Firstly, some of these 
have no scientific basis at all. In fact, these could be 
accused of serving as ideology for perpetuating poverty and 
inequality. For example, apportioning blame on the poor for 
their state of affairs easily justifies (a) the simultaneous 
existence of wealth and poverty, and (b) study of poverty in 
complete abstraction from affluence. Secondly, some of the 
explanations are merely detailed descriptions of poverty and 
poor peoples’ behavioural pattern, but as explanations, these 
have very little to offer. Thirdly, most explanations avoid 
the fundamental causes of poverty and instead concentrate on 
the causes which perpetuate poverty once it already exists. 
Finally, these are specific to Western experience, where there
is relative poverty but little of the absolute poverty known in 
Third World countries. In the light of the above, it is 
essential to propose an alternative analytic framework. This 
we take up in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE STATE OF POVERTY STUDIES IN BANGLADESH
In Chapter 1 we examined three aspects of poverty (i0eo definition, 
measurement, and explanation) in general0 In this chapter we propose 
critically to evaluate poverty studies in the specific context of 
Bangladesho In so doing, three periodsare covered, namely the colonial 
period ending in 1947, the Pakistan period between 1947 and 1971, and 
the post-independence period commencing from 1972o
I0 Poverty Studies during the Colonial Period
;1) Measurement of Poverty
For the colonial period, a major source of empirical evidence
on the incidence of poverty in Bangladesh are the various
. "t-government documents, such as District and Imperial Gazeteers, 
Annual Administration Reports, Decennial Census Reports, 
District Settlement Reports, Famine Commission Reports, etcQ 
These were the outcome of official surveys, tour reports, and 
personal impressions of colonial officials and deliberation of 
Government-constituted commissions„ The official surveys were
conducted mainly in connection with decennial censuses and the 
preparation of Gazetteers and Annual Administrative Reports0 
Often, surveys on socio-economic conditions were combined with 
Settlement Operations (i0e0 preparation of a record-of-rights 
relating to land, through plot-by-plot survey) <> The actual 
data collection was done by junior officials of the Revenue 
Department (but during censuses the village police and gentry 
were also involved), while overall supervision, compilation and 
report writing were the responsibilities of the District
Officers/Settlement Officers, often members of the Indian Civil 
Service0 There were a number of compulsions behind all 
statistical exercises during the colonial periodo Firstly, for 
a region as vast as India, effective administration could be 
carried out by a small minority of Europeans only if the 
essential characteristics of the subject people were known with 
some degree of accuracyQ Secondly, as Choudhury, SoBo (1964, 
172) suggests, a feeling of confidence had to be inspired and 
a certain degree of knowledge of the Indian scene had to be 
diffused before British capital could flow and operate in IndiaQ 
Thirdly, as the nationalist stance of^British rule gained 
ground, it became necessary to counter statistics with 
statisticsQ Thus Jack (1916, 6) wrote: "That (i0e0 British)
rule has been much attacked of late on the economic side0„„°
This book will not be written in vain if it proves that, in one 
corner of india at least, no such charge can be laid against the 
British Empire"„ Finally, the civilians of British India were 
perhaps some of the best-educated people available at that time» 
They had at their disposal adequate spare time, given the 
prevailing slow pace of administrationD These, combined with 
their commitment to the "glory of the Empire" and "civilising 
mission" in India, detachment and enormous power and prestige, 
produced the perfect conditions for undertaking such worke 
(For details on the mental make-up and life-style of British 
civilians in India, see Woodruff, 19540)
Despite their methodological crudeness (in comparison with the
sophisticated techniques of more recent times, which we have 
presented
'jin the opening chapter), poor theoretical underpinnings, and
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sometimes openly propagandist stance,* these official reports 
and statistics nevertheless constitute the only available 
basis for an understanding on the inter-temporal cha-nges in the 
poverty situation m  the country during the colonial periodo 
As an example of what these are worth, the poverty profile 
for Jessore (i.e„ the District in which our study village is 
located) between the last part of the nineteenth and first
oh.quarter of the twentieth century is drawn below 'the basis of 
these materialso
As may be seen from the above tables, the rural population in 
each case has been divided into four categories of economic 
condition.. Comparisons are difficult because these are 
subjectively derived. However, in the case of Jessore 
(Tables 1 and 3) these subjective categories are combined with
For example (a) in 1888, the Commissioner of Dacca reported, "Looking 
at their needs, the peasantry in East Bengal are the most prosperous 
in the world" (GOB, 1888, 91); (b) The Bengal Report on the Material
Condition of the People 1890-91 concluded: "Judged from their own 
standpoint, the peasantry of Bengal are happy and prosperous" (GOI, 
1894a.j9); (c) The Third Decennial Moral and Material Progress Report
(1891-92) asserted: "Conditions of the peasantry from a material stand­
point is one of sufficiency, according to a standard that is gradually 
and continuously rising" (GOI, 1894frj427)<,
During this period no effort was made in political and academic circles 
to carry out any independent inquiry based on actual surveys to 
determine the leve£. of poverty and inequality for any region of the 
province., In fact, only one village study (conducted between 1942 
and 1946) was produced during such a long period (Mukherjee, 1971)0 
However, this was a general study and not particularly focused on 
rural poverty„ Thus where increasing and acute poverty in the 
countryside was postulated, the proof rested on one or more of the 
following: (a) quotations from "dissident" civilians, i„e. those 
officials disagreeing with the propaganda stance; (b) time series on 
average per capita income, calculated from official statistics on 
population and national income; (c) comparison of average per 
capita income with estimated expenditures of the lower classes and 
actual per capita jail expenditures; (d) indebted statistics quoted 
in official documents (for example, Azizul Haque,l938); (e) frequent 
occurrence of famine,, Thus such "unofficial" poverty estimates did 
not constitute any basic improvement over the official ones„
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TABLE 1 : Classification of Jessore Rural Households, 1921*
Category 
of economic 
condition
Average 
per capita 
annual net 
income and 
debt in 
rupees
Occupational
category
Number of 
households
Percentage 
of households
In comfort 8Q0OO: 
no deb t
Large land 
owners/money 
lenders/big 
merchants
235 15
Below
comfort 58*00: 
8o0Q as 
debt
Medium 
landowners, 
weavers, 
fishermen
552 32
Living from
hand-to-
mouth 50*00:
12o00
as debt
Small land- 555 
owners, other 
non-agricultural 
occupations
33
Starving 35*00: 
30*00 
as debt
Landless 
agricultural 
labourers, 
beggars, etc.
331 20
All
categories 54*00: 
15*00 
as debt
All
categories 1643 100
'Source: Momen (1925, 72), based on a sample of 58 villages comprising
1643 households and 10,019 persons, and spread over all the 
19 thanas of Jessore District*
TABLE 2 : Classification of Earidpur* Rural Households, 1906
Class Category of
economic
condition
Annual 
per capita 
net income
Percentage of 
households
Class I In comfort 60 49*5
Class II Below comfort 43 28*5
Class III Above want 34 18*0
Class IV In want 27 • 4*0 ....
All classes 100*00
Source: J*C* Jack (1916, 93)
*Faridpur is the district adjacent to Jessore*
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TABLE 3 : Classification of Rural Households of Jessore, 1888*
Class Category of Occupation Number of Percentage
economic
condition
households of
households
Class I Extremely 
well off
Large landowners 
(gantidars/lakhi 
raj dars)
155 19o42
Class II Fairly 
well off
Small and medium 
landowners, but 
engaged in 
agricultural wage 
labour, weavers, 
fishermen, etc*,
232 29 o01
Class III Well off Agricultural wage 
labourers, other 
agricultural 
occupations, e0g0 
cobblers, 
potters, etCo
365 450 19
Class IV Indigent Beggars, disabled 46 5.16
All classes All occupations 798 JOOoOO
*Source: Enquiry into the condition of the Lower Classes of People in 
Bengal, 1888, as quoted in O'Malley (1912, 856), based on 
statistics obtained under the personal supervision of 
Collector, Jessore District from nine large villages situated 
in different parts of the District*.
occupational and asset ownership characteristics, which make 
them more meaningful than the data in Table 2Q The income data 
in the three tables are of little use for comparisons and under­
standing of poverty firstly because relevant price figures are 
not known, and secondly because these describe the income 
situations of households whose economic condition have been, 
a priori, determined subjectively0 It may also be noted that 
the Faridpur figures show an exceptionally low level of poverty„ 
Whether this is the real picture, or is due to abnormally good 
harvests of the year of data collection, or because of extreme 
subjectivism, is difficult to discern*. Keeping these 
reservations in mind, the following tentative inferences may be 
drawn from the above tables:
a) the material condition of all categories except perhaps 
the top one, declined between 1888 and 1921;
b) the worst hit category, i.e0 Class IV, swelled over the 
years from 5 016 per cent of rural households in 1888 to 
20 per cent of the rural households in 1921;
c) compared to Faridpur, the material condition of the rural 
people in Jessore was far worse in the first quarter of the 
20th centuryo It may be mentioned here that this was 
despite the fact that per capita food availability in 
Jessore for the year 1921 was 10*, 17 maunds,* i0e„ 0o42 maunds 
above the year per capita requirement of 9o75 maunds, 
considered as normal and desirable by the Famine Commission 
of 1901o
* 1 maund = 80 lb (approx*,)
Extent of Indebtedness in Jessore
The 1888 Report on the Material Condition of Lower Classes in
Bengal mentions very little about rural indebtedness in JessoreQ
However, Momen (1925) provides the following information on rural
indebtedness in this district:
a) per capita debt and annual interest rate for borrowings in this 
district for 1921 were, respectively, Rupees 15 and 25 per cent, 
and this placed Jessore among the most indebted districts in 
Bengal at that time*, The very heavy burden of such indebtedness 
becomes apparent from the fact that this accounted for about one 
quarter of per capita net income and about one-sixth of per 
capita agricultural assets (i0eo 1*,5 acres of land, and 0o40th
of a plough/beast valued at Rupees 100o00) at that time;
b) in 1921, as much as 15 *,4 per cent of the total land was 
transferred,, Of this 14 per cent was due to extension of 
permanent leases, 1o02 per cent through voluntary sales and 
0o38 per cent through compulsory sales by order of the civil 
courts;
c) between 1890 and 1921, land mortgages doubled, sales increased 
by 40 per cent, and perpetual leases increased by 600 per cent;
d) indebtedness was the most important mechanism for 
differentiation: "Having no spare capital, the cultivator finds
himself stranded whenever there is a crop failure or a cattle 
epidemic*, He is, therefore, forced to borrow at high interest 
rates from the professional moneylendersQ And once in debt, he 
can never extricate himself, and finally becomes a landless 
labourer" (p073)o
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TABLE 4 : Agricultural Wages, 1909-1921
Year Money Wages* 
(rupees 
per day)
Price of Paddy 
(rupees per 
maund)
Paddy Equivalent 
of money wages 
in maunds and 
pounds
1909-10 0o50** 2.42 Qo206 (16.5)
1921 0o466*** 20 875 0o 162 (13.0)
ft
ft*
ft**
Generally included two meals over and above the money wageso
The wages of an ’’adult male coolie" have been taken as the 
equivalent of agricultural wages since the Hatter were paid 
mostly in kind (i0e0 one bundle of paddy for every 20 bundles 
cut) .
The great majority of them got employment for only six months 
in a yearQ The wage indicated above represents what they got 
daily during this period„
Source: O’Malley (1912, 83) and Momen (1925, 75)„
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TABLE 5 : Per Capita Annual Income of the Jessore
Agriculturist in 1921
Gross Income Rupees Annas Pies
Crop cultivation 
Fruits and vegetables 
Poultry and dairy 
Home industries
61
4
5 
2
12
15
0
0
11*) 
- )
Rupees 70**
Total Gross Income 
Expenses
Rents and cesses 
Labour wages 
Seed and manure 
Cattle and implements
5
9
14
4
9 
3 
11 
0
Total expenses 23 1 1 1
Net income 50
(53-
10
14-
0
1)
* Calculated on the basis of enquiries into 58 villages of the
district (covering 19 thanas) with a population of 10,019 persons0
** Based on per capita value of crop production for 19210
Source: Momen (1925, 69)„
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Even if the second estimate (i0e0 based on per capita value of
crop production) is taken as more accurate, the per capita net
income of the Jessore cultivator in 1921 was no more than Rupees 54=
In the same year, the average expenditures incurred by the
government for a convict were, respectively, Rupees 51 for food and
Rupees 9 for clothing and bedding, as against Rupees 40<>75 and
Rupees 6, respectively, in the above budget; in other words, the
average cultivator's economic condition was perhaps no better than 
that
than of a prisoner xn the gaolo
In 1872, the per capita net income and pel:, capita expenditure of 
an agriculturist (calcualted in the same manner as for 1921 
presented above) were, respectively, Rupees 12 and Rupees 10o8o 
However, in calculating the per capita net income for 1872, the 
yield/acre of various crops was considered as the same for both 
yearso But according to J, Westland (1874, viii), the yield/acre 
for paddy in 1872 was 27 maunds, as against 14 maunds in 1921Q As 
such, it can be safely concluded that in 1872, the average cultivator 
was far better off than he was in 19210 The budget does not 
include the annual interest on debt of Rupees 3 per headQ That 
included, the annual per capita expenditure comes to Rupees 53018, 
which is only Rupees 0o82 less than the per capita net income of 
Rupees 54o In real terms, this is a precarious situation, since 
the budget provides for only the barest minimum, and during a year 
of poor harvests (owing to flood, drought, etc*) even this budget 
would have to be further curtailedQ Momen concludes: "It is
evident that the ryot was quite affluent half a century ago, although 
his income is readily increasingooo0But it is his gross income which 
has increased and not net income, and the increase is more than
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TABLE 6 : Average Annual Budget of an Agricultural Family
C3 adults and 2 children), 1921
Rupees Annas
Paddy* 147 2
Salt 3 8
Fish, dal, vegetables 24 0
Tobacco** 6 0
Spices 5 0
Oil** 12 0
Gur (molasses) 6 0.
Kerosene oil 6 0
Clothes*** 28 0
Bedding 2 0
Utensils 2 0
Dwelling house 4 9
Births/deaths/marriages 4 8
Children tax 0 12
Total 250 14
Rupees 50o18 
per head)
* Paddy consumed by an individual has been taken to be 10125 seers 
per day, which is what was recommended by the Famine Commission, 
as the minimum amount required to keep a member of an agricultural 
family physically fito The price of paddy has been taken to be 
Rupees 20875 per maund.
** In this district this was essential as a prophylactic against
malaria0 Note also that nothing on account of medicines has been 
includedo
*** Does not include winter clothes0
Source: Momen (1925, 66)0
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counterbalanced by increase in the cost of living, increase in 
the cost of cultivation, decrease in productive power of the land 
and decrease in the area of land now available for cultivation by 
each family• o =, 0The vast majority who live from hand to mouth are 
hardly benefited by rise in the prices of food crops, as the 
benefit derived by selling a small quantity of crops at higher 
prices is more than compensated by general rise in the cost of 
living" (po69-70)o
TABLE 7 : Population of Jessore, 1872*— 1921 
Year____________________Total population
1872 1,451,507
1881 1,939,375
1891 1,888,827
1901 1,813,155
1911 1,743,371
1921 1,722,219
Source: Various Census Reports, G0Bo
The above figures show that following considerable population 
increase between 1872 and 1881, a steady decline set in between 
1881 and 19210 However, official documents explain this trend in 
terms of the extremely unhealthy climate and physical conditions of 
Jessore resulting in a preponderance of malarial deaths (in 1921,
80 per cent of the deaths in the district were caused by malaria) 
and high female mortality at childbirth, rather than as a direct 
outcome of povertyQ
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3) Explanation of Poverty
a) Official Explanation
There is considerable divergence in official documents over 
the explanation of rural poverty during the colonial eraQ 
Thus extravagance, lethargy, litigation mania among 
cultivators, and unhealthy natural conditions of Jessore 
resulting in the preponderance of malaria are considered as 
the main reasons for the cultivators1 poverty in some of the 
official documents (for example, O'Malley, 1912, 86-7)„ On 
the other hand, Momen (1925) strongly challenges these 
explanations: "He (the cultivator) is unfortunate, but not 
extravaganto Possibly, when the crops are good and he gets
some ready money in hand, he is inclined to spend some money 
on an umbrella, a lantern, a coat, a good sari for his wife 
and some fish0 This, however, we can hardly call extra­
vagance a An umbrella is necessary to keep him comfortable 
during the rainy season, the lantern protects him from snake 
bite, and the sari brings a smile to the face of the hard- 
worked wife, which even a cultivator may be excused to long 
for and love to see. Nor is the cultivator litigious. He 
never goes to the court willingly unless he is driven to do 
so for the redress of some grievance,,.»„ .or to defend himself 
against the oppression of his landlord, w^en it becomes 
unbearable. It is only the half-eduCated upper class among 
the cultivators and the middlemen tenure holders who frequent 
the law courts" (p.70). According to Momen, the people were 
not innately lazy either, but "..„.stricken by malaria, have 
lost their physical vigour and energy and are incapable of 
hard work in the field or at home. Under normal conditions,
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the district could produce double as much crops as it now 
produces0 During the malarial season, there is such an 
epidemic of the disease among the people that it it a wonder 
how the cultivators at all manage to get their lands 
cultivated and sown. There is a dearth of labour everywhere, 
and the lands do not get proper treatment0 A lot of land 
lies fallow, and those that are cultivated do not yield full 
crops11 (p021)0 However, Momen did not consider malaria as 
the primary cause of poverty: "I have heard officers and
others who came to the district blame the poor villagers for 
being lazy and not making their surroundings sanitary by 
clearing jungle and digging wells to supply good water0 
They, however, forget that owing to poverty and disease these 
villagers are reduced to a state of callous inactivity, which 
renders them incapable of even nominal exertion" (p02Q)0 
And elsewhere: "QQDoNamasudras and others who cultivate
lands in the beels get bumper crops, are well fed and have 
greater resisting power against attacks of malariaa„ooln 
the course of settlement operations, not a single officer of 
the Settlement Department and very few Kanungos suffered 
from repeated attacks of malaria, whereas among the menials 
very few escaped0 In the town of Jessore, very few adult 
Bhadraloks have got enlargement of the spleen and liver, 
whereas, among the poor classes it is an exception to find a 
man without an enlarged liver and spleenD Malaria has been 
causing havoc because of the poverty of the people0 But for 
their poverty, the people could easily resist the germs of 
malaria from working into their system" (ppo20-l)o However, 
although Momen was able to dispel sqme of the "colonial"
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explanations of poverty, he failed to offer any alternative 
thesis for the growing poverty trend in the District over 
time which he so clearly brought out in his reporto
Another important official explanation was due to FoLo Brayne 
(1931). According to him, rural poverty in India was 
because of (a) "ignorance", and (b) "bad habits" of the 
villagerso He, in fact, identified 50 "ignorances” and 
50 "bad habits" of Indian villagers to prove his point0 
Other explanations offered by the colonial bureaucracy were 
over-population, an enervating and unpredictable climate, 
fatalism, usurious money lending, etcQ (Curzon, 1904, 149 
and 160; Dufferin, 1899, 240). Some of these were also 
echoed by Indian academics (for example, Vakil, 1933, 21-2)„ 
As was argued in Chapter 1, some of the factors identified 
in these "explanation^ were merely manifestations of 
povertya More importantly, since these explanations were 
devoid of any reference to the existing property relations 
internally and colonial relations externally, despite their 
limited validity, these served more as "ideology" in the 
service of colonial rule than as concrete explanation of
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Bengal’s rural poverty„ Also, these were not back-up by any 
serious empirical work, so that their value was no more than 
that of "common sense" and impressions gathered in the course 
of limited and uninvolved contact with Bengal’s countryside. 
Finally, these could not explain the relative poverty among 
the Indian people0
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b) Nationalist Explanation
The nationalists obviously contested the colonial 
explanations (for details, see Chandra, 1966, Chol)o 
However, like the officials, they rarely backed up their 
rebuttals by independent and concrete investigations„ In 
their opinion, the main cause of India's poverty was the 
systematic and unilateral transfer of resources from India 
to Britain through various mechanisms» Propounded first by 
Naoroji in 1867 (Naoroji, 1887, 1901) this came to be known 
as the "Drain Theory" <, The main theme of this thesis was 
that as a consequence of the drain, not only did capital 
accumulation face formidable obstacles in India, but also 
India became an easy prey to foreign capital0 This 
position was soon to be adopted by the nationalist movement., 
Thus, writing in Young India in 1928, Gandhi asserted:
"The trade, the military, the currency, the railway and the 
revenue policy of the foreign government are directed 
deliberately to promote an exploitation such as the world has 
never witnessed,, Poverty of India will never be removed so 
long as this exploitation continues unabatedo He, therefore 
who would explore the remedies for removing poverty, has to 
tackle first the question of stopping the continuous drain" 
(quoted in Vakil, 1933, 23)„ While such an explanation was 
well argued and documented, it was inadequate in several ways 
Firstly, it generally avoided the manner in which foreign 
drain was inextricably linked with internal urban and rural 
class interestsQ Thus, R0C0 Dutt (1901, iv-) duly recognised 
the deleterious effects of the drain, but failed to link the
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Zemindari system in Bengal with foreign drain0 Secondly, 
the drain mechanisms were not fully identified: they
generally restricted themselves to visible mechanisms and 
did not raise, for example, the question of "unequal 
exchange"o Thirdly, they failed to locate the economic 
compulsions in the mother country and the world economy in 
favour of the drainc These issues are particularly 
important because the implication of the nationalist 
explanation was that once India attained political 
independence, such drain would cease hence the poverty
caused by it would be eradicated,, But subsequent evidence 
has shown that poverty has continued to increase in the 
entire South Asian region, despite the political independence 
granted in India and Pakistan in 1947o
It is in the context of such inadequacies that R.P„ Dutt's 
work, India Today (1947) deserves particular mention.
Drawing upon Lenin’s Imperialism (1970), Dutt showed clearly 
(a) the varying mechanisms of India's drain as commercial 
capital in Britain was transformed into industrial and 
finance capital, and (b) how such drain helped and was being 
helped by indigenous urban and rural propertied classes,,
The implication was clear: unless the present correlation
of power and property was drastically, reorganised, the drain 
could continue even after formal political independence,,
However, the Dutt analysis is not without its weaknesses„ 
Firstly, he did not take into account, dealing as he was with 
the sub-continent as one entity, uneven development before 
and under British rule, and hence the consequences and
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possibilities of one regionTs development at the expense of 
the othero East Bengal, later to be known as East Pakistan 
between 1947 and 1971 and Bangladesh since 1972, is a case 
in point in this regardo Thus, apart from external drain, 
this region suffered from its hinterland position vis-a-vis 
Calcutta-based commercial and industrial development 
throughout British ruleQ Also, owing to expediencies of 
colonial rule, Bengal as a whole was economically and 
administratively discriminated against, whereas the opposite 
was true for certain provinces (for example, the Punjab) 
(Yunus, 1976)Q Secondly, like the nationalists, DuttTs 
substantiation is based entirely on secondary source 
materialso It is, no doubt, a Marxist analysis of India1s 
economy in general and her poverty in particular, but devoid 
of any concrete class analysis of Indian society! Thirdly, 
he may have displayed a certain amount of economic determinism 
in that he avoided any discussion of the specific impacts of 
religion, caste, and other superstructural factors on Indian 
poverty0 In short, Dutt's work, despite its significant
contribution, suffers from the shortcomings of over­
generalisations obtained through piecing together available 
secondary
evidence,, It was not, therefore, particularly helpful in 
explaining the specif icities of Bengal’s rural poverty,, It is 
hoped that the present study identifies such specificities and 
contributes to their explanation,,
IIo Poverty Study During the Pakistan Period 
1„ Measurement of Poverty
During this period, the quality of traditional government
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documents on rural Bangladesh sharply declined., Thus, for 
example, the District Gazetteers brought out by the East 
Pakistan Government in the 1950s and 1960s generally lacked 
rigour and in some cases, were no more than banal plagiarism 
of Gazetteers produced during the colonial period, Similarly, 
owing to the slow pace of the revisional land settlement survey 
operations, very few settlement reports were compiled after 
1947, and in any case these, unlike the colonial reports, have 
little to offer on rural poverty, As such, these were of no 
use in estimating the extent of poverty in rural Bangladesh 
during the period under studya
However, beginning in 1959, the Central Statistical Office of 
Pakistan started household income-expenditure surveys in 
Bangladesho Called National Sample Surveys, these were 
discontinued in 1961Q They were confined to rural areas
and only a tiny fraction of the rural population was covered 
in the sample0
As a result, although these surveys paved the way for future 
attempts, no confidence can be placed in their results. The 
next round of surveys began in 1963-64, when several breaks were 
made with the past. First, both rural and urban areas were 
included in the survey; second, the relative sample sizes of 
rural and urban areas were to be chosen in such a manner that 
the combined figures for the country as a whole were to be self- 
weighted, Thirdly, the sampling fraction was much larger than 
in the earlier rounds of NSS, The sample chosen for each year 
was to be divided into four groups, one group to be covered
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fully in each quarter of the year. Accordingly, these were 
called Quarterly Surveys of Current Economic Conditions (QSOCEC)0 
There were no complete surveys for 1965-660 From 1966-67 up to 
the break-up of Pakistan in 1971, surveys were carried out for 
every single year0 But full results of the survey for the 
area now called Bangladesh were published for only 1966-67Q 
Thu: s, for the Pakistan period, complete income-expenditure data 
for Bangladesh are available for only two years, 1963-64 and 
1966-670 As Bergan (1967) pointed out, the 1963-64 data had a 
number of serious shortcomings„ The 1966-67 data were slightly 
better, in the sense that non-response bias was minimal and 
also definition of income was revised to bring it into close 
conformity with the theoretical concept„ On the whole, the 
expenditure data were more reliable than the income data (see 
Osmani, 1978 for details). However, except for Bergan (1967), 
no one used these data during the Pakistan period in order to 
determine the level of inequality and poverty in Bangladesh„
But even the Bergan study was confined to only one year, i0e0 
1963-64o As such, it was of use only for inter-sectoral, but 
not inter-temporal comparisons0 Thus, despite the surveys 
during the Pakistan period, very little progress was made at 
that time in the direction of poverty measurement based on these 
survey dataQ
Besides Bergan1s inequality measurement for 1963-64, only three 
more studies relating to poverty measurement may be cited for 
this period: Khadija Huq (1965), Khan (1967), and Bose (1968).
Khadija Huq examined the income distribution of only that 
section of the urban population which was liable to pay income
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taxa The limitation of this study is obvious, since in 
Bangladesh the only people who are liable to pay direct taxes 
are the upper and middle income groups„ KhanTs study was 
partial in that he restricted his investigation to movement in 
real income of only industrial workers,, The main focus of 
Bose’s study was the level of living of the poorest section of 
rural Bangladesh (i„e. agricultural wage labourers) for the 
period 1949/50-1963/64. But in the process he also analysed 
the movement in the per capita income of rural and urban sectors 
as well as of Bangladesh as a whole for the same period0 
According to Bose’s study, (a) real agricultural wages remained 
below the 1949 level through the 1950s and rose above the 1949 
level for only a few years during the 1960s, and (b) per capita 
rural income declined, but per capita urban income steadily 
increased during this period, clearly indicating widening 
urban-rural disparity0 Khan, on the other hand, found that
during the period 1954-63, real wages of industrial workers fell 
sharply at the beginning, and although they picked up subsequently, 
they were still below the 1954 level at the end of the periodo 
The main trend emerging from these two studies, i0e„ declining 
economic wellbeing of urban and rural poor, as we shall soon see, 
fits in very well with the findings of poverty studies on this 
period carried out after Bangladesh's independence,,
2) Explanation of Poverty
s
As in the area of poverty me asurement, this period witnessed 
very little organised study on the explanation of poverty in 
Bangladesh,, However, at different times, government documents 
as well as independent academic work tried to locate the causes 
behind the poor economic performance of Bangladesh as a whole„
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The more important among these are (a) natural disasters like 
floods and cyclones; (b) transfer of resources to India through 
smuggling and other illegal means, and to West Pakistan through 
various deliberate discriminating policies of the Central 
Government, and (c) high population growth rate. Below we 
examine the validity of the first two explanations, since these 
are specific to Bangladesh and were not covered in Chapter 1.
We shall take up the issue of high population growth rate in 
a subsequent chapter.
Natural Disasters
A 1954 government document commented: "....the above picture
gives us some idea of the precarious and hand-to-mouth life of 
about 96 per cent of the people of the Province. The grimness 
of the life of these people is further aggravated by the 
incidence of storms and floods which frequently visit the 
Province" (GOEB, 1954, 2). This kind of official explanation 
continued throughout the Pakistan period, and one has only to go 
through official reports (for example, GOEP, 1969, 2 and GOEP, 
1970, 1) and parliamentary records of the relevant period for 
numerous instances of such explanation being handed out by the 
government of the day whenever Bangladesh's poor economic 
condition had to be accounted for. However, this particular 
explanation did not cease with Bangladesh's independence.
Thus the Awami League government blamed floods exclusively for 
the 1974 famine. Similarly, the Bangladesh Government's 
recent Two-Year Plan described Bangladesh as a "disaster'prone 
economy" (GOBD, M78*L9). Generally, the aid-giving agencies
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also take a similar view. A 1974 USAID report commented: 
"Natural disasters make it extremely difficult for both, 
government and donors to move from relief to a development 
strategy" (USAID, 1974, 15).
Between 1960 and 1971, there were nine major cyclones, and 
tornadoes and six major floods in Bangladesh, causing about 
250,000 deaths and loss of crops worth Tk.2,530 million (this, 
excludes crop losses due to 1970 cyclones for which, no figures 
are available) (Faruque, 1974, 27). Therefore, apparently, 
there is considerable empirical support behind the "natural 
disaster" hypothesis. However, such a hypothesis needs to be 
treated with the greatest of care. Firstly, natural disasters 
are not phenomena beyond human control and manipulation. Thus, 
as early as 1956, the Krugg Commission set up by the United 
Front Government in East Pakistan reported that floods in the 
Province could easily be controlled through carefully planned 
dredging, water conservancy and dam constructions (Saralananda 
Sen, 1971, 75). Also, the Chinese experience in flood control 
clearly demonstrates that it is quite feasible to tame rivers 
in the delta region through mainly labour-intensive technology. 
Therefore, the pertinent question to raise is: Under what
socio-economic and socio-political conditions does a population 
successfully cope/fail to handle natural disasters, rather- 
than taking these as given and uncontrollable? Secondly, 
natural disasters can, at the most, explain an extreme situation 
in a particular region at a given point in time, but not the 
overall secular trends in the economy. This is well illustrated
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by the fact that there are marked differences in the capacities 
of various classes in the society to cope with natural 
disasters. However, given a poverty situation, natural 
disasters can and do aggravate it in several ways. Finally, 
according to Griffin’s (1979) estimation, cyclical instability 
in food supplies owing to natural disasters is only 6.5 per 
cent for Bangladesh, and this is lower than the corresponding 
figures of several Asian countries. As such, the harmful 
effect of natural disasters on the Bangladesh economy may not 
be as high as it might appear at first sight.
Unilateral Transfer of Resources
The 1954 government report cited above has the following to 
note on resource transfer to India after the 1947 Partition: 
"The^Ci.e. Hindu merchants) had monopolised the wholesale and 
retail distribution of consumer goods and were solely operating 
the primary and assembling markets of agricultural produce.
The community of merchants has continued to smuggle its capital 
from the Province into India by illegal means, and has therefore 
also created a very high demand for Indian currency, upsetting the 
ratio of foreign exchange, to the great detriment of the economy 
of the country" (p.5). And elsewhere: "The prices in East
Bengal have, however, remained obstinately high, particularly 
for goods of Indian origin. One of the contributory causes of 
this has been the control of a large amount of Pakistani 
currency by local Hindu merchants, which they want to convert 
into Indian currency at any cost. The goods thus obtained 
from India are highly over-invoiced and upset the price mechanics 
of the Province basically" (p.5). According to a detailed 
study by A. Sadeque (1954, 23-4 and 31), the main sources of
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Hindu evacuee capital were income of Hindu (especially jute) 
traders, sale proceeds of Hindu real estate property and Hindu 
zeminders1 rent and lease values. He estimated that on 
average, such transfers amounted to Tk.380 million per year 
between 1948/49 and 1952/53, and which meant about 6 per cent 
of the yearly Provincial GNP during that period.
As Bangladesh (then known as East Pakistan) moved into the
1960s, resource transfer to West Pakistan (as distinct from
transfer
resource, to India) became the m a m  theme around which 
Bangladesh’s poor economic performance vis-a-vis that of West 
Pakistan began to be explained. Initially, the Central 
Government was reluctant to admit even the existence of inter­
wing disparity. However, as the autonomy movement gathered 
momentum in East Pakistan, and findings of noted foreign and 
Bengali economists found their way into the popular press, 
the "disparity thesis" could no longer be ignored by the 
government, and ultimately found its place in the Pakistan 
Fourth Five-Year Plan (1970-75) document (GOP, 1970). The 
disparity literature is quite impressive in volume, especially 
when newspaper articles, booklets and pamphlets brought out 
before and during the 1971 liberation war, are also taken into 
account. Of these, the more noted ones are: Ansur Rahman
(1968), Rehman Sobhan (1969), Mahbubul Haq (1963), Akhlaqur. 
Rahman (1970), Arjun Sengupta (1971), Papanek (1967), Auspitz, 
Marglin and Papanek (1971), Lewis (1970), Power (1963), and 
Desai (1971).
Basically three main elements emerge out of the disparity 
literature quoted above. First, over the years, economic
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disparity between East and West Pakistan, as expressed through 
r« -al wages, per capita income, growth rate in GDP, performance 
of individual sectors of the economy, etc., widened sharply. 
Second, this became possible mainly because of deliberate 
discriminatory policies pursued by the Central Government in 
respect of allocation of development expenditure, foreign 
exchange and foreign aid, distribution of import licences, 
location of industrial investment, etc., and through under- 
pricing of East Pakistan's agricultural products. Thirdly, 
as a consequence, trade, industry and governmental power became 
monopolised by West Pakistan, and Bangladesh became an 
"internal" colony, that is supplying cheap raw materials and 
foreign exchange for West Pakistan-based development and 
acting as a captive market, absorbing products of West 
Pakistani industries at prices several times higher than world 
market prices. According to one estimate (Desai, 1971), 
transfer of resources from East Bengal to West Pakistan during 
the period 1950/51-1964/65 was as follows.
TABLE 8 : Transfer of Resources from East Bengal to West Pakistan 
1950/51-1964/65
in million Rupees
1950/51
1954/55
1955/56
1959/60
1960/61 
1964-/ 6S
Income on:
Exchange earning 636 533 62
Inter-wing trade surplus 81 142 212
Industrial investment 16 31 73
Total 733 706 437
Proportion of East Bengal’s
GNP (per cent) 7.3 5.4 1.9
Source: Desai (1971, 1038).
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However, the above table excludes (i) debt services borne by 
East Bengal for foreign aid spent in West Pakistan, and 
(ii) Central Government expenditure in West Pakistan out of 
revenues raised in East Bengal. The actual size of the drain 
must, therefore, have been considerably larger.
In the light of the above, the reality of massive resource 
drain from Bangladesh to India, especially during the post- 
Partition period, and to Pakistan throughout the period 1947—
71, cannot possibly be disputed. As such, external drain 
as an important cause of Bangladesh's continued poverty also 
appears as legitimate. However, the manner in which external 
resource transfer was analysed more or less repeated the 
"drain theory" used by the Indian nationalists during the pre- 
1947 independence struggle. Thus, as in the past, there was 
little effort in either political or academic circles to 
link external drain with "internal drain" caused by the existing 
socio-economic and socio-political structures in East Bengal's 
urban and rural sectors. In fact, during the entire Pakistan 
period, only three village studies were produced in Bangladesh 
(Beech, 1966; Bertocci, 1970, and Quadir, 1969), and none of 
these focused any attention on the poverty-perpetuating and 
-producing mechanisms in village society, and their urban and 
external prop s. Consequently, the entire disparity/drain 
thesis degenerated into an "ideology" in the service of first 
the Pakistani ruling class to hide its own resource transfer 
tentacles during the early years of Pakistani rule, and later 
of the Bengali rising bourgeoisie for its quick ascendancy to 
state power during the independence struggle.
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III. Poverty Study after Bangladeshis Independence 
1. Measurement, of Poverty
In this regard only four studies have so far been reported, by 
Khan (1976), Burki and Streeten (1978) based on Khan (1977), 
Osmani (1978) and by Alamgir (1978). The latter study also 
attempts to explain poverty, and will, therefore, be reviewed in 
a separate section. The main findings of Khan are presented in 
the table below.
TABLE 9a: Incidence of Rural Poverty in Bangladesh, 1963/64-75
(percentages)
Year Absolutely Poor* 
HH Persons
Extremely Poor** 
HH Persons
1963/64
1968/69
1975 (first 
quarter)
51.7 
84. 1
70.3
40.2
76.0
61.8
9.8
34.6
50.5
5.2
25.1
41.0
Source: Khan (1976, 15)
As may be seen from this table, (a) the proportion of extremely 
poor increased sharply and steadily throughout the period (five 
times between 1963/64 and 1975?»he found this trend quite consistent 
with the movement of real agricultural wages during this period), 
and (b) the proportion of absolute poor increased by more than a 
third between 1963/64 and 1975, although between 1968/69 and 
1975, this proportion declined. However, as the author admits
Per capita monthly income of Tk.23.61, corresponding to per 
capita calorie intake by the family of 1935 K.cals, i.e. 90 per cent 
of recommended intake.
Per capita monthly income of Tk. 17.02, corresponding to per capita 
calorie intake by the family of 1720 K.cals, i.e. 80 per cent of 
the recommended intake.
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the 1975 estimate is based on Household Expenditure Survey (HES) 
of only one quarter of 1975, and as such, "There is no way we 
can ascertain the possible direction of bias due to this 
factor". It is, therefore, quite possible to relate the 
observed decline in the proportion of absolute poor between 
1968/69 and 1975 with this shortcoming. Also, there is 
contradiction between his 1977 "basic needs" exercise (Khan,
1977) and his 1976 estimate of poverty in rural Bangladesh. In 
the 1977 paper he argued: "The FAO estimate of calorie
requirement for an average person in Bangladesh (based on weight, 
age and environmental temperature) is about 2150 per day. The 
requirement is much greater for households engaged in heavy 
physical labour. Typically, such families are located in the 
lower range of the income scale. To determine the basic need 
level of calorie intake, we must estimate the requirements of 
the lowest income groups" (p.82). Accordingly, he took per 
capita calorie consumption of 2500 per day as the basic need for 
Bangaldesh. On the other hand, in the 1976 paper, he defined 
his poverty lines in relation to the above-mentioned FAO 
recommended minimum calorie need for Bangladesh. The poverty 
profile presented in the above table may, therefore, have failed 
to capture that section of the poor working people with calorie 
intake between 2150 and 2500. To the extent that among the rural 
poor there are far more working than non-working people 
(especially given the widespread use of female and child labour 
in poor families), Table 6 figures may also have underestimated 
the actual poverty situation.
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Based largely on Khan's basic needs quantification exercise, 
Streeten and Burki came up with the following rough estimate of 
the "short fall population" in Bangladesh in relation to "core" 
basic needs.
TABLE 1:0 : Estimate of Short Fall Population (i.e. in Poverty) 
in Bangladesh
Item Short Fall Population (percentage)
Food:
Calorie >50
Protein >60
Clothing 20-25
Safe drinking water 40-45
Shelter >50
Source: Streeten and Burki (1978, 419)
They concluded as follows: "If the basic needs targets were
to be met in the next ten years, within the present structures, 
this would imply an 8 per cent rate of real growth in the 
average incomes of the absolute poor. Meeting the target over 
a period of 25 years implies a real growth in personal incomes 
of the absolute poor at the rate of 3.1 per cent per annum.
Such high rates of growth in incomes do not seem possible without 
a fundamental change in development policies" (p.419). However, 
they failed to explain how fundamental changes were to be brought 
about in development policies within the present structures!
Osmani’s study is confined to only the first two years, i.e. 
1963/64 and 1968/69 and is also based on the government income- 
expenditure survey data used by Khan. In addition to 
constructing several poverty lines and estimating therefrom the
proportion in poverty, he also calculated the degree of 
inequality for the two years, and covered both rural and urban 
sectors. Although he developed more sophisticated estimation 
methods,* his conclusion was similar to that of Khan, i.e. 
increasing rural poverty and inequality between 1963/64 and 
1968/69. Neither Khan nor Osmani made any attempt at explaining 
the poverty, trends they obtained, although in a later article 
with Griffin (1978), Khan wrote in the context of Third World 
poverty: "Our empirical work has demonstrated that poverty is
associated with particular classes or groups in the community, 
e.g. landless agricultural labourers, village artisans,
plantation workers, etc We do not believe it is possible to
get very far in understanding the problems of the Third World 
until it is more widely accepted that there are classes in 
society and that the interests of the various classes often are 
in conflict" (p.302). And elsewhere: "Perhaps it would be
better, however, to work with a structural definition of poverty, 
in which poverty is regarded as a product o.f a social system and 
reflects differences in access of various groups to sources of 
economic and political power" (p.303).
b) Explanation of Poverty
The only three studies in this direction are due to Alamgir (1978), 
Griffin (1979), and Arens and Beurden (1977). Published under 
the title, Bangladesh: A Case of Below Poverty Equilibrium Trap,
He measures inequality through the use of modified Gini coefficients 
in order to be sensitive to price variations. His poverty line is 
defined as the minimum income at which a person does rather than can 
satisfy the minimum nutritional requirements.
Alamgir!s book is divided into seven chapters. In the first
chapter he expounds his main thesis: the majority in Bangladesh
are caught up in a below-poverty equilibrium trap, which lies
between the poverty and the famine lines, and that although this
state of affairs is caused by the dominant groups in the society,
they and their international backers are quite sensitive to any
significant fall-out beyond the famine line, owing to fear of
violent reaction from the affected majority. In Chapters II
and III he presents empirical evidence on real per capita income,
real wages, extent of inequality, polarisation and pauperisation.
His figures for 1973/74 are derived from BIDS survey data, while
those for the 1960s are estimates from the government income-
expenditure data used by Khan and Osmani. The main trends
emerging from his estimates are (a) the proportion below the 
poverty
line declined between the early and the late sixties, but 
(b) between the late 1960s and 1973/74, there was a clear 
decline in the wellbeing of the majority of people. A number 
of issues need to be raised at this point. Firstly, as Osmani 
(1978, 135) correctly points out, the poverty indices proposed 
by him (i.e. GI and IIP) are illegitimate in that in developing 
these hybrid measures, he performed ratio scale operations on 
ordinate measures (i.e. Gini coefficient, Sen’s Poverty Index, 
etc.), which are appropriate only for specific contexts, so that 
when combined with other indices these are rendered meaningless. 
Secondly, his finding that poverty in Bangladesh declined between 
the early and late 1960s is hardly acceptable in view of the 
exactly opposite findings by Khan (.1976), Mujahid (1977) and 
Osmani (1978). As Mujahid and Osmani point out, Alamgir’s
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unique finding may have stemmed from one or more of the 
following:
a) he did not adjust inter-household income distribution 
with household size;
b) the optimal pattern of nutrients intake defined by 
Alamgir deviated much more severely in 1968/69 than 
in 1963/64, and
c) AlamgirTs price index wasvrnarrowly based: the consumption 
pattern of only agricultural labourers was taken into 
account and also the commodity list covered only a few 
items.
More important, his finding that poverty declined between 
1963/64 and 1968/69 falls flat on his central thesis that 
dominant groups are constantly pushing more and more people below 
the poverty line. In fact, throughout the book, he provides no 
explanation for this serious contradiction. Thirdly, incredible 
as it might sound, the entire evidence on polarisation and 
pauperisation refer to a single point in time, namely 1973/74, 
and are not based on inter-temporal comparisons.
His weakest chapters are IV and V, i.e. where he attempts to 
explain Bangladesh's poverty. The main theme of Chapter IV 
is as follows: (a) there have been so far four dominant modes
of production, i.e. primitive communal, feudal, feudal-colonial 
and semi-feudal semi-colonial; (b) under each of these society 
was divided into three classes, A, B and C. Members of A 
experienced increasing welfare in each epoch, members of B 
suffered decreasing welfare, and those in C did not undergo any 
consistent upward or downward movement, and (c) these social
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groupings were caused by "internal dialectics" of class 
configuration (p.43). As is evident, his modes are too 
general and neat (as if taken out of an introductory Marxist 
political economy text) and hardly situated in the concrete 
conditions of South Asia, and least of all related to Bengal0 
Thus, there are no explanations or specific evidence on the 
following:
i) the transition of primitive-communal mode to feudalism,
by-passing slavery;
ii) the specificities of Indian feudalism (thus, there is
not even a passing reference to the Asiatic mode), and
iii) the actual mechanisms of production, distribution and
exchange, within a given mode, and of transition from 
one mode to another, and their implications for poverty 
(his "internal dialectics" argument for explaining the 
three classes is no more than tautology, because 
dialectics can generate more than one outcome, so that 
unless specified, any historical set of facts could refute 
or confirm this "theoretical construct"),,
In fact9 at the existing level of knowledge of South Asia’s 
economic history, especially beyond the British period, Alamgir’s 
innumerable "authoritative" but unsubstantiated assertions 
throughout the chapter appear highly embarrassing„ Unfortunately, 
he continues with this practice, even when discussing presentday 
Bangladesh society and economy„ To give one typical example, 
at p084 he suddenly comes up with a remarkable (but none the 
less key) assertion that in Bangladesh, the comprador and the 
national bourgeoisie are represented in the state machinery by 
the civil and the military bureaucracy respectively, but does
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not back it up by any empirical evidence. Indeed, such 
substitution of empirical work by wholesale hypothesising has 
greatly devalued the academic content of this book0 There are 
also serious lapses and confusions in Chapter IVQ Thus he 
leaves out, for whatever unknown reasons, middle and rich 
peasants from his analysis of the presentday Bangladesh society!
He does not either seem sure whether to accept Mao or A„G„ Frank 
on the concept of the "national bourgeoisie^
His Chapter V is entitled "Laws of Motion in the Bangladesh 
Society", but as one quickly finds out, what he actually 
discusses are mostly no more than manifestations of poverty, 
and as such could have been easily fitted into Chapter IIIo But 
once again, since based on the data of a single year (i°e. 1973/74) 
these are quite meaningless even as manifestations of increasing 
poverty,, In the section on urban domination, he displays grave 
inconsistency in that he completely breaks with his earlier 
zealous involvement with "class" and settles for urban-rural 
disparity, transcending its underlying class dimension, in 
explaining the growing rural poverty in Bangladesh,,
In Chapter VI he provides an evaluation of state economic goals 
and specific attempts since 1972, and clearly brings out their 
anti-poor bias. However, in so far as he recognises that 
poverty and inequality in Bangladesh are structural issues, his 
prescriptions to the government of the day for taking up certain 
measures again appear as highly contradictory„ To sum up, 
Alamgir?s poverty study is a case of dubious methodology, 
inconsistent findings and poor explanations„ It is also an 
application of Marxist framework of analysis with a free
interpretation of basic Marxist categories, so that in the 
process he ends up with no more than a few unsubstantiated 
"radical11 statements on Bangladesh1 s poverty0
Griffin’s article is basically an appraisal of the recent ILO 
poverty studies on a number of Asian countries (ILO, 1977), 
including Bangladesh. Through trend analysis of empirical 
evidence contained in these studies, he not only repudiates the 
earlier Ahluwalia (1978) finding that growth tends to reduce 
poverty (which, by implication, strengthens the "trickle down" 
hypothesis) but also effectively demonstrates that in general, 
growth and increased poverty go hand-in-hand in Asian countries0 
According to Griffin, there were three main causes behind this 
phenomenon (ioe0 what he also calls "immiserisation growth"): 
concentration of productive wealth, especially land, in a few 
hands, high degree of inequality in income distribution as a 
consequence, and control by a small segment of the population 
instruments of the state and the use of these to further their 
own economic interests0
While there is little to disagree with in such an explanation, 
it needs to be pointed out that it is not specific enough0 As 
Griffin himself showed, not all Asian countries studied fell 
under the category "growth-cum-inequality"„ Thus, Bangladesh
was one clear case of "stagnation combined with increasing 
inequality". On the other hand, Taiwan and South Korea seemed 
to manage growth and reduction of income inequality 
simultaneously. As such, inequality in economic and political 
power were a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
accentuating poverty in a country. For this to be a sufficient
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condition, it has also to be combined with a particularly 
perverse pattern of appropriation and on utilisation of the 
economic surplus (i.e0 actual income minus minimum subsistence 
requirements) by the predominant owners of productive wealth0 
On the other hand, there is a need to delineate the specific 
pattern of surplus appropriation and utilisation whereby even 
with significant inequalities in ownership of productive wealth 
and access to political power, a relatively better balance is 
achieved between income distribution and growth in some 
countries0 Also, it is necessary to have a hard look at the 
actual structure of per capita growth claimed for most of the 
Asian countries studied, in view of the many methodological/data 
collection gaps under Third World conditions? Thus, unless the 
specific appropriation and utilisation processes are clearly 
brought out, the sheer "inequality in productive assets" 
argument may not stand up to the counter-argument that 
redistribution of productive assets may amount to no more than 
"equal sharing of poverty"0 Finally, although Griffin correctly 
locates the special role of political power (i0e. state) in the 
analysis of poverty, he does not link it up, by way of concrete 
analysis (i0e0 based on empirical evidence) with either the under­
lying socio-economic structure or the international economic and 
political systems o Thus, for example, one cannot possibly explain 
the Taiwan and the South Korea phenomena without going into the 
cold war political environment of the 1950s and the particularly 
involved participation of the United States in their economic and 
political developmento
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Jhagrapur (Arens and Burden, 1977) is perhaps the first village 
study in Bangladesh from an explicitly Marxist framework, and 
its focus is basically on the processes within the village 
society which cause and maintain poverty in rural Bangladesh„ 
However, as a comprehensive poverty study, it suffers from a 
number of shortcomings. Firstly, owing to its heavy 
anthropological bias (and hence reliance mainly on participation- 
observation method), its quantitative analysis is very weak0 
Secondly, the authors do not spe.cij:y the criteria for selecting 
their villageo This is extremely important because for 
generalisations drawn from a single village study to be valid, 
the typicality of the selected village has necessarily to be 
ensuredo Thirdly, it lacks historical perspective, a prime 
requisite for proper application of Marxist categories0 On 
most issues, the study is confined to still shots of here and 
now, and its treatment of the transition process in rural society 
appears inadequate<, For example, the authors are unable to 
bring out the changes over time in crucial aspects like productive 
forces, production relations and differentiation among the 
peasantry, etcQ There is, of course, no doubt that given 
the general lack of any benchmark data, reconstruction of the 
past rural society is now a difficult proposition,. And yet, it 
could be argued that since the authors stayed in the village for 
more than a year, they could have generated a wealth of relevant 
data through memory recall and cross-examination of carefully 
selected informants. Since this is not a very satisfactory 
method, information obtained through this method could be 
checked against official documents like Settlement Reports,
Thak Survey and Revenue Survey village maps, rent rolls, 
village co-operative records, etcQ Finally, the authors 
fail to link the unit under study (i„ea the village Jhagrapur) 
with the external world. In Chapter 19 they list large land­
owners, big merchants, high government officials, members of 
the Awami League, etca, as the forces responsible for the 
poverty of the Bangladesh peasantry during Sheikh Mujib's rule. 
However, throughout the book, there is not even a fleeting 
mention of how these internal forces are linked with interests 
originating outside the formal national boundaries0 Given 
the continued colonial and neo-colonial relationship of 
Bangladesh vis-a-vis not only old and new metropolises, but also 
regional powers, it is crucially important to evaluate the 
contribution of external forces in shaping her internal class 
structure and resource mobilisation,, One would have expected, 
therefore, from this study an analysis of the implications of 
foreign aid, foreign trade (including smuggling), private foreign 
investment, and other overt and coverfc external economic and 
political relations, for the Bangladeshi peasantry in general, 
even if it could not be pinpointed in the specific context of 
Jhagrapur. On foreign aid, the stand taken by the authors 
seems to be: "Do not give aid to Bangladesh because it does
not reach the rural poor". The point is to understand why, 
despite this, aid is given and will continue to be given to 
Bangladesh under the existing correlation of internal forces„ 
However, despite these weaknesses, Jhagrapur stands out as a 
significant contribution to the understanding of rural poverty 
in Bangladesh.
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From the foregoing discussion on the state of poverty studies in 
Bangladesh, the following may be summed up0 Firstly, in general, so 
far poverty research efforts have been directed more towards measurement 
than explanation of poverty„ Secondly, these measurement exercises 
generally indicate an accentuation of poverty and inequality in 
Bangladesh over time, although there are considerable differences among 
these over magnitudes of poverty and inequality at different points in 
time, as also over poverty trend between the early and the late 1960s0 
These differences are attributable to differences in estimation 
techniques, choice of data, and assumptions made in the process of 
applying the estimation techniquesa By themselves, these studies serve 
little purpose, becauses there are not only silent on the "whys" of 
poverty, but also on "whoTs who" among the poor. Thirdly, the 
explanatory studies are characterised by unsound theoretical framework, 
weak empirical support, lack of emphasis on the historical perspective, 
failure to delineate the various levels of analysis, etc0
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CHAPTER THREE
THE SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OP 
THE PRESENT STUDY
As mentioned earlier, the main focus of this study is on explanation
. tain
of the processes which cause, aggravate and m a m  rural poverty m  
Bangladesho We noted in Chapter I that bourgeois explanations of poverty 
are grossly inadequate, and as such there is a need to postulate and test 
an alternative framework for analysing rural poverty in Bangladesho In 
Chapter II, the following were observed: (a) in recent years, the major
emphasis has been on measurement of poverty in Bangladesho Not that 
this is unimportanto But a country which is derided as an "international 
basket ftase" (Henry Kissinger, 1971, quoted in Gurtov, 1974, 186), 
"Malthusia" (Austin Robinson, 1974, 647), "test case for development" 
(Faaland and Parkinson, 1976), etcOJ or where stark poverty on a mass 
scale is apparent even to the naked eye, the need for explanation obviously 
takes precedence over the need for measurement. In any case, most of 
these measurement studies are based on extrapolation of government data 
and not on direct surveys carried out by the authors themselves0 However, 
the following two trends are apparent from these studies and other national 
level statistics (see Appendix E)0 Firstly, according to both relative 
and absolute poverty measures, there has been a clear increase in poverty 
in rural Bangladesh over:vtime0 Secondly, poverty has, been increasing 
within the context of general stagnation in the economy as expressed 
through movement of indices like per capita GDP, per capita food 
availability, per capita industrial production, etc0 over time (see also 
Griffin and Khan, 197S)0 (b) In general, this phenomenon has been left
largely unexplained, or where explanation has been attempted, a number 
of inadequacies were apparent0 Firstly, fundamental causes were left 
unexploredQ Secondly, the levels of explanation and their inter-
83
connection were not identified and delineated properly0 Thirdly, 
empirical evidence was not marshalled in support of explanation, iQe., 
theory was based on abstractions and not tested against empirical 
evidence. Finally, most explanations lacked any historical perspective.
In this study, an attempt will be made to explain rural poverty in 
Bangaldesh at three distinct levels:
a) forces within the rural society responsible for rural poverty;
b) forces within the urban sector responsible for rural poverty;
c) international dimensions of rural poverty in Bangladesh.
In delineating the forces within the rural society, the Marxist 
concepts of "mode of production” and "socio-economic formation" have 
been employed. A moderof.'production is an articulated combination of 
"relations of production" and "forces of production", structured generally 
by the domination of the former. The relations of production define the 
specific relations people enter into with one another in the course of 
production, distribution and exchange. In more concrete terms, these 
relate to (a) social distribution of the means of production; (b) surplus 
value* appropriation; (c) utilisation of surplus value. It is according 
to one's position vis a vis these three aspects that one's objective class 
position is determined in the society. In other words, it is on the 
basis of the above that the society is stratified into various classes, 
with distinct and conflicting interests.
Marx (1967<t?Vol.I, 171) defined surplus as the difference between 
current output and necessary product, the latter being the amount 
required for reproduction of labour power, but keeping in view the 
existing social norms. Baran Cl967, 42) on the other hand, defined 
actual surplus as the difference between actual current output and 
actual current consumption. It is thus smaller than Marx's surplus 
and consists of that part of Marx's surplus which is being accumul ated 
actually and does not include consumption by the rich, government 
spending on administration, military establishments, etc. Thus it is 
identical to conventiomKKeynesian) saving. Unless otherwise
specified, we have used Marx's concept of surplus throughout the texto
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The forces of production refer to the mode of appropriating Nature, 
that is, to the labour processes, in which a determinate raw material 
is transformed into a determinate product. The elementary factors of 
labour processes are (a) objects of work (e.g. land, forests, mines, etc.); 
(b) tools of work (e.g. plough, tractor, fertilisers, etc.), and (c) the 
personal activity of man, i.e. work itself (e.g. production knowledge, 
labour productivity, organisation of labour,jetc.). At a given point 
in time, a number of modes of production may be identified within a 
society, but then there is always a dominant mode of production.
A mode of production also gives rise to an appropriate superstructure, 
consisting of a combination of definite values and institutions in the 
religious, social, cultural, juridical and political spheres. Once formed 
the superstructure, in a limited sense, may attain some degree of autonomy 
and also reinforce the mode of production responsible for its creation.
In this regard, the role of the state deserves special mention0 The 
mode(s) of production together with the superstructure constitute the 
overall socio-economic formation,,
The productive forces are the most mobile elements in the mode- of 
production; these are continually changing since people are constantly 
improving the instruments of labour and accumulating production 
experience. So long as the relations of production correspond to the 
level of the productive forces, the latter develop uninterruptedly.
However, relations of production change at a much slower pace, and these 
after a time inevitably become a fetter on the further growth of production 
and productive forces9 resulting in anarchy and stagnation in the economy. 
At the political level, this contradiction between productive forces and 
production relations manifests itself in antagonistic class relations, 
culminating in more naked interventions by the state to maintain the
status quo in production relations. In other words, in such situations, 
the state, in the service of the ruling classes, may attempt changes in 
productive forces, but little or no change in production relations.
To sump up, delineation of the forces within the rural society 
responsible for rural poverty will consist in the examination of changes 
in (a) productive forces, (b) production relations, and (c) super­
structure in the rural society over a period of time, and their 
implications for (i) social production in the various sectors, and 
(i*i ) distribution of the social product. - among various classes in the 
society. The essential assumption here is that reduction of poverty is 
directly related to greater production and more equitable distribution 
of the social product. For this purpose, data obtained from an 
intensive study of a village have been used. The justification for a 
single village study, the criteria used for selecting the particular 
village (along with its location, extent and lay-out) and the methodology 
adopted for data collection have been detailed in a later section of this 
chapter.
Examination of the forces within the urban sector responsible for 
rural poverty will consist essentially in testing the validity of the 
following two diametrically opposite hypotheses: ^
a) There is a definite "urban bias" in the overall economic policies 
being pursued in Third World countries, and this constitutes the 
main cause for rural poor staying poor; this "urban bias" is the 
result of an alliance between the urban poor and urban rich against 
the entire rural sector (Lipton, 1977),
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b) Urban bias is a m^th® The beneficiaries of state economic
policies in the Third World are the urban and the rural rich, with 
urban and rural poor being generally excluded from the benefits of 
these policieso As such, what is paramount in state economic 
policies is "class bias" (Byres, 1979, 210-44)®
Examination of international dimensions of rural poverty in 
Bangladesh will test the validity of the following hypothesis:
a) There has been a net outward flow of real resources from the country
r")
through various legal (e.g® debt servicing, unequal foreign trade,
7 devaluation, brain drain, repatriation of super-profits of private
foreign investments, etc®), and illegal (smuggling, currency 
e.
rackteerxng, invoice manipulation etc,), means® Consequently, thereA
has not only been loss of resources, but also capital could not 
fructify within the national boundaries, thus adversely affecting 
production®
b) The inflow of resources in the shape of foreiij*v aid, private foreign 
investment, remittances from abroad, foreign exchange earning through 
international trade, etc®, have generally found their way into 
unproductive channels and benefited only the urban and rural rich®
In testing the hypotheses listed under urban and international 
dimensions of poverty, mostly secondary data have been used.
Methodology and Field Work Problems in Collecting Primary Data 
1® Village Selection and Data Collection
The emphasis of this study is on processes which cause and maintain 
poverty rather than measurement of poverty® As such, as long as 
(a) historical perspective is maintained, and (b) the village 
selected is typical of the majority of Bangladeshi villages, one 
village study is sufficient to yield the relevant data® As a
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popular rural Bengali saying goes: "One needs to press only on.e-
grain to find out if all the rice in the pot has been boiled". In 
any case, cost and other subjective factors would not permit 
intensive study of a number of villages. While there are recognised 
regional variations in rural Bangladesh in soil, climate, natural 
vegetation, elevation, etc0, these are not as pronounced as those in 
a big country like India,, Also, in contrast to India, Bangladesh is 
characterised by a unique religious and linguistic homogeneity 
(of the total population 80 per cent and 95 per cent are Muslims 
and speak Bengali as their mother tongue, respectively).
The village selected ( M a g u r a )  had the following characteristics which 
made it representative of the majority of the 68,000 Bangladesh 
villages:
1) It was not a peri-urban village. The nearest township of 
Narail was about 11 miles away, and Narail itself came to have 
a town committee only in the 1960s.
2) It was not a recently inhabited village,, As the Thak survey 
and Revenue Survey maps (see Appendices C and 0) show, this 
village existed before 1856a
3) It was not inhabited exclusively by either the poor or the rich, 
as with some villages.
4) It was not a "hot house" village, iQe. falling under various 
experiments, action,programmes, development schemes undertaken 
by the BARD, World Bank, USAID, DANIDA, SIDA, Dutch Government, 
etCo On the other hand, it was not either completely out of 
the purview of governmental development efforts„
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5) It was not an off-shore, coastal, mountainous or tribal 
village.
6) It did not fall into one of the known acutely poverty-stricken 
regions of the country (such as Rangpur, which has been 
affected by famine twice since 1972)0
7) Hindu-Muslim proportions in this village were not too widely 
off the national proportions,
Ija addition, the selected village had two additional characteristics:
a) the Hindu population was composed of various castes;
b) a number of non-agricultural occupations co-existed along 
with agriculture.
The selected village was about 3 miles from the residential quarters* 
of the study team. This provided the necessary detachment to 
undertake the worko On the other hand, the distance made the 
investigation tedious and time consuming. The data were collected 
over a period of about one year, from February 1*977 to March 19780 
In June-July 1978, all suspected data (which comprised about 5 per 
cent of the total data) were rechecked and corrected. Five research 
assistants (three male and thro female)** were deputed for the study, 
and between them and the author, they covered all the data 
collection. It needs to be mentioned here that crucial aspects of
The residential quarters were built before commencing data 
collection. This was necessary for two reasons. Firstly, female 
investigators could not be persuaded to come to the village unless 
assured of minimum privacy. Secondly, and more important, in the 
absence of separate quarters, the hospitality of the rural rich would 
have become almost unavoidable, and this would have meant the loss .of 
the independence and neutrality required for conducting the research. 
Female investigators had to be employed in order to interview village 
woman, most of whom would not even appear before, let alone speak to 
male strangers.
field work, namely, village selection, recruitment and training of 
research assistants, formulation of the general framework of 
investigation, preparation and testing of questionnaires, work 
schedules and all other investigation materials and selection of 
research methods (and personnel) to be used for different aspects of 
the study were performed exclusively by the author„ Of the actual 
data collection work, about 30 per cent was completed by the author 
personally, but the remainder was carried out under his close 
supervision and direction. In fact, during the field work period, 
which in all lasted about one-and-a-half years, the author spent, 
on an average, about 25 days in a month in the study area. In June*= 
July 1978, the author personally rechecked all suspect data. In 
other words, the entire responsibility for the field work lies with 
the author alone <,
Methodology
In obtaining the data, various methods were employed: community,
survey, complete household census, interviews, observations, 
biographies, perusal of official and private records and maps, and 
continuous cross-examination sessions with selected informants. The 
latter were carefully chosen from among knowledgeable villagers with 
a high sense of integrity and objectivity0 The group composition 
varied according to the topic, and at times groups/persons were 
separately cross-examined on the same topic0 The sessions were held 
mostly in the afternoons, either in the village or at the study team's 
residential quarters at Maizpara. When held at the latter venue, it 
was usually on days when informants came to Maizpara Hat for shopping
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on their own. There were no monetary incentives as such, but 
they were generally looked after whenever they got into any serious 
difficulty; also they were always entertained with light 
refreshments during the discussion sessions<, One community survey 
and two household censuses (one devoted specifically to income and 
expenditure) were carried out through administration of detailed 
questionnaires lasting for about four months.* Survey questionnaires 
were administered according to the respondents1 convenience with 
respect to time, duration and place0 Cross-examination sessions 
with selected informants and other investigations followed these two 
surveys, that is, well after the investigators, in the process of 
the surveys, became sufficiently acquainted with the salient 
characteristics of the village,,
It will be noticed that data for 1951 and 1961 are mostly in round 
figures. This was because in arriving at these data, selected 
informants were asked to provide approximate answers (and if that 
were not possible, at least indicate the trend over time) for these 
years on the basis of 1977 data, obtained through straight household 
census. Wherever possible, this procedure was also followed during 
the household census. The main difficulty in the latter respect 
was that many households of today have no continuity with the past 
owing to in-and-out migrations, partition, extinction, etc. In 
order to facilitate recall, only those dates which people remembered 
clearly were chosen (thus 1951 and 1961 were the years of land reform 
legislation). In reconstructing the past rural scene, extensive 
use was made of official and private records. However, it was 
found that official data were mostly less accurate than the 
"intelligent guesstimates" of the villagers which were, at times, no
doubt blurred by lapses in memory recall.
See Appendix F
3. Field Work Problems
There was no overt opposition to field work at Magura, owing to 
past familiarity with the area, strong administrative backing and 
rapport with a section of the rural power structure at the personal 
level.* However, there was all along a strong tendency among the 
rural rich to hide information on their assets, and their various 
economic and extra-economic relations with the poor people all for 
very understandable reasons. In the beginning, the poor people 
also tried to inflate the extent of their poverty, in the belief 
that this would attract government relief. At times, the poor 
villagers refused to part with information, for example on money 
lending, owing to fear of reprisals. But once the purely academic 
purpose of the study was explained through several public meetings 
and personal contacts, they extended full co-operation. However, 
this was not so with the richer people, so that information 
volunteered by them was especially checked against official records 
and information obtained through selected informants.
A posture of strict neutrality, respect for the social, religious 
and cultural milieu of the rural society and generally helpful 
attitude towards all sections of the local people were also extremely 
important in ensuring the collection of quality data. In this 
regard, some of the concrete measures taken were:
a) voluntary part-time teaching in the local high school by 
the research investigators;
b) distribution of free medicines for common ailments;
c) pleading with local officials for redressing individual 
and community grievances;
The author was Sub-Divisional Officer of Narail in 1970-71, a member 
of the erstwhile Civil-Service of Pakistan (CSP).
d) generally low profile life style (this meant, among other 
things, simple living, inoffensive public appearance, especially 
by female investigators, strict formality in the relationship 
between male and female investigators, etc.);
e) non-interference in local groupings, disputes and rivalries, and
f) above-board behaviour in financial and personal dealings with 
the local people.
Location, Extent and Lay-out of the Selected Village 
Magura village is located in the south-western district of Jessore 
(sub-division: Narail, Thana: Narail, Union: Maizpara). The
journey to this village from Dacca is relatively easy: by air to
Jessore (160 miles), then by bus/autorickshaw/jeep to Narail 
(21 miles), and finally to Magura by boat (15 miles), during the 
rainy season, or rickshaw van (11 miles) during the winter months.
The present village is bounded on the west by the village of
Kalukhali, on the south by the villages of Poradango-and Loknathpur,
on the south by the village of Kathalbaria, on the east by Tarashi 
village, and on the north by Dariaghata village. The extent of the 
village has been defined according to villagers' perception of the 
same, which is a socio-economic one, that is, villagers see their 
village as not simply a cluster of residential quarters, but 
comprising also agricultural lands, water bodies, jungle, waste land, 
places<of worship, educational institutions, playgrounds, graveyards, 
etc. Magura is part of the Khatur Magura Mouza, the latter being 
the revenue village. According to the Revenue Survey of 1856-7,
the total area of this revenue village was 1,656-8 acres, i.e., more
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than three times the area of the present village„ It is quite
possible that the original village conformed to the boundaries of 
this revenue village, but we could not ascertain when this split into 
three distinct villages, namely, Magura, Kalukhali and Dariaghata 
came about„ The residential part of the village is divided into 
eightneighbourhoods (Paras). Onex these, five (Dai Para, Molla Para, 
Purba Para, Madhya Para and Bagh Para) are inhabited by Muslim®, 
while the remaining three (Kayestho-Brahmin Para, Tanti Para and 
Malo Para) are exclusively Hindu neighbourhopds. The salient 
characteristics of the village are shown on the 'village map in 
Appendix D0
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CHAPTER POUR 
DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTIVE FORGES
In order to live, people must have food, clothing, housing, and 
other material means. People must work and produce, if these are to 
be acquired. In fact, a society will collapse if it ceases to produce 
material wealth. It can, therefore, be also argued that if a particular 
society's level of production is very low, the amount of material wealth 
that can be made available for distribution, in order to satisfy the 
needs of its members, will be grossly inadequate (although the converse 
is not necessarily true; indeed, increased production, as expressed 
through rising per capita production, may not ensure satisfaction of 
even the rudimentary needs of an increasing proportion of the population; 
see, for example, Keith Griffin, 1979, for empirical evidence in this 
regard). Other important ways in which the level of production can 
affect a poverty situation are through firstly price spiralling; 
secondly, reduction in employment (which also means a decrease in 
"effective demand") and most important a low investible surplus (a large 
investible surplus is vitally necessary for expanded reproduction).
As such, at one level, it is possible to explain poverty simply in terms 
of a society's actual production capacity trend over a period of time 
(while at another level, the particular production capacity trend 
itself has to be accounted for).
As noted in Chapter 3* the production process includes three 
elements (collectively known as productive forces), namely:
i) People as agents of production (human labour) i.e. level of
production knowledge and experience as acquired through formal 
and informal education and training, labour productivity as 
expressed through various demographic characteristics (for
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example, dependency ratio), general state of health and disease, 
intake of calories and protein, etc, and labour organisation, 
as expressed through degree of labour specialisation, division 
and socialisation,
ii) Various objects of work (i.e. in the context of our village, land,
water bodies, flora, fauna, climatic and soil characteristics, etc.).
iii) Various tools of production (i.e. in the context of our village,
all instruments, implements, accessories, materials, physical 
infra-structure, etc. used for agriculture, weaving, fishing, 
boating, etc. and exchange of goods).
It is, therefore, of crucial importance to delineate their quantitative 
and qualitative changes and interrelationships over time in order to 
capture a society's capacity and level of production, and their poverty 
implications. Thus, while human labour is the most important element 
of the productive forces, (as Engels put it, "labour created man 
himself"), human beings are also the consumers of all production; a 
population devoid of proper production knowledge, experience, and 
organisation will be an ineffective productive force, but since certain 
essential consumption requirements have to be met irrespective of 
productive capacity, an imbalance will have been created between 
production and human needs. Similarly, short term considerations of 
production may lead to non-regenerative depletion of the objects of 
labour (i.e. environmental pollution and destruction), thereby adversely 
affecting production and the quality of human labour, in the long run. 
Finally, under a given level of technology (as expressed through the 
quality of human labour and tools of labour), there is a definite range 
within which human labour can be combined with objects of labour, without 
lowering per capita output. In other words, when this range is 
exhausted, there must be improvement in technology or else stagnation
will ensue*
This chapter will be devoted to a detailed examination of the above 
aspects of productive forces in the context of the village of Magura 
over time, and their implications for production, and what is available 
for distribution* And at the same time an effort will be made to 
indicate the production potentialities of this village, so as to evaluate 
the extent of the gap between current production and production potential*
A People as Agents of Production 
1 Population
TABLE 1(A)
Population Growth at Magura, 1836-1977*
Year Total No. of 
Households
Total
Popn.
Average Size 
of Household
Male Female Hindu Muslim
1856** 50 250 5 .0 0 n.a. n.a. 162 88
1951 135 9^0 6 .9 6 500 ¥+0 5^ *0 koo
1961 1^ 3 950 6.6^ 505 *f50 500
1977 156 961 6 .1 6 ^82 V?9 278 683
* The population figures in the Census Reports of 1921 and 1931 are 
Mouza (revenue village) wise and hence have not been included* /
** Thak Survey, 1856 (see Appendix 0).
Thus, in the 95 years between 1856 and 1951* the population almost 
quadrupled. However, during the period 1951-771 village population 
remained almost stationary. This was mainly because of Hindu migration 
to India after 19^ 7 (see Table IB). Also, the Muslim population 
registered an increase from -^00 in 1951 to 683 in 1977* i.e. about 2.6^ 
average annual growth rate. Finally, while in the period 1856-195%
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the average household size continued to increase, in the second period,
195“1*7 7$ this showed a marked decline, indicating nucleation of families 
rather than decline in fertility,
TABLE 1(B)
Extent of In and Out Migration, 1947-77
Type Period No, of Households No, of Persons
Permanent 
Hindu Migration 
to India
1947-58
1959-71
1972-77
19V7-77
55 
12
9
56
184
55
30
267
Migration to 19^7-77 11 47
Other Places
Within Bangladesh
Migration to 191+7 .7 7 8 51
Magura from
Other Places
Apart from depressing the population growth rate, Hindu migration 
to India also reduced the village^ total stock of production knowledge 
and assets. This is clearly attested by Table 2A on the inter­
temporal changes in occupation structure. Thus, a decline in weaving 
and only a slight increase in fishing as the main occupation between 
1951 and 1977 can partly be explained by permanent migration to India 
of a large number of experienced Hindu weavers and fishermen after
19 7^.
TABLE 1(C)
Distribution of Population by Age, Sex and Religion, 1977
Age Distribution 
(in years)
Total Male Female Hindu Muslim
0 - 5 200 86 114 50 170
6 - 1 0
000-V 87 91 37 121
11 - 15 150 64 66 38 92
16 - 20 102 54 48 33 69
21 - 50 125 7k 49 40 83
1 £* O 84 37 47 27 57
41 and above 144 80 64 53 91
Total 961 482 479 278 683
The above table brings out the following important trends*
Firstly, 52*7% of the village population was 15 years of age and below* 
Such a high proportion of youthful population meant that the effective 
working force was relatively small, and this had adverse implications 
for production* Secondly, since female labour was grossly under 
utilised in that they could not, in general, work outside the household 
(see Chapter 7)* the effective working force was even smaller, and the 
dependency ratio (DR) calculated on the basis of the formula
no Total Population - Male Adults*
Male Adults
works out at 2*92* According to straight survey, there were in all 
278 "earning" persons in this village, and on this basis, the dependency 
ratio comes out to a further unfavourable figure of 3*46.
Male Adults = Males of age 16 and above.
There were 13 households whose "earning capability" was further 
jeopardised in that the household head (the main earning member in most 
cases) was either female or old/sick/disabled male.
2 Occupation
TABLE 2(A)
Occupation Structure, 1931-1977
1951 1977
Main Occupation* Number of 
Households
Percentage
of
Households
Number of 
Households
Percentage
of
Households
A Agricultural Sector 95 70.30 111 71*15
B Non-Agricultural Sector
Fishing 10 - 19 -
Weaving 10** - 9 -
Trade and Commerce 13 - A -
Transport 2 - k -
Hired Non-Agricultural 
Labour L _ —
Others 5 - 9 -
Non-Agricultural Sector ^0 29*70 28.85
Total 135 100 156 100
* Main occupation, as perceived by household head.
** In 19^ 5 there were 60 households with weaving as either main or 
subsidiary occupations; decline in weaving took a sharp turn in 
19^ 7 and after, owing to large scale Hindu migration to India.
Agriculture continued to be the main occupation during the period 
under study, and in fact, the percentage of households with main 
occupation as agriculture registered a slight increase, from 70.3% in
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1951 to 71*15% in 1977* It may be mentioned here that according to the 
Thak Survey of 1856 (see Appendix C ), the percentage of the village 
population, with agriculture as main occupation in that year was only 
60%, showing more clearly the decline of non-agricultural occupations 
and increased dependence on agriculture over time. In the non- 
agricultural sector, weaving and trade as a main occupation declined 
during the period 1951-7 7, from 7*^% to 5.7% of the total households in 
the case of weaving, and from 9-7% to 2.5% of the village households in 
the case of trade and commerce. This high dependence on agriculture 
and loss of occupational diversification had obvious adverse implications 
for the growth of productive forces and product diversification.
Specialisation and Division of Labour
There are a number of obvious impediments to a rational division of 
labour. Firstly, in most households, there is a strict division of 
labour between men and women: the men work outside the homestead
(cultivation, marketing, etc.) while women remain at home and take care 
of grain processing, child rearing, household management, etc. How 
strictly this is followed depends mainly on the socio-economic position 
of a household* Thus, better off households are able to keep their 
female members in strict seclusion and besides save them from physical 
labour by hiring other women to do the work. On the other hand, widows, 
divorced women and women of land poor classes are not as such restricted. 
The latter generally have less work to do inside the homestead as there is 
little or no agricultural produce brought to be processed and very little 
food to prepare. These women, therefore, seek outside work if they can 
get it. Secondly, among the Hindus, caste restricts occupational 
mobility considerably. All in all, such irrational sex and caste labour
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divisions act as obstacles to development of productive forces and 
production (see also Chapter 7)*
Division of labour and specialisation are generally very low: 
there is multiplicity in occupations as well as in the roles within the
main occupation. For example, agricultural land is owned by 115
households but it is the main occupation of only 92 of these households.
Of the 19 households with fishing as the main occupation, 8 own 
agricultural land. Of the 9 households with weaving as the main
occupation, 8 own varying quantities of agricultural land.
Similarly, the role of most villagers within the main occupation 
is multiple; for example, 53*1% households whose main occupation is 
agriculture (111) has more than one role within agriculture:
TABLE 2(B)
Role Within Agriculture as Main Occupation
Role within Agriculture Number of Households
Cultivates some of own land and share 
crops out rest 11
Cultivates own land plus share crops 
in some land 3*f
Does manual labour as well 
supervises labour 12
Share crops in as well as share crops out 2
Total number of households with more than 
one role 59
This low level and irrationality in the division of labour have 
obviously adverse implications for growth in production experience, 
production organisation and production.
1 0 2
Extent of Social Labour
Labour in various agricultural and non-agricultural production was 
not socially organised. The only genuine labour cooperation in the 
village (despite the existence of various government sponsored 
cooperatives) was the ,Badli* among 4 households, i.e. in peak 
agricultural seasons, these got together and helped one another with 
the work. Thus, in the agricultural sector, the tiny plots were 
cultivated by one or more persons at different times, and the scope of 
social labour (i.e. a large number of persons working together in an 
interdependent manner to maxiraise production and reduce time and costs) 
was extremely limited.
Level of Food Consumption and Labour Productivity
Before discussing the general level of food consumption at Magura, 
it is necessary first to present the national averages as a reference 
point. Two national surveys have been carried out so far (in 1962-64 
and 1975-76). Comparison of the two surveys yields the following 
picture*:-
a) Average caloric intake (per person/per day) decreased from
2251 to 2094 K cals, i.e. by 7%. The average intake now is 93% of the 
2requirement (2,248 K cals). 59% of the households were deficient.
b) Average protein intake (per person/per day) has remained the 
same i.e. 5 8 .5 gm; 60% households were deficient with respect to the 
requirement**(i.ew 43.3 gm per person per day).
* Nutrition Survey of Rural Bangladesh (1975-76), Institute of
Nutrition and Food Science, University of Dacca, Dacca, December 
1977, P. 196.
** Based on the findings of FAO/fyHO Expert Committee as quoted in 
op. cit., pp. 30-3 2.
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c) Calcium intake has remained the same (305 mg per person per 
day); 81% households were deficient with respect to requirement * (i.e. 
500 mg per person per day).
d) 89% households were now deficient in vitamins (93% of the 
households were deficient in vitamin C).
e) 70% households were at present deficient in iron.
The nutrition survey for Magura was based on the recall method. ** 
The sample consisted of 21 households, with 3 households drawn from seven 
landholding categories (see Chapter 5). Two points in time were 
chosen, namely (i) February, that is, the harvest time and (ii) June- 
July, that is, the leanest period of the year. Average per person/ 
per day intakes of two items, namely energy and protein, were computed 
for each of the landholding categories, and these were then used for 
calculating the averages for the entire village. The following results 
were obtained:
a) Average energy intake (i.e. per person per day) was 2,079*69 
K cals, i.e. slightly below the national average.
b) Average protein intake (i.e. per person per day) was 53.66 gms 
i.e. again below the national average.
Although the inaccuracy associated with the recall method can hardly 
be disputed, the following interrelated findings confirmed the validity 
of the above figures:
a) All respondents thought that 50 years ago, average food 
consumption was decidedly better.
* Based on the findings of FAO/VHO Expert Committee as quoted in 
op. cit., pp. 30-3 2.
* * The gap between recall and consumption did not exceed 24 hours.
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b) Over the years, a number of factors have combined to reduce 
fish availability in this region. Firstly, the river system in the 
region became moribund owing to natural silting and unplanned 
construction of bunds. Secondly, unplanned use of chemical 
fertilisers and insecticides adversely affected natural fish breeding. 
Thirdly, the village ponds and tanks were not properly maintained.
Thus, given a declining per capita supply, fish prices rose rapidly; 
consequently fish went out of the reach of most villagers.
c) Traditionally, the Hindu population, which at one time 
constituted the majority in this village, were averse to protein from 
cattle and poultry. However, between 1972 and 1977, livestock 
production in this village increased by about 50% owing to the following 
reasons:-
i) In 1971, there were serious livestock losses given the
exigencies of war and floods; this coupled with the pressing 
need of some livestock varieties for agricultural production 
and transport (for example bullocks) provided the pressure 
for making up the loss, 
ii) The availability of fish, the alternative protein source,
sharply declined after independence, so that this also gave 
pressure for increasing animal protein production,
iii) The general price spiral since 1972 also pushed some villagers 
into taking greater interest in livestock rearing,
iv) In 1971, most Hindus of this village took shelter in West 
Bengal where they found little prejudice among the local 
Hindus against poultry rearing. This experience might also 
have contributed towards a remoulding of their traditional 
attitude (in fact, since 1972, there has been a significant 
change among Hindus of this village in this respect).
On the other hand, despite increased production of animal protein 
in the village, the general level of consumption of animal protein did 
not increase. Firstly, given the constraints of livestock feeds, 
initial investment and frequent outbreaks of poultry epidemics, 
successful rearing was confined mostly to the wealthier households. 
Secondly, rearing of livestock by poorer households was mainly for sale 
rather than for consumption, in order to supplement their low incomes. 
Finally, in any case, as indicated in Table 3 below, the per-household 
livestock availability in this village in 1977 had not caught up with 
the 1970 (i.e. a normal year before the 1971 war of liberation) level. 
It is, therefore, safe to conclude that there has been, in general, a 
clear decline over time in the average intake of protein and calories 
in this village. Its adverse implications for labour productivity 
and production hardly need any treatment, especially since the general 
level of such intake was, to begin with, already quite low.
TABLE 3
Per-Household Livestock Availability at Magura, 1977
Description Per Household 
Availability 
in 1977
National per 
Household 
Availability 
in 1970*
Per Household 
Availability 
in Jessore in 
1970*
Cattle and Buffaloes 1.77 a.53 2 .6 8
Goats and Sheep 0.96 0.91 1.32
Poultry 1.98 7.58 na
* Source: pp. 110-1, Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh, 1975,
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Government of the 
Peoplefs Republic of Bangladesh.
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State of Health, Water Use and Sanitation, and Labour Productivity
Fifty years ago, the most common diseases for Magura were malaria, 
kalazar, cholera, small-pox, typhoid and dysentry. Malaria was, in 
fact, a curse for the entire Jessore district, and Magura was no 
exception. Nearly 8QP/0 of villagers then suffered from it. Besides 
causing death on a large scale, it also had, as Momen vividly records, 
particularly deleterious effects on the victims* and survivors* ability 
to undertake physical work. Since 1958, malaria, on an epidemic scale, 
has stopped. After 1970, it became a rare disease. This became 
possible mainly because of the cheap availability of quinine and various 
government anti-malarial measures. In 1932, cholera took a heavy toll 
in Magura, and village elders still recall that year with fear*
Similarly, in 19Vf, a large number of Magura people died from small pox. 
Although individual cases are sometimes reported, large scale outbreaks 
of these two diseases have ceased since 1970. This change was possible 
for two reasons. Firstly, 98% of villagers have by now switched over 
to tube-well from river/pond as source of drinking water. Secondly, 
anti-cholera injections and anti-pox vaccines are now easily available. 
Typhoid was another common disease in the past. Although death from 
it was very rare, it often led to paralysis and other severe side 
effects. Nowadays, the disease is under greater control owing to cheap 
availability of anti-biotics but its severe side effects (for example, 
continuous physical weakness) remain owing mostly to lack of proper diet. 
Similar seems to be the situation with dysentry. There was no T.B. 
in this village 50 years ago but now, at least five persons are visibly 
suffering from it (the actual number could be much larger)• The two 
recent (i.e. ost 1972) diseases are night blindness (reported victims 
- 5) aud. gastric ulcers (reported victims - 1.0). The most common 
diseasesamong children now are tetanus, skin diseases, rickets, polio,
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worms, etc. During the last four years, 15 children died from these 
diseases. The following table gives a rough idea of the changes 
in the nature of treatment received by villagers during the last 50 
years.
TABLE if
Type of Treatment (in order of importance)
50 years ago At present
1 Self treatment through locally 
available herbs, leaves and 
roots
1 Self treatment through 
locally available herbs, 
leaves and roots
2 fFakir' (Faith healing) 2 Allopathic
3 Ayurve di c (Indigenous) 3 Homoeopathic
if Homoeopathic if Fakir (Faith healing)
5 Allopathic
6 Unani (Greek system, adopted by 
Muslims)
At present, there is only one homoeopath in the village. He has 
been practising here for the last 20 years. Although the allopathic 
system has gained in popularity, there are no trained allopaths either 
in this village or in the entire union. The nearest LMF/MBBS doctor, 
government dispensary, hospital, health clinic, maternity, etc. are 
all located at Narail town, which is about 11 miles from the village, 
and hence out of reach for most villagers, given the poor communication 
and the high expenses involved. Recently, a quack doctor has started 
a medicine shop at Gorer hat, about a quarter mile from the village. 
However, important allopathic medicines are not available even at 
Maispara which means that one has to travel to Narail and Jessore to
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procure these. To sum up, the following trends were noticed. Firstly, 
while certain known diseases have been brought under control, certain 
other diseases, the control of which are essentially dependent upon the 
intake of proper diet, are becoming prominent. Secondly, while the 
mortality rate has certainly come down over time, in general health 
in this village appears to be caught in a low level equilibrium, and 
this has adverse consequences for labour productivity. It also seems 
self-evident that the general decline in health in this village cannot 
be separated from the general decline in the intake of protein and 
calorie, as discussed earlier. Thirdly, although self-treatment through 
local herbs, leaves and roots is still predominant, it has been losing 
ground over the years, especially since 1972. On the one hand, the 
younger generation are less aware of these than their elders, and on the 
other, these are becoming scarcer in the village and surrounding region.
In the context of the slow and lopsided inroad of allopathic medicine, 
there is a need not only to reverse such a trend but also to develop 
the potentialities of these materials on a scientific basis, and thereby 
augment allopathic treatment.
Nearly 9Wo of villagers presently use tube-well water for drinking 
purposes (50 years ago, not more than 10% had access to tube-well water). 
The number of tubewells in this village is 8, which means that the 
man: tube-well ratio is 120:1. However, most of the cooking and washing 
(of clothes, utensils and people themselves) is still dependent upon 
pond and river water. Since tanks and ponds have not been well 
maintained and the river drainage has deteriorated over the years, 
pollution from these sources is very high. Fifty years ago, the only 
method of human waste disposal was to use jungles and open fields.
At present, only one family has a proper latrine. Another five 
families have improvisations to serve the needs of their adult females;
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so that for all practical purposes, there has been little change in the 
human waste disposal system. However, since population is far greater 
and natural drainage is on the decline, traditional waste disposal 
practices now constitute a more serious health hazard.
Formal Education and the Level of Production Knowledge
There is one primary school (i.e. covering grades I-V) and one 
high school (i.e. covering grades VI-X) in this village. The primary 
school was started in 1931 with some help from the Union Parishad.
In 19^ 1» the school had to be closed down, owing to lack of funds.
The school was revived in 19^ 7. In 1968, the government took over 
its management.* The high school was started in 1972, but it was not 
until 1975 that the school received government recognition and financial 
aid. The other nearby high schools are at Maizpara and Pulum, which 
are respectively 3 and 2 miles from Magura. The curriculum in none of 
the primary and high schools places any emphasis on modern agricultural 
practices and for that matter on any vocation, the general orientation 
being towards humanities. The nearest college (which provides 
courses in science, commerce and humanities up to degree level) and 
vocational institute are located in the sub-divisional head quarters 
at Narail township.
The present literacy rate is 20.6% (in 1931, the literacy rate was 
about 11%). The female literacy rate is even lower: only 12.3% of
females are literate and only 28.3% of the literates are females.
* This simply meant that government paid the salaries of the 
teachers.
i l o
In 1977, the number of Magura children in the primary school age 
group (5-10) was 193 and the number of children from this village 
actually attending primary school was 61 which is only 31*6% of the 
children who should have been studying in a primary school* For 
females, the picture was worse. Of the 100 girls who should have 
been in the primary school, only 16 (i.e. 16%) were actually attending 
primary school. Both seasonal and permanent drop outs were prominent 
so that the real picture must be even more depressing.
In 1977, the number of students attending the Magura High School 
was 110. Of them, only 38 were from Magura. About l6 f^ children were 
in the high school age group (i.e. 11-16) at Magura which meant that 
only 22.9% of the eligible children were actually attending high school. 
Again, since both seasonal and permanent drop outs were high, effective 
high school attendance must be much lower.
At present, only one student from this village is attending 
college at Narail. The number of persons with a secondary school 
certificate and above qualification from this village is only 7*
Of them only one is a female. None of them has any vocational 
training or has been trained in modern agronomy.
The teaching standard at both primary and high school is simply 
deplorable, and has certainly deteriorated during the last 30 years. 
Poor academic attainments of present teachers, exodus of well trained 
Hindu teachers to India after 19^ 7, and pursuit of other occupations to 
the neglect of teaching appear to be the main reasons in this respect.
Thus, the formal education system has not only been unable to make 
any headway in the village, it has also failed to transmit, given its 
bias for humanities, advanced production knowledge related to the
ill
occupations pursued by the villagers. Thus, the most important 
process of transmitting production knowledge continues to be through the 
pursuit of family occupation, whereby the older generation hands down, 
by word of mouth and through demonstration, new experiences gathered 
by them during their life time together with what was handed down to 
them by their forefathers. While this knowledge is based on direct
practice and observations, it lacks systematic summing up and is
repetitive, out of date, non-analytical and, hence, non-conducive to 
increased production. For example, most villagers are still under the 
influence of Khana's sayings on agricultural practices and production 
(Khana was a sage of ancient Bengal). Now at least 1,000 years old, 
these were obviously gems at a time when man had little control over 
Nature. However, the very fact that these still dominate the 
village agriculture in the last quarter of the 20th century shows the 
poor dissemination of modern production knowledge. The other 
informal sources of transmitting production knowledge are the various 
"nation building" government and semi-government agencies. However, 
their record in this respect is hardly worth mentioning. Thus, for 
example, only one man has so far been trained from this village as a 
"model farmer" by the IRDP*, and it is highly doubtful if the "training"
received by him was of any quality. There is no one in the village
who has received any training in the modern methods of pisciculture.
The Narail based fisheries officials have, in fact, never visited 
this village. The same story is true of livestock and agricultural 
extension officials.
Integrated Rural Development Programme, run by a Government 
Directorate (see Chapter 8).
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B Objects of Work 
Land
TABLE 5(A)
Privately Owned Land Utilisation, 1951-77
(acres)
Land Use Category 1951 1961 1977
Agricultural Land ¥*5*00 435.00 405.76
Homestead Land 47.00 43.00 40.93
Water Bodies 9.37
Garden Land 47.00 37.00 2 0 .0 2 33.68
Waste Land
Others 4.09
TABLE 5(B)
Privately Owned Land-Man Ratio, 1951-77
(acres)
Year Man-Total Land Ratio
Man-AgricultureX' 
Land Ratio
Man-Horaestead 
Land Ratio
1951 0.57 0.47 0 .0 5 0
1961 0.54 0.46 0.045
1977 0 .5 0 0.42 0.040
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The decrease in all categories of private land (Table 5B) 
was mostly because of sale of land to residents of other villages and 
declaration of about 58.15 acres of land as "enemy" property after the 
1965 Indo-Pakistan War and of 10.26 acres of land as government (Khas) 
land after the legislation of the East Bengal State Acquisition and 
Tenancy Act in 1951. However, a substantial amount of both categories 
was being enjoyed by some of the villagers, legally or illegally.
It was also quite possible that in reporting their own property, they 
might have included some of these.
Eight households of this village own 7.47 acres of land in 
the villages of Tar&shi, Bamankhali and Antaikhola. On the other 
hand, households of outside villages (Kalukhali, Andal Baria,
Poradanga and Kathalbaria) own 9-40 acres of land in Magura.
Considering that these nearly cancelled each other out, the amount of 
privately owned village land might be taken as 480*37 acres. If we 
also consider that reported "enemy" property and "Khas" (government) 
land have not been included in the privately owned land, then the 
village land amounts to 548.78 acres. Finally, after adding various 
communally owned land, total village land totals 556.94 acres, the 
breakdown of which by use, is as follows:
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TABLE 5(C)
Village Land Use, 1977
Land Use Type Amount (in acres)
Agricultural Land 445.92
Garden Land 24.08
Homestead Land 59.32
Water Bodies 9.57
Grazing Ground 3 .8 0
Football Ground 1.92
Educational Institution Land 3.50
Religious Land 1.74
Road 3 .0 0
Waste Land 4.09
Total 556.94
Calculated on the basis of the above data, the man-total land 
ratio, man-agricultural land ratio and man-homestead land ratio, for 
1977 work out at 0.67, 0.46 and 0.06 respectively. Compared with 
1951, these represent a static picture while the data for 1977 
presented at Table 5B indicates a clear deteriorating trend. Given 
an almost static population in the village between 1951 and 1977, in 
the face of considerable net out-migration, land-man ratios appear to 
be somewhere in between these two sets of data, i.e. on a slight 
decline. However, since the scope of out-migration has almost been 
exhausted, land-raan ratios are likely to be more adverse in the future, 
with more agricultural land being taken up by homesteads and other 
non-productive uses and increased pressure of man on a decreasing
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amount of agricultural land.
Agricultural Land
Extent of Fragmentation and Sub-Division
In 1977, the total agricultural land in the village was divided 
into 1,845 plots, so that the average area of a plot stood at only 
0.219 acres. Between 1951 and 1977, the total land owned by all 
households underwent at least two divisions, increasing, according to 
our estimate, the plots by about 30 per cent. On this basis, in 1951 
there were 1,292 agricultural plots, and the average area of a plot 
was 0.359 acres.
The number of farms increased from 87 in 1951 to 115 in 1977.
In 1977, only 2 farms had no fragments, 20 per cent had 2-3 fragments, 
22 .5 per cent had 4-5 fragments, 40.7 per cent had 6 -9 fragments, and 
15.8 per cent of the farms had 10 or more fragments. In 1977, in over 
80 per cent of the farms, plots were scattered and disparately located.
The continuous fragmentation and sub-division of land into numerous 
tiny plots, together with their scattered location were disadvantageous 
to agriculture in several ways. It meant loss of valuable land 
through boundary lines, inconvenience and increased cost of cultivation, 
the precluding of economies of scale, and a formidable obstacle to the 
introduction of modern productive forces.
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TABLE 6
Climatic and Soil Characteristics at Magura, 1977
Characteristics Findings Remarks
A Climatic Characteristics
i Maximum Temp (°F)
ii Minimum Temp (°F)
iii Annual Rainfall (inches) 
Annual Evaporation 
(inches)
108
41
64.11
45.95
dry,
needs irrigation 
in the winter (dry) 
months
B Surface Soil (0"-6") 
Charact eristics
i Soil Texture
ii Nitrogen content
iii Carbon to nitrogen 
ratio
Sand 23%, Silt 49% 
and Clay 28%
0.038
27.1
iv Pg (-log of hydrogen
ion concentration) 6 .9
v Calcium, Magnesium High, owing to 
and Potassium content weathering of
readily weatherable 
minerals like 
felspars & biotite; 
also available in 
exchangeable form 
(high "base 
saturation")
vi Electrical
conductivity 
(E.C. 10mm ho/cra)
vii Plough pan
viii Elevation
ix Land capability
0.34
Not compact, 
consequently 
capillary moisture 
is usually 
hindered
Undulating in 
parts
Good land with 
moderate
limitations during 
dry season owing 
to droughtiness
Clay loam; potential 
use brick and pottery
Low; undesirable
High; undesirable for 
Nitrogen availability
High; unde sirable 
for Phosphorous 
availability
Natural fertility 
high.
Very low salinity; 
desirable for crops
Supports short term 
dry land ,Rabi* 
crops (pulses, oil 
seeds) requiring 
little moisture
Irrigation rendered 
di f f i cult; land 
development necessary
Irrigation required 
during dry months
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At present, the soil in Magura is used exclusively for agriculture, 
although some pottery and brick making could be developed here, given 
the considerable availability of clay and loam in the soil. As may 
be seen from Table 6, the soil here is characterised by a low content 
of Nitrogen and Phosphorous , a high Carbon to Nitrogen ratio and a high 
P„, all of which are undesirable, but on the other hand, naturalJrl
fertility (as expressed through Calcium, Magnesium and Potassium 
content) is high and salinity is low.
In general, soil productivity has been on a sharp decline since the 
late 1960s. As pointed out earlier, this is partly owing to lack of 
natural flood silting by the rivers (whose flow decreased as a result 
of dam construction upstream). Thus, the use of chemical fertilizers 
here is necessary not so much to increase soil productivity as to 
arrest its deterioration. The underground water level in winter is 
about 18 feet below the top soil. Also, given the tendency to drought, 
irrigation is a must during the winter months for successfully raising 
another crop. However, the undulation in parts makes irrigation a 
difficult proposition. There is, therefore, considerable need for land 
development in this village before introducing modern irrigation.
Single cropping is followed in low-lying areas where owing to water­
logging after paddy harvest, no other crop can be grown. Double 
cropping is practised in the uplands, where a third crop cannot be 
raised due to lack of water between February and April. A third 
crop is grown only in those lands which are neither too low nor too 
high and as such immune from both water-logging as well as drought.
The main crops are paddy, jute, oil seeds and lentils. The 
following is a break-down of agricultural land by various crops:
TABLE 7
Cropping Intensity at Magura, 1977
Total
Land
Under
Culti­
vation
Land Under Different Crops CroppingIntensity*
Aus Aman Boro Jute Veg. Oil Others
Seeds
445.92 275 530 0 100 20 200.00 100 .00 5 0 .0 238.4
. . , . ^ Total cropped area•Cropping intensity = S55
In general, of the total agricultural land, 25% is cropped once,
45% twice and 30% thrice a year. Fifty years ago, the cropping choice 
was more or less where it stands today. The cropping intensity 
appears to have increased but now the soil productivity is decidedly 
lower. The average yields per acre have also declined (Araan paddy: 
1,280 lbs/acre in 1951 and 960 lbs/acre in 1977; Jute : 1,0*10 lbs/acre 
in 1951 and 800 lbs/acre in 1977)*
Water Bodies
The River System at Magura
Two rivers, the Chitra and the Kazla, account for about one and a 
quarter miles of the village boundary (Chitra, one mile on the northern 
boundary, and Kazla, one quarter mile on the Western boundary). The 
confluence of the Fatki and these two rivers is the north western point 
opposite the periodical market place known as Gorer Hat. The Chitra 
is 150 feet wide and 9 feet deep in the dry season. The Kazla would 
be about double these measurements. Both rivers swell slightly during 
the Monsoons. Fifty years ago, the river system in and around Magura 
was navigable throughout the year and as such played an important role
in a flourishing internal trade and commerce in and around this region. 
Also, until very recently, the road communication of Magura with the 
sub-divisional and thana headquarters at Narail was very poor, and as 
such boating through the Chitra was the only way of reaching Narail.
The rivers in and around Magura were at that time an important 
source of livelihood for the fishing community of Magura and the 
neighbourhood. Fishing was possible throughout the year and the catch 
was sufficient to meet both internal consumption requirements as well as 
external demands. At present, the main fishing grounds for the fishing 
community of Magura are (i) 2 miles in the Chitra, 2 miles in the
Kazla, 2 miles in the Fatki and 2 miles in the Bamunkhali canal;
(ii) the beels, ponds and canals in and around the village. However, 
owing to the decline of the river system and drying up of the local 
canals and beels, the present fish catch is very low and the fishermen 
now have to reach out to distant water bodies like the Nabaganga and 
Bara Chitra rivers and Nahata beel in the neighbouring sub-division. 
Finally, in the wake of annual flooding, the rivers brought to the 
agricultural land fresh deposits of silt and in the process more than 
made up for the natural soil exhaustion.
The present condition of the rivers is as follows. Firstly, 
the river bed has risen substantially owing to silt deposits, while 
.the extent of annual flooding has considerably decreased due to the 
construction of a barrage across the river twenty-five miles up stream, 
under the Ganges-Kobadak Project. Planned by bureaucrats and engineers 
at Dacca, such constructions were not preceded by consultation with the 
local people and failed to take note of adverse side effects.
Secondly, water hyacinth and under water foliage have increased over 
the years and there has been no attempt at clearing these obstructions.
Sketch' of' Main' Fishing' (Grounds' f’o'r' 
the' Magura Fishing Community^X977" r
12/0
KAZLA R
VILLAGE MAGURA
BAMANKHALI CAMAL
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Thirdly, increased use of the river water by human beings and livestock, 
together with the effects of organic waste including human and animal 
excreta*, chemical fertilizers and insecticides, under-water jute 
processing, etc* have all contributed to raising the pollution level of 
the river water, given that the total flow of these rivers is 
definitely on the decline*
As a consequence, fishing and navigation on these rivers have 
decreased considerably. The big boats, carrying various merchandise, 
can now negotiate these only during the full Monsoons. Fishing is 
again limited to the rainy season and annual silting by the rivers has 
almost stopped. Of course, the decline of the river system is not 
peculiar to Magura. As has been pointed out by both A* Momen (1925*
7-9) and Westland (1874,4-ll)fchis phenomenon of rivers changing 
course and becoming moribund has been occurring in various parts of 
Jessore throughout the last hundred years. However, what is striking 
is that neither in Magura nor elsewhere in the district, has any 
appreciable human effort so far been consciously planned and channelled 
towards combating Nature*s vagaries. On the other hand, it is quite 
evident that given planned and conscious effort, it is not only possible 
to make the rivers serve the villagers as these did in the past, but 
also to extract the extremely necessary irrigation water from these rivers 
for raising winter crops.
As discussed elsewhere in this Chapter, these could have been used 
as fertilisers if systematically collected and properly processed, 
thus turning their present negative effect into a positive one.
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Tanks and Ponds*
There are 21 tanks (and k ponds) in Magura, covering an area of 
9*57 acres* In 1921, the number of tanks per acre in Narail thana 
was *0139**whereas for Magura in 19771 this was 0*038, which means an 
approximately three-fold increase* However, this increase must be 
placed in the context of increasing population and a declining river 
system at Magura* At present, only 12 tanks are usable (for water) 
and suitable for pisciculture* The rest require to be re-excavated 
if any use is to be made of these on this line. The 12 tanks referred 
to above are now mainly used for bathing, washing of clothes, utensils, 
livestock, etc., cooking water and fishing.
However, pisciculture is not carried out on any scientific basis, 
and only about 5% of the potential of the 12 tanks has been exploited, 
although given soaring fish prices, limited fish supply and excellent 
natural breeding conditions, its pursuance on a commercial scale could 
be highly profitable* On the average, about 10-15 thousand young 
fish are annually added to the 12 tanks, yielding about 50-60 mds. of 
fish in a year (10-15 mds. are marketed)* If all the tanks were 
re-excavated, and pisciculture was carried out on a scientific basis, 
it would have been possible to catch 2/2*5 thousand maunds of fish 
every year. According to our estimate, the annual expenses incurred 
for re-excavation and modern pisciculture would be about Tk. 50,000/- 
for all the tanks, and the annual net profit could have been 
Tk. 0*5 million* Even if modern pisciculture was limited to the 12 
tanks in more or less proper condition the annual catch would have been
* At present, the country has about 0.6 m acres of tank water
(Mazumdar, 1978, 1)*
** Momen (1925, Appendices E and F).
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a thousand maunds. These tanks also offer excellent prospects for 
duck farming* Finally, the banks of the tanks could be used for 
horticulture and vegetable growing. Needless to mention, none of 
these potentialities have been exploited to any appreciable degree.
Flora (Vegetation)
As clearly indicated in the Revenue Survey Map of 1856 for Khatur 
Magura Mauza (See Appendix B ), this village at that time was covered 
by considerable natural vegetation, especially along the river banks*
Old villagers still recall the dense forests and the wild life in and 
around Magura fifty years ago* Now all that is gone, and it seems 
that defoliation on an extensive scale took place particularly during 
the last fifty years in order to extend land for human habitation and 
agriculture. Similar seems to be the fate of garden trees, i.e. new 
plants have not been able to keep pace witfr destruction of the old 
ones. Thus, for example, whereas in 1921, there were 1.209 date palm 
trees per acre in Narail thana*, the number of date palm trees per acre 
in this village in 1977 (i.e. 52 years later) was only 1.077. To some 
extent, this phenomenon is associated with the large-scale Hindu 
migration to India after 19^ 7. Not only were trees felled and sold 
out hurriedly before the migration from the village, but also those 
remaining did not take care to plant new trees because they were not 
sure if they too, would migrate at a later date. Other factors were 
the demand for construction materials and the need for firewood. In 
fact, there is now an acute scarcity in the village of both these items. 
The present extent of garden trees is as follows:
* Momen (1925, **1)
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TABLE 8
Extent of Garden Trees at Magura, 1977
Type of trees No* of Adult/Fruit Bearing Trees
Coconut 250
Date Palm 600
Plantain 50
Bamboo 8 ,0 0 0
Jack Fruit 80
Mango 200
These trees have either fruit value or wood value or both* This 
village is highly suitable (as most of Jessore district is) for 
coconut, bamboo, date palm and jack fruit, planned planting of which 
could open up considerable economic opportunities for the villagers* 
The low lying areas in the village, especially along river slopes and 
canal banks, are highly suitable for growing a particular grass used 
for mat making* However, so far no one has exploited this potential 
on any considerable scale*
G Tools of Work
Tools of Work in the Agricultural Sector
Agriculture, or to be more precise cultivation of crops, in 1977 
was the main occupation for 71*15% of households of Magura (in 1951 * 
the figure was 70*3%)* However, the actual involvement of the 
Magura households in the agricultural sector is much greater. Forty- 
one households in Magura do not own any agricultural land, so that the
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remaining 115 households are associated with agriculture in one way or 
the other (whether as main or subsidiary occupation). Of the 41 
landless households, the main occupation of 19 households is agriculture 
so that 134 households are clearly linked with agriculture. Since 
half of the remaining 22 landless households are engaged in agriculture 
as a subsidiary occupation, the number of households associated with 
agriculture comes to 14-5 * which is 92.94^ of the total households in 
Magura. Thus, the agricultural sector by far outstrips all other 
economic activities in the village.
There has been no change in the traditional method of ploughing 
developed thousands of years ago, and 100% of the land continues to 
be ploughed by wooden ploughs* driven by bullocks. In Magura, there 
are 108 cultivation bullocks, which means 0.69 bullock per household. 
Only 46 households have one pair of bullocks, which is what is necessary 
for one plough. In other words, only 24*98% of households have the 
minimum required number of bullocks. 22 households, i.e. 14.1% of the 
total households have only one bullock. Only 69 households (i.e.
44.2% of the total households) have one or more ploughs. In 19771 
the total number of ploughs was 85, i.e. for every 4.77 acres of
* The Bangladesh plough is a variant of the Biblical bar-point plough. 
It has a long, massive sole, the front of which ends in a metal 
capped point. It penetrates some 3T1-4I,» smoothing the level on 
which it travels. The layers are shattered and stirred by the 
shank. It is an ideal rice implement; forming a plan below the
surface that slows down markedly the early penetration of water and 
is a powerful means of extending rice cultivation over the greatest 
possible area. But this very feature renders it the worst possible 
implement to prepare land for crops other than rice in all but the 
easiest soil conditions, and may well be one of the basic reasons 
why other crops yield so poorly. Also, with this implement, as 
many as 4-6 ploughings are necessary for preparing one acre of land, 
as compared to 1-2 ploughings with an improved version of this 
plough driven by a single animal. As such, with the present plough, 
not only more animal power is required but also, man and beast have 
to work harder. (IBRD, Bangladesh Land and Water Resources Sector 
Study, vol. 5, Technical Report, 16, 1972, p. 3 and GOBD & FAQ/UNDP 
Agricultural Mission Report, Working Report 5» 1977i P- 11).
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agricultural land, there was one plough. In 1921, for the entire 
Narail thana, there was one plough for every 12.84 acres of agricultural 
land.* On the other hand, the present bullock/plough ratio is 
1.27, i.e. 0 .7 3 less than the minimum requirement and 1.96 short of 
this ratio for the Narail thana in 1921.* Also, in 1921, for this 
thana, the number of bullocks per household was 0.96*, i.e. 0 .2 7  
more than what it was in Magura in 1977. Similarly, the amount of 
agricultural land per bullock increased from 3.97 acres for Narail thana 
in 1921* to 4.12 acres for Magura in 1977* The villagers also 
overwhelmingly confirmed the deterioration in the agricultural 
implements situation in the village over time. The quality of the 
plough has at best remained unchanged; many cultivators, in fact, 
complained that owing to non-availability of proper metal, the quality 
of the metal cap in the plough has deteriorated over the years. The 
quality of bullocks has certainly deteriorated over the years, there 
being no facilities for artificial insemination for cross-breeding the 
local stock with improved imported varieties. Most bullocks are 
rickety and suffer from one disease or the other; local herbs are 
generally used for treatment, modern treatment being limited to bullocks 
of only a few households. There is a livestock office at Narail 
township but given the distance and the high expenses (including bribes), 
the question of taking advantage of this facility does not arise for 
most households. The deterioration in the quality of the bullocks is 
clearly linked with shortage of animal fodder. Owing to increasing 
population pressure in the region, most grass lands have been converted 
into crop fields so that grass, the main feed for the bullocks, has 
now become scarcer. Those who do not have the required number of
* Momen (1925, Appendices E & H).
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bullocks/ploughs resort to what is locally known as ’Anguri1 cultivation, 
i.e. they rent in these implements on the condition of ploughing the 
owner fs land for two days in exchange for ploughing their own land for 
one day with these implements.
The other implements commonly used for cultivation are the Moi, the 
Achra, the Nirani, and the Kastey. The Moi ("ladder") generally made 
of bamboo, is used as a land leveller. It is too light, and even two 
operators crouching on it at work do not increase its efficiency to any 
great extent. The Achra (comb harrow), made of iron and wood, is used 
for sparsing crop plants, weeing and aeration. The Nirani, a small 
hand trowel, is used for clearing weeds. The Kastey is the harvesting 
sickle made of iron. These implements have been known from time 
immemorial. There is no evidence of their quality having been 
improved nor of any innovation being brought about with respect to these 
agricultural operations.
The use of chemical fertiliser is a recent phenomenon in this 
village. Fifty years ago, the villagers used neither chemical 
fertilisers nor cow dung. As a matter of fact, such use was considered 
unnecessary at that time, owing to the high soil fertility caused by silt 
deposits through the annual floods. Such floods were regular up to 
1970; since 1970, floods have been few and far between so that soil 
fertility sharply declined. In the early sixties, villagers started 
using cow dung as fertiliser, and before 197%  only 20-30% of the 
households were using chemical fertilisers. The latter development 
had perhaps something to do with the massive propaganda launched by the 
Ayub Government in favour of using chemical fertiliser. At this time, 
a fertiliser factory was also built at Fenchuganj with Japanese 
collaboration. However, after 1970, chemical fertiliser use rapidly
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increased owing to a sharp decline in soil fertility, as discussed 
above, and increased alternative use of cow dung as a fuel*, given the 
lack of firewood in this village. At present about 90% of cultivating 
households use chemical fertilisers, however, the intensity of fertiliser 
use varied widely, the average being about 42 pounds of fertiliser per 
acre of cropped land. Although the figure compares favourably with 
38 lbs/acre for entire Bangladesh in 1976-77 and 27 lbs/acre for Narail 
thana in 1975-76, this is not very high in view of the poor soil 
fertility of this village. Interestingly, against a background of 
increased chemical fertiliser use, there are in this village, besides 
cow dung (whose increased supply is, of course, tied to livestock breeding), 
two completely untapped sources of organic manure, namely human excreta 
and humus from decaying leaves and water hyacinth. Although there is 
a cultural barrier against the use of human excreta, most villagers 
recognised its effectiveness, especially in growing vegetables.
However, the critical input for effectively using these manures, namely 
a group effort in collecting and processing these materials, did not 
exist in the village.
The use of chemical insecticides has now completely stopped. In 
1963, for the first time, chemical insecticide was used in this village 
for paddy cultivation. The supply was ensured by government, free of 
cost. Similarly, in 1968-6 9, 95% of the cultivators used free 
insecticides for jute. In 1970, the government carried out aerial 
spraying of insecticides over paddy fields. In 1974, only 3 rich
* About 28 m tons of dry dung is produced in the country annually.
Of this total, 11 m tons are either burnt as fuel or left uncollected. 
This is equivalent to about 220,740 metric tons of chemical 
fertiliser, which if applied to agricultural crops, could result 
in output increase of 1.4 to 1 ,7 m tons of food grain annually, 
enough to meet the annual deficits in food grain production (GOBD 
and FAO/UNDP Agricultural Mission Report, 1977? Working Paper 5, 
p. 6).
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households used insecticides for jute. At present, nobody is using 
insecticides owing to (a) non-availability of the insecticides (one has 
to procure these from the black market at exorbitant prices), (b) 
discontinuation of government policy of supplying spraying machines 
free of cost. Also, last year, these machines were officially *out 
of stock* so that even if one could pay the price, it was impossible to 
buy them, except on the black market. In 1977» about 20% of paddy and 
about 30% of jute were damaged owing to pest attacks.
The cultivators here do not practise either the modern (power 
pump, shallow and deep tube-well, etc.) or the traditional system of 
irrigation (*DUN*). Between 1973 and 1975* a 2 cusec power pump was 
brought through the cooperative. The area actually irrigated in 
these years was 10.35 and. 13 acres respectively. After 1975*
irrigation through the power pump was abandoned. On the other hand,
the potential for irrigation here is considerable, even with the 
traditional method, given the easy access to the river Chitra, provided 
necessary land development was also undertaken simultaneously.
In that case, the cultivators here could easily raise a third crop on 
all agricultural lands during the winter season. The villagers are 
aware of the increased productivity of the HIV*, but at present only two 
villagers are using it, and that too not as a general practice. Five 
years ago, some villagers tried the Jute HIV but gave it up after 
obtaining disappointing results. Irri cultivation was started in 1973 
by the agricultural cooperative. This was discontinued after 1975 (see 
Report otv Agricultural Cooperatives, Chapter 8).
* With irrigation, production per acre of HIV paddy could easily be
3 ,2 0 0  lbs, i.e. almost 4 times the present per acre production.
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Methods of Cultivation
At least four ploughings are necessary for any one of the major 
crops grown in this village (i.e. Aus, Aman, Jute, etc.). The first 
and second rounds of ploughing are followed by levelling land and 
breaking up of large pieces of soil through the use of the Moi. After 
the land becomes ready for sowing, the cultivators wait for rain; 
after a heavy shower, the third round of ploughing is completed. 
Ploughing over, phosphate and potash, in a mixture, are applied (highest 
rate: 80 lbs of phosphate and 28 lbs of potash/acre).* The Moi is
again used to level the land. After the fourth and final rounds of 
ploughing, the seeds are sown by broadcasting. The Moi is again used
after sowing in order that seeds are well pressed against the soil.
When plants attain a height of 5M-6!t, Achra is used to make the plants 
denser and the weeds sparser. This is followed by regular Nirani, 
i.e. weeding. When plants attain a height of about 1 foot, urea is 
used (highest rate: 32 lbs per acre).* Urea is again used before the
seeds mature. This arrangement in fertiliser use is valid only for
Aus. For mixed Aman (Aus and Aman together) and Joli Aman (Aman grown 
in low lying lands), fertiliser use is somewhat different. In case
of mixed Aman, two additional doses of urea are applied after Aus 
harvest (highest rate: 32 lbs an acre per dose).* In 1977* 90% of
cultivators used four doses of urea for mixed Aman and only 2 households 
used 5 doses of urea for mixed Aman. Only phosphate and potash are 
used in Joli Aman land, and the highest rate of application is the same 
as stated above. No urea is generally used for this crop. In 1977*
These refer to the highest amounts applied in 1977. However, 
actual amounts applied varied widely and depended on land quality 
and the individual cultivators access to fertiliser and his 
perception about fertiliser use. For example, some cultivators 
thought that higher amounts could damage soil fertility.
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only one household used urea for Joli Aman. Only 30% of the 
cultivators used chemical fertilisers for Joli Aman.
For jute cultivation, ploughing and sowing methods are the same as 
those for paddy. Only phosphate and potash are used just before 
sowing. In 1977, only 3 households used urea for jute. 40% of the
households use phospate and potash for jute.
For winter crops, the number of ploughings is the same as for paddy 
but in the case of the former, cultivators do not wait for rain before 
sowing. After the third ploughing, urea, phosphate and potash are 
used in a mixed form, the highest rate being 32 lbs, 80 lbs and 28 lbs 
per acre respectively. This is followed by the fourth ploughing and 
sowing. 50% of the cultivators generally use fertiliser in this method.
The remaining 50% use phosphate and potash only. Thus, except that 
fertilisers are now in use, there has been no mentionable change in 
the cultivation methods over the last fifty years. The implications 
for production need hardly be spelt out.
Tools of Work; Fishing
Fishing is the main occupation of 10.9% households of Magura*
Fifty years ago, only 13 households were engaged in fishing. In 1977,
21 households were involved. During these fifty years, there has been 
practically no change in either the quality of implements or the methods 
of fishing. The main implements and accessories required for 
traditional fishing are a country boat, which is manually operated; 
various types and sizes of nets, again manually handled (local names 
of the more prominent ones are Ber Jal, Kheo Jal, Bheshal, Dharmajal, 
etc.); and Daria, the domesticated otter, which chases fish into the
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net (average price of one such animal is now about Tk. 1,000.00).
Fifty years ago, all fishing households had these basic means for 
catching fish. At present, only 2 households can claim ownership of 
the necessary fishing equipment. Seven households have no fishing 
assets at all and the remaining 12 households are insufficiently 
equipped for catching fish. Government supplies in respect of fishing 
net thread have so far been grossly inadequate in relation to 
requirements (see Chapter 8).
Tools of Work: Weaving
In 1977, weaving was the main occupation of 9 households, compared 
to 10 households in 1951* In 194%  about 60 households were engaged in 
weaving. This drop is mainly due to the large scale Hindu migration 
from this village after 1947* The implements and methods of weaving 
have not undergone any change over the last 50 years. All of the 
weavers still use manually operated wooden looms, spinners and spindle. 
The following table shows the extent of loom availability over the 
years. They are now generally employed on a daily basis, although a 
piece rate system is also prevalent.
TABLE 9
Weaving Loom Availability at Magura, 1945-77
Year Total Number of Looms Number of Operational Looms
1945
1951
1961
1977
85
65
60
41
85
65
50
21
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Yarn is the most important ingredient for weaving. Its 
availability sharply declined after independence. Government supplies 
were far too short in relation to requirements, even though demand also 
fell owing to migration of weavers to India (see Chapter 8).
Carpentry
Fifty years ago, there was no carpenter in this village. At 
present, one household*s main occupation is carpentry. However, the 
implements available to the household are very few, and as such it can 
undertake only minor work requiring rough finishing, such as the making 
of a cart, a bench, a bedstead (chowki), a plough, etc.
House Repairing/Construction
4-5 households are at present engaged in the construction/repair 
of straw houses. The number was the same fifty years ago. The 
implements used are the Dao (a curved knife) and the Sulai (made of bamboo 
with a small hole at one end).
Molasses Making
Forty households (7 as second main occupation) are now engaged 
in molasses making from date palm juice as compared to 30 households 
(5 as second main occupation) fifty years ago. The method and 
implements of production are crude and have not changed over the last 
fifty years.
Miscellaneous Trades
Over the last fifty years, no one from this village has taken up 
black smith power pump driving, mechanical fitting, boat making, etc. 
since increase in demand in the relevant fields has been negligible and
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could be met by people already in these occupations in this region.
Fifty years ago, 2 households in Magura processed milk into various 
products (butter, butter oil, yogurt, sweet-raeats, etc.) as a side line. 
One of them has migrated to India. The other is still in the village 
and continues with this activity. However, there has been no 
improvement in the method and implements of production. In fact, 
the quality of products has deteriorated because of the lack of quality 
raw material, i.e. pure milk. There was one oil press in this village 
around 1950* It was dismantled in the face of unequal competition, 
soon after the arrival of a power driven oil press-cum-flour mill at 
Maizpara and Gorer hat market places in the 1960s.
Means of Transport and Communication
Over the last fifty years, the only important road built in this 
area has been the Magura - Narail road via Maizpara. However, the 
road is still very narrow (two motor vehicles cannot pass) and unmetalled 
so that it is completely unnegotiable during the rainy season, when 
even walking becomes difficult in parts owing to accumulation of thick 
mud. In the winter/dry months it is negotiable by rickshaw, cycle, 
rickshaw van, bullock cart, jeep, etc. Repair work limited to filling 
in ditches on the road with earth has been undertaken several times. 
Another "road" connecting Magura with Kalukhali was built under the 
Rural Works Programme (see Chapter 8). However, it is fit mainly for 
walking, and for a rickshaw van only occasionally; as such it has 
had practically no effect on goods transportation.
As pointed out earlier, the effectiveness of the river system 
has been greatly reduced owing to silting, decreased flow of water in 
the off season and preponderance of water hyacinth and mossy growth.
In the rainy season, however, the river becomes suitable for traffic,
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and fairly large boats carrying merchandise can move about. Thus, 
in the field of physical communication, the situation is a stagnant 
one, with a road opened up on the one hand, and a declining river 
transport on the other,
Magura*s links with outside villages, i,e, through land ownership, 
shalish (dispute adjudication), hiring of share croppers/wage labourers, 
visits to relatives, market places, Melas (fairs), Union Parishad, etc., 
are confined within a radius of about 5 miles. The urban/semi-urban 
centres relevant for Magura are, in order of importance, Narail,
Jessore, Lohagora, Daulatpur and Khulna, About 75% of journeys to 
other villages, including those involving merchandise transportation, 
sire on foot and the remainder are on boat, bullock cart and rickshaw van. 
In 1977* there were 31 bullock carts in this village, i,e, 0 ,1 9 8 cart 
per household. This compares very unfavourably with 0*56 cart/ 
household for the entire Narail thana in 1921*, especially when one 
considers that road mileage is now much higher. There were 17 boats 
in this village in 1977 which works out at 0 ,1 0 8 boat per household.
In 1921, for Narail thana, there was 0,103 boat, per household.** 
Considering that there is a fishing community at Magura, it is most 
likely that boat availability in this village actually declined over 
time. Narail is the only sub-urban/urban centre to which some goods 
in bulk are carried from this village; generally the goods go only up 
to the nearby rural market place.
Among the means of transport, the only new local innovation over 
the last fifty years has been the rickshaw van (which is found now only
* Momen (1925, Appendix H).
** Ibid.
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in Jessore and Kushtia districts). It is a cycle rickshaw with an
open plate on 2 wheels (there being one more wheel at the front) and
can easily carry passengers and goods weighing upto half a ton. Fifty 
years ago, no one in this village used a bicycle. In 1977i there were 
3 bicycles in the village. One villager has also picked up repairing 
of bicycles, rickshaws and rickshaw vans and has taken this up as a 
side profession. Thus, as is the case with physical communication, 
the growth in the means of transport in Magura and the surrounding 
region has been very slow and halting.
Means of Exchange
The two most important market places for Magura are (i) Gorer 
hat, (ii) Maizpara-Urani hat and bazaar. The former, located just 
outside the village on the other side of the river Chitra, was started
in 1963 at the present site as a private bi-weekly market place;
this situation continues despite several attempts to raise it to the 
level of a hat and a bazaar, i.e. combining bi-weekly market 
activities with a daily market. The latter, 3 miles from Magura, is 
about 150 years old. It started as a market place owned by the 
Narail Zemindars. Later, it was taken over by the Government, who 
in turn leased it out to the highest bidder on a year to year basis.
For a while, the ownership and bidding rights were with the Union 
Parishad instead of the Central Government.
In 1977, the level of marketing facilities and exchange at these 
two market places was as follows:
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TABLE 10
Level of Marketing Facilities and Exchange at Gorer Hat and Maizpara-Urani
Hat and Bazaar, 1977
Indices of Marketing 
Facilities
Gorer Hat Mai zpara-Urani 
Hat and Bazaar
1 Year of
establishment
1963 Approximately 150 
years ago
2 Days in the week 
the market place 
meets
2 days (Sunday and 
Thursday) - conflicts 
with the schedule 
followed by Pulum 
market place; no 
bazaar (i.e. daily 
market place)
2 days (Tuesday and 
Friday) the bazaar i.e. 
the daily market meets 
between 8 am and 12 noon; 
the hat schedule does 
not conflict with those 
of nearby market places.
3 Extent of the 
area served
About 90 per cent of 
the buyers and 
sellers are from a 
radius of one mile 
only
About 90 per cent of 
the buyers and sellers 
are from a radius of 
2 miles
k Area of the market 
place (in acres)
1.7^ 2 .5 8
5 Number of permanent 
shops
8 (5 grocers,
1 firewood, 1 cycle 
repair, 1 doctor- 
cum-medicine)
80 (13 grocers, 3 
clothes and tailoring, 
sweetmeats, 6 
dispensary and medicine, 
3 goldsmiths, 3 cycle 
repairs, 3 blacksmiths,
1 utensils, 3 hair 
cutting, 7 fertiliser 
and insecticide, and 
8 ration goods)
6 Number of temporary 
shops*
500 (350) 1 ,200 (550)
7 Other permanent 
structures
1 mosque, 1 rice 
mill (out of order 
since 1975)» 12 
gadis** and godowns
1 mosque, 1 temple, 2 
rice mills, 1 oil press, 
32 gadis** and godowns,
2 cemented landings on 
the river
The figures in and outside the parentheses indicate respectively 
the numbers in normal and peak seasons.
** The place from where the money lenders (Mahajons) operate.
TABLE 10 (Continued)
Gorer Hat Maizpara-Urani
Hat and Bazaar
Indices of Marketing 
Facilities
8 Storage facilities
9 Sanitation, waste 
disposal, security 
arrangements, etc•
10 Means of transport­
ation for goods 
entering the market 
place
11 Type of goods
exchanged (in order 
of importance)
72,791 cu« ft• of 
kaccha* and ^ ,070  
cu.ft. of half 
pucca** storage 
capacity in the 
godowns
1 thatched latrine,
1 tube-well (both 
generally unusable) 
no permanent 
sweeper, and as such 
extremely unhygienic 
condit ions• Night
watchman employed 
only during the 
jute season.
Of the total volume 
of goods entering on 
a market day, 58% by 
boat, 36% on head 
load and only 6% by 
bullock cart• This 
is a riverine area; 
in the rainy season, 
95% of the goods are 
carried by boat*
2 ,7 0 0 cu*ft* or kaccha, 
172,7^9 cu.ft. of half 
pucca and 22 ,012 cu,ft* 
of storage capacity in 
the godowns
1 thatched latrine 
(unusable), 1 tube-well, 
no drains* * *; one 
permanent sweeper, 
generally very un­
hygienic conditions; 
has provision for 
regular night guards.
In the dry season 75% 
as head load, 15% by 
cart and 10% by boat. 
During the monsoons,
^5% as head load and 
55% by boat. Use of 
rickshaw van as a 
goods carrier has not 
as yet assumed 
significant proportions.
a) Agricultural 
products (paddy/rice, 
jute, pulses, edible 
oils, vegetables, 
betel leaf, betel 
nut, coconut, fish, 
livestock and live­
stock products, 
molasses, etc,).
b) Cloth, about half 
of which is of rural 
origin (i.e. handloom 
products)•
c) Medicine, Kerosene, 
salt, etc*
d) Pottery
a) Agricultural 
products (items as in 
col. 2),
b) Cloth (about *f0% 
of rural origin).
c) Medicine, kerosene, 
salt (100% from cities/ 
ports)•
d) Flour (100% from 
cities/ports)•
e) Pottery (100% of 
rural origin).
* Non-cemented floor, tin roof, thatched walls.
** Cemented floor, tin roof, tin walls.
***A cemented drain was being constructed in 1977 out of government funds
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TABLE 10 (Continued)
Indices of Marketing 
Facilities
Gorer Hat Maizpara-Urani 
Hat and Bazaar
12 Volume of.goods 
exchanged on a 
market* 3 ay
13 Weights and 
measures
Paddy/rice: 200 mds. 
(50)
Jute: 250 mds. (20) 
Pulses and oil seeds: 
75 mds. (5 0)
Vegs: 50 mds. (30) 
Flour: 50 mds. (20) 
Fish: 50 baskets (4o) 
Betel leaf:
3 ,2 0 0  pieces (2 ,A0 0) 
Betel nut: 2 mds. (1) 
Tobacco: O.A mds. 
(0.25)
Molasses: 35 mds.
(15)
Poultry: 100 no. (60) 
Coconut: 300 pieces 
(200)
Cloth: 1,000 yds. 
(700)
Pottery: AO mds.
(20)
500 (200)
800 (100)
300 (125)
150 (50)
100 (3 0)
6 0  (AO)
100,000 (75,000) 
A- (2)
A- (3)
A5 (18)
150 (120)
350 (300)
15,000 (8,000)
50 (30)
The metric system has not been introduced 
nationally. Weights are by maunds, seers, 
poas and chattaks.** Although there is a 
national standard for these units, weight 
pieces for these units vary not only with 
the corresponding national standards, but 
also among the shops. For many items such 
as poultry, fish, certain vegetables and 
fruit, no weighing is done, and these are 
sold on the basis of subjective and 
customary (and hence non-standardised) 
measures.
* The figures in and outside the parentheses indicate respectively
the amounts exchanged in normal and peak seasons.
** One standard maund is roughly 1/27th of a ton;
AO seers equal a maund and 1 seer is roughly 2 lbs;
A poas equal a seer
and A chattaks equal one poa.
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TABLE 10 (Continued)
Indices of Marketing 
Facilities
Gorer Hat Mai zpara-Urani 
Hat and Bazaar
1A Type and number Producer/seller 300
of traders* (2 0 0) 1 ,050 (Aoo)
Broker 10 (7) 
Itinerant trader 
(faria)/Shopkeeper
8 (6 )
(bepari) 39 (31) 
Stockist (aratdar)
195 (175)
7 (5)
Stockist-cum-
2 (2)
Mahajon** 10 (10) 9 (9)
Mahajon 5 (5) 20 (20)
Total: 561 (258) 1,28A (512)
The figures in and outside the parentheses indicate respectively 
the number in normal and peak seasons.
** Money lender cum trade financier.
As is apparent from the above chart, there is no qualitative 
difference between the two market places, in that both are primary 
exchange centres dealing with essentially agricultural products and 
other goods of rural origin under highly underdeveloped conditions of 
sanitation, shopping, storage, transport, weights and measures, etc.
On the other hand, the quantitative differences between the two (for 
example in area served, volume of goods handled, number of traders, 
extent of shopping and storage facilities, etc.) can easily be explained 
by their differences in age and location (lines of communication, 
conflict with the marketing schedules followed by other market places, 
etc.).
Gorer Hat was started at the present site in.1963* Before that 
it existed near the present high school at Magura at a more modest 
level. However, development of marketing facilities at Gorer Hat
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appears to have reached its peak by 1970. Since then it has been a 
story of slow but clear decline. Attempts at starting a daily market 
here failed. A college was to have been established nearby. This 
never materialised. A number of traders and notables who were at one 
time the moving spirits behind this market place have either migrated, 
or have turned to other market places. The rice mill set up here has 
been out of order for the last 3 years. Then, there is also the 
conflict with the market day schedule of Pulum Hat which is only a mile 
away. Our selected informants also confirmed that in terras of both 
volume of goods entering and the number of buyers and sellers visiting 
this market place, there has been a steady decline since 1970.
The situation at Maizpara-Urani market place is slightly different. 
Lengthy cross examinations of selected informants yielded the following 
trend for this market place. Firstly, around 1950, apart from head 
load carriage, boats were the principal means of goods transportation 
to and from this market place. Now rickshaw/rickshaw van, ox and 
horse-carts, etc., have come into use. On the other hand, there has 
been a sharp decline in the use of water transport, owing to silting 
and mossy undergrowth in the river Chitra. Secondly, the number of 
permanent and temporary shops at this market place increased by 
respectively 3 and 2.5 times between 1950 and 1977* On the other hand, 
the number of people visiting the market place (as both sellers and 
buyers) increased by about A times during the same period. As such, 
per capita shopping facilities have slightly declined. Thirdly, there 
has been no change in respect of weights and measures since 1950.
Since the market area did not increase and there has been no 
substantial improvement in drainage and cleaning facilities since 1950, 
sanitary conditions inside the market place have actually deteriorated,
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especially because the number of people using the market registered a 
substantial increase during this period* Fourthly, as in 1950, 
agricultural and rural handicraft products still dominate the market 
place, although in absolute terras the amount of goods from the urban 
sector has registered a considerable increase during this period (in 
particular, modern medicine, fertilisers/insecticides, imported food, 
cloth, kerosene, oil and salt)* Finally, between 1950 and 1977* rice/ 
paddy availability in this market place increased by about b times, 
while for cloth and oil seeds and pulses, increases have been respect­
ively to the tune of 2 and b times* On the other hand, jute
availability increased, if at all, only marginally and there has been
fish
a sharp decline in availability (at least by 2 times)* However, while 
in 1950, 90 per cent of buyers and sellers at this market place 
originated from within a radius of 1 .5 miles only, in 1977, 90 per cent 
of buyers and sellers came from a radius of 2 miles* Thus, while 
market activity and marketing facilities have been increasing in 
absolute terms between 1950 and 1977, this market place may at best be 
considered to be in a state of stagnation, especially when the 
population growth in the hinterland of the market place is compared 
against some new developments that have actually taken place during 
this period.
Effect on Production
We have so far discussed the changes in and interrelationships 
among various aspects of productive forces in the context of Magura 
over time* Let us now see how these have affected the level of 
agricultural and non-agricultural production in the village.
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Agricultural Production
In 1977, total production of paddy and jute in this village were 
respectively about 7 ,5 0 0 and 1 ,660 maunds, i.e. per capita production 
of 7*8 maunds of paddy and 1.72 maunds of jute. In 1921, these were 
respectively 14-.55 maunds of paddy and 1 .90 maunds of jute for the 
entire Narail thana.* The declining per capita agricultural 
production is also borne out by the following evidence:
1) privately owned agricultural land has declined, though 
agricultural land under control of the villagers may have at best 
remained static;
2) in both quality and quantity, traditional agricultural implements 
and ingredients have declined;
3) yield/acre has declined, owing to deterioration in soil 
fertility, and lack of efforts to combat it;
b) population has slightly increased, but now that Hindu migration 
to India is almost over, the present trend is towards a high population 
growth rate.
The only positive factors in favour of increased production have 
been increase in cropping intensity and use of chemical fertiliser. 
However, for reasons stated earlier, these could not have offset the 
negative factors working against agricultural production* The 
villagers1 own impression also confirmed the downward trend in 
agricultural production.
Non-Agricultural Production
As discussed earlier, fishing implements as well as sources of 
fish have become scarcer over the last fifty years. On the other
* Momen (1925,Appendix G and '55)•
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hand, the number of households involved in fishing has increased. 
According to our informants, the present fish catch could be no more 
than 10% of what was caught fifty years ago. In the weaving sector, 
the total yearly production fell from about 28 ,000 pieces in 1945 to 
4,320 pieces in 1977* In other words, production per weaving 
household fell from 466 pieces in 194-5 to 210 pieces in 1977, and per 
loom fell from 329 pieces in 1945 to 205 pieces in 1977*
The following trend emerges from the above discussion on the growth 
of productive forces in Magura over the last fifty years. Firstly, 
both quantitatively as well as qualitatively, the development of 
productive forces has been, in general, at best extremely slow or 
stagnant, and in some areas, clearly declining. Modern technology 
has simply failed to make any appreciable impact on village production, 
exchange and distribution. Similarly, although population increased, 
quantity and quality of effective human labour did not. The available 
natural resources (i.e. the objects of work) also appear to have been 
depleted over time owing to faulty governmental policies (for example, 
the WAFDA* barrage on the river upstream) and lack of conscious efforts 
by the villagers to control and manipulate Nature to their own 
advantage. In fact, the general tendency has been one of passive 
adjustments to the vagaries of Nature. Consequently, given the 
population increase, the balance between natural resources and 
population became adverse over the years. Secondly, and as is to be 
expected, per capita production in certain sectors, and even absolute 
production in certain others, declined over time. At this stage, we 
may explain poverty at Magura simply in terms of this stagnation/decline
Water and Power Development Authority - a serai government 
organisation set up in the '60s.
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in the productive forces and production over time. Thirdly, by all 
indications, it is apparent that even at the existing low level of 
technology and production knowledge, a proper organisation of human 
(physical) labour, based on willing participation of the labouring masses 
can, alone ensure, from the available resources (i.e. objects of work), 
a much higher level of production, consumption and investible surplus; 
and by no means can it be asserted that the potentialities of the 
available resources at Magura have been fully exploited. There is 
thus a wide gap between current production and production possibilities. 
In order to understand the determinants of poverty at Magura fully, 
it is of crucial importance to explain this gap, since mere proof of 
the existence of the gap constitutes only a partial explanation of 
poverty. We devote the next chapter to this issue.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION AND EXCHANGE
1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, it was observed that there has been either decline 
or, at best, stagnation of productive forces and production in this 
village during the last fifty years. In this chapter we examine the 
evolution of the important aspects of production relations in this 
village: i.e. (a) ownership of the various means of production (and
exchange), (b) the forms and extent of appropriation and utilisation
of surplus value arising therefrom. We then see how these have 
affected the development of productive forces and production, as 
outlined in Chapter 4, and the distribution of the social product.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the assumption here is that poverty is caused 
and perpetuated by stagnation/decrease in production and inequitable 
distribution of the social product. Finally, we also consider in this 
context, whether the conventional neo-classical argument that inequality 
in income distribution is essential for greater savings and productive 
investments holds true in the context of Magura.* If the opposite
The assumption here is that it is the rich who are able to save and 
invest significant proportions of their incomes while the poor 
spend all their incomes on consumption goods, and GNP growth rates 
are directly related to the proportion of national income which is 
saved. This means that an economy characterised by highly unequal 
distributions of income would save more and grow faster than one 
with a more equitable distribution of income. It also follows 
that national and per capita incomes would be high enough to make 
possible sizeable redistributions of income through tax and subsidy 
programmes, but until such a time is reached, any attempt to 
redistribute incomes significantly would only serve to lower growth 
rates and delay the time when a larger income pie could be cut into 
bigger slices for all population groups. One of the earliest and 
best known defences of this position was by W. Galenson and 
H. Liebenstein (1953)* Also see Kurihara (1959, 122-9) lor a 
critical appraisal of this position. For the formal neo-classical 
growth model most often used to justify this argument, see Todaro 
(1977, Appendix 5*1)*
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holds good, it will only lend support to the hypothesis that 
inequality in Magura increases poverty also through adverse effect on 
production. In this regard, the main arguments are as follows.
Firstly, unlike the historical experience of the now developed countries, 
the rich in contemporary Third World countries are not noted for their 
frugality, nor for their desire to save and invest and are, on the 
contrary, given to anti-productive surplus extraction methods. 
Consequently, a growth strategy based on sizeable and growing inequality 
may, in reality, be nothing more than an opportunistic myth designed to 
perpetuate their vested interests and to maintain the status quo in 
the society.
Secondly, the low incomes and low levels of living for the poor 
which are manifested in poor health, nutrition and education can 
lower their economic productivity and, thereby, lead directly and 
indirectly to a slower growing economy. Thus, strategies aiming at 
raising the income levels of the poor would contribute not only to 
their material well-being but also to the productivity and income of 
the economy as a whole.
Thirdly, raising the income levels of the poor will stimulate 
an overall increase in the demand for locally produced necessity 
products like food and clothing. On the other hand, the rich tend to 
spend more of their additional incomes in luxury goods, often of foreign 
origin. Raising demand for local necessity goods provides a greater 
stimulus to local production, local employment and local investment.
It thus creates the conditions for rapid economic growth and a broad 
popular participation in that growth.
Finally, a more equitable income distribution can stimulate
1 4 S
healthy expansion by acting as a powerful material and psychological 
incentive to widespread public participation in the development process. 
On the other hand, wide income disparities can produce exactly the 
opposite effect.
2 A Tentative Glass Analysis Scheme
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are various types of 
objects and subjects of labour in Magura. However, the most important 
is decidedly agricultural land. This may not become apparent from 
the distribution of households by main occupation, as presented in the 
table below, since agriculture is the main occupation of only 71*15 
per cent households:
TABLE 1
Household's Main Occupation according to Household Head's Main 
Occupation as perceived by him
Sector Number of HH Percentage
Agriculture 111 71.15
Non-Agriculture: 28.85
Fishing 19
Weaving 9
Boating 4
Trade and Commerce k
House Servant 1
Teacher 2 (both RPI)
Doctor 1
Priest 1
Carpenter 1
Other non-agricultural activities 3
Total: 156 100.00
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On the other hand, as shown in Table 2 below, 115 households owned 
some agricultural land. And of the 4-1 landless households, 
respectively 19 and 14* were engaged in agriculture (wage labourers/ 
share croppers) as main and second main occupation. This meant 
(a) 9^*8? per cent (1 -^8) of all Magura households were involved with
the agricultural sector one way or the other; (b) many households 
whose main occupation was not agriculture, nevertheless owned 
agricultural land. Also, as shown in Table 2(A) Chapter 
dependence on agriculture was on the increase between 1951 and 1977. 
Finally, in Magura, land, and particularly agricultural land, could not 
be valued by merely its market price; it was something around which 
the entire range of the villagers* economic and political aspirations 
revolved.
TABLE 2
A Tentative Class Analysis for Magura, 1977
Class of Household Agricultural Land Number of
by Household Households
(in acres)
i) Landless household (LLH) 0 41
ii) Poor Household (PH) 0 .1 - 1 .0 0 29
iii) Lower middle Household (LMH) 1.01 - 2 .5 0 3k
iv) Middle Household (MH) 2.51 - ^.50 26
v) Upper Middle Household (UMH) •^51 - 7.50 11
vi) Rich Household I (RH I) 7.51 - 12 .50 10
vii) Rich Household II (RH II) 12.51 and above 5
Given this overriding importance, agricultural land was taken as 
a "proxy" for other subjects and objects of work, and the 156 households
1 5 C
of Magura were divided into seven classes according to the amount of 
agricultural land these households actually owned and controlled 
(Table 2 above)•
The above was only a "tentative" class analysis because it did 
not, at least at that stage (a) take into account ownership of other 
means of production, family size and structure, soil fertility, etc., 
and (b) correlate ownership of the means of production (in the above, 
only agricultural land) with the form and extent of surplus value 
appropriation and utilisation.
It was precisely for the second reason that as many as seven, 
instead of three (i.e. poor, middle, and rich) classes were chosen in 
the above schema so that at the time of examining surplus appropriation 
and utilisation later, it became possible to trace accurately the 
transition across these classes (i) from appropriation of surplus to 
being appropriated and (ii) from consumption for bare existence to 
socially productive investment and socially unproductive and wasteful 
consumption*
In deciding the landholding range of these seven classes, we 
depended for the most part on our evaluation of the villagers' 
perception. The villagers' perception in this regard was quite 
explicit (and hence very valuable) because for most of these categories 
(i.e. landless, poor, lower middle, middle, upper middle, rich, etc.), 
there were not only standard Bengali equivalents, but also local 
colloquial expressions.* As such, there was little difference among 
our selected informants on the landholding range of these seven classes.
For example, Bhumi Hin Chashi (landless peasant), Kishen (landless 
agricultural labourer), Garib Ghashi (poor peasant), Madhobitto 
(middle class), Mahat (rich peasant), Jotedar (big land owner), etc.
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3 Ownership of the Means of Production and Transport, and.
Trading Capital:
Ownership of Land:
TABLE 3
Village Land According to Various Types of Ownership, 1977* in acres
1 Government (Khas) Land
Agricultural land A-.13
Grazing ground 3*80
Homestead land 0.33
Road 2.00
Sub-Total of Khas Land 10.26
2 Government "Enemy Property"
(A) Reported "Enemy Property"
Homestead land 18.06
Garden land 4.06
Agricultural land 36.03
Sub-Total of Reported "Enemy Property" 58.15
(B) Unreported "Enemy Property"
Homestead land 5*11
Agricultural land km07
Sub-Total of Unreported "Enemy Property" 9.18*
continued
Unreported "Enemy Property" is assumed to have been included in 
the privately owned land and hence excluded from the calculation 
of total village land.
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
3 Communally Owned Land
Football ground 1.92
Land devoted to educational institutions 3*50
Road and others 1.00
Muslim Religious Property
(Mosque, Open air Prayer Ground, Grave Yard) 0.96
Hindu Religious Property
(Burning ghat, place for Puja, etc.) 0.78
Sub-Total of Communally Owned Land 8.16
4 Individually Owned Land
Agricultural land 405.76
Homestead land 40.93
Water bodies (Tanks & Ponds) 9.57
Garden land 20.02
Fallow land 4.09
Sub-Total of Individually Owned Land 480.94
TOTAL Village Land 556.94
Khas (Government) Land:
There are various sources of government land:*
a) excess land from ceiling impositions such as EBSATA**, 1950 and 
Presidential Order (PO) 98 of 1972**;
b) land purchased by government in certificate sales (i.e. sales for 
arrears of land revenue);
c) land accruing to government by surrender, abandonment and escheat;
* See Abdullah (1976).
** East Bengal State Acquisition & Tenancy Act which fixed land
ceiling at 33*3 acres/family. This was enhanced to 125 acres/ 
family in 1961. The P.O. 98 of 1972 once again brought down the 
ceiling to 33.3 acres/family.
d) land that was never settled since it was originally waste land/ 
forests or used as public utility, such as roads, common grazing 
ground, canal, etc* Although the source of the 10*26 acres of 
government land at Magura could not be located, it is certain 
that these are not excess lands arising out of ceiling imposition*
It is not likely that these belong to the 4th category listed above. 
The grazing ground by the Muchi(Khal) Canal (3.80 acres) is 
communally enjoyed but obviously the richer households of Magura 
and Kalukhali, with a larger number of livestock at their 
disposal, use them much more than the poorer households. The 
4.13 acres of government agricultural land has been under illegal 
possession of 7 UM, 3 R II and 3 M households of Magura, Kalukhali 
and Poradanga for many years now. When asked how this was 
possible, the Tehsildar (the revenue official in charge of collecting 
land revenue for about 10-12 villages) had no reply. His 
complicity in the matter was confirmed by selected informants.
Government "Enemy Property"
In the wake of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, the property of Indian 
nationals living in Bangladesh (then known as East Pakistan) was 
declared as "enemy" property and as such taken over by the government.
2 Hindu. RH II and 2 RH I did not report the property that should 
have been declared as "enemy" property. This amounts to about 9*18 
acres of land. Through bribing relevant officials, legal documents 
were brought out to show that these were not "enemy" property. Of 
the reported "enemy property" of 58.15 acres, 44.54 acres are under 
legal/illegal possession of 22 Hindu RH II, RH I and UMH* The 
remaining land is under legal/illegal possession of 11 M, LM and P Hindu 
households. This has again been possible because of either
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"connections" with relevant officials or lack of implementation of the 
government measure* However, what is important is that in breaking 
this law, the richer households by far outstrip the poorer ones.
Communally Owned Land
Most of the communally owned land (8.16 acres) in Magura was 
donated by the richer households. However, as shown later, it is 
also they who dominate and reap the maximum benefits from the 
religious and educational institutions set up on these lands. (See 
Chapters 6 and 7)
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From Tables k - 6, the following trend may be noticed. Firstly, 
landlessness was considerably on the increase, from 17*0% of all 
households in 1951 to 26,6% of all households in 1977* Similarly, 
households with landholding below 2,5 acres increased from 46% in 1951 
to 5k% in 1961 to 65% in 1977* Secondly, in 1951» the top 16% 
households owned about 50% of the land. In 1977* the top 16% owned
, : 0 I ;
almost 60% of the lank. Also, in 1977» the per capita agricultural 
land for RH II was approximately 21 times greater than the per capita; 
agricultural land for PH, indicating staggering inequality in land 
ownership among the households* However, while there was a clear 
trend of increased differentiation among the households into owners 
and non-owners between 1951 and 1977* the data do not show that it was 
occurring at a very rapid pace, at least until the present (so far, 
landlessness increased at the rate of only 0,36% per annum); land 
transfer data for the period 1968-76 also confirm this:
TABLE 7
Reported Land Sale, 1968-1976
Class Background Buyers Sellers
LLH - -
PH 3 27
LMH 7 36
MH 25 18
UMH 12 5
RH I 26 2
RH II 18 3
There was no doubt a considerable number of unreported transfers 
(i,e, parties did not register the transaction) because: (a) legal
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sales involved payment of fees to the government exchequer as well as 
bribes to the government officials; (b) when a rich person was the 
buyer he could be "officially" exceeding the ceiling through purchase 
of new land; (c) legal purchase enhanced land revenue and cesses;
(d) the existing law of pre-ef^mption provided that certain relatives 
had preferences over non relative purchasers, which meant that relatives 
could create problems for a seller, especially if the land sale was 
officially registered; (e) some of the transfers were due to 
inability to repay outstanding debts for which land was a collateral.
In such cases, the usual procedure was to deposit a land-ownership deed 
with the money lender, and the latter did not press for formal legal 
transfer because the borrower, being the weaker party, would not 
generally lay claim on land lost to the money lender, legally or 
otherwise. However, our estimate is that total land transferred 
through sale and mortgage during this period, after taking into 
consideration unreported transactions, would not exceed 75*0 acres.
This means a transfer of only 8.33 acres per year.
TABLE 8
Legal Land Sale, 1968-1976
Year Amount sold in acres
1968 1.51
1969 6.75
1970 5.51
1971 -
1972 1.A-0
1973 1.60
197^ 3.3
1975 5 M
1976 6.1
Total: 31.58
Source: Records maintained in the office of the
Sub-Registrar of Land, Narail.
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In explaining this rather slow pace in the differentiation process 
at Magura, the nature of in- and out-migration for this village since 
19^7 needs to be examined carefully. Of the 56 households migrating
to India between 19^8 and 1977* 26 were LLH, 5 PH, 19 LMH, 5 MH and 
1 RH I at the time of their migrations. Of the 11 households 
migrating out to other villages during this period, 9 were LLH, 1 PH 
and 1 MH at the time of their migration. On the other hand, of the 
8 migrating in households (from other villages) 3 were LLH, 2 PH and 
1 LMH at the time of migration. This means not only a net exodus, but 
one consisting of more poor than rich households. As such, migration 
has considerably hidden the real extent of differentiation at Magura.
On the other hand, Hindu migration to India also had some 
cushioning effect on the differentiation process at Magura in the 
manner in which the lands of the migrating households were transferred. 
While most of the land sold by the departing Hindus of this and 
neighbouring villages was bought by Muslim rising classes (MH and 
upward), it was also possible for some Muslim landless and poor 
households to buy this land, often on credit (See Chapter 7) so that 
some upward mobility took place in the post 19V 7 period. Given this 
special circumstance of Magura, involving considerable out-migration, 
the Magura data cannot possibly represent the actual extent of 
differentiation that has taken place in rural Bangladesh as a whole 
during this period. Finally, the land market at Magura, as elsewhere 
in rural Bangladesh, was a limited one. Firstly, despite economic 
pressures, people sold land only as a last resort. Secondly, the 
prospective purchaser did not go beyond a particular distance from his 
normal place of residence in buying new land. Thirdly, and as 
mentioned earlier, existing law provided that relatives had a preference 
over other land purchasers, which meant that relatives could create
18 1
obstacles for land sale.
However, although differentiation has been slow so far, this is 
likely to be rapid in the coming years, since scope for out migration 
has been almost exhausted and economic pressures have increased, 
especially since 1972#
TABLE 9
Female Ownership of Land, 1977
Mode of Acquisition Amount (in Acres) Number
Inheritance 13.96 12
Gift 19 .20 3
Purchase 0.71 k
Total 33.87 19
TABLE 10
Female Land Ownership According to Class Background^ 1977
Class Number Amount
LLH 1 0,12 (Homestead land)
PH 7 ^.70
LMH 3 2.84-
MH 1 0 .0 6
UMH 3 2 .2 8
RH I 2 • 0 0
RH II 2 22.99
Total 19 33 .8 7
The above tables show that (1) females own only 7.05% of the 
total privately owned land; (2) only 3*7% of the females in this 
village own some land. In most cases, females were found giving up
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the little land that they were legally entitled to inherit in favour 
of brothers (according to both Hindu and Muslim family laws, the female 
share of inherited property is much lower than that of the male) 
because in case of misfortune like divorce, death of husband, etc,, 
such a gesture was considered to ensure shelter in the brother^ 
household#
Ownership of Other Means of Production in the Agricultural Sector:
TAHT.T. 11
Bullock Ownership Pattern, 1977
Class Number
Owned
Bullocks Number Bullocks/ 
Household
Number Bullocks/acre 
of Agricultural Land 
Owned
LLH W * 0 ,0 9 0
PH 18 (10) 0.62 1.128
LMH 30 (18) 0.88 0.55
MH 27 (15) 1.03 0.32
UMH 22 (9) 2.0 0.36
RH I 28 (8) 2.8 0.32
HH II 13 W 2.6 0.03
Total: 1^ 2 (68) 0.91 0.35
Figures in parentheses indicate the number of households, owning 
bullocks•
TABLE 12
Plough Ownership Pattern, 1977
Class Number of Ploughs 
Owned
Number of 
Ploughs/Household
Number of Ploughs/acre 
of Agricultural Land
LLH 5 (5)* 0.12 0
PH 12 (11) 0.4-1 0.75
LMH 18 (17) 0.53 0.33
MH 18 (16) 0.7 0.21
UMH 10 (9) 0.9 0.16
RH I 16 (8) 1.6 0.18
RH II 6 (3) 1.2 0 .0 6
Total: 85 (69) 0.54- 0.21
* Figures in parentheses indicate the actual number of households 
owning a plough*
Ownership of Water Bodies in and Around Magura;
Ponds and Tanks:
There are 21 tanks (pukur) and 4- ponds (Doba) in Magura village, 
comprising an area of 9*57 acres. Of these, only 12 are in good 
condition, i*e. not derelict.** These are owned as follows:
** On physical inspection, it was found that all the tanks and ponds 
in this village require some degree of renovation if they are to 
be used for scientific fishing and as sources of clean water.
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TABLE 13
Ownership of Tanks and Ponds, 1977
Class In Good Condition Derelict
LLH - 1
PH - 1
LMH 1 2
MH - 3
UMH 3 1
RH I k k
RH II k 1
All Classes: 12 13
Thus, the richest three classes, among themselves, own 17» 
i.e. 62*9% of the tanks and ponds* In terms of area, this is well 
over 80% of the total tank area in the village. Of the 8 tanks and 
ponds owned by the lowest k land-owning classes, only one is not 
derelict. On the other hand, about 65% of water bodies owned by the 
three upper classes were in good condition* Not one of the tanks is 
owned by any member of the fishing community. In 195% the number 
of tanks and ponds in this village was 18 and ownership was more or 
less as skewed as it is today (no specific statistics could be 
collected in this regard)*
The River System
Before 1950, fishing rights in the eight miles of river system 
in and around Magura (Fatki, Kajla, Chitra and Baraunkhali canal)
'I
belonged to the family of one GSK of the neighbouring village of
'I
Bamunkhali. This was part of their fGantidari' (at present GSK is 
a millionaire businessman)* In lieu of an annual rent, the family- 
used to lease these eight miles of open fishery to fishermen of 
villages Magura, Bamunkhali and Tarashi. Eight fishermen of these 
three villages obtained written deeds to this effect, while for the 
remaining 90 fishing households of these villages, it was an oral lease. 
Following the enactment of the EBSATA* in 1950, ownership of this open 
fishery vested in the government. This was contested in the civil 
court by those eight fishermen who had written deeds. The other 90 
fishing households also joined these eight in the legal battle. In 
1955i that is, after about four years, the court gave its verdict in 
favour of the fishermen. Since then, the fishing community of the 
three villages has been exercising joint fishing rights over these 
eight miles of open fishery, so that unlike most fishermen of the 
country, they do not have to lease in fishing rights over these eight 
miles of open fisheries from the government who own almost 95% of 
the country's open fisheries.
However, the fishermen of these villages have been venturing out 
to water bodies beyond these eight miles of open fisheries for the 
last seven years because of the paucity of fish in these waters.
During the Pakistan period, fishing rights for these water bodies had 
to be acquired indirectly, i.e. through Ijaradars. There were three 
Ijaradars relevant to the fishing community of Magura. All of them 
belonged to the RH II class. After obtaining a lease from the 
government, the Ijaradars, in turn, used to sublet fishing rights to 
the actual fishermen.
East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act; its main provisions 
are indicated in Chapter 8.
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In 1972, the Ijaradari system (i.e. leasing to the highest bidder 
on a year to year basis) was abolished, and under the new arrangement, 
only the local fishermen's cooperative was allowed to bid for an open 
fishery in the area. In other words, although government is still 
the juridical proprietor, the actual ownership now vests with the 
management of the local cooperative since the amount required for 
leasing in is nominal. The money for leasing in is raised by the 
cooperative from its members, and if non-cooperative members or 
members of another fishing cooperative wish to fish in these waters, 
they are required to pay a rent to the cooperative that has leased in 
from the government.
Although, nominally, sill fishermen of a cooperative have equal 
fishing rights in the leased in open fisheries, the actual position is 
quite different. Firstly, those fishermen who lack or have 
insufficient fishing gear obviously cannot carry out fishing on the 
scale that fishermen with adequate fishing gear are able. Secondly, 
the cooperative office bearers (who are invariably the richest among 
the members in terms of both land and fishing gear) arrange for both 
leasing-in and leasing-out. For leasing-in from the government, 
they usually raise a much higher amount from cooperative members and 
appropriate the difference among themselves and revenue department 
officials. In fact, raising of a higher amount is usually justified 
to the members on the pretext of bribing revenue officials, who despite 
the clear legal stipulation for leasing in open fisheries to 
fishermen cooperatives alone, can nevertheless delay leasing on 
various "grounds". Similarly when renting out fishing rights to 
fishermen of another cooperative or fishermen outside any cooperative, 
it is these cooperative bosses who appropriate to themselves the extra 
income of the cooperative through sub-letting.
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Ownership of Fishing Gear
21 households of Magura are involved in fishing as either a main 
occupation (19) or as a side line (2)* The fishing, gear (net/boat) 
ownership pattern among these households is as follows:
TABLE 1*f
Fishing Gear Ownership Pattern, 1977
Ownership Type No* of
T-ITI
Land Ownership Class
Hil
LLH PH LMH MH ITMH EH I RH II
Sufficient
Fishing Gear 2 - 2
Insufficient*
Fishing Gear 12 6 5 1
No fishing gear 7 4- 3
Fifty years ago, there were 13 fishing households in this village. 
All of them possessed sufficient fishing gear; in any case, at that 
time, there was no fishing family without any fishing gear.
Ownership of Weaving Assets
There are *f1 looms in this village. Of them, only 21 are now 
operational. There are now 26 weaving households in this village, 
on the basis of caste and traditional family occupation. However,
5 households have completely switched over to agriculture. Of the 
remaining 21 weaving households, weaving is the main occupation of only 
9 households. Among them they own 10 active looms, as shown below:
Owns either net or boat, or when possesses both, their condition 
renders these unsuitable for fishing.
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TABLE 13
Loom Ownership Pattern, 1977
Number of 
Operational 
Looms Owned
Number of 
HH
Land Ownership Class
LLH PH LMH MH UMH RH I RH II
Owns 2 Looms 3 - - 1 1 1
Owns 1 Loom k - - 2 1
Owns no Loom 2 1 1 - -
In 19^5i of the 60 weaving households in Magura, there was none 
without a loom and other essential weaving gear. There were then, 
in all, 85 looms and all in active condition.
Ownership of the Means of Transport and Communication
Ownership of Transport Boats
There are at present 6 households whose main (A-) or subsidiary (2) 
occupation is boating (Patni). Four of them own boats of their own, 
but the condition of the boats of two boating households is far from 
satisfactory. Two of the households hire in a boat during the rainy 
season, i.e. when water communication becomes important. Of the six 
households engaged in boating, 5 are landless and 1 is poor. In 195% 
there were only 3 households dependent on boating as a main or 
subsidiary occupation. All of them possessed boats, and in good 
workable condition.
Ownership of Cycles/Rickshaw Vans/Bullock Carts
In 1977» there was no one in this village owning a rickshaw van-. 
In all 5 cycles were owned by 3 persons from RH I and II, 1 from UMH 
and 1 from MH classes.
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TABLE 16
Bullock Cart Ownership, 1977
Glass Number of Bullock Carts Owned Number of Bullock Carts 
per Household
LLH 0 (0)* -
PH 1 (1) 0.034
LMH 3 (3) 0.09
MH 7 (7) 0.24
UMH 8 (8) 0 .7 2
RH I 8 (8) ' 0 .8 0
RH II 4 (4) 0 .8 0
All Classes: 31 (33) 0 .198
The figures in parentheses indicate the number of households 
owning bullock cart(s).
Ownership of Trading Capital
Ownership of Trading Capital at Magura
At present the main occupation of 4 households (3 LLH and 1 LMH) 
is trade* One of these (LLH) does not own any trading capital, 
working or fixed* In 1951» the main occupation of 13 households was 
trade and commerce. There was no trading household at that time 
without at least a working capital.
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Ownership of Trading Capital at Maizpara Market Place
TABLE 17
Ownership of Fixed Capital Relating to Trade by Beparis, Moha.jons, 
Stockists, Aratdars, Permanent Shopkeepers, at Maizpara Market Place, 
1977
Land No. of % age Number of Traders with Fixed Capital*
Ownership Traders of (relating to trade) Valued at
Class Traders — ---   — ..........   -
Below Between Between Above
Tk. 25 Tk. 25 Tk. 50 Tk. 100
Thousand Thousand Thousand Thousand
and and
Tk. 50 Tk. 100
Thousand Thousand
Lower
Middle
Household 5,6
and Below
Middle
Household 30
Upper Middle 
Household 32
Rich
Household 51
I
Rich
Household 22
II
Total: 191 100.00 48 42 77 24
Including stock in trade.
It was not possible to find out in detail either the total value 
of the fixed assets or the amount of fixed assets owned by each of 
the above traders at Maizpara market place. However, our estimate, 
based on the above table and cross examination of selected informants, 
is that traders from rich households I and II (i.e. about 38 per cent
29.31 30 21
15.70 12 11
16.75
26.70
11.51
10 13
40
12
11
10
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of the total traders in this market place) own roughly 80 per cent 
of the total fixed capital (relating to trade) of this market place, 
and also there has been, between 1951 and 1977 » increased concentration 
in the ownership of fixed capital in this market place. One 
important reason for this trend is that during this period there has 
been very little expansion in the market place area, so that expansion 
in permanent shopping structures, processing industries (oil press 
and flour mill), storage capacity, money lender cum trading financier's 
establishment, etc., was brought about mostly by those persons (95 
per cent of whom belonged to RH I and II from Urani-Maizpara,
Charikhada and Hossainpur) who in the 1950s were already owning and 
controlling most of the land in and around this market place.
TABLE 18
Land-Owning Background of Holders of License, Permit, Agency and 
Dealership at Maizpara Market Place, 1977
Type of Trading Monopoly Number of 
Holders
Land-Owning Class
RH II RH I UMH MH LMH and 
Below
Export-Import License 5 1 2 - mm mm
Cloth/Soda Permit 5 1 1 1 -
Cigarette Agency b 2 1 - 1
GRC* Dealership 1 1 - - -
Fertiliser/Insecticide
Dealership 7 b 2 1 — —
MR Dealership 7 b 2 1 - -
All Types: 25** 15 8 5 1
* Government Rationed Commodities.
** The same person may be holding more than one type of trading 
monopoly.
Farias (Itinerant traders) and Palais (Brokers)
At Urani-Maizpara, the number of Farias and Palais at the peak 
marketing season is about bO and 8 respectively. Farias have no 
fixed capital and their working capital is also generally very small. 
They move from market place to market place, purchasing goods from the 
producer-sellers and then selling these to bigger merchants at a 
higher price. During the period 1951-1977 the number of Farias at 
this market place increased by about b times. None of the Farias
at Maizpara came from RH I or EH II classes. About 55 per cent were
from LMH and below classes, 25 per cent from MH, and 20 per cent from 
UMH. The Dalai's functions consist of establishing contact and 
negotiating deals between producer-sellers/small merchants and big 
merchants, and in the process changing a commission from the latter.
He does not possess even working capital. 6 of the 8 Palais are 
from lower middle and below households, and the remaining 2 are from 
middle households.
Froducer-Sellers
It was not possible to determine accurately the class background 
of all producer-sellers and their respective contributions to the 
total gross marketed surplus. However, on the basis of a sample 
survey, the following estimate for paddy/rice was obtained:
1 ?
TABLE 19
Estimate of (a) Class Background of Paddy/Rice Producer-Sellers, and
(b) Their Contribution Gross Marketed Surplus of Paddy/Rice at
Maizpara Market Place, 1977
Class Percentage of Total Paddy/ 
Rice Producer-Sellers
Percentage of Total 
Paddy/Rice Marketed
LMH and Below 50 10
MH 15 8
UMH 10 12
RH I and II 25 70
All Classes 100 100
TABLE 20
Ownership of Production Assets other than Land (in Taka)
Class Total Value of; Assets in Taka
0-
250
251-
1250
1201-
2500
2501-
5000
5001-
10000
10001-
20000
20001-
50000
Above
50000
LLH *f1 13 12 10 *f 1 1 - -
PH 29 3 9 7 8 1 1 - -
LMH 3^ - k 7 i*f 8 - 1 -
MH 26 - - 2 9 11 k - -
UMH 11 - - - - 3 3 1 -
RH I 10 - - - 1 - 7 2 -
RH II 5 - - - - - 2 1 2
Total 156 16 25 26 3 b 26 20 5 2
Thus, A-2#9% of all households own production assets valued at 
Tk# 2,500/- and less; 39*1% of all households own production assets 
valued at between Tk# 2,500/- and Tk# 10,000/- and only 16,02% of the
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households own production assets valued at between Tk. 10 thousand 
and Tk. 50 thousand. On the other hand, the class wise position is 
that while 85.3% of the landless households and 6 5*5% of poor 
households own production assets valued at Tk. 2,500/- and less,
100% of the RH II and 90% of BH I own assets valued at above 
Tk. 10,000/-.
From the discussion on ownership of the various means of 
production, exchange and distribution, two clear inferences may be 
drawn. Firstly, there is a strong correlation between agricultural 
land ownership and ownership of all other assets for production, 
exchange and distribution. Secondly, the trend over time in the 
ownership of all production assets was that on the one hand, these 
were getting concentrated in fewer households, and on the other, more 
and more households were being dispossessed of these. In other 
words, a distinct process of differentiation of the village households 
into owners and non-owners had set in. The implications of this 
for accentuating poverty in this village can easily be deduced.
17 5
if Role in the Main Occupation
TABLE 21
Main Occupation, Classwise, 1977
LLH PH LMK MH UMH RH I RH II Total
Agriculture 19 17 29 23 11 8 if 111
Fishing 11 8 0 0 0 - 0 19
Weaving 1 2 3 2 0 0 1 9
Boating 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 k
Trade and Commerce 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 k
House Servant 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Teacher 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
Doctor 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Priest 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Carpenter 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
School Porter 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Rope Making 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Non-Agri* Labour 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 41 29 3*f 26 11 10 5 156
Male Household Heads: 150
Female Household Heads: 6 (1 PH, ^ LMH, 1 UMH)
TABLE 22
Role in the Main Occupation (Agriculture - 111)
Role LLH PH LMH MH UMH RH I RH II
(19) (17) (29) (23) (11) (8) w
1 Does Manual Labour 
regularly 19 16 25 16 3 1 -
2 Hires in Labour 
regularly -
- - 1 5 if 2
3 Hires in Labour 
in Peak Seasons
- 1 10 10 6 if 2
if Share Crops in Land 9 7 18 7 1 1 -
5 Share Crops out Land - 2 3 3 3 3 3
176
TABLE 23
Role in the Main Occupation (Fishing - 19)
LLH (11) PH (8)
Hires in Labour Regularly or 
Occasionally 1 0
Does manual Labour Regularly 11 7
Owns Sufficient Assets for Fishing - 2
Owns Insufficient Assets for Fishing 5 5
Owns No Fishing Assets k 3
TABLE Zk
Role in the Main Occupation (Weaving - 9)
Role LLH PH LMH MH UMH RH I RH II
(1) (2) (3) (2) (0) (0) (1)
Hires in Labour 0 0 0 1 1
Regularly or otherwise
Does Manual Labour 1 2  3 1Regularly
Owns Assets for Weaving 0 1 3 2 - 1
TABLE 25
Role in the Main Occupation (Trade - f^)
Role LLH (3) LMH (1)
Hires in Labour 0 0
Owns Some Capital Relating to Trade* 2 1
Hires in Assets 1 1
* Trading Capital was less than Tk. 2,000/- in all cases.
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TABLE 26
Role in the Main Occupation (Boating - 40
Role LLH (3) PH (1)
Hires in Labour 0 0
Owns Assets for Boating 3
Does Manual Labour 3 1
From the above tables, the general trend emerging is that on the 
one hand, those who own the means of production are divorced from the 
direct responsibility of actual production, while on the other, those 
who are actually engaged in production (and exchange), own very 
little or no means of production (and exchange)* This means that 
inequality in the ownership of means of production, in the specific 
context of this village, not only defeats the ends of distribution 
but also of production, with consequent implications for poverty 
accentuation*
5 Surplus Appropriation
Usufructuary Mortgaging in Land
Fifty years ago, land had to be formally registered, so that the 
mortgages, even after paying the full amount borrowed, did not 
necessarily retrieve the land since the occupier of the land could
produce legal documents in his favour* Now, no formal registration
is required* The present terras are:
i) The owner gets back his land as soon as he completes payment
of the full amount plus interest at usurious rates against 
which land was mortgaged out. Until such time, land and
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production from land are enjoyed by the person to whom land 
has been mortgaged out*
ii) However, a fixed yearly deduction is made from the total
amount payable, for use of the land* Therefore, after a 
certain period of time, the land automatically reverts to 
the owner. However, if the owner wishes to resume his land
earlier, he is required to pay the amount that is payable
after the aforesaid deductions.
In some cases, mortgaging out land amounts to cash renting 
(which is illegal), because no interest is charged for the money 
advanced* But when usurious interest payments are added to the 
amount advanced, the land is, in effect, being used as collateral in 
a usurious money lending operation* At present, there is no fixed 
custom for land mortgage and practice varies according to the 
respective economic strengths of the persons involved in the 
transaction* Thus, when a PH was mortgaging out and an RH was 
mortgaging in a piece of land, the terras were generally detrimental 
to the former. On the other hand, when the parties involved were of 
same economic background, the conditions tended to be softer.
Causes for mortgaging out also affected the terms. The main reason
for mortgaging out by a PH to a MH was immediate cash requirement to
meet difficult economic and social situations* On the other hand,
the only RH II (SM )*who had mortgaged out his land did so in order to
obtain cash to buy more land. When the PH and LLH were mortgaging
in land, they did so in order to supplement their otherwise paltry 
incomes but when an RH or a UMH did the same, there was obviously not 
the compulsion of a dire poverty situation.
ou
* Throughout the text, Subscript 1 refers to Muslim name while 
subscript 2 refers to a Hindu name* A
1 7 9
Over the period 1951-77» mortgaged out land as a percentage of the 
total agricultural land increased from 1.07 to 2.56. However, since 
1972, the rate of increase seems to have accelerated. In a few cases, 
the terms for mortgaging were more favourable than those for share 
cropping. Most poor and lower middle households mortgaging out land 
felt that they would not be able to resume their land in the near 
future, and that they would have to wait until such time as the yearly 
deductions squared out the entire amount for which the land was 
mortgaged out.
TABLE 27
Class Background of HH Mortgaging in/out Land*, 1977
Landholding Class No Mortgaging In No Mortgaging Out
LLH 10 (33.33)** —
PH 6 (20.00) 7 (26.92)***
LMH 6 (20.00) 11 (42.30)
MH 3 (10.00) 6 (23.10)
UMH 2 (6.66) 1 (3.84)
RH I 3 (10.00) -
RH II - 1 (3.85)
* Mortgaged out land = 10.39 acres. Mortgaging out households 
all belong to Magura. Mortgaging in households belong to
Magura and surrounding villages, i.e. HH who have mortgaged in
the 10.39 acres mentioned above.
** Percentage of the total mortgaging in HHs.
*** Percentage of the total mortgaging out HHs.
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Share Cropping
 ^ Terms of Share Cropping
There is no written contract. However, at present, the following 
are the commonly faccepted* terms and conditions of share cropping in 
this village:
1) Land owners can evict the share croppers at any time, although
the lease (which is oral) is valid for usually one year.
2) Produce and by-products are equally divided between the land 
owner and the share cropper.
3) The entire cost of cultivation is borne by the share cropper.
He has also to transport the landowner*s share from the field
to the latter*s house.
k) The share cropper decides the crop(s) to be raised.
5) Sometimes, additional cash advance (non-refundable) has to
be paid to the landowner.
6) As and when required, the share cropper is expected to render 
free services to the landowner and follow him in his 
factional politics.
Of the 58 Magura share croppers interviewed, 78.9^% thought they 
were dependent on the landowners for their livelihood. Only 5 among 
them considered land reforms involving either land distribution or 
better terms in share cropping as a plausible way out of their 
dependency. The response of the rest, in fact, varied among the 
following:
a) one should work hard and buy land;
b) there is nothing to be done;
c) do not know.
181
When asked specifically if they rendered free services to and/or 
followed the land owner in the latter's factional politics, only 52.6% 
admitted having done these. The main reason for this rather limited 
extent of extra-economic compulsion is that when the share-cropper is 
below the MH class and the landowner is above the MH class (which is 
the general case), extra-economic compulsions become prominent but 
when share cropping is among equals/near equals, these are not 
applied.
All of the share croppers interviewed thought that the terms of 
share-cropping have either deteriorated or have not changed over the 
last fifty years. No one thought that these had improved from the ±r
point of view. They mentioned that before 1967i they (share­
croppers) did not have to carry the owner's share from the field to 
the latter's house. Also the land/man ratio being much more 
favourable they could bargain better with their landowners for input 
supplies and exemptions in case of a bad harvest. This is also 
attested to by O'Malley in his 1912 District Gazetteer for Jessore(p 8 3)
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2 Extent of Share Cropping
TABLE 28
Land Use by Tenancy 1951-“1977
1951 1961 1977
Agricultural 
Land Use 
Categories
Amount 
of Land 
(in
acres)
Percent­
age of 
Total 
Agricult­
ural Land
Amount 
of Land 
(in 
acres)
Percent­
age of 
Total 
Agricult­
ural Land
Amount 
of Land 
(in 
■ acres)
Percent­
age of 
Total 
Agricult­
ural Land
1 Owner Managed/ 
Cultivated Land 235.0 50.53 233.0 5 5 .6 2 287.52 70.86
2 Share Cropped 
out Land 225.0 k8.k 196.0 4 5 .0 107.85 26.58
3 Cash Rented 
out Land
A- Mortgaged 
out Land 5.0 1.07 6*0 1.38 10.39 2 .56
Total 6^ 5 .0 100 ^35.0 100 ^05.76 100
TABLE 29
Extent of Share-Cropping (by Households) 195*1-77
Categories 1951 1961 1977
Number
of
HH
Percent­
age of 
Total HH
(135)
Number
of
HH
Percent­
age of 
Total HH 
(1^ 3)
Number
of
HH
Percent­
age of 
Total HH
(156)
1 Share Cropping 
in ko 31.1 5^ 31.^7 57 36 .53
2 Share Cropping in 
as the Main 15 
Source of Income
11.11 20 13.98 13 8 .3 3
3 Share Cropping 
out 55 40.7^ 50 3^.96 28 .20
k Share Cropping
out as the Main 30 
Source of Income
22.22 25 17.^8 12 7 .6 9
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TABLE 30
Glass Background of Share Cropping in Households, 1977
Glass No* of Share Cropping in Amount of Land Amount of Land
HH Share Cropped Share Cropped in
In (in acres) /HH in the
Respective Class 
(in acres)
LLH (19.3)* 11 (26.8)** 18.65 0.45
PH (17.5) 10 (34.48) 35.28 1.21
LMH (33.3) 19 (55.9) 31.59 0.92
MH (21.05) 12 (46.15) 15.70 0 .6 0
UMH (5.26) 3 (27.27) 1.84 0 .1 8
RH I (3.50) 2 (20.0 ) 1.08 0 .11
RH II _ _ —
* % of the total share cropping in HH (57).
** % of the total HH in respective class*
TABLE 31
Class Background of Share Cropping out Households, 1977
Class No. of Share
HH
Cropping out Amount of Land 
Share Cropped 
Out (in acres)
Amount of Land 
Share Cropped out 
/HH in the 
Respective Class 
(in acres)
LLH - - -
PH (20.45)* 9 (31.03)** 3.53 0 .1 2
LMH (29.5*0 13 (38.23) 15.07 0.44
MH (20.48) 9 (34.61) 16.76 0.64
UMH (9.09) 4 (36.36) 14.49 1.31
RH I (11.36) 5 (50.00) 19.75 1.94
RH II (9.09) 4 (80.00) 38.25 7.65
* % of total share cropping out HH (44).
** % of total households in respective class*
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TABLE 32
Extent of Absenteeism* among Share Cropping out Households, 1951-77
Year Total Number of Share 
Cropping out 
Households
Number of Share 
Cropping out 
Households Absent 
from Village
Number and Percentage 
of Share Cropping out 
HH not Cultivating 
with Family Labour
1951 55 - 'to (73)
1977 44 - 30 (68)
’“Absenteeism may be at two levels:
1) Totally absent from village
2) Present in the village but not engaged in cultivation 
through own labour*
From the tables above, the following may be deduced. Firstly, 
land under owner/owner managed cultivation increased from 50*53% of 
agricultural land in 1951 to 70.80% of the agricultural land in 1977* 
Secondly, while land under share cropping decreased from 48.4% in 
1951 to 26*58% in 1977» share-cropping in households increased from 
31*1% in 1951 to 3 8*53% in 19771 indicating that now too many households 
were competing for too little land, thereby decreasing the bargaining 
strength of the share-croppers* Share cropping as a main occupation 
was on a slight decline (8.33% in 1977 as against 11.11% in 1951) and 
this showed that the terms of share cropping being what they were, 
share cropping as an only occupation was becoming less attractive. 
Thirdly, while the overwhelming majority of the share-cropping in 
households were from LL to MH classes (91*2%), 70.4% of the share- 
cropping out households were from RH II to MH. In terms of land 
share cropped out, RH II to UMH classes share cropped out 72.49% of 
the total share cropped out land. Also, the amount of land share 
cropped out per household was far larger for UMH to RH II than for MH
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to PH classes. There were two main reasons why some middle to poor 
households share-cropped out land:
1) pre-occupation with other income earning work such as fishing 
and weaving (9 fishermen and weavers of LMH to MH classes 
share cropping out their land while pursuing fishing and 
weaving);
2) lack of draught animals, agricultural inputs and implements, 
wage fund, family labour, etc., or when a female or an old/ 
sick man was the household head; in 8 of the 31 share 
cropping out households within MH to PH classes, household 
heads were either females or old/sick males.
Thus, share cropping in Magura, as a method of surplus 
appropriation was characterised by rack renting in kind involving 50% 
or more of the produce, divorce of the owner from risk and respons­
ibility of cultivation and various extra-economic pressures. The 
landowners were able to apply this particular appropriation process 
because of their monopoly ownership and control over land in an economy 
with a very low level of productive forces.
Although the surplus extracted thus is not very great, either in 
absolute terms or from the viewpoint of the production possibilities 
inherent in using modern agricultural technology and methods, the rate 
of return is high, given that landowners do not have to contribute 
anything towards cultivating cost or share in any way the risk and 
responsibility of cultivation.
Moreover, given the adverse land/man ratio, landowners can also 
extract free services and support for their factional politics from 
share croppers. This support can then be used to strengthen their
political position and to acquire access to the various governmental 
inputs supplied through the local power structure.
From the point of view of the share cropper, such appropriation 
leaves him with very little for necessary consumption and investment.
The insecurity associated with share cropping also prevents him from 
making any long terra land improvements. Also, at this high level of 
appropriation, the cost of incremental production through improved 
technology may outstrip the value of his share. The only compulsions 
to maximise production working on him are (a) his own needs of 
consumption and (b) threat of eviction.
As a consequence, he does what is obvious under the circumstances, 
namely maximisation of his labour on the share cropped land. But in 
this he faces a number of constraints. First, there is often his own 
plot of land, however tiny, competing with the share cropped land for 
his labour, specially during the peak agricultural seasons. Second, 
at his low level of consumption, the intensity and quality of the 
labour provided by him are not very high, even though there is no lack 
of effort on his part. Thirdly, the output of this labour is low 
also owing to the low level of implements with which he has to operate. 
Sometimes, he does not possess even the basic objects of labour like a 
wooden plough or a draught animal, or, if he does possess them, their 
quality is very low (and as such he has to resort to Anguri cultivation*). 
In fact, this is the main reason why share croppers from poor 
households are preferred to those from landless households (see Table 
30). Fourthly, since he has no proprietory or tenancy rights over 
the land he share crops, he cannot mortgage it for credit from
* See Chapters 4 and 9*
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institutional agencies. Fifthly, the land share cropped out in this 
village is generally of lower quality. Finally, unless production 
is abnormally low there is little fear of eviction* since, as mentioned 
earlier, the land owner's calculation is conditioned more by the high 
rate of return involving no investment and risk and responsibility of 
cultivation and extra-economic uses of his share croppers than by the 
profit possibilities of capitalist agriculture, requiring investment, 
management and even physical labour. Thus share cropping 
appropriation acts as a positive hindrance to higher production and 
growth of productive forces. The above explanation is based on 
personal observation as well as extensive interviews with share cropping 
in and out household heads. It is also validated by Tables 33 and 34 
below which give the yield/acre for various crops in owner cultivated/ 
managed and share cropped out land in Magura.
TABLE 33
Major Crops Produced from Owner Cultivated/Managed Land, 1977
Crop Total acreage Production in Mds. Yield/Acre (Mds)
Deshi Aus 187.37 1,837.50 9 .8 0
Scattered Araon 166.77 2,014.50 12.07
Deshi Amon 42.48 585.OO 13 .60
Roa Amon 15.15 174.00 11.48
Total Paddy 411.75 4,611.00 11.19
Jute 88.83 842.61 9*48
Evictions can and do, in fact, take place for extra-economic 
reasons; for example, if a share cropper does not render 
political support or free services.
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TABLE 54
Major Crops Produced from Share Cropped Out Land, 1977
Crop Total acreage Total Production Yield/Acre in
in Mds. Mds.
Deshi Aus 87.21 666.00 7.63
Scattered Amon 75.93 705.00 9 .28
Deshi Amon 31.56 474.00 15.01
Total Paddy 194.70 1,845.00 9 .4 7
Jute 41.85 382 .92 9.14
TABLE 35
Yield/Acre in Owner Managed/Cultivated Land and Share Cropped in Land 
for Lower Middle and Poor HHs who Managed/Cultivated own Land as well 
as Share Cropped in Land, 1977
Category Yield/Acre in Owner Managed Yield/Acre in Share Cropped in 
Land in Mds. Land in Mds.
LMH
PH
11.3
7.75
10.9
7.04
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Hired Agricultural Labour 
TABLE 36
Casual Labour* Wages, 192,f-1977
Year Wage/Day 
Without Food 
in Taka 
(8 a.m. - 
2 p.m.)
Wage/Day (plus 
meals) in Taka 
(8 a.m. - 
6 p.m.)
Rice Equivalent 
of Col. (2)
Rice Equiv­
alent of 
Col. (3) 
in lbs.
1925** N.A. 0.^6 - 5.12
1951 0.50 0.50 2 .6 0 2 .6 0
1977 4.50 ^#00*** 1 .80 1 .6 0
* Work consists of land preparation, sowing, weeding, harvesting 
and post harvest operations.
** Source: A. Moraen (1925* 75).
*** Though still in existence, part kind-payment is now sharply on 
the decline.
TABLE 57
Seasonal Variation in Casual Labour Wages, 1977
Month Rate Without Food in Tk.
May 15 - June 15 5*00
June 15 - August 15 7-00
August 15 - October 15 2*00
October 15 - February 15 6.00
February 15 - April 15 2.50
April 15 - May 15 6.00
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TABLE 38
Asset Ownership of Households With Main Occupation as Agricultural
Wage Labour, 1951-1977
Asset Percentage of Households with 
Agricultural Wage Labour as Main 
Occupation
1951 1977
Owns some Agricultural Land 70 40
Owns a Homestead 100 100
Owns Two Bullocks - -
Owns One Bullock 20 20
Owns One Complete Plough 30 10
Owns a Sickle 100 80
TABLE 39
Permanent Labour (Muni) Income, 1951-1977
Year Annual Income pay in Tk* Bice Equivalent in lbs.
1951
1977
200-300
600-900
800-1200
240-360
1 9 1
TABLE 40
Hired Agricultural Labour as Main. Occupation*, 1951-1977
Year Number of Households Percentage of Total Households
1951 10 7.**0
1977 20 (8 PH and 12 .82
12 LLH)
Members of other households were engaged in agricultural wage 
labour as a subsidiary occupation* They ranged between LLH 
and MH Glasses.
From the above tables, the following trends may be noted.
Firstly, the real income of both casual and permanent hired 
agricultural labourers has sharply declined over time. There is also 
considerable seasonal variation in the wage rates causing great 
uncertainty and fluctuations in total income. Secondly, hired 
agricultural labour as both a main and a subsidiary occupation showed 
some increase over this period (from 7*40% in 1951 to 12.82% in 1977) 
but obviously this was not enough to make wage labour a dominant form 
of surplus value appropriation in the agricultural sector. Thirdly, 
the process of dispossession had clearly set in, and even so, the 
hired agricultural labourers were not as yet completely divorced from 
the means of production.
Wage Labour Mobility
There was little wage labour mobility, owing to lack of alternative 
employment opportunity in and out of the agricultural sector. Only 
in the peak agricultural seasons was some mobility observed. 15 
persons from this village (5 LLH, 5 LMH, 5 MH) regularly travel to 
south Barisal and Khulna for paddy harvesting. On the other hand,
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both during harvesting and sowing seasons, outside wage labourers seek 
work in Magura. In 1976, 55 persons from Faridpur came here during 
the harvesting season. Called Daoals, they arrived by boat and lived 
in the boat during the one month they worked in Magura. They were 
paid in kind at the rate of 7 sheafs of paddy for every 100 sheafs 
harvested. Then, during the sowing season, 30 persons came to this 
village from Faridpur and other parts of Jessore. They worked from 
6 a.m. to 7 p.m. for about 20 days. They were paid in both cash and 
kind at the rate of Tk. 2 plus 3 meals a day.
Thus, in reality, wage labour in Magura was ”captive” labour, 
given its lack of mobility in the face of little alternative employment 
opportunities in and outside the agricultural sector. Consequently, 
landowners could dictate wage rates to their advantage and the rate 
of surplus value appropriated through wage labour was very high and on 
the increase over the years (as indicated by the fall in real wages 
during the period under study).
For land owners, such a high level of surplus appropriation meant 
little incentive to undertake productive investment (higher productive 
investment meant greater employment opportunities, decrease in the 
reserve army of unemployed, better bargaining power of the labourers 
for higher wages and consequently a lower profit rate for the land 
owners), so that actual surplus obtained was very low but the land 
owner's rate of return at the existing level of production was high. 
Such a high surplus appropriation rate also meant lower consumption by 
the wage labourers and consequently lower labour productivity.
At this low level of labour mobility, the land owners were also 
able to subject wage labourers to extra-economic pressures (which in
19  3
the last analysis, helped strengthen their economic position). Thus, 
of the 57 wage labourers interviewed, 32 (i.e. about 56.1^%) admitted 
having done one or more of the following:
1) having given free services to the landowner;
2) having supported the landowner in his factional politics;
3) having voted in the elections according to the landowner's 
dictates.
It was noticed that extra-economic pressures were absent when 
the wage labour relation was among persons of similar economic standing.
Surplus Appropriation in the Exchange Sector
1 Level and Nature of Market Relations
In numerical terms, above 90 per cent of the exchanges undertaken 
by the villagers conform to C-M-C', i.e. commodities are sold to obtain 
money to buy, almost immediately, the various necessities of life, so 
that money plays a very limited role. However, the villagers are now 
much more market oriented than they were 50 years ago. This is most 
significant among petty producers (MH and below) who frequent the 
market place 'more regularly, in the hope of a better price.
Similarly, the number of itinerant traders visiting the village for 
courtyard purchase is now smaller than it was 50 years ago. They now 
generally approach producers in the market place (a few of them still 
come to the village directly in the winter to buy jute, coconut, 
pulses, etc.) because the latter now prefer to take their produce to 
the market place in the hope of a better price. Barter, i.e. C-C* 
exchange has not completely died out, and exists as follows:
i) exchange between oil and oilseeds;
ii) exchange between rice and betel nuts/betel leaf;
iii) exchange between rice/paddy and utensils;
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iv) exchange between meal/rice and services, such as 
agricultural wage labour, haircutting, etc*
At the two market places, i.e. Maizpara-TJrani and Gorer hat, 
M-C-M*, i.e. the traders* exchange circuit assumes some importance in 
terms of volume of goods handled through various exchange circuits, 
although in numerical terms, about 80-90 per cent of the exchanges 
are of the C-M-C* type.
Another way of looking at the level of market relations of this 
village would be to examine the volume of gross marketed surpluses for 
the important agricultural products of this village. Data on these 
are presented below:
TABLE 4-1
Gross Marketed Surplus, 1977
Name of Commodity Total Production 
in Mds.
Gross Marketed 
Surplus in Mds.
Col. (3) as % 
of Col. (2)
Paddy 6,4-38 807 12.5
Jute 1,662 1,54-2 92*7
Pulses ^50 150 33*0
Coconut 6,000 pieces 4-,000 pieces 66.6
Molasses 400 250 55.5
If we take into consideration that in 1977? the villagers bought 
113*6 mds. of paddy and 1,355*5 mds. of rice from the local market 
places (Table 4-3), we see that this is a food deficit village, so that 
here net marketed surplus is negative. Jute is a cash crop, and 
has little use locally, so that a high percentage of the total
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production has necessarily to be marketed. On the whole, the above 
statistics show that production for the market, of the kind that one 
would find in a capitalist economy, has not as yet developed.
Although precise figures for 1951 could not be obtained, on the basis 
of personal observation and cross examination of selected informants, 
it is safe to assume that marketable surplus has, at best, remained 
where it stood, in 195*1 • On the other hand, according to selected 
informants, there has been a definite decline in the marketable surplus 
for jute, coconut and molasses owing to a decline in production and 
increase demand for household consumption.
Finally, as may be seen from the occupation structure of the 
village (Table 2(A), Chapter if), trade as a main occupation has 
declined over time. However, as a side line, it seems to have 
registered a considerable increase.
2 Surplus Appropriation in the Exchange Sector
a) Distress Sale 
TABLE kZ
Forward Sale of Jute*, 1977
Class Total No* of 
Households
No. of Households who 
Forward Sold Jute
Amount of Jute 
Forward Sold (in mds.)
LLH i f 1 - -
PH 29 i f 6.50
LMH 5^ 6 8 .5 0
MH 26 7 19.50
UMH 11 1 i f . 50
RH I 10 - -
RH II 5 1 8.00
There was very little forward sale of paddy or any other 
agricultural item and hence left out.
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The forward sale by SM (EH II) was to procure cash in order to 
buy land# Otherwise the pressure for forward sale came from one or 
both of the following needs: repayment of outstanding loans and
purchase of basic necessities such as cooking oil, salt, cloth, etc.
5 persons (3 RH II, 1 EH I and 1 in'® - one of the RH II was from the 
neighbouring village of Bamankhali) bought this jute at prices ranging 
from Tk# 60 to Tk# 80 per maund.
They sold this jute in February to itinerant traders (Farias) 
visiting the village from Barisal and Faridpur at prices ranging from 
Tk. 1^ 0 to Tk# 150 per maund. Since they did not have to spend 
anything on transport, they made a substantial profit.
Sale Immediately After Harvest
Almost all households sell immediately after the harvest owing to 
cash requirement for various purposes (this invariably means a lower 
price). However, UMH to RH II households sell only a small part of 
the produce immediately after harvest since pressures for such sales 
are not acute. However, this is not so with the LLH to MH households 
on whom such pressures are heavy owing to the need to repay outstanding 
loans and buy salt, kerosene, cloth, etc. In 1977i 8 LL and 8 P 
households sold within a month of harvest (a) 98 maunds of jute at
prices ranging between Tk. 60 and Tk. 65 per maund; (b) 10 maunds of 
paddy at Tk. 65/- per maund (the highest per maund prices for jute and 
paddy in 1977 in this area were Tk. 150 and Tk. 110 respectively).
The table below presents the prices paid by the rich and the poor in 
respect of rice/paddy sold and bought in 1977*
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b) Speculative Trade and Hoarding
1 EH I, 1 UMH, and 1 RH II of Magura are engaged in speculative
2trade of agricultural produce. One of them, NK (RH II) has been
engaged in this trade for the last 30 years. The business procedure
is very simple, hoarding one*s own surplus and buying up, for hoarding,
agricultural commodities while these are cheapest and then releasing
the stocks in seasons when these are scarce and prices are highest.
Such business can be successfully carried out only by big land owners
because it is they alone who have a considerable surplus over and above
their consumption requirement, the necessary staying power and the
space for safe storage. Also, share cropping provides them with a
direct control over the produce (which could not have occurred if the
rent obtained was in cash). At this low level of production, this
kind of trade is highly profitable. For example, during the 197^
2
famine NK sold about 200 maunds of paddy at the exhorbitant price of 
Tk. 250/- per maund. Also, in both the market places (Gorer Hat and 
Maizpara) hoarding was a principal method of trade, for especially the 
big traders with a high staying power and monopoly over the limited 
storage facilities available in the market places. In doing this, 
they often violate government anti-hoarding measures through links with 
local officials.
Thus, surplus appropriation through distress sale and speculative 
trade (a) was closely linked with ownership of land and other assets, 
which gave different asset owning classes different staying power and 
hence different capacity to extract surplus or resist surplus 
appropriation through exchange; (b) provided big owners and traders 
with a high rate of return without the necessity to undertake 
productive investment and as such discouraged them from undertaking
expanded reproduction through capital investment. For the poor, such 
appropriation meant their greater immiserisation with a consequent fall 
in their labour productivity and essential consumption. Many of the 
MH to LLH respondents interviewed could not at first appreciate the 
process of unequal exchange to which they were a constant prey, 
because apparently the market was impersonal and guided by the objective 
laws of demand and supply. However, when asked to explain why, 
whether purchasing or selling a commodity, the price was always 
dictated by the trader and not by them, they readily grasped the point.
c) Extra-Economic Surplus Appropriation may be divided into 
two categories (i) toll collections from the market place by 
intermediaries; (ii) bribe/extortions by government officials.
Toll collections from the market place are not something new, and in 
fact many of the problems faced today in this respect have remained 
unresolved for the last 200 years. Thus, J. Westland (187 4,8617) 
wrote:
... abolition of Sayar duties was another great change at the 
same time*. These were duties levied at hats or markets upon 
goods brought there for sale. The duties were of two sorts: 
first, 'chandni* which meant a sum paid for occupation of a 
place in the hat; and second *tolahs* or rates paid upon 
the various articles, partly going to the proprietor, partly 
to the maintenance of the *darogah* or keeper of the hat, 
the 'jarubkash* or sweeper and the caller of the hat. These 
taxes the government was determined to abolish as prejudicial 
to the interests of trade; payment for permanent occupation 
of land on the hats, being of a different nature, were alone 
to be retained. These collections were as much part of the 
Zemindars* revenue as their rent collections from their 
ryots, and upon the principle which government laid down for 
itself, one eleventh part of them was the property of the 
zemindar and 10/11ths were what he had to pay to the state 
as its share.
Refers to 1793, i.e. when Permanent Settlement was being 
implemented in Bengal.
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The government, therefore, reduced their demand upon the 
zemindar by 10/11ths of the Sayar collections, which otherwise 
would have formed part of it; and by way of compensating the 
zemindars for the 1/11th of which they were prohibited from 
collection for themselves, they made a further deduction equal 
to this 1/11th.
The zemindars, of course, consented to receiving these 
deductions but they did not, for all that, cease to collect 
the Sayar duties. The policy of the government was not 
carried out, and the result was not an abolition of Sayar 
duties, but simply a handing over to the zemindars of the 
entire amount of them. They continued to collect them, and 
appropriated not only their own share (for the loss of which 
they had received compensation from government) but also the 
share which belonged to the government.
Consequently, government legally restored toll collection in 
order to ensure government share of the tolls, which were being 
collected anyway, despite the legal ban. This situation continued 
until the 1950s, when the East Pakistan government nationalised all 
rural market places so that in place of the zemindar and his staff, 
government officials became responsible for their management. In this 
respect the government simply followed the zemindars' footsteps, 
that is, gave away, on a year-to-year basis, toll collection rights 
to the highest bidder. Although, under the law the successful bidder 
(called i.jaradar locally) could not sublet his collection rights, in 
practice, several layers of intermediary toll receiving rights were 
created so that exhorbitant toll collections continued unabated.
In 1972, the i.jaradari system was abolished and local hat/bazaar 
committees, together with revenue officials, were entrusted with the 
responsibility of (a) collecting tolls directly and (b) maintenance 
and development of the market places. In 19751 the i.jaradari was 
restored in the face of massive misappropriation of funds and other 
malpractices by revenue officials and hat/bazaar committee members.
In other words, matters were back to square one.
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Legally, tolls at the market places have at present to be 
collected in accordance with a toll chart prepared regionally by a 
committee of local revenue officials* Although the government 
maintains a marketing department, its local officials are never 
included in these committees* On the other hand, revenue officials 
do not maintain any record of price movements, so that ultimately 
"thumb rules" and "impressions" guide the preparation of these toll 
charts* Sellers are quite oblivious of their existence since these 
have never been publicly displayed in the market place. Relevant 
officials have not either tried to ensure their implementation.
In the last analysis, the arbitrary judgement of the toll collectors 
decides everything. However, such arbitrariness is not without a 
pattern: (a) big traders are always charged less tolls per unit than
temporary shopkeepers and hawkers; (b) in clear contravention of 
government rules, toll is collected in kind as well. This augments 
illegal exactions; since toll in kind is selectively applied to 
petty sellers, they are the worst sufferers on this score also.
In June 1977, the legal position in regard to toll receiving 
interests in Maizpara-Urani market place was as follows:
Government
Local Bidder (Ijaradar)
Traders
Maizpara-Urani was one of those market places in Narail thana 
whose reputation for sub-letting of collection rights (which is illegal) 
was minimal. And yet, there were as many as seven toll receiving 
interests here, besides the legal lessee:
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a) the Managing Committee of Maizpara High School;
b) Semi-permanent lessees of a tottering bamboo bridge across
the river (at the main approach point to the market place
from the other side of the river) and two nearby wharfs;
c) the bazaar committee;
d) private owners of hat/bazaar land;
e) sub-lessees for tolls collected on river-transported goods 
to and from this market place;
f) members of the hat/bazaar committees, toll collectors, 
including their substitutes and helpers;
g) sweeper*
'j
The Legal I.jaradari is MH , a GRC dealer from nearby Boramara Village* 
He owns more than 20*0 acres of land and a licence for the export- 
import trade* Previously he was a government-registered rice trader 
and wholesaler in indigenous cigarettes (bidis)• He has also good 
connections with the local Awami League organisation* Apparently, 
he has no interest in toll collection* Since the School Managing 
Committee could not legally participate in the bidding in their own 
right, he lent his name to the bidding in order to circumvent 
official rules, in favour of the School Managing Committee. However, 
as will be evident from the list of toll collectors (see Table Mf), 
three of them are his representatives, and they are obviously there to 
make considerable personal gains. Thus MH is not only strengthening 
his influence in the area by distributing favours and helping a school 
in his area in obtaining the lease; he is also endearing himself to 
the existing power structure controlling the school and the market 
place•
The Actual Ijaradar is the School Managing Committee, and their share 
of the gross toll receipts are supposed to be used for the upkeep of
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the Maizpara High School- The School Managing Committee do not 
collect tolls directly, but through 8 toll collectors-
Toll Collectors
Toll is collected by the following 8 persons on behalf of the 
School Managing Committee:
TABLE ¥+
Toll Collectors on Behalf of the School Managing Committee
Name Land Owned 
in Acres
Occupation Other Than 
Agriculture
Other Characteristics
F1 10 - Representative of legal 
Ijaradar
BKD2 6 Quack doctor -
ALS1 0 Chawkider 
(village police)
-
SM1 2.0 - Tout, faction leader
1
m 3.0 - Representative of legal 
Ijaradar
1
GR 12-0 Dealer in modified 
rationed goods
Ex-Chairman, Village 
relief committee
HRK1 1.5 - Representative of legal 
Ijaradar
AR1 15.0 School Teacher Matbar, UC member
As remuneration for toll collection, the chawkidar (i-e. ALS )
and two of the legal ijaradar*s representatives are allowed to draw 
Tk- 3,000/- annually from the gross receipts, so that the others are 
supposed to be providing voluntary service- However, the actual 
position is very different- According to our estimate, toll 
collectors and their substitutes appropriate among themselves, about
2 0
Tk. 20,000 over and above what they are allowed to draw by the School 
Managing Committee.
TABLE k5
Net Receipts by the School Committee as Tolls from the Maizpara-Urani 
Market Place, 1972-76
Year Amount at which Leased in 
from the Government in Tk.
Net tolls Collected in Tk.
1972 200.00 1,858.21
1973 200.00 2,625•11
197^ 200.00 ^,29^.71
1975 200.00 5 ,060.86
1976 800.00 10,6^-5.00
Source: Maizpara High School Accounts Books.
Private Landowners
2 2 2 NGS and BS own the private land in the market place. NGS is
a teacher-cum-trader-cum-money-lender; he owns about 20 acres of
land and is also Secretary of the local cooperative society. He
2
was at one time a UC member. BS owns about 15 acres of land and is 
also engaged in money lending. In lieu of use of their land by the 
temporary shopkeepers, they charge a toll, and this is completely 
illegal.
Semi-permanent lessees of bridge and wharfs
The persons associated with the market bridge collect about 70 
mds. of paddy per year from residents of the surrounding villages, i.e. 
those who regularly use the bridge (the bridge provides access to the
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market place from the other side of the river)* For strangers, the 
rate is 0*1 Tk* per crossing. Besides, they also collect fish and 
vegetables worth about Tk* 800/- annually from traders for use of the 
wharfs.
Sweeper
' A sweeper is employed by the bazaar committee, but is not paid any 
salary. She collects, as salary, fish and vegetables worth Tk. 100/- 
per month from the market place.
Lessees for Toll Collection on River-Transported Goods
The rate is 10 paisa per maund of goods coming in or going out of 
the market place. The School Managing Committee sub-lets their 
collection right. In 1976, SM (and three others) bought it for 
Tk. 1,000/-. He paid only Tk. 500/- to the School Managing Committee, 
and pocketed a net profit of Tk. 3,000/-.
Bazaar Committee
The Bazaar Committee raises its funds from the general members, 
i.e. permanent shopkeepers at the rate of Tk. 100 per month.
Besides these collections, the traders have also to pay separately 
for (a) upkeep of the mosque and the temple; (b) religious functions 
like Milad, Pu.ja, etc., held in these premises. The following is the 
breakdown for the various collections from this market place in 1976:
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TABLE 46
Toll Collections (Legal and Illegal) from Maizpara Market Place, 1976
Toll Receiving Interest Net Amount 
Obtained in Tk.
Kind/Cash
1 Government 800.00 Cash
2 Legal Ijaradar - -
3 School Managing Committee 10,600.00 Cash and kind
4 Bazaar Committee 2,000.00 Cash
5 Private Landowners 500.00 Kind
6 Lessees of bamboo bridge/wharfs 7,000.00 Cash and kind
7 Payments to Chadwidar and 2 other 
collectors and sweeper 4,000.00 Cash and kind
8 Illegal retention by toll collectors
and their substitutes 20,000.00 Cash and kind
9 Sub-lease for collecting toll on 
river-transported goods 3,000.00 Cash
Total 47,900.00
From the above discussion, the following may be deduced.
Firstly, in comparison with what the government (i.e. the actual 
owner of the market place) appropriates, appropriation by various 
intermediaries between the government and the actual traders is far 
greater. Secondly, these appropriators are either rich landowners or 
poor people associated with the former as their henchmen/followers. 
About one quarter of the tolls go towards the upkeep of the Maizpara 
High School. Even if it is assumed that there is no outright 
misappropriation of these funds by the School Managing Committee 
members (all of whom are from rich land-owning classes), there is no 
reason to assume that such expenditure benefits the entire rural
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society because most students and teachers of this school are from the 
richer classes. Thirdly, this appropriation is augmented by the 
political and administrative power of the rural rich, and this arises 
out of (a) their domination of the bazaar and hat committee (see 
Chapter 7)* and (b) government's failure to implement its own rules 
on toll collections*
Several effects of such appropriations can be identified.
First, these seriously hinder the growth of production for the market, 
in so far as these exhorbitant tolls act as a disincentive to traders 
and producer-sellers. Secondly, since the tolls are more severe for 
the poorer traders/producer-sellers, it means not only hitting the 
weakest in the society, but also monopolisation of the market place by 
the strong and the sturdy. Thirdly, since such appropriations are not 
based on any service or production, but on the "muscle” of the power 
structure dominating the market place, these inevitably encourage 
anti-productive activities, especially because the rate of return of 
such appropriations is almost infinite (there being no/little costs). 
Finally, as was revealed through selected informants, the surplus 
appropriated thus was mostly used for the personal consumption of 
the appropriators, and very little of it was ploughed back into the 
market place for its maintenance and development.
Bribes/extortion by Government Officials
Fifty years ago, it was a common practice for most government 
officials on tour, especially those of the police and revenue 
departments, to take away various commodities from the market place for 
their personal consumption, either free or at throw-away prices.
Such open extortions have decreased substantially. In any case, 
we did not detect any such case during our stay at Magura. On the
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other hand, bribes and covert extortions have now become far more 
prominent. Thus, new or renewal of old licences for trade and godowns 
cannot be obtained without bribing the relevant officials. In 1977» 
the bribe rates were Tk. 500/- per trader's and Tk. 100/- per godown 
licence.
Then, there are the corruptions centring around various regulations 
on trading activities. For example, jute above a certain degree of 
moisture cannot be sold; anti-hoarding measures come into force from 
time to time in case of scarce commodities; tolls have to be collected 
in cash only and according to a certain prescribed toll chart; 
weights and measures have to conform to the prescribed standards; 
adulteration of food is an offence, and milk above a certain degree of 
water may not be sold; no trading and storage inside the market place 
is allowed without relevant licences, etc. Such regulations are 
more violated than followed, but this also means that relevant 
government officials have to be regularly bribed in order that these 
violations can continue unchecked and unpunished. The traders 
affected by bribes/extortions are generally the richer ones, but this 
only implies that they more than make up the losses by raising prices 
and carrying out those very "free for all" activities against which the 
above mentioned regulations are directed, so that ultimately the 
economically weak are the worst sufferers. On the other hand, the 
surplus appropriated as bribes/extortions by officials finds its way 
into consumption unrelated to production, as is the general fate of 
all "easy money".
d) Proliferation of Intermediaries in the Exchange Circuit
Over the last fifty years, there has been a relative proliferation 
in the number of intermediaries between the producer and the actual
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consumer, given that the increase in marketed surplus has not kept pace 
with the increases in intermediaries. This proliferation seems to 
have intensified, particularly in the post-independence period.
Thus, in 1977* about 35 per cent of the licensed traders and over 75 
per cent of the itinerant traders at Maizpara-Urani market place 
entered trade in 1972 and after. For the richer households trade is 
more lucrative than production, because in a situation of stagnant 
production and increasing population, hoarding and speculative trade 
yield a much higher rate of return. On the other hand, for the 
poorer households, trade was a poverty response to seek a supplementary 
income in a situation of declining real wages, deteriorating terms 
of share cropping, etc. This trend is also attested to by the 
estimate of the per-maund profit made by various intermediaries for 
rice and jute in 1977 (as obtained through selected informants):
Broker/itinerant trader*
Small traders*
Big traders/Stockists* 
Daulatpur-Khulna-based brokers 
Daulatpur-Khulna-based Exporters
Jute 
0.50 -  1.00 
5 
10 
10 
15 - 20
Rice 
1 -  2
20 -  30
not applicable
not applicable
In fact, the position of many brokers/itinerant traders is so 
precarious, that they are thoroughly dependent on the goodwill of the 
big traders for whatever little profit they are able to make. In 
turn, the big traders obtain from them personal loyalty which is then 
utilised to strengthen the big traders' political muscle in times of 
election, factional rivalries, etc.
* Located at Maizpara-Urani market place
The other obvious effects of intermediary proliferation are
(a) steep price increases, which ultimately intensify the hardships 
of those in the city and countryside having the least purchasing power
(b) accumulation of surplus in the hands of those who have little 
connection with production. In fact, some of the intermediaries, 
for example, the city-based jute brokers, provide no service as goods 
move from the village to the city. The only basis of their profits 
is access to capital and good connections with exporters and managers 
of nationalised jute industries. Similarly, big traders provide 
little service (such as processing, packaging, etc.) and the real 
basis of their high profits is their ability to hoard and speculate.
Money Leading
Usurious money lending was a very sensitive topic to mention in
the village for a number of reasons. Firstly, in Islam, it was
clearly condemned. Secondly, under the existing law, also, money 
lending at usurious interest rates was banned (but so far no one has
been prosecuted for this in the living memory of the villagers.
Some villagers were not even aware of the legal restrictions on money 
lending). Thirdly, the borrowers clearly saw the 'squeeze1 they 
faced under the existing terms and conditions of money lending, and 
that this was possible only because of their acute scarcity situation, 
and that once in the grip of the money lender, they were on the road 
to inevitable ruin. And yet, this was a matter they were most 
reluctant to talk about because of fear of loss of collateral, refusal 
of loan in the future, and other retaliations. Many days and hours 
were spent in simply trying to locate the money lenders and borrowers, 
and it was only after a great deal of persuasion and repeated 
assurances that the borrowers and the money lenders finally agreed to
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open up. In one case, the borrower was threatened with withdrawal of 
the land he had share-cropped in from the money lender, for having 
given us his version of money lending at Magura. The author had to 
visit the money lender personally and tell him that he had no fears fro 
the fact that he was money lending at usurious interest rates but that 
if he withdrew land from his share cropper only because he had disclosed 
certain facts on money lending, the author would also retaliate against 
him in any way he could. Since the author was from the elite 
bureaucracy, the money lender took him seriously and left the poor man 
alone•
Usurious money lending at Magura now involves cash lending only 
(kind loans were quite prominent before 1972), deposition of a 
collateral and an annual interest rate ranging between 1 23 to 2 40%.
In 1921, this rate was about 25%; the present annual interest rate 
for bank/cooperative loans did not exceed 1 X.5%» At times, the 
interest has to be returned in kind. The most common terms for the 
latter are: for a loan of Tk. 100 for 3 months, the interest payable
is 1 maund of Paddy, whose minimum value would be Tk. 75• Collateral 
consists of wide ranging items such as ornaments, utensils, bullocks, 
plough, boat, fishing net, land, trees, standing crops, etc.
Since 1972, land has become more prominent as a collateral, and this 
partly explains the increase in usufruct mortgaged land. In most 
cases, collateral can be recovered only if principal and interest are 
paid within a specified time. Of the 35 borrowers interviewed, 31 
claimed to have deposited a collateral before taking out the loan.
Of these, 21 thought they could not/did not hope ever to recover their 
collateral.
212
TABKE V?
Main Money Lenders Relevant to Magura, in Order of Importance %  1977
Name Village Landholding Occupation and other Characteristics
Class
NK Magura RH II Matbar, School Teacher, Speculative 
Trader, Agriculture
MM1 II RH I Matbar, Agriculture
1
FR IT RH I Matbar, Agriculture
KPD2 II RH II Matbar, Agriculture
AM1 11 RH I Matbar, Agriculture
AK2 11 MH Cloth trade and Agriculture
JDR2 Poradanga UMH Trade and Agriculture
1
AU Magura MH Agriculture
MM1 ti MH Agriculture, petty Matbar
AM1 IT MH Agriculture
* Based on capital circulating in the money lending business.
TABLE 48
Extent of Indebtedness to Money Lenders, 1931-1977
Year No. of HH Indebted 
to Money Lenders
Amount in Taka Per Capita* Indebtedness
1951 18 (14.0%) 5,000 .00 5.51
1977 57 (22.0%) 21,530 .00 22.40
In 1921, the per-capita indebtedness for the entire Jessore 
district was Rs. 12.125 (Momen, 19251 71). The decline in per- 
capita- indebtedness between 1921 and 1951 could be explained by 
migration of money lenders (most of whom were Hindus), flight of 
rural capital to India in the years immediately following 1947 
and political and economic instability as an aftermath of 
Partition, communal riots, exodus, etc.
TABLE ^9
Class Background of Households Indebted to Money Lenders, 1977
Land Owning Class Number of Households indebted to Money Lenders
LLH 11
PH 9
LMH 11
MH W
UMH -
RH I -
RH II -
All Classes 35
From interview of borrowers and money lenders, cross examination 
of selected informants and personal observations, the following other 
money lending characteristics could be.discerned at Magura:
1) there was generally no kinship relation between lenders and
borrowers;
2) in order of importance, the reasons for taking loans were
general poverty, crop failure and marriage expenses;
3 ) in order of importance, the reasons why poor borrowers could
not/did not avail themselves of the bank/cooperative/ 
government loans were lack of "connections’1, non-availability 
in time, bribes by credit officials and red tape;
*0 12 out of the 35 borrowers claimed that besides returning
the principal and repaying the interest, they had to do one
or more of the following:
i) free services for the money lender,
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ii) vote in the election according to the money lender’s 
dictates,
iii) support the money lender in his rivalries and factional 
politics. However, where the money lender and the 
borrower were of similar landholding classes (for 
example, when a LMH/MH was borrowing from a MH) such 
pressures were rare;
5) two of the money lenders were using government/bank loans
(received at lower interest rate) for money lending purposes.
In order of importance, money lending surplus found its way 
into consumption, transfers out of the country, recycling 
into money lending and trade, and land acquisition.
The above discussion on moneylending may be summed up thus.
Firstly, usurious money lending at Magura, as a method of surplus 
appropriation, yielded a very high rate of return involving no 
productive investment. Secondly, it could be practised on a 
significant scale only by the richer land owning classes since they alone 
had the necessary surplus (and the staying power) to allow a part of 
it to circulate in money lending. Thirdly, it could thrive only 
because there was general capital scarcity and wide spread poverty in 
the village. The high interest rate represented only the monopoly 
over scarce capital but neither administrative costs nor risk premium 
since these simply did not exist given that loans were duly covered by 
collaterals and money lenders and loanees lived close to one another. 
Fourthly, given the high rate of return it yielded and the extra- 
economic stranglehold it ensured over the poor, surplus obtained from 
money lending could not possibly flow into any productive investment, 
and this is confirmed by empirical evidence.
Finally, for the village poor, usurious money lending implied loss 
of productive assets as collateral and their pauperisation and
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immiserisation through extraction of high interest surplus, with 
consequent adverse effects also on labour productivity, effective 
demand and production*
Appropriation of Governmental Inputs/Assistance
The rural sector has traditionally received very little 
governmental assistance and inputs* Since the 60s an increased flow 
has been ensured, and this consisted of the following:
a) Various production inputs at subsidised rates (credit, 
fertilizer, yarn, insecticide, fishing net, power pump,
HYV, etc.);
b) funds for development of physical and social infrastructure 
(roads, canals, culverts, buildings for schools and local 
government offices, tubewells, health and family planning 
programmes, etc.);
c) materials, specified for target groups (relief materials for 
flood/famine victims, modified rationing for the low income 
households, etc.).
As will be seen in Chapter 8, in detail, most of these have been 
appropriated outright by the rural rich (i.e. UMH to RH II landholding 
class) and by the bureaucrats. In Chapter 7, it is shown that the 
various institutions/committees/organisations through which government 
assistances have been channelled are dominated by the rural rich. As 
is apparent from the discussion on different methods of surplus 
appropriation, their very nature generates and strengthens existing 
dependency relations and extra-economic pressures, and as is shown in 
Chapter 7» in greater detail, these are used for dominating the local 
power structure through which all governmental items are funnelled. 
Such appropriation of government funds by the rural rich thus
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illustrates (a) translation of economic relations into political power 
relations and (b) use of political power relations not only to maintain 
existing economic relations but also to acquire further economic 
resources originating from the urban sector/beyond the national 
boundaries.
Again, like other appropriations discussed earlier, this is also 
effortless in the sense that it requires no productive enterprise.
It is, in fact, little better than plunder and hence militates against 
production. For the rural poor, the consequences of such 
appropriation can easily be deduced. On the one hand, the bias against 
production associated with such appropriation makes them poorer.
On the other, such appropriation further strengthens those who are 
already dominating them economically and politically.
Surplus Appropriation in the Fishing Sector
Before 1950* the open fisheries (i.e, the river system) in and
1
around Magura belonged to the family of GSK , big gantidar of the 
neighbouring village of Bamunkhali. They used to sublet these to 
individual fishermen at annual rents varying from Tk. 5 to Tk. 50 per
person, depending on the fishing assets possessed. Over and above
1
this, the fishermen were also obliged to supply GSK with as much fish 
as his family wanted, free of cost. As mentioned earlier, fishing 
rights in these waters passed on to the fishermen directly, although in 
general, open fisheries throughout the country became government 
property and came to be leased out to the highest bidder on a year-to- 
year basis. Since the latter part of the 60s, Magura fishermen 
started, increasingly, to visit the open fisheries outside their own 
fishing grounds, and as such they were also affected by the appropriation 
taking place there. In the government-owned open fisheries, the
lessee (i.jaradar) was almost always a non-fisherman who generally 
obtained the lease through under-hand dealings with revenue officials. 
He would then sublet fishing rights at a 4-5 times higher amount and, 
sometimes, there would be several intermediary rent receiving interests 
which meant rack renting of the actual fishermen and a high rate of 
return without the risk and responsibility of fishing for the lessees 
and sublessees of fishing rights. On top of this, a substantial 
quantity of fish had to be given away free to Ijaradars, U.P. members/ 
chairmen, police officials, etc. After the abolition of Ijaradari 
in 1972, such open exactions stopped, and fishermen cooperatives came
to be the only bidders in respect of open fisheries in the area.
However, the cooperative executives who are invariably the richest 
among the fishermen (and generally not participating in fishing 
directly) were engaged in the following:
1) appropriating rents obtained by subletting fishing rights
to non-cooperative members;
2) raising a higher amount from cooperative members than 
required for payment to government as lease money and then 
splitting the difference among themselves and revenue
officials (the rationale used for raising a higher amount
being that unless offered a bribe, government officials 
would delay lease permission, which is often the case);
3) pilferage of inputs supplied by the government at subsidised
rates in order to sell these in the black market.
As such, although formal I.jaradari has been abolished, its 
vestiges continue to haunt the fishing sector.
Of late, some 20 persons of villages Aranggacha, Komkhali, 
Goshgati, Ramanada Kathi, Tarashi and Charbilla have been forcibly
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catching fish from the 8 miles of open fisheries. They are all 
Muslims, and their backgrounds range from rich to lower middle 
households. Retaliation against protest by the fishing community 
included stealing, and even open snatching of their nets and other 
implements while they were catching fish.
None of the tanks and ponds in Magura is owned by any member of 
the fishing community, i.e. those who have some fishing knowledge and 
expertise. The richer tank owners employ them for catching fish from 
these tanks on condition that 75% of the sale proceeds of the fish 
caught would belong to the former. Thus, given no investment, the 
rate of return for the owners is very high. Also, since these more 
or less meet the consumption needs of richer tank owners, they are 
not very concerned about modern pisciculture and tank re-excavation.
Surplus Utilisation Pattern
As may be noted from Chapter 6, net income, on the whole, is very 
small compared with production possibilities from the available 
resources, and necessary consumption (especially food) takes up the 
major part of this, so that surplus available for productive 
investment is very small in absolute terms. On the other hand, 
unproductive and wasteful consumption such as in social/religious 
rites/festivals increase with land ownership (discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 7). Puja, Eidul-Azha (see Table 50), Ziafat, 
Sradh, marriage and dowry consume a substantial part of the rural 
rich incomes. The poor cannot afford these and hence, over the years, 
they have been increasingly abstaining from such expenditures.
However, as noted in Chapter 7, their mental attachment to these does 
not seem to have declined, and there is no reason to believe that 
under the existing system, a landless household of Magura would not
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emulate the life style of the rural rich, if suddenly he obtained a 
lot of money, say in a lottery. An interesting aspect of such 
wasteful consumption was that in all these festivals/rites, the major 
expenditure was on food, and over-eating and waste were endemic.
At least this was the author*s experience whenever he visited the rural 
rich during various festivals and rites.
TABLE 50
Animal Sacrifice* on the Eidul Azha Festival, *1972-1977
Year Cows Goats Glass Background
LLH PH LMH MH UMH RH I RH II Total
1972 5 2 - - if 3 6 2 15
1973 4 1 - - 3 3 5 2 13
1974 6 2 - - 3 3 7 2 15
1975 4 1 - - 3 3 6 2 14
1976 4 2 - - 3 3 6 3 15
1977 3 5 - - - **3(19) 5(8) 5(8) 3(3) 16
* The ability to sacrifice animals on the day of Eidul Azha was a 
good indicator of a household*s poverty/prosperity situation.
The number of households sacrificing was about double the number 
of animals being sacrificed in a year because sacrifice was mostly 
on share.
** The figures in the parentheses indicate the total number of Muslim 
households.
In the agricultural sector, the relative under-utilization of 
agricultural land (in. terms of yield/acre) by the rural propertied 
classes is apparent from the following Table:
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TABLE 51
Yield/Acre of Paddy in Owner Managed/Cultivated Land According to Size 
- Class Distribution, 1977*
Size Class 
Category
Total Acreage of Owner 
Manage d/Cult ivat e d 
Land
Total Production 
in mds.
Yield/Acre 
in mds.
RH II 123.60 1,323 .00 10.7
RH I 77.40 846.00 10.9
UMH 6 1 .8 0 739.50 11.96
MH 76.05 952.00 12.38
LMH 53.94 613.50 11.30
PH 18.96 147.00 7.75
All Classes 411.75 4,611.00 11.19
The above table shows that yield/acre is highest with the MH and 
UMH and very low for both PH and RH I and RH II. For the PH, low ? 
yield/acre may be explained by their lesser access to production 
assets, poor quality of land, lower labour productivity, etc., which 
offset the back breaking labour they apply on their land. On the 
other hand, the low yield/acre for RH I and RH II can be explained 
only by the assurance of a high rate of return from appropriations 
associated with little responsibility and risk for production.
Similar is the situation with the tanks and ponds owned by the rural 
propertied classes. Despite the considerable fish production potential
In the context of India, existence and causes of an inverse 
relationship between size of holding and productivity havfcbeen the 
subject of a long drawn out debate, which is by no means over 
and concluded. Some of the important contributions so far in this 
regard are by Sen (1962), Sen (1966), Rao (1966), Bhagwati and 
Chakravarty (1969)1 Bharadwaj (1974), Patnaik (1972),
Chattopadhaya (1972), Chanda (1978), Rudra (1968), Ghose (1980), 
etc. However, we have purposely avoided this debate because it 
does not concern us directly.
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of these tanks (the price incentive is also present in that fish is 
very costly in this region), not more than 3% of it has been exploited 
(see Chapter 4). Here again and as pointed out earlier, it is the 
existing high rate of appropriation which mainly guides this response. 
Also, from time immemorial, tank excavation has been undertaken by the 
rural rich more as a mark of social prestige and distinction than from 
utilitarian considerations. That a tank can be a source of fish 
production on a commercial scale is a notion that is making headway 
among the rural propertied classes, who own most of the tanks, if at 
all, only very slowly. Thus so far only one person from a rich 
household added a high yielding variety fish to his tank.
The poor tank owners have entirely different problems. They do 
not have the necessary capital to undertake re-excavation and modern 
pisciculture, and this is clearly borne out by the fact that only one 
among the ten tanks owned by them is in any usable condition. They 
do not either have the required knowledge for modern pisciculture.
If they had a strong organisation among themselves, they could easily 
have re-excavated these tanks by pooling their labour power on a 
cooperative basis. But this is something that is yet to develop in 
this village.
As pointed out earlier, money lending and speculative trade were 
some of the important investment avenues of the surplus, since these 
yielded a high rate return without any productive effort, and in an 
economy characterised by lack of capital and production* It was not 
possible to find out precisely the amount of capital circulating into 
these activities but on the basis of evidence presented earlier, it is 
certain that such capital was increasing over time and a portion of 
the capital obtained from government/semi-goverament sources for the
purposes of agricultural production was being redirected into these 
activities.
The data on land transactions, presented earlier, clearly show
that the rural propertied classes invested a considerable portion of
their surplus in land acquisition, but again no precise statistics could
be obtained in this respect. However, the land purchase spree among
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them is well illustrated by the example of SM (EH II) who mortgaged 
his existing land to obtain money to buy more land.
The table below presents an estimate of how the trading surplus 
was being utilised by the UMH, EH I and EH II traders of Maizpara-Urani 
market place in 1977*
TABLE 52
Utilisation of Trading Surplus* at Maizpara-Urani* *, 1977
Main Field of Utilisation Number Percentage
Land Purchase 26 2^ .7 0
Money Lending 5 ^.90
HH consumption *** 6k 6 0 .90
Industrial Production 3 2.85
Ploughing Back into Trade 3 2.85
Transfer out of the Country k 3 .8 0
All Fields 105 100.00
* Gross Earnings - Operational Costs, including costs towards 
licenses, bribes, fees, taxes, etc.
** Based on straight survey, modified by cross examination of selected 
informants.
*** It was not possible to separate "necessary" from "socially wasteful" 
consumption.
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As the above table clearly demonstrates, the trading surplus was 
not moving into production proper on any mentionable scale*
It is, therefore, quite evident from the above discussion that 
the surplus utilisation pattern that has existed in Magura over time 
was a class phenomenon: those who did not possess a surplus were
involved in production, whereas those owning a surplus channelled it 
into socially anti-productive activities* Also, in the context of 
Magura, there was little in the Explanation* that it was linked with 
lack of profitable investment opportunities.* As will be evident 
from Chapter 8, all production facilities and incentives were, in 
effect, flowing specifically to the rural rich, i.e. those who owned 
the surplus. On the other hand, there were strong indications to 
suggest that this was mainly because there were no restrictions on 
socially anti-productive activities, which yielded a very high rate of 
return, and which did not require any risk bearing enterprise, 
management/skills, gestation period, etc. The effects of such surplus 
utilisation on production in general, and on price movement, optimum 
use of available resources, and employment expansion, in particular, 
can easily be deduced.
A Comprehensive Class Analysis for Magura
So far in this Chapter, I have employed a particular class analysis 
scheme, which I have called a tentative class analysis scheme (hereafter 
TCAS). It is characterised by a number of categories which, in 
practice, seem illuminating but which are difficult to trace historically. 
In the final section, I shall present a comprehensive class analysis
* Schultz (196 ,^ 131-2) is the main proponent of this line of 
argument.
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(hereafter CCA), in which the relevant categories are reduced, and 
which has the merit of being amenable to historical treatment. The 
different schemes will suit different purposes. In the analysis of 
contemporary poverty at the village level, I have felt the former to 
be the more useful.
Before laying out the CCA for Magura, a few clarifications are 
in order. Firstly, the data presented in Table 6 of this Chapter show 
that family size does not in any way invalidate the classes defined in 
the TCAS: per capita land ownership increases clearly as one moves
from PH to RH II, the per capita agricultural land ownership of RH II 
being 21 times higher than that of PH (the per household agricultural 
land ownership disparity is, of course, far greater among the TCAS 
classes, per household agricultural land of RH II being *f1 times greater 
than that of PH). However, it is likely that a very small number of 
households would move up or down the class ladder, if family size was 
superimposed on TCAS classes. On the other hand, the by-and-large 
direct correlation between natural land productivity and class position 
and a clear inverse relationship between family structure (in terms 
of dependency ratio) and TCAS classes would tend to balance the possible 
off-setting effect of family size on class position of this small 
number of households. Therefore, no need was felt to improve the 
TCAS classes in terms of effect of these factors, in arriving at the 
CCA. Secondly, as in the TCAS, the CCA takes agricultural land as 
the proxy for all means of production (and exchange). This is 
because the data in this Chapter clearly show a direct relationship 
between ownership of agricultural land and that of all other
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assets,* Thirdly, the CCA is a definite improvement upon the TCAS
in that in CCA, each class exhibits surplus appropriation and
utilisation characteristics quite distinct from those of the other
classes* TCAS is based only on land ownership and does not take into
consideration the surplus appropriation and utilisation situation of
the households. However, TCAS is not without its advantage. The
larger number of classes according to TCAS (7)» compared with 3, according
to CCA is perhaps more desirable for an accurate formulation of class
alliances at a given point in time, against the main contradiction of
the village poor. Fourthly, the author is aware of (i) Kritsman's
direct method of class analysis (see Cox, 1979 for details), whereby
hire and sale of labour power, rent and lease of land and the hire and
lease of stock and working animals are computed for a household, and on
the total surplus appropriated, its class position is determined;
(ii) Ubsa Patnaik's (1976) modified application of the Kristman method
in the Indian context, through the use of the "E-criterion", where,
E = + b^Lb2*(.C»"S? ; &. = labour (in man-days) hired in; ap = labour
1 + 2
(in man-days) hired out; b^  = man-days equivalent of value received 
through leasing out of land b_ = man-days equivalent of value paid out
C.
for leasing in land; c^  = man-days equivalent of value received for 
hiring out ploughing servies; c^  = man-days equivalent of value paid 
out for hiring in ploughing services; Y^  = family labour (in man-days) 
used in cultivation; Y^ = exchange ("Badli") labour (in man-days) 
provided.
* However, from the considerations of a thorough going asset reform aiming 
at (a) "one household, one occupation" (in order to promote special­
isation, relieve pressure on agricultural land and arrest the decline 
of rural industries), and (b) distribution of particular assets only 
among those households for whose present main occupation, such assets 
are relevant, a different schema would have been more appropriate: 
first, a classification of households into main occupations, and 
second, within the main occupation, further classification of house­
holds according to ownership of the main means of production relevant 
for the particular occupation (e.g. agricultural land for agriculture, 
net/boat for fishing, looms for weaving, etc.).
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However, there are a number of problems with the direct method.
Most important, it is extremely difficult to collect accurate data, 
especially on the quantum of labour hired in/out for a whole year 
through administration of a questionnaire at a single point in time owing 
to memory relapse of respondents, irregular character of labour hiring, 
existence of a number of labour hiring arrangements, etc. As Adnan 
(1977» 35-6) points out, in the context of Bangladesh the E-criterion 
is concerned only with the agricultural aspect of a households class 
position (and hence inadequate for households pursuing other occupations) 
and it cannot either handle cases of households which operate as 
intermediaries in agriculture. Also, Patnaik assumes the same labour 
productivity for hired and family labour, but this does not hold good in 
reality. No less important is the fact that the Kritsman method 
emerged in the specific situation of post-1917 Russia, where sweeping 
land reforms had been carried out, and consequently, there remained 
significant differences among households in the ownership of only 
agricultural assets other than land. In view of the above, we did not 
opt for the direct method, but at the same time we did not either settle 
for acreage grouping as the only criterion for class analysis.
Instead, we have first tried to bring out the dominant trends in surplus 
appropriation and utilisation for as many as seven acreage groupings, 
and therefrom deduce the final classes.
Finally, a clear distinction needs to be drawn between "academic*1 
class analysis and that carried out from the fold of a vanguard party 
of the poor*, engaged in concrete political practice, and therefore 
placed in a unique position to comprehend reality in the process of
For example, Mao*s famous 1926 class analysis for China, in 
Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. I, FLPM,1966,
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changing it. Thus, while an "academic" class analysis, by its very 
nature, can be no more than a rough approximation of reality, a 
political class analysis is likely to make a more concrete appraisal 
of the effect of factors like family size, family structure, quality 
of the means of production, etc., on the class position of individual 
households*, as also of the concrete requirements of political 
alliances and asset reforms, demanded of at a given point in time.
Historically, five classes may be identified for Magura, namely 
Zemindars (i.e. the big statutory landlords), Gantidars (i.e. tenure 
holders or quasi landlords), rich peasants, middle peasants and poor 
and landless peasants. Of these, the first two classes disappeared 
after the 1950 land reforms. However, these will also be discussed 
in order to trace the evolution of present classes in Magura 
historically*
Zemindars
Magura fell within the estate of the Narail Zemindars (in Jessore, 
their estate covered Narail and Lahagora thanas and Magura Sub-Division. 
They had smaller estates in Faridpur, Bajshahi, Pabna, 2k Parganas, 
etc.)•
General life style
At Narail town, they maintained a fabulous palace with marble 
walls and floors, mahogany furniture of the finest workmanship, 
life-size statues and oil paintings, sprawling gardens, 
artificial lakes, large temples, Mogul-style dance floors, 
chandelier decorated anterooms. In fact, all that imagination 
suggested as desirable was to be found within their palace
See, for example, William Hinton, Fanshen, Penguin, 196*f.
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compound. And there they lived in rare grandeur. Constantly 
attended by a large retinue of servants they enjoyed the best 
food, clothes and drinks that money could buy. They completely 
shunned physical work and abhorred any contact with the 
labouring masses. When they moved about in their phaetons or 
palanquins, no one was allowed on the road. No one even dared 
to carry an umbrella within their sight. Their lives were filled 
with festivals, merry making and carnal pursuits. After dusk, 
their garden houses became the venues for all-night sessions of 
music, dance, drink and orgies. It is said that within their 
estates, any woman who pleased their eyes had to submit to their 
lusts. During the "Dur”"'’5a PujaM, they would spend huge sumo of 
money on splendid feasts, and in organising dances, music and 
operas, with artistes hired from Calcutta. After 1930, the 
Narail zemindars shifted to Calcutta permanently, where they had 
already acquired several palatial houses and commercial concerns. 
At this time, effective administration of the estate passed to 
their Chief Manager, stationed at Narail. However, until 19^8 , 
the Narail zemindars continued to visit Narail regularly in order 
to supervise estate affairs. In 1950, the East Bengal State 
Acquisition and Tenancy Act did away with statutory landlordism.
In 19^7» the Partition of Bengal had also taken place. There 
was, therefore, very little incentive for them to visit Narail 
any longer.
Surplus extraction and use
The estate land could be divided into three categories: (a) land 
that was not rented out, i.e. it remained under direct control 
of the zemindars; (b) land cash rented out to tenure holders,
such as gantidars, jotedars, etc.; (c) land cash rented out to 
the ryots. For rent collection, the estate was divided into a 
number of units, each under a rent collector (Naib). In case of 
default, the penalty was auction sale of land and other assets, 
executed by the zemindar's staff. Subsequent legislation 
provided that such auction sales had to be vetted by a court of 
law. However, legality was never any consideration for the 
zemindars and their staff. Physical violence was often used 
against defaulting tenants. When default took an organised form 
zemindars would let loose their private army (lathials) to ensure 
general reprisals. This estate was also notorious for "abwabs", 
i.e. illegal collections over and above the rates sanctioned by 
government. Sometimes, default resulted from the rent 
collectors' refusal to receive rents in time or even after 
receiving these, refusal to issue receipts for the same, so as to 
extract additional amounts later from a helpless peasantry.
Annual legal rent amounted to Tk. 1*3 million, whereas total 
annual rent collected amounted to about Tk. 2.0 million. 
Government demand was only Tk. 0.6 million, so that the zemindar* 
surplus was Tk. 1.*f million. This was spent in the following 
ways:
a) salaries of a large number of servants and officials;
b) maintenance of the life style described above;
c) construction and maintenance of a number of public utilities, 
like roads, educational institutions, medical centres, etc.;
d) religious festivals and rites.
The effect of expenditure on public utilities was very limited. 
Firstly, they provided only the upper strata in the rural areas 
with access to modern medical, educational and communication
facilities. Secondly, the amount directed for such philanthropic 
work was no more than a drop in the ocean compared with what was 
wastefully consumed by the zemindars, who made no productive 
investment either in industry or agriculture*
Links with administration and politics
Narail zemindars and their officials always maintained close links 
with the colonial administration. Most District and Sub- 
Divisional officers accepted their hospitality, so that they 
generally took a lenient view of the zemindars' "excesses" with 
the peasantry. The zemindars maintained special retainers in 
the offices of these administrators. Several of the Narail 
zemindars were awarded titles like "Rai Bahadur" by the British 
Raj. Towards the latter part of the 1930s, several members of 
the Narail zemindar family became supporters of Congress, by then 
established as the major political party in India and Bengal.
One of them became a Legislative Council member on the Congress 
ticket. By this time many members of the zemindar family had 
obtained higher education at Calcutta and abroad, and became 
prominent lawyers and government officials.
Effects of 1950 land reforms
Narail zemindars did not fight out the 1950 land reforms in the 
law courts. For them the Narail estate had lost its attraction. 
Over the years they had taken out a large part of the surplus 
derived from Narail estate to West Bengal (several palatial 
houses and commercial concerns at Calcutta and zemindari estates 
in 2k Parganas). Also, after the creation of Pakistan, they 
felt they had no stake in the Muslim-dominated East Bengal. They 
transferred some of the moveable assets to India in 19^8. The
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rest of their assets at Narail were in no time either plundered 
or "legally" acquired by bureaucrats and local rising Muslims.
Only a small portion of their non-rented land is now government 
property.
Gantidars
Before 1950, there were seven gantidars in this village. Only 
one among them was a Muslim. The gantidars constituted the stratum 
below the Narail zemindars as far as land in this village was concerned. 
About two-fifths of the village land was their "Khas" property, i.e. 
not cash rented out and under their personal control. This was 
mostly share cropped out and only a small portion of it was cultivated 
through wage labour. For the remaining three-fifths of the land 
they were "rent receivers", in which capacity they obtained cash rents 
from their ryots, who in turn either sub-let these to under-ryots or 
got them cultivated through share croppers/wage labour/family labour.
The rents paid by the gantidars to the Narail zemindars were 
approximately one-third of what they realised from their ryots.
Most gantidars collected rents personally (i.e. did not employ rent 
collectors) but generally the tenants came down to pay up the rents. 
Default was punished by auction sale, and illegal collections were 
quite common. Ryots, share croppers and wage labourers involved with 
them were also obliged to render free services whenever these were 
demanded. (According to one ex-gantidar, this was done out of respect 
and gratitudeI) One gantidar would regularly let loose his cows, and
tenants were strictly forbidden to restrain them from eating standing
used
crops. Another gantidar . regularly to snatch the best of the 
fishermen^ catch with little or no payment. One of the gantidars 
was a prominent money lender in the area. He also employed weavers,
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produced hand-loom cloth and sold this in Calcutta, where he maintained 
wholesale trading facilties. Most gantidars were also speculative 
traders in agricultural products. Like zemindars, they were also 
divorced from manual labour and risk and responsibility of production 
and given to conspicuous consumption, especially during marriage and 
death rites, baptisms and religious festivals. After the 1950 land 
reforms, two of the gantidar households left for India, after suitably 
disposing of their landed property. At least two gantidars had 
personal land above the 1950 ceiling. They escaped the ceiling by 
falsifying records in collusion with revenue officials. Those 
gantidars whose personal land was below the ceiling resumed, in 
contravention of the law, cash rented out land. Also, since the 
abolition of rent-receiving interests were implemented after 
considerable delays, they continued to extract rents long after 1950. 
Finally, they also received compensation for loss of their rent- 
receiving interests. In this way, they were left virtually untouched 
by the 1950 reforms, except that social prestige associated with rent- 
receiving rights was now gone, and they could no longer openly bully 
the village poor. Of the seven gantidars, there are now only three 
in the village. Others have migrated to India.
Rich peasants
They now constitute the dominant class at Magura. They are 
composed of RH II, RH I and UMH, as defined by TCAS. Before the 1950 
land reforms, this class consisted of (a) smaller 2 of the 7 Magura 
gantidars, and (b) some of the superior tenants (i.e. occupancy ryots 
and ryots at fixed rents). After the reforms, the remaining gantidars 
and some of the Muslim middle peasants (owing to the vacuum created 
by large-scale migration of Hindus from this region after 19^7) came to
join this class. Between 1951 (i.e. the year following the reforms) 
and 1977, the percentage of village households falling into this class 
declined from 30 to 17 (see Tables and 6, Chapter 5)* This took 
place owing to mainly two factors, (a) migration of some of these 
households to India, (b) partition of households. However, none of 
the households originating from the rich peasant class in 1951 has 
fallen below the middle peasant class in 1977* On the other hand,
the per household agricultural land ownership for this class increased 
from 8.35 acres in 1951 to 9*70 acres in 1977, indicating growing 
economic differentiation and concentration, despite the cushioning 
effect of Hindu migration.
In the agricultural sector, present rich peasant economic 
activities consist of share cropping and owner managed cultivation 
(i.e. through wage labour) but little or no cultivation through family 
labour, and at the same time extracting unpaid labour/services from 
their share croppers and wage labourers through extra-economic 
pressures. In the non-agricultural sector, rich peasants are engaged 
mainly in usurious money lending at exorbitant interest rates and 
speculative trade in agricultural commodities. In recent years,
there is an increased tendency among them to diversify their 
occupations by taking up professional (e.g. teaching) and administrative 
jobs in rural and semi-urban areas, and this coincides with their shift 
away from even supervisory association with traditional pursuits like 
agriculture, weaving, etc. They are also given to outright 
appropriation of various government-provided inputs through domination 
of the rural power structure. There are no merchants with fixed 
capital from this village, but the richest of such merchants at 
Maizpara-Urani and Gor market places are from this class. However,
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for both speculative traders of Magura and the established merchants 
in the two market places, the modus operandi for profit making are 
similar, i.e. hoarding, price speculation, purchase of distress surplus, 
etc. In keeping with their surplus appropriation mechanisms, rich 
peasants of this village utilise their surplus for mostly wasteful 
consumption, reinvestment in money lending and speculative trade, land 
purchase, transfer out of the country, etc. On a limited scale, some 
of them do invest in agricultural production in the shape of modem 
inputs and agricultural practices, but so far, no rich peasant owner of 
tanks and weaving looms of this village has taken any steps towards 
either tank development for modern pisciculture or modernisation of 
looms for increased cloth production.
To sum up, rich peasants at Magura were by and large anti-productive, 
parasitical, and generally divorced from the risk and responsibility 
of production. As Table 51 of this Chapter shows, despite their far 
superior access to production inputs, yield/acres in rich peasant farms 
was lower than in middle peasant farms, and only for the lowest segment 
of this class (UMH), was the yield/acre nearest to the middle peasant 
yield/acre. Their anti-productive role is possible because by using 
their monopoly control over all means of production, they can obtain 
a high rate of return from anti-productive activities (e.g. rack 
renting, money lending, speculative trade, etc.), diversify their 
occupations and augment their incomes through exclusive appropriation 
of governmental inputs.
Political and social role
Socially, they enjoyed a superior position; among the Hindus 
they generally belonged to the upper castes. The same was true 
also in the sphere of education. Most of the school graduates
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and students at primary and secondary stages came from this class. 
Politically, this class acted as intermediaries between the 
village and the outside world; they were Matbars (i.e. faction 
leaders) and Samaj leaders. They sat on the Shalish (village 
judicial bench) and dispensed justice according to their 
interests. They were in complete control of local government 
institutions and other public committees and institutions in the 
area. They had the closest links with central government 
officials. As mentioned earlier, they appropriated to themselves 
government-provided inputs through domination of the rural power 
structure and connection with officials. They also used these 
to dominate the rural poor. During local and national elections, 
they acted as "vote banks", thereby ensuring the electoral success 
of "appropriate" persons and political parties and consequently 
policies which would not hurt their interests (see Chapter 7).
Middle Peasants
They are composed of MH and LMH, according to TCAS (i.e. land 
ownership ranging between 1.01 and ^.50 acres)# In both 1951 and 1977 
they constituted about 38 per cent of the village households (although 
there has been a slight increase in their number from 52 to 60 during 
this period). The reason why the percentage remained constant is that 
while (a) some middle peasants moved to landless and poor peasant class, 
and (b) there was an upward mobility of some middle households to rich 
peasant class in the aftermath of post-partition Hindu migration to 
India, some rich peasant households came down to this class, owing to 
household partition. During the period 1951-1977, the per household 
land ownership for this class declined slightly, from 2.30 to 2.27 
acres.
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Economic role
Before 1950, they were both superior and inferior tenants (i.e. 
under ryots). The 1950 land reforms conferred on them 
proprietorship of land they were cash renting from zemindars/ 
gantidars/superior tenants. They were more owner-cultivators 
(i.e. cultivating with family labour) than share croppers. In 
peak agricultural seasons, they also employed small amounts of 
wage labour, but in times of crisis, they could also be employed, 
on a temporary basis, as agricultural wage labourers. Some 
middle peasant households, lacking adequate family labour, were 
also share cropping out land. They were generally not market 
oriented, and production was geared to the needs of the family 
and subject to the logic of family-based agriculture. But again, 
in difficult conditions they also marketed a "distress” surplus.
All in all, they enjoyed a very precarious situation, given the 
fact that they could easily be ruined through bad harvests, price 
fluctuations, flood, drought, litigation, etc. The most common 
pauperisation process was borrowing from the money lender at high 
interest rates to meet an emergency situation, and then asset 
disinvestment to repay outstanding debts. Like rich peasants, 
they were also trying to diversify their occupations. For 
example, some of the middle peasant households now own agricultural 
land, although their main occupations continue to be fishing or 
weaving, i.e. their caste/family occupations.
Social and political position
Socially and educationally, they are generally in between rich 
peasants and poor and landless peasants. There are a few 
Matbars (village factional leaders) and sub-Matbars from this
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class. This is because some of them (a) are connected to the 
rural rich through kinship ties, and (b) have a popular following 
and constitute a powerful opposition to the rural rich, so that 
they have to be accommodated within the power structure for 
maintaining the existing balance and stability. As brought out 
in the response to past land reform policies and their 
implementation and role of rural power structure, they appeared 
to be more militant than landless and poor peasant respondents. 
This was because they enjoyed a more independent economic position, 
and were rarely tied to rich peasants in a direct unequal economic 
relationship. But on the other hand, there was also scope for 
the rich peasants to win some of them over through selective 
distribution of favours. However, given the growing economic 
crisis, the threat of a rapid pauperisation of this class was now 
a real one, and most middle peasants seemed to be aware of it, 
even if some of them nurtured rich peasant aspirations (especially 
since some of them were rich peasants one or two generations ago)• 
This has clear political implications in terms of providing an 
objective basis for alliance between middle, landless and poor 
peasants.
Poor and landless peasants
They are composed of PH and LLH, according to TCAS (i.e. land 
ownership ranging between 0 and 1.0 acres). Between 1951 and 1977, the 
percentage of households falling into this class increased from 32*6 
to Mf.9. This took place owing to (a) partition of households in this 
class, and (b) differentiation among middle peasant households. During 
the same period, the per household all land ownership (i.e. including 
homestead and other non-agricultural lands) for this class declined from
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0.5 to O.^ f acres, indicating their pauperisation on the one hand, and
concentration of land in the rich peasant class on the other.
In agriculture they are more share croppers and wage labourers 
than owner cultivators. However, the completely landless among them 
are more wage labourers than share croppers. One reason for this is 
that landowners prefer poor peasants to landless peasants as share 
croppers, since the former are comparatively better endowed with 
agricultural implements in order to carry out their own cultivation on 
their own tiny plots. In order to meet their deficiencies with 
respect to agricultural implements, they sometimes resort to "Anguri", 
whereby they rent in these from richer peasants in exchange for 
agricultural labour. In peak agricultural seasons they may 
occasionally hire in labour, but sometimes they also resort to "Badli",
1.e. by turn they provide labour in each other1s fields. Some 
households of this class, lacking family labour and agricultural 
implements, also share crop out their land. The terms of share cropping 
are very harsh, when they share crop in and are becoming detrimental
to their interests. Real wages have declined over time. They are 
also victims of seasonal fluctuations in agricultural wages. They 
are responding to this situation by diversifying their occupations as 
far as possible. Thus, they are at times share croppers, at times
wage labourers, at times fishermen, and at times agriculturists.
However, this has its limitations, given almost no scope for employment 
in the urban sector. In the exchange circuit they are losers in both 
roles, as sellers as well as buyers. They market a "distress surplus", 
which owing to the supply situation at the time of marketing, fetches 
them very low prices (but they are compelled to market thus at this 
time, given the compulsion to buy basic necessities, or pay outstanding
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debts, etc*). On the other hand, if necessary through further 
borrowings from money lenders and disinvestment, they are forced to 
buy food several months after the harvest, when under a declining 
supply situation, food prices begin to soar* Most of them are heavily 
indebted to usurious money lenders, whose rates of interest have 
increased manyfold compared with the situation fifty years ago. At 
present, some of their production assets are also lying with money 
lenders as collateral.
Given their personal dependence on rich peasants for land, 
employment, credit, etc., they are bound in a semi-free relationship 
with the latter. This finds expression in two ways: through providing
free labour (this is less frequent now compared with the situation fifty 
years back), and as faction followers of rich peasant Matbars (faction 
leaders). The latter amounts to supporting Matbars in their 
competitions and quarrels with rivals and voting in various local and 
national elections according to their dictates, thereby ensuring rich 
peasant domination over the local power structure and government 
developmental inputs flowing in to the countryside. They are also 
frequent victims of various open and extra-legal violences of the rural 
rich (see Chapter 9)* Socially, they are at the bottom of the ladder, 
and this is reinforced by the dominant social, cultural, and religious 
institutions and ideology in the village (see Chapter 7).
By and large, it can be said that most poor and landless peasants 
of this village are not conscious of their objective situation in the 
society, or even if conscious, have not as yet considered collective 
and political actions as serious alternatives* This is also brought 
out clearly in their response to past land reforms policies and 
implementation and role of rural power structure (see Chapter 8).
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However, given the growing differentiation and pauperisation (even now, 
all landless households own some homestead lands and a few agricultural, 
implements), the objective conditions for a more militant and 
revolutionary response are becoming more pronounced.
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CHAPTER SIX 
RELATIONS OF DISTRIBUTION
In this chapter, the distribution of the social product among 
various classes of people in the village is discussed. In so doing 
the following aspects are covered:
1) access to the five basic needs of life, i.e. food, shelter, 
clothing, health and education*
2) possession of durable consumer goods;
3) income and expenditure pattern;
4) gainful employment;
5) self-assessment of the villagers on their poverty situation.
Food Consumption Pattern
The main food items are rice, wheat, pulses, vegetables, gur*,oil, 
fish, fruit, eggs, milk and meat. In general rice is preferred to 
wheat, but poorer households eat mostly wheat which is cheaper and 
sometimes offered as wages.
TABLE 1
Average Food Consumption, 1977
Class Half fed 
(in
months)
Only one Unfed Number of months in the year own 
meal (in production sufficient to meet 
(in months) months) household consumption requirement
LLH 3.25 1.75 0.45 1.46
PH 2 .8 0 1 .80 0.95 2.54
LMH 1.58 0.30 0.13 7.76
MH 0.83 0.27 0.03 7.11
UMH - - - 12.00
RH I - - - 12 .00
RH II - - - 12.00
Total 1.78 0.85 0.35 6.006
Molasses.
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TABLE 2
Daily Calorie and Protein Consumption, 1977
Class Daily Calorie Intake 
per capita*
(in kcals)
Daily Total Protein 
Intake per capita 
(gms/day)*
LLH 1,848,0 48.48
PH 1,934,0 49.97
LMK 1,929*0 50.21
MH 2,108.0 53.85
UMH 2,477.0 60.84
RH I 2,5 2 8 .0 65.74
RH II 2,584.0 67.43
All Classes: 2,079*69 53.66
* The Bangladesh national averages, according to the 1975-76 
• Dacca University Nutrition Survey, are 2,094 kcals and 58*4 gms. 
respectively. According to a survey of four Kushtia thanas
(Kushtia is the district adjacent to Jessore), in 1977* the 
average daily calorie intake per capita for rural households with 
landholding between 0 and 2,5 acres was 1900 calories (Kingdom 
of the Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1978, p, 28, 
hereafter Dutch Report).
From tables 1 and 2, it is clear that
i) there is a general correlation between the level of food 
consumption and the class position of the households, and
ii) both average calorie and average protein intake at Magura 
are slightly lower than the national averages (2,094 kcals 
and 58 ,5 gms. respectively) for 1975*7 6,
From personal observation and cross examination of selected 
informants, it also seems quite certain that, in general, females were 
more under-nourished than males, except in the highest land owning 
households (i*e, from UMH to RH II),
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Housing Condition 
TABLE 3
Housing Condition According to Valuation in Taka*, 1977
Class Number of
HH
Type A 
House
Type B 
House
Type C 
House
Type D 
House
Type E 
House
Type F 
House
LLH 41 34 5 - 2 - -
PH 29 17 7 3 1 1 0
LMH 34 13 6 10 3 2 0
m 26 5 2 9 5 5 0
UMH 11 0 0 3 3 3 2
RH I 10 0 0 1 0 5 4
RH II 5 0 0 0 1 1 3
All
Classes. 156 • 69 20 26 15 17 9
Housing materials varied widely among houses as well as among 
various parts of a house. Accordingly, the proxy for housing 
quality is expressed in terms of valuation in Taka,
Valuation (in Taka)
Type A Less than 500
Type B 501 - 1000
Type C 1001 - 2000
Type D 2001 - 5000
Type E 5001 - 10,000
Type F 10,001 - and above
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TABLE *f
Housing Condition According to Homestead Land Owned, 1977
Class Area of Homestead Land per Household (in Acres)
LLH 0.078
PH 0.253
LMH 0.256
ME 0.306
UMH 0.357
RH I 0.602
RH II 0.750
All Classes: 0.262
Source: Computed from Table 6 , Chapter 5.
TABLE 5
Housing Condition According to Number of Rooms*, 1977
Class No. of 
HH
Total Number Number of 
of Rooms Rooms per HH
Number of Persons 
per room
LLH 41 68 1.65 2.95
PH 29 56 1.93 3.07
LMH 98 2.58 2.03
MH 26 7^ 2.8if 2.27
UMH 11 k5 ^.09 1.95
RH I 10 45 *f.50 1.73
RH II 5 30 6.00 1.83
All
Classes : 156
Vl6 2.69 2.30
Includes kitchen/store room* 3 persons per room is estimated 
as minimum level of satisfaction acceptable in present day 
Bangladesh (see Dutch Report, 1978, 28).
From Tables 3, ^ and 5 the following may be gleaned* Firstly, 
57*05% of all households (which included 90% of LLH and PH) owned 
houses worth less than Tk* 1,000/- whereas only 16.66% households 
(which included 18 out of 26 TIME to RH II) owned houses valued at more 
than Tk. 5,000/-, indicating that quality of housing varied in general 
according to land ownership of households. Secondly, there is a 
positive correlation between land ownership and number of rooms per 
head* On the other hand, the number of persons per room decreases 
with increase in the household land ownership* If kitchens sire 
excluded from the total rooms, then the number of persons per room 
would be above 3, the minimum acceptable level, for II to M households. 
Finally, there was silso a genereil correlation between ownership of 
homestead land and class position of the households.
Cloth Consumption
TABLE 6
Average Cloth Consumption Pattern, 1977
Class Number of
HH
Insufficiently* clothed (in percentages 
of HH in the respective class)
LLH *f1 60*97
PH 29 62*06
LMH 3^ 32*35
MH 26 26*95
UMH 11 -
EH I 10 -
HH II 5 -
All Classes: 156 39.10
* Insufficient clothing was defined as follows: If within a household,
a member did not possess something which the family considered wsirm 
enough to protect the upper portion of the body, from cold during 
the winter months or if an adult female member*s Sari(s) was torn 
to the extent that she could not come out of the house, the 
household was considered as possessing insufficient clothes. This 
is a stricter definition than the one offered by A.R. Khan (1977,
85) i.e. 7 yards per capita per year.
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Table 6 shows that (a) 39*10% households in Magura were 
insufficiently clothed (despite the existence of a weaving community in 
the village), and (b) insufficiency of clothing in the village does not 
go beyond the middle class.
State of Health and Medical Care
The changes in the general state of health during the last fifty 
years have been as follows, classwise:
Upper Middle and Above Classes
Fifty years ago, .jotedars, gantidars, money lenders, big traders, 
etc. enjoyed good health. They were generally fair looking, their 
skin was soft and they were generally on the fat side with rounded limbs 
and pot bellies. This was because they were a leisured class, did not 
go out in the sun, ate rich food, and felt more assured of their 
position. At present, their health is still the best among various 
classes, but not to the extent it was fifty years ago. General 
scarcity of quality food, mental worries in the face of complexities of 
the present times, etc. were the main contributing factors in this 
respect. In the given circumstances, they had the best access to 
medical treatment and care. In 1977* some of them went as far as 
Narail and Jessore towns to obtain allopathic medical treatment.
Lower Middle and Middle Classes
Compared with the situation fifty years ago, the health of the 
middle classes has deteriorated considerably. The physical labour 
that a middle class young man can undertake now is certainly much lower 
than what he could fifty years ago. At that time, a sixty year old 
man could undertake a non-stop 20 mile walk. Now at this age he feels 
lucky if he can simply move about. The general economic crisis, food
shortage and unemployment, together with increasing mental worries have 
all contributed to this situation*
Poor and Landless Households
The health of the poor has sharply deteriorated over the years. 
Fifty years ago, a man could be poor but he was generally strong and 
stout, since he was at least assured of a full meal. Now, he is 
generally half-fed and suffers from malnutrition. In most cases, the 
poor people are bent, short, skeletal and sunburnt. A forty year old 
poor man now looks ?0 years old. Stunted growth among children and 
anaemia among women from poor and landless households are common 
features, although these are to be found also among lower middle and 
middle households. From middle to landless households, self-treatment 
through herbs, allopathic treatment through quack doctors and 
homoeopathic treatment are the main forms of medical care*
TABLE 7
Reported Infant* Mortality, 1976 and 1977
Class No. of Tetanus 
Deaths
Virus
Fever
Diarrhoeal
Pysentric
Others
LLH 5 2 1 1 1
PH 3 3 - - -
LMH 3 1 - 2 -
iMH 2 1 1 - -
UMH 1 1 - -
RH I 1 - - -
RH II - - — * -
All Classes: 15 8 2 3 1
5 and under.
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TABLE 8
Extent of T.B., Night Blindness, Gastric Ulcer and Rheumatism, 1977
Name of Disease Number of Persons Suffering with Class Background
Night Blindness 5 (2 LMH, 3 PH)
Tuberculosis 5 (3 MH, 1 LMH, 1 PH)
Gastric Ulcer 9 (2 UMH, 1 MH, 5 LMH, 2 LLH, 1 PH)
Rheumatism 7 (1 EH I, 2 UMH, 2 MH, 2 PH)
From the above discussion and tables, a number of points may be 
noted. Firstly, the general level of health has deteriorated, 
affecting all classes of people but the lower landholding classes 
have been the worst hit. Secondly, although, as discussed earlier, 
certain epidemic diseases, which took a heavy toll of human lives fifty 
years ago, have been controlled, diseases which are clearly related 
to intake of regular and nutritious food are becoming prominent, with 
the majority of the victims from MH and below classes. Thirdly, 
the present infant mortality rate is low compared with the situation 
fifty years ago, but as before, the affected households continue to be 
more from MH and below classes. Finally, such a low level health 
equilibrium (i.e. lower death rate but those living little better than 
living dead) had disastrous implications for both production and 
development of political consciousness among the village poor.
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Education 
TABLE 9
Literacy Rate, 1977
Glass Number of 
Persons 
Able to 
Head and 
Write
Percentage of 
Total number 
of Persons 
Able to Read 
and Write (198)
Total Number 
of Persons 
Classwise
Col. 2 as 
Percentage 
of Col. 5
1 2 3 k 5
LLH 22 11.11 201 10.9*f
PH 23 11.62 172 13.75
LMH 35 17.67 199 17.59
MH kk 2 2 .2 2 168 2 6 .2 0
DMH 28 1*f.l4 88 3 1 .8 2
RH I 51 15.66 78 39.7^
RH IX 15 7.58 55 27.27
All Classes: 198 100 961 2 0 .6
TABLE 10
Attendance in all Educational Institutions, 1977
Class Number Attending Percentage of Total Number 
Institutions Attending Institutions
LLH 8 6 .8 9
PH 6 5.17
LMH 15 12.95
MH 2k 20 .68
UMH 23 19.86
RH I 2k 20 .68
RH II 16 15.79
All Glasses: 116 100
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TABLE 11
Primary Education Attendance, 1977
Class Number
Attending
Percentage of Number in the 
Total Attending Primary Age 
Group
Col* 2 as a 
% of Col. 4
1 2 3 4 5
LLH 7 11*4-8 42 16 .6
PH 1 1.64 28 3.57
LMH 11 18*03 40 27.50
MH 11 18*03 35 31.42
UMH 11 18*03 20 55.0
RH I 10 16.39 15 66.6
RH II 10 16*39 13 76*9
All Classes: 61 100 193 31.6
TABLE 12
High School Attendance, 1977
Class Number Percentage of 
Attending Total Number 
Attending
Number in the 
High School 
age-group 
(11-16)
Col* 2 as a 
% of Col. 5
1 2 3 4 5
LLH 2 5.3 32 6.25
PH 3 7.9 27 11.11
LMH 2 5.3 30 6.66
MH 12 31.5 27 44.44
UMH 9 23.6 20 45.00
RH I 8 21.1 18 44.44
RH II 2 5.3 10 20.00
All Classes: 38 100 23.17
TABLE 13
Female Primary School Attendance, Classwise, 1977
Class Number
Attending
Percentage of
Total
Attending
Number in the 
Primary Age 
Group
Col* 2 as 
percentage 
of Col. ^
1 2 3 4 5
LLH - - 19
PH - - 17 -
LMH 5 31.25 23 21.7
MH 1 6.25 20 5.0
UMH 2 12.50 9 2 2 .2
RH I 6 37.50 8 75.0
RH II 2 12.50 4 5 0 .0
All Classes: 16 100 100 16
TABLE 14
Female High School Attendance, 1977
Class Number
Attending
Percentage of
Total
Attending
Number in the 
High School 
Age Group
Col. 2 as 
percentage 
of Col. 4
1 2 3 4 5
LLH - - 2 .2 -
PH 2 20 18 11.11
' LMH - - 11 -
MH 2 20 12 16.66
UMH 2 20 10 2 0 .0 0
RH I 3 30 6 5 0 .0 0
RH II 1 10 5 20 .00
All Classes: 10 100 11.9
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TABLE 15
Class Background of the Teachers and Managing Committee Members 
of Magura High School and Primary School, 1977
Category Number
Primary School High School
LLH - -
PH - -
LMH - 1
MH 2 4
UMH 2 2
RH I 3 4
RH II 3 2
All Classes: 10 13
TABLE 16
Permanent Dropouts from Magura High School and Primary School, 1977
Class Primary School High School Total
Male Female Male Female
T T TT 2 2 6 1 11
PH 3 - - - 3
LMH 3 - 3 - 6
MH - - - - -
UMH - 1 1 vm 2
RH I - 1 1 1 3
RH II - 1 1 - 2
All Classes: 7 6 12 2 27
70.3% of the dropouts were from LLH to LMH background,
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TABLE 17
Reasons for Dropout
Reasons Number, with Class Background
Economic Compulsions* 20 (LLH to LMH)
Neglect by Guardian 2 (UMH)
Marriage (not out of 3 (EH I and II)
economic compulsion)
Does not like Studies 2 (RH I and II)
* i.e. inability to bear educational expenses, need to help the family, 
marriage since family cannot maintain, etc*
TABLE 18
Educated Unemployed, 1977
Name Qualification Class
Background
Present Employment Status
JM1 S.S.C.** RH II Connected with Agriculture*
PPK2 S.S.C. RH II Trade and Commerce
AW S «S.C. RH I Connected with Agriculture
AKKC2 B. Com. RH I Learning Typing and Shorthand
SD2 I. Com. UMH Private Tuition Plus 
Connected with Agriculture
MR1 s .s .c . UMH Connected with Agriculture
AR1 S.S.C. MH Connected with Agriculture
AB1 s .s .c . MH Connected with Agriculture
* Connection with agriculture is tenuous in that this is taken up as a 
last resort and involves practically no physical labour. Even the 
supervisory role in the agricultural sector is not done properly.
It is a difficult situation: the education they have received has
made them averse to manual labour and agriculture; on the other 
hand, they could not get the urban white collar jobs to which they 
aspire. During our stay at the Project area, these young men were 
constantly approaching us for jobs, and if that was not possible, 
to recommend them to persons who could give them the jobs they were 
looking for.
** Secondary School Certificate.
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A number of trends emerge from tables 9-18:
1) The literacy rate was very low (20.6%); only 31*8% of the 
children in the primary school age group were attending 
primary school; the attendance in the high school was even 
lower (23*27% Of the total number of high school age group 
children)* If female children were considered separately 
the picture was still more dismal. 16% of the primary 
school age group females and 11*9% of the high school age 
group females were respectively attending the primary and the 
high school. Dropout in 1977 was 27*27% of the total High 
School and Primary School enrolment. There were 8 persons 
in the village who possess Secondary School Certificates
and above. All of them were unemployed.
2) There was a general correlation between access to education 
and class position of the households. Thus not only were 
the upper land-holding classes (UMH and above) more literate 
than the lower land-holding (MH and below) ones (Table 9»
Col. 5), but there was also wide discrepancy between them
in total and female attendance in the local primary and high 
schools (Table 10, Col. 5j Table 11, Col. 5; Table 12,
Col. 3; Table 13, Col. 5)* Of the teachers and managing 
committee members of the local schools, about 70% were from 
UMH and above classes. There was no one on the teaching 
staff or managing committee from LLH and PH. 10.3% of the 
1977 dropouts from the local educational institution were 
from T.T/H to LMH classes and for them the reason for dropout 
was invariably economic compulsion (Tables 16 and 17)* Of 
the 8 persons in the village with S.S.C. and higher degrees, 
there was no one from LMH and below.
Possession of Durable Consumer Goods 
TABLE 19
Ownership of Durable Consumer Goods*, 1977
Class No. of 
HH
Number of Households Owning Durable Consumer Goods 
worth Taka:
0-250 251-500 501-800 801 -1000 8 _A 1 $ 8 2501-7500
LLH 4-1 25 15 1 - - -
PH 29 15 7 3 2 1 -
LMH 3^ 15 11 6 2 - -
MH 26 3 10 2 6 5 -
UMH 11 1 2 3 2 1 2
RH I 10 - - 1 5 2 2
RH II 5 - 1 - 2 2
Classes 156 60 45 17 17 11 6
The items considered as durable consumer goods were furniture, 
radio/transistors, utensils and crockery, clocks/watches, cycles, 
umbrellas and thermos flasks.
To give an indication, the most ordinary bicycle now costs about 
Tk. 1,200/-.
Gold and silver ornaments were excluded from this list because 
accurate responses on these were highly unlikely. However, 
according to selected informants, their possession was clearly 
related to class position.
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From Table 19, the following maybe noted:
1) 67*3% of households owned durable consumer goods (DCG)
valued at Tk. 500 and less;
2) 97.6% of LLH, 79.31% of PH, 76.^7% of LMH and 50% of MH
owned DCG valued at Tk. 500/- and less;
3) 90% of SH I and 80% of KH II owned DCG valued at Tk. 801
and above.
Income and Expenditure Pattern
TABLE 20
Average Household Income in Tk., 1977
Class Average Gross
Household
Income
Average Household Average Net 
Operational Household 
Expenses Income
Average Net 
Per Capita 
Income*
1 2 3 k 5
LLH 3,139.75 505.25 2,63^.50 537.65
PH 3 ,900.00 6^2 .0 0 3 ,2 5 8 .00 5^9.AO
LMH ^ 11.30 965.80 3,2^ -5.50 55^.70
MH 5 ,0 15 .^0 1,129.70 3,885.70 601 .50
UMH 12,596.75 3,091.50 9,^95.25 1,186.87
SH I 16,069.33 3,362.33 12,707 .00 1,6 2 9 .10
SH II 25,685.67 5 ,131.00 20,55^.67 1,868.56
All
Classes 6 ,089 .10 1,293.19 ^,795.91 778.56 (£ 38.93)**
* The average per capita income was obtained by dividing the average 
Net Household Income by average household size of class.
According to the Dutch Report (1978, 27) the per capita income in 
1977 varied between Tk. 250 and Tk. 500 for households with land 
holding from 0 to 2.5 acres, in the adjacent Kushtia district.
** / 1 = Tk. 20 (approximately).
TABLE 21
Household Annual Monetary Expenses on. Selected Items, 1977
Class Average Annual Household Monetary Expenses on
Food* Education Medicine Clothes Social/Religious 
Rites Festivals
LLH 2,578.17 12.50 55.00 479.17 31.67
PH 2,475*91 - 105.64 450.91 39.00
LMH 1,798.75 87.50 170.83 608.33 54.17
MH 1,676 .00 82 .00 400.00 653.00 7 8 .0 0
UMH 887.50 475.00 562.5 1,125.00 662*50
RH I 436.67 373.30 533.3 1,333.33 1,196.67
RH II 230.00 433.30 833.3 2,6 6 6 .6 7 2,066.67
* Col. 2 does not indicate the Tk. equivalent of food consumed but 
only the amount spent on buying food from the market.
From Tables 20 and 21f the following may be noted:
1) The average per capita net income was about Tk. 778*56 or
#38.93 (calculated at #1 = Tk. 20). There was a clear direct
relationship between class and income. The average household 
income of the highest landholding class was 7,8 times that
of the lowest landholding category. However, the average 
household income of the highest landholding class, i.e.
Tk. 1,712.8 per month (#85.64) was very low by international 
comparisons (even if allowances are made for differences in 
prices, "national culture" and natural environment).
2) The major expenditure item for most households was food and
for the LLH class, more than 90% of income was spent on food.
Although available data do not clearly indicate the situation
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in respect of other classes, it is safe to assume that none 
of the classes spent less than 50% on food. For other items, 
the trend is clear; it varied directly with income and class.
Gainful Employment 
TABLE 22
Households According to Number of Earning Members*« 1977
Class No. of
HH
Number of Households with Earning 
Members
Total Average 
No. of No. of 
Earning Earning 
Members Members 
per HH
1 2 3 if 5 6 7 8 9
LLH 27 12 2 57 1.39
PH 29 14- 9 3 2 1 56 1.93
LMH 3 ^ 19 7 5 2 1 61 1.78
MH 26 12 9 5 ^5 1.73
UMH 11 5 2 if 21 1.99
EH I 10 3 1 W 2 25 2 .3 0
EH II 5 1 1 1 1 1 15 3 .0 0
All
Classes 156 81 Zk 7 2 1 278 1.78
Earning member was not defined in the survey questionnaire. It 
was left to the respondents to answer according to their concept 
of earning member.
As shown in Table 22 above, there was, on the average, 1.78 earning 
members per family at Magura. However, earning members per household 
decline as one moves from EH II to LLH class, which clearly indicates 
that gainful employment opportunities were again directly related to
a household's socio-economic position. Given the seasonality of 
agricultural wage labour, the employment situation of poor households 
is rendered precarious by also low labour demand and low agricultural 
wages in the slack season (see Table 371 Chapter 5)* Since women, in 
general, are restricted to domestic chores, to which no monetary value 
is attached, their socially useful and economically vital role in the 
production process (i.e. especially in freeing men in obtaining gainful 
employment outside the home) is not recognised. On the other hand, 
only females of land-poor households are engaged in outside home work 
(females of rich households do not have to work since these
households generally employ maid servants). In 1977» 15 women, all 
from LL to LM households, were working as maid servants or in other paid 
jobs (mostly on part-kind, part-cash payments basis). As maid servants, 
they have to do very heavy work, such as paddy husking, grinding wheat 
and pulses, washing and plastering floors and walls with a mixture of 
cowdung and mud, fetching water, etc.
Self Assessment by Villagers of their Poverty Situation 
TABLE 23
Household Head's perception of his/her Economic Condition
Class Total number 
of HH
Consider themselves 
as Poor
Do not consider 
themselves as Poor
LLH 41 41 -
PH 29 28 1
LMH 34 32 2
MH 26 21 5
UMH 11 1 10
RH I 10 - 10
RH II 5 1 4
All
classes 156 124 32
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TABLE 24
Household Head's Perception of Cause of his/her Poverty
Response LL(41) PH(28) LMH02) MH(21) UMH(1) RH 1(1)
1 Lack of/
Insufficient
Land/Productive 37 24 18 8 - -
Asset
2 Income Less
than - - 10 10
Expenditure
3 Sickness - 2 2 2
4 Do not know 4 2 2 1
TABLE 25
Household Head's Perception of his/her Present Economic, Social 
and Educational Conditions vis k vis his father
Response Economically Educationally Socially
Better than Father 16(10.25)* 80(51.3) 10( 6.4)
Same as Father 32(20.51) 52(33.3) 68(43.5)
Worse than Father 108(69.23) 24(15.4) 78(50)
Total 156(100) 156(100) 156(100)
TABLE 26
Household Head's Perception of his/her present Economic Condition 
vis eL vis his Father
Response Total LLH PH LMH MH UMH RH I RH II
Better than Father 16 3 - 4 4 1 3 1
Same as Father 32 6 8 4 5 4 3 2
Worse than Father 108 32 21 26 17 6 4 2
Total 156 41 29 34 26 11 10 5
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From Tables 23 to 26, the following trends emerge:
1) 79*48% households considered themselves as poor. Of these,
70.16% blamed lack of land/productive assets as the root 
cause of their poverty. 8.87% households claiming to be 
poor said they did not know why they were poor. 17*74% of 
these households mentioned income less than expenditure as 
the cause of their poverty. Since this is a vague answer, 
it is safe to assume that 26.61% of the households claiming 
to be poor did not know specifically why they were poor. 
6 9*23% household heads thought that they were economically 
worse off than their respective fathers. 20.31% thought 
that the situation did not change since their father's days 
and only 10.23% felt that they were better off than their 
parents.
2) 100% of EL, 96.55% of P, 94.11% of LM, 80.76% of the M,
9.09% of the UM household heads and only one from among the 
R I and R II household heads thought that they were poor. 
90.24% of EL, 85.7% of P, 56.25% of LM and 38.09% of M 
household heads who considered themselves as poor thought 
lack of/insufficient land/production assets was the root 
cause of their poverty.
3) 78.04% of LL, 72.4% of P, 76.47% of LM, 65.38% of M household 
heads thought they were economically worse off than their 
fathers. 14.6% of the landless, 27*58% of the poor, 11.76% 
of the lower middle and 19*23% of the middle household heads 
thought their economic condition is the same as it was in 
their father's days. The rest thought that they were better 
off now.
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*0 51*3% of household heads thought that they were educationally
better off than their fathers* On the other hand, 50% of 
household heads considered themselves socially worse off than 
their fathers, indicating a positive correlation between 
social and economic positions and a negative correlation 
between educational and economic positions of the households*
From the data and discussion presented in this Chapter, the following 
inferences may be drawn:
1) There is a strong correlation between poverty and class, 
based on ownership of production assets, particularly 
agricultural land; and the various manifestations of poverty 
become prominent as one moves from the middle to the landless 
class* As such middle, lower middle, poor and landless 
households of this village may be considered els being below 
the "poverty line". If two poverty lines, as suggested by 
Khan (see Chapter 2), are drawn, then it is self-evident from 
the data presented above that landless and poor households 
would fall under "extreme poverty" while middle and lower 
middle households would be classified under "absolute poverty". 
In other words, respectively &3*3% and of the Magura
households live below "absolute" and "extreme" poverty lines,
a finding quite consistent with that of Khan (1976, 15)*
However, unlike Khan, we have been able to identify them 
concretely in terms of their asset ownership and surplus 
appropriation and utilisation characteristics*
2) On the other hand, if international comparisons are drawn 
(after making due allowances) it would appear that the
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general level of economic well being, including those whom we 
have termed as RH 1 and RH II, is very low and this seems to 
strengthen the general finding of the previous chapter that 
the root cause of poverty lies essentially in the village's 
existing socio-economic structure, and more concretely, in 
class-relationships, the very logic of which accounts for 
both low production and inequitable distribution of the 
social product.
3) The existing relations of distribution are not only highly 
inequitable but also these hold back increased production 
through depressing the labour productivity (as expressed 
through access to food, medical care, education, etc.) of 
those who are actually associated with production.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUPERSTRUCTURE AND POVERTY
There are basically two theoretical positions within the Marxist 
tradition on economic base (i.e. mode of production) - superstructure 
(i.e* non-econoraic factors) relationship, namely "fundamental" and 
"dialectical". The former holds firstly that base and superstructure 
are distinct and externally related, secondly that changes in the 
economic stratum (i.e. mode of production) produce corresponding 
changes in the superstructure and thirdly that the casual relationship 
is entirely or almost exclusively one way, with the economic system 
determining the superstructure and not vice-versa. The latter 
maintains that there is a dialectical interaction between the two 
strata and that superstructure enjoys a "relative autonomy", in that 
even after a mode of production changes, some elements of the old 
superstructure may persist and interact with the new mode of 
production. As Melvin Rader (1979? Chapter I) shows, the former 
position amounts to economic determinism and is far out of line with 
what Marx and Engels wrote and meant. In fact, in the context of 
"Asiatic mode of production" (which covers pre-British South Asia),
Marx clearly conceded to the state (an important element of the 
superstructure) the dominant role in its relationship with the economy 
(Mandel, 1971, 122).
In this Chapter, therefore, we examine, in the context of Magura,
O'.
^Engels wrote: "Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the
fact that younger writers sometimes lay more stress on the economic 
side than due to it. We had to emphasise this main principle 
in opposition to our adversaries, who denied it, and we had not 
always the time, place, or the opportunity to allow the other 
elements involved in the interaction to come into their rights." 
(Marx and Engels, 19^2, V77.)
the effect of the superstructure (i.e. non-economic factors) on the 
economy in general, and on production and distribution in particular, 
and therefrom assess the relationship between superstructure and 
poverty. In this regard, the following aspects of the village 
superstructure are taken up for detailed analysis:
(i) religious and socio-religious institutions and practices; 
(ii) dominant ideology and value system;
(iii) communalism;
(iv) factions;
(v) Samaj ("society”);
(vi) Shalish (village adjudicating bench);
(vii) Union Parishad (the lowest level local government);
(viii) kinship;
(ix) recreation and entertainment;
(x) Management Committees of Gor and Urani-Maizpara market 
places (i.e. the two market places most frequented by 
Magura residents).
Religious and Socio-Religious Institutions
Religion is and has been a powerful force in this village among 
both Hindus and Muslims. In order to understand its relationship 
with poverty, it is necessary first to delineate the extent, formal 
functions and class content of the various religious institutions in 
this village*
Muslim religious institutions and practices 
Mosque and Idgah:
The village has its own mosque and Idgah (open air facility for 
holding annual congregational prayers). Fifty years ago, the
mosque was completely controlled by the Mollah Goshthi.* Now it is 
run by a Committee headed by SM (RH and Matbar of the Mollah faction) 
and the other 4 Committee members are Matbars from Madhya Para and 
Baghpara. The mosque employs a Muazzin (i.e. one who calls for 
prayers), an Imam (i.e. one who leads the prayers). The Imam** is
paid Tk. 24/- per month and the Muazzin is paid two maunds of paddy 
every year. The Imam is landless, from a neighbouring village and 
•Imamati’ is his hereditary profession. The villagers, according to 
capability, donate towards the upkeep and maintenance of the mosque, 
the Imam and the Muazzin.
The most important function of the mosque is to organise prayers, 
especially the Friday congregations. In his Friday sermons, the 
Imam generally upholds traditional interpretations of "good and evil" 
and their rewards and retribution in this life and hereafter. 
Explanation of poverty is usually in terms of the individuals own 
actions and "divine retribution" like flood, cyclone, drought, etc.; 
and due care is taken to avoid sermons that may cause any resentment 
against the village power structure in general and the mosque committee 
in particular. For example, he has never condemned the many immoral 
(i.e. from the point of Islam) activities like money lending at 
usurious rates, illicit sexual relationships, nepotism, pilferage and 
maldistribution of public property, etc. in which the village rich are 
prominently involved. This is obviously because the ImamS 
livelihood is entirely at the mercy of the rural rich. Finally, the
* Approximately the patrilineal kin group.
** Besides his duties at the mosque, he also performs rites in
connection with death, birth, marriage, etc. He has to be paid
separately for these.
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sermons emphasise strict purdah observance and discourage female 
education and working outside the home.
Religious Educational Institutes
There are two religious educational institutes relevant for 
this village. Both axe under firm control of the village rich.
None of the students comes from below MH classes. A special toll is 
collected from the sellers at Gor market place for upkeep of one of 
the institutes. About of the collection is misappropriated by- 
people collecting toll on behalf of the institute. There is close 
ideological similarity between what is taught at the two institutes 
and what is preached from the pulpit of the mosque.
Waz
Waz (open air religious meeting) is held in Magura and adjoining 
areas quite regularly and is addressed by the big Maulanas (i.e. those 
well versed in religion) and Pirs (seers) of the district. The last 
Waz in Magura was held in the High school football ground and was 
attended by about 3*000 persons. In this regard, the village Matbars 
and the Madrasah at Shahbad (^f miles from Magura) took the leading 
role. Before and during the Waz, substantial "presents11 and 
subscriptions in cash and kind were raised. A part of it went 
towards meeting the expenses of the Waz (in particular the sumptuous 
food consumed by the speakers and their followers during the week long 
Waz) and the rest was divided among the speakers and carried home. 
Nowadays, the Waz speakers usually avoid reference to national level 
politics and concentrate on socio-religious matters and the general 
line pursued is the same as that of the Imam of the Magura mosque,
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i.e. revivalist, anti-women, communal and generally supportive of 
the status quo.
Animal Sacrifice
Yearly animal sacrifice on the day of Idul Azha is restricted 
to UMH, RH I and RH II classes only. During the last five years, on 
an average, 7 cows and 10 goats have been sacrificed annually.
Animal sacrifice by the Muslims is not liked by the Hindus because 
the cow is revered by them; but there has been no untoward incident 
so far on this issue.
Zakat
The incidence of Zakat (poor tax) in this village is on the 
decline. Last year, only 6 households (all RH) gave Zakat and that, 
too, as a nominal gesture (i.e. it was far less than they should have 
given according to the laid down principle).
Other prevailing Muslim religious practices in the village are 
Haz (pilgrimage to Mecca), Roza (fasting during the month of Ramadan), 
visiting Dargahs (holy shrines), religious therapy conducted by 
"Fakirs", Idul Fitr (celebrations following the month long fasting), 
Shabe Barat (night long prayer followed by feasting, congregational 
prayer, distribution of sweets, etc.), Khatna (circumcision rite 
involving feasting attended mainly by relatives), Challisa/Jiafat 
(Public feast on the f^Oth day after death), Akika (Muslim equivalent 
of Christening), etc. Most of these practices entail considerable 
expenses, food being the main item. Over the last fifty years, there 
has been a clear decline in their incidence and grandeur, owing to the 
deteriorating economic condition of most villagers. At present, 
these expenses can be afforded only by the village rich. For example,
'I
the Challisha for SM fs mother (RH) in 1976 involved a feast in which
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6 goats, k raaunds of rice and 3 maunds of yogurt were consumed*
Hindu Religious Institutions and Practices
Kali Tala
There is no temple in the village and the shade under a banyan 
tree (known as Kali Tala, after the Goddess Kali) is its substitute* 
All the major punas (acts of worship) are held here*
Guru (religious leader)
2
MPH is the only Guru of this village. He is a hereditary Guru 
with a number of disciples in Magura, surrounding villages, and in the 
Khulna district. To become a disciple, one has to arrange for Puja 
involving, among other things, presents to the Guru and feasting.
Fifty years ago, a non-Brahmin could not marry unless he became a 
disciple. This restriction is now gone. After becoming a
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disciple, various diet restrictions have to be followed. MPH has 
3.00 acres of land but his main income is derived from his disciples. 
In his youth, he used to move from house to house among his disciples, 
and by the time he came back to Magura, he had enough "gifts" to 
sustain him well for the year. In recent years, his disciple 
strength declined considerably owing to Hindu migration to India and 
his decreasing mobility due to old age. Consequently, his income as 
a ^uru1 fell considerably, but since all his children are now in 
India, he is still very well off.
Purohit (Priest)
There are 7 purohits (i.e. conductors of various socio-religious 
rites) relevant to this village. Of them 3 are from UMH to EH, 3 
are from LMH and only one is from LLH. Among them they are the 
priests for various caste groups in and around Magura. In exchange
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for providing religious services during the Pujas and other socio­
religious occasions, they are given sumptuous gifts (both cash and 
kind) by the laity.
Interviews with the Guru and the 7 purohits revealed the 
following: Firstly, they all upheld the Hindu caste system with all
its ramifications and injunctions and felt distressed at certain
changes that have taken place recently. Secondly, according to them, 
the Hindu view of life consisted in accepting one's reality as 
rewards and punishments for one's actions in a past life, and that it 
was through righteous actions within one's existing station in this 
life that one could attain salvation of the soul. Thirdly, they 
all vigorously preached such views to their followers.
Puja
Since the early 60s, the two most important Pujas (i.e. Durga and 
Kali Pujas) have been held collectively (i.e. transcending caste 
barriers) through a committee constituted for the purpose. Of the 
11 committee members, 6 were from UMH to PH II. The puja expenses 
(at present about Tk. 3,000/- per puja) were met by subscriptions 
raised by the committee. Before 19&7, low caste Hindus were not 
allowed to come close to the idols. No collective puja has been held
during the last two years following allegations of funds 
misappropriation by some committee members. Other important pujas 
for this village are Lakshmi Puja, Sarawasuati Puja, Manosha Puja,
Shani Puja, Narayan Puja, Ganga Puja, Bishakarmar Puja, Fagun and 
Shubha Chanin Puja. Among other things, these involve making idols 
of relevant god/godess, "offerings11 to the god/godess, feasting, gifts 
for the purohit, etc. Over the last fifty years, Puja celebrations 
have become increasingly limited to the village rich as the poor simply 
cannot afford the expenses.
Other Hindu Socio-religious rites and festivals important for this 
village are Sradh (Hindu equivalent of Muslim Challisha), Anna Praganna 
(Hindu equivalent of Muslim Akika), marriage, Shad Bhakhan (to mark 
pregnancy), Jamai Jashthi (feasting in honour of the son-in-law), 
Bhai-Phota (to cement brother-sister relationship), Pahela Baisakh 
(to celebrate the Bengali New Year), Maghi Purnimav (bathing in Ganges 
water), Ratha Jatra (to celebrate the chariot ride of Radha and 
Krishna), etc. All these involve elaborate arrangements and intricate 
rituals and entail considerable expenses. As with the Pujas, poor 
people's participation in these rites and festivals has dropped to the 
barest minimum.
We may sum up the above discussion as follows. Firstly, although 
over the years, their hold was somewhat weakened, religious institutions 
and practices are still a powerful force (as will also emerge from a 
later section on dominant ideology and values) in village life.
Secondly, religious institutions are clearly dominated and manipulated 
by the village rich. Thirdly, religious rites and festivals involve 
considerable non-productive consumption, and this clearly militates 
against production and investment in productive channels, especially 
since the existing production level is very low. Fourthly, the 
existing religious institutions preach an interpretation of life and 
religion, which clearly help and justify the maintenance of the status 
quo in the existing power and class equations in the village society. 
Finally, the poor have clearly opted out of those aspects of religious 
rites and festivals which demand expenditure, owing to their poverty 
situation; however, this does not necessarily indicate a declining 
commitment on their part to the ideology contained in the dominant 
interpretation of religion in this village.
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Dominant Ideology and Value System
In order to delineate the nature and extent of the dominant 
ideology and values in this village, the following ten topics were 
selected (the choice of topic was guided by three criteria - direct 
relevance for poverty, easy comprehension of the topic by the 
villagers and minimum number of sensitive topics): fatalism, belief
in superstition, caste system, manual work, female and co-education, 
purdah, females working outside home, husband*s domination of the wife 
and dowry. Through direct interview (DI), villagers* attitudes 
towards these ere then ascertained (for this purpose, we selected 
132 adult* respondents, roughly of the total adults of the village, 
through stratified random sampling, based on the distribution of 
population according to age, sex, class and religion. A choice of 
four responses was offered: '*favourable", "favourable to some extent'1,
"unfavourable" and "do not know/refuse to answer".) Finally, this 
was followed by cross-examination of selected informants, i.e. 
knowledgeable and trustworthy persons of the village who were selected 
for verifying information obtained through other methods (henceforth 
CESI) on the same topics. Thus, data generated through application 
of these two methods, together with our own observation, form the 
basis of our analysis of the dominant ideology and value system at 
Magura, as spelt out below.
In the case of females, of age 14 and above, and in the case of 
males, of age 16 and above.
2 7 3
Fatalism
TABLE 1
Attitude towards Fatalism at Magura, 1977 (as obtained through DI)
Respondent Categories Percentage of Favourable Response
Male *f0 .6
Female 69.1
Hindu 5^.0
Muslim 5 6 .0
Poor** 58.75
Middle Class** 55.88
Rich** 3 8 .8 8
Total (132) 55.3*
* 66.66% if we include those who responded 'favourable to some
extent *•
** Poor (LLH + PH); Middle (LMH + MH); Rich (UMH + RH I + RH II).
Trend as obtained through cross examination of selected 
informants (GESI)
i) There has been some decline in fatalism during the last
fifty years but the majority are still fatalistic,
ii) The poor, the Muslims and the females were respectively more
fatalistic than the rich, the Hindus and the males.
Poverty, lack of education and belief in a particular 
interpretation of religion were the main causes for this 
difference.
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Poverty implications of fatalism
i) A resigned attitude towards life acts against the growth of 
productive forces and justifies the maintenance of the 
irrational and inequitable production relations,
ii) It demobilises the poor in that it prevents organised/ 
conscious responses to distress situations.
Superstitious Beliefs* (regarding eating habits, birth, death, 
marriage, travel, etc.)
TABLE 2
Attitude towards Superstitious Beliefs at Magura, 1977 (as obtained
through DI)
Respondent Categories Percentage of Favourable Response
Male 59.3
Female 66.1
Hindu 66.0
Muslim 66.90
Poor 66.25
Middle Class 55.90
Rich 50.00
Total (132) 62.80
In formulating the question, the word superstition was avoided 
in order not to offend the respondents.
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Trend as obtained through CESI
1) There has been some decline in superstitious beliefs during
the last fifty years; however, the majority still believe
in various superstitions.
2) The poor, Hindus and females were more prone to
superstitions than the rich, the Muslims and the males
respectively. Poverty, lack of education and preponderance 
of myths in the Hindu religion appeared to be the main 
causes. In this respect, the sayings of Khana, the wise 
sage of ancient Bengal seem to have a particularly strong 
effect (see Chapter II on Khana*s sayings on agricultural 
practices). Although Islam does not formally encourage 
superstitious beliefs, Muslims are not immune from these.
Poverty Implications of Superstitious Beliefs
1) The prescriptions provided by these superstitions have 
no rational scientific basis; as such these ultimately 
hamper productive activities.
2) These help demobilise the poor in that these make them 
depend on chance factors and prevent them from taking 
conscious efforts in life, and from grasping the real 
causes and solution of their poverty.
Casteism among Hindus
TABLE 3
Attitude towards Casteism at Magura*, 1977 (as obtained through PI)
Respondent
Categories*
Percentage of Favourable 
Response to casteism in 
general
Percentage of Favourable 
Response to inter-caste 
marriage
Male 50*0 8*33
Female 61*5 7.69
Poor 53.3 6*66
Middle
Class 53.5 13.3
Rich 60*0 -
Total (50) 56 8 .0
* All respondents were Hindus*
Trend as obtained through CESI
The grip of the caste system has somewhat loosened in certain 
respects over the last fifty years but it continues to be a dominant 
institution* Some of the obvious ’’excesses'1 are gone but caste 
still controls choice of occupation and maintains social distance 
between upper and lower castes* Thus, there has been so far no 
inter-caste marriage in this village; until 19&7 * the lower castes 
were not allowed to come close to the idol during the collective 
Puja ceremonies; in 1973* the upper castes (i*e* Brahmins and 
Kaesthas) refused to attend the post-death rites of a scheduled caste 
fisherman*
The females and the rich were more conservative about caste than 
the males and the poor respectively. Lack of education on the part
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of women and co-incidence of higher caste with wealth explained this 
phenomenon*
The changes that have taken place were caused by spread of 
education, migration of upper caste Hindus to India after 19^7* their 
loss of political and economic power after the establishment of 
Pakistan and the impact of various political struggles such as the 
Tebhaga of 19^-^7 and the 1971 Bangladesh independence movement*
Casteism among the Muslims
Theoretically, there is no scope for casteism among Muslims since 
such distinctions between man and man are clearly condemned in Islam* 
However, in Magura, the story is quite different* Thus, the 
residents of Daipara, who are all Muslims, are considered as social 
outcastes by the rest of the Muslim villagers: they are not members
of any of the Muslim 'Samajes' and 'factions* and no inter-marriage 
can take place, or has so far taken place with them* This is 
because besides being poor, they are either recent arrivals or their 
females sire engaged as quack midwives (Dai) and both these 
characteristics relegate them to a lowly social position*
Poverty Implications of Caste
1) It prevents the poor among the various castes from coming 
closer and from becoming conscious of their objective 
economic condition*
2) Since upper castes by and large coincide with upper economic 
classes, caste is used to augment the domination of the poor 
by the rich*
3) It is an irrational division of labour and hinders
278
occupational mobility and hence development of productive 
forces*
4-) By implication, it preaches man*s predestined role in life 
and hence justifies a status quo that militates against 
the poor*
Manual Work 
TABLE k
Attitude towards Manual Work at Magura, 1977 (as obtained through DI)
Respondent Categories Percentage of Favourable Response
Male 89.06
Female 80 .0 8
Hindus 8 2 .0 0
Muslims 86 .5 8
Poor 8 3 .7 5
Middle Class 8 5 .2 9
Rich 87 .65
Total (152) 84.8
Trend as obtained through CESI
a) There has been some increase in a positive attitude towards 
manual labour over the last fifty years* The majority of 
the villagers still do not consider it dignified. The 
general attitude was, "the poor people must do manual 
labour because they can't do without it". Conversely, 
anyone who could afford to escape manual labour would do 
so*
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b) Fifty years ago, no educated person* and only about 10% of the 
rich did any manual labour relating to their occupation* At
present about 20% of the educated and 25% of the rich did any
manual labour* Manual labour and the poverty situation of
a household are inextricably linked with one another.
c) At present, the Hindus and the rich are more averse to 
manual labour than the Muslims and the poor respectively*
In the dominant interpretation of the Hindu religion, 
manual labour is reserved for only the lower castes; there 
is no such formal sanction in Islam. The rich consider 
manual labour undignified. There is considerable 
discrepancy between the findings of DI and CESI. We 
consider the latter to be more authentic* In our 
observation, the DI results do not reflect the real feelings 
and life style of the rich and the educated.
Poverty Implications of Adverse Attitude to Manual Work 
At the existing level of productive forces, organised manual 
labour was of the utmost importance in increasing social capital.
Such an attitude was thus a serious hindrance to the'development 
of productive forces, especially when those possessing education and 
capital did not want to combine mental with manual labour*
Possessing School Leaving Certificate and above.
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Women*s Emancipation
a*) Female and Co-Education;
TABLE 3
Attitude towards Female and Co-Education at Magura, 1977 (as obtained 
through DI)
Respondent
Categories
Percentage of Favourable 
Response to female education
Percentage of Favourable 
response to co-education
Male 98.8*f 21.87
Female 95.25 16.17
Hindus 98. Vf 26.0
Muslims 96.28 1^.63
Poor 96.78 21.25
Middle
Class 100.00 11.76
Rich 100.00 22.22
Total (132) 97.72 18.9
Trend as obtained through CESI
1) There has been some progress in female education over the 
last fifty years and attitudes towards female education are 
now more favourable because female education means either 
better education for children at home, or brighter marriage 
and employment prospects, or both to most villagers*
2) However, the strategy that most villagers desire in obtaining 
female education is through separate education, the 
attitude to co-education being strictly negative* But 
given the present resource position, such a strategy is 
impossible to attain, especially since the existing 
educational institutions are poorly manned and equipped
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owning to lack of funds.
3) On female and co-education, the Muslims and the females were 
more conservative than the Hindus and the males respectively. 
In the interpretation of Islam dominant at Magura, female 
education is looked down upon; given their relative lack 
of education, female conservatism in this regard stems 
mainly from their continued subservience to men*
b) Purdah* and females working outside home 
TABLE 6
Attitude towards Purdah and Females Working Outside Home at Magura, 
1977 (as obtained through DI)
Respondent
Categories
Percentage of Favourable 
Response to Purdah
Percentage of Favourable 
Response to Females 
Working Outside Home
Male 59.37 28.12
Female 83.82 38.23
Hindus 54.0 44.00
Muslims 82.92 26.82
Poor 71.25 37.50
Middle
Class 73.52
26.4?
Rich 66.66 27.77
Total (132) 71.9 33.33
Literally means veil. In practice, it constitutes covered/ 
non-appearance of especially adult females before certain 
categories of unrelated and distantly related adult males.
Trend as obtained through CESI
1) Purdah observance has considerably decreased over the last 
fifty years and in the same period the percentage of females 
working outside the home has also increased and similar has 
been the change in respect to attitude towards purdah and 
females working outside the home. However, the present 
situation is still far from a decisive break with the past.
2) The relaxation in respect to purdah and females working 
outside the home is more marked among the Hindus and the 
poor than among the Muslims and the rich respectively.
In the interpretation of Islam prevailing here, purdah is 
very strictly defined; there is no such sanction in 
Hinduism. On the other hand, poverty has driven the poor 
females out of their huts. They are at present engaged as 
either maid servants in the rich households or in various 
post-harvest operations.
c) Dowry
In the direct interview, only 2.2% of the respondents considered 
dowry as desirable. However, despite this universal condemnation, 
it was clearly on the increase. Fifty years ago, dowry was unknown 
in this village. In fact, at that time, the reverse, i.e. bride 
price, was the dominant norm. Dowry started with upper caste Hindus 
and the educated. Now it is common to all classes and religious and 
caste groups.
Nowadays the amount of dowry generally varies as follows with 
different classes:
Rich: Cash and presents worth Tk. 10 - 15 thousand
Middle class: Cash and presents worth Tk. 5 - 7  thousand
Poor: Cash and presents worth Tk. 2 - 4 thousand.
During the last five years, breach of promise in respect of 
dowry resulted in two divorces, 5 wife beatings and 10 cases of neglect 
to the wife. A poor peasant had to sell his tin roofs to provide his 
daughter*s dowry. He is now shelterless.
The increase in dowry can be ascribed to several causes: (a) the
relatively greater importance of man in the economic process, (b) the 
lower social position of women, augmented by the prevailing 
interpretation of religion, and (c) decline in polygamy and child 
marriage, thereby relatively increasing the number of marriageable 
females.
d) Husband*s domination over wife 
TABLE 7
Attitude towards Husband's Domination over Wife at Magura, 1977 (as 
obtained through DI)
Respondent Categories Percentage of Favourable Response
Male
Hindus
Female
92.18
89.70
86.90
Muslims 92.68
Poor 91.25
Middle Class 85.29
Rich 94.40
Total 90.90
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Tread as obtained through CESI
1) There has been only very slight decrease in the domination of 
wife by husband over the last fifty years, owing especially 
to raan*s predominant economic and social position (female 
land ownership clearly points to this: See Chapter III).
2) Wife domination was quite severe among the poor, despite the 
fact that poor women were more associated with productive 
labour than rich women. There was no significant 
difference between Hindus and Muslims in this regard, 
possibly because in the dominant interpretations of both the 
religions, women have been down-graded.
Poverty implications of adverse attitude to women*s emancipation
Women constituted half the population, and unless they were 
liberated from various bondages, the development of productive forces 
was bound to be impeded. The existing sexual division of labour was 
highly irrational and held back the full realisation of their 
potentialities. Similarly, the present man-woman relationship also 
promoted exactions like the dowry, which, among other things, amounted 
to non-productive consumption.
Communalism
A serious impediment towards the political mobilisation of the 
rural poor is communalism, which has always come as a handy tool to 
the propertied classes, both Hindus and Muslims, for diffusing the 
former*s attempts at economic and political emancipation. In order 
to understand the level, strength and ramifications of this force, 
it needs to be discussed in historical perspective.
Before 19^7» class and religious divisions more or less coincided 
in the village. About 60% of the villagers were Hindus. Among the 
seven gantidars, who among themselves owned the entire village land, 
only one was a Muslim (and that too a petty gantidar). The majority 
of the Muslims were from MH to LLH classes, whereas the majority of 
the Hindus were above the MH class. In other words, the majority of 
the Muslims were employed as wage labourers and share croppers in 
Hindu-owned land. This, together with the prevailing interpretation 
of Hinduism, which downgraded both Muslims (as converts from low caste 
Hindus) and manual labour, made the Muslims of this village objects 
of various forms of social discrimination: they were called 'Chotolok*
(lowly people) openly; even the young children of the gantidars would 
address elderly Muslim peasants by their first names (which is a sign 
of disrespect). If a Muslim peasant visited the house of a Hindu, he 
would be offered at best a gunny bag to sit on; if a Muslim passed by 
the house of a Brahmin, water and cowdung would be sprinkled for 
purification of the "polluted" place. Elderly villagers still recall 
an incident of 19^0 when a small Muslim boy of a poor peasant family 
was tied up and detained for 2k hours by a Hindu gantidar for having 
trespassed into his mango gardens.
It was these circumstances that paved the way for communal 
politics in Magura and the region. In the 1937 legislative assembly 
elections, the main contestants were from the Muslim League and the 
Congress, and the votes were divided clearly on communal lines. The 
Congress candidate won mainly because the voters for this election 
were those who paid the village police tax (which was fixed according 
to the amount of property owned) or were Matriculates, and both these 
criteria favoured the Hindus much more than the generally poorer and 
the less educated Muslims. In the '\^ k6 referendum for Pakistan, the
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Congress purposely set up a Muslim candidate from this area (Syed 
Nausher Ali*) in order to divide the Muslim votes. As a result, 
neither the Muslim League nor the Congress but the scheduled caste 
Hindu candidate won. He chose to vote in favour of Pakistan, much 
to the dismay and anger of the upper caste Hindus. At this time, 
the local Muslim League leadership rested with the rising Muslims of 
the area (i.e. persons from rich and upper middle households in the 
rural areas and lawyers, teachers, etc. in the towns) who had little 
scope for further upward mobility given the entrenched position of 
Hindu landowners, merchants and professionals. Thus, they started 
making free use of communalism, given the contradiction between Muslim 
peasants and Hindu landowners, in furthering their own cause. And 
indeed after 19^7, with the departure of about 60% of the Hindus from 
this area, the rising Muslim classes were able to acquire land and fill 
in professional (for example, teaching) positions vacated by Hindus. 
Although we could not get hold of relevant official records, according 
to our informants, in the years following 19^7 , a substantial amount 
of the village land was transferred by the departing Hindus to the 
local Muslims. Since the former were in a great hurry to leave the 
village, owing to their acute insecurity generated in a general 
atmosphere of communal riots and bitter Hindu-Muslira relationships, 
the land price dropped very low. Although the lion’s share of this 
land was bought by the rising Muslims (MH and above classes), some of 
the Muslim landless, poor and lower middle households were also able 
to obtain the land at this price. In several cases, the Hindus 
preferentially sold their land to their Muslim share-croppers on credit 
(i.e. on the condition that the price would be paid after harvest and
Later member of the Indian Rajya Sabha.
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sale of the standing crop) because some of the powerful Muslims were 
conspiring to obtain Hindu land completely free*
Following the 19^7 Partition, political allegiance of the Hindus 
to India and their transfer of resources across the border became the 
new basis of communalism in East Pakistan* However, a number of 
countervailing factors were also at work* Firstly, the Partition 
and the exodus significantly eroded the class basis of communalism in 
that now, the majority of both the upper and the lower classes were 
Muslims* At the level of social intercourse, even the poor Muslims 
of the village, especially following the enactment of the EBSATA in 
1950, ceased to show respect and reverence to Hindu gantidars.
Secondly, the concession obtained in the aftermath of the exodus was a 
once-and-for-all affair able to satisfy only a small section of the 
rising Muslims of East Pakistan; and with the growth of a new 
exploitative arrangement vis-a-vis the West Pakistan based ruling class, 
the ambition of the Bengali rising bourgeoisie and rural propertied 
classes, especially those who failed to capitalise on the post- 
Partition vacuum, received a serious jolt* Consequently, the target 
for attack also changed. Thirdly, Narail was an important centre of 
the 19^ Tebhaga struggle. This was also the time when the Muslim 
League had mounted its broadside crusade for Pakistan on communal lines* 
Although the second current prevailed at the end of the day, the 
Tebhaga*s class line directed against jotedars, transcending religious 
divisions, left behind for the common man of this area a good example 
of non-communal struggle, besides being able to prevent any severe 
communal outburst at that time (in fact, Narail was one of those few 
areas in Bengal where no communal killing and looting took place)*
Thus in the 195^ elections, despite the communal stance of the Muslim
League and its tirade against the UF* (United Front) for being pro- 
Hindu and pro-Indian, the latter swept the polls in Narail (as in most 
other constituencies)• Following the promulgation of Martial Law in 
1958 and return of the Muslim League to power under the wing of the 
armed forces, the government provided a number of provocations for 
communal riots (for example, in 196^ and during the 19^5 Indo-Pakistan 
War)* But these did not produce the desired effect in Magura and 
the adjoining area* In fact, by the end of the 60s, given the 
complete disenchantment of the majority of the Bengali Muslim rising 
classes with Pakistan and the need to look for an external ally in 
neighbouring India, Hindu-Muslim unity became quite visible, and in 
the 1970 general elections, Hindus and Muslims of the village worked 
jointly towards the electoral success of the Awami League. After 
the 1971 crackdown by the Pakistan army, the Hindus and the Awami League 
supporters of the area fled to India. Meanwhile, the village came 
under control of the Razakars** for a brief spell, during which time 
they hired and encouraged some of the Muslim villagers to loot 
abandoned Hindu property* The looting was put to an end, when in the 
next phase, the Naxalites took over and tried to launch a class struggle. 
On return to the village, in the wake of triumphant entry of the Indian 
army and the Mujib Bahini*** in this area at the end of 1971» the 
Hindus found their property destroyed and looted and were obviously 
angered* On the other hand, the Muslims in the village were generally
* The U*F. consisted of anti-Muslim League forces - the Krishak 
Sramik Party, the Awami League, the Congress, etc.
** Para-military force raised by the occupation Pakistan army.
*** Para-military forces raised by the Awami League from its student 
supporters*
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offended by the 'victor* attitude of Hindu returnees, and their
boastful threats of retaliation, on the strength of the Indian
occupation army and the Awami League government* The real looters
and Razakars also took advantage of this situation* In order to
hide their crimes, they started whipping up hatred against Hindus by
playing on Muslim religious sentiments* After Sheikh Mu jib's
assassination in 1975* the rich Hindus of the village appeared rather
afraid* They took the fall of Sheikh Mu jib and the Awami League as
their own, and openly spoke of migrating to India* They tended to
equate anti-Indianism with anti-Hinduism and some of them even secretly
relished the withholding of Ganges water by the Indian government
through the Farakka barrage. On the other hand, local followers
of the Jamat-i-Islam and the Muslim League have been constantly
imparting a communal colour to the political allegiance of some of the
Hindus to India and their resource transfer across the border. Thus,
after 19719 the Hindu rich in the village were able to unite all Hindu
castes into a single faction to put up a joint front against the
Muslims, and in doing this, they made particular use of the looting
incident* Also, during the 1978 Presidential elections, despite the
existence of a pro-Zia* Scheduled Caste Federation, the majority of
Hindus, including the lower castes, were induced to vote for Osmani,
the Awami League candidate. Similarly, during the last U.P* elections,
some of the Muslim Matbars of this village and Union invoked religious
2
sentiments in their election campaign against BB , the U*P* Chairman.
All in all, communalism is on the wane, and there have been 
several instances since the Tebhaga struggle of 19^ when the poor of 
both the communities got together against their exploiters, whether
The present President of Bangladesh.
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Hindu or Muslim* However, this does not mean that communalism, as a 
divisive force, has died out* Despite the erosion of the economic 
basis of communalism, it can still be whipped up to generate hatred on 
religious lines* At the level of social intercourse, the gross 
form of discrimination of the past is now unthinkable and yet the 
distance remains. For example, (a) in living memory, there has not 
been a single Hindu-Muslim marriage in this area, and the attitude of 
both the communities towards such marriages is strictly negative;
(b) the very residential pattern in the village, divided as it is into 
9 distinct neighbourhoods, clearly reveals the reality of not only 
religious but also caste barriers among the villagers.
Factions
Bangladesh is one of those areas in South Asia, where an organised 
village government consisting of a headman, an accountant and a 
Panchayet (council of elders) never quite flourished, especially after 
introduction of Permanent Settlement in 1793** What has definitely 
existed instead are the factions (Dal). A faction is generally 
composed of one main leader (Matbar), one or more sub-leaders and 
followers. A faction is supposed to safeguard both group (vis-^-vis 
other factions) as well as individual interests of its members*
There are at present 3 factions in this village. All the Hindus
The 1871 Bengal Administration Report commented, some things
are in some places regulated by village Panchayets and by headmen, 
elders* But more and more, the Zemindari agent supplants the 
old model and the landlord takes the place of indigenous self- 
rule" • (Quoted in Tapper, 1976, 31*)
291
of this village (59 households) belong to a single faction while the 
Muslims (97 households) are divided into the following k factions:
i) the Mollah faction (16 households);
ii) the Madhya para* faction (26 households);
iii) the Bagh para faction (20 households);
iv) the Purba para faction (27 households).
Eight households of Dai para do not belong to any of the factions.
Until 1950, all Muslim households of this village belonged to a 
single faction, led by IM , EH II and prominent Matbars from the 
Mollah goshthi (kinship lineage group). He was also one of the 
prominent leaders of the greater Muslim 'Samaj1 consisting of Muslims 
of Magura and four other neighbouring villages. In leading the Magura 
faction, he was assisted by heads of other prominent kinship lineage 
groups of the village. But the main leader of this faction 
traditionally came from the Mollah goshthi. Various complaints 
accumulated against the Mollah leadership over time. However, at the 
root of it all was the special social status enjoyed by the Mollahs 
owing to their so-called blue blood** (for example, (i) a member of 
the Mollah goshthi always led the Idd congregational prayers, (ii) 
Mollahs considered families outside their lineage too low for 
matrimonial relationships despite the high economic standing of some 
of them and this was obviously something very difficult for them to 
swallow). In 1951» following the death of IM , the faction split 
into two, one consisting of member of the Mollah goshthi, and the 
other consisting of the remaining Muslim Households of Magura. The
* Neighbourhood.
** Before coming to this village the person who founded the Mollah 
Goshthi was a weaver. Their new aristocracy was based on land 
ownership and better access to religious knowledge.
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immediate cause for the split was non-consultation with the rest of 
the village in drawing up the list of invitees for the »Challisha* 
(feast to commemorate death) of IM •
In 1967» the non-Mollah faction further split into three new
factions over a land dispute between two cousins of a rich household,
1 1UT and J • As the dispute intensified from exchange of hot words 
to physical fights and litigation in the courts, they invoked their 
respective kinship ties and dependency relationships with the poor 
households to increase their strength, and in the process Bagh para 
and Madha para factions were formed* Only 6 households of Purba para 
joined the Bagh para faction and the remainder steered clear of this 
fight and constituted the Purba para faction* During the 1971 
liberation struggle, animosity between Bagh para and Madhya para 
factions intensified and manifested itself through sharply opposed 
political stands, dacoity, murder and damage to property* Following 
liberation, weariness forced the three factions into peace and 
reconciliation* However, in 1975? the three way split came once 
again, this time over invitation to the marriage ceremony of a Matbar*s 
son* In reality, it was a pretext to fall apart after three years 
of uneasy truce*
The eight poor and landless households not falling into any of 
the factions all belong to Dai para* They are virtually outcastes 
from the Muslim society of this village because of their lowly 
family profession of midwifery and recent arrival to the village*
Until 19^8 , there was only one faction among the Hindus of this 
village* The split came over misappropriation and black marketing of
yarn, meant for distribution among weavers through the village weavers*
2 2 cooperative, by NNK and his brother SSK (they were respectively
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President and Secretary of the cooperative and were responsible for
lifting the y a m  from the government store at Narail), This first
affected only the weavers, and later the entire Hindu community of the
2
village. The faction led by NNK consisted of only 10-12 households*
In 1950, the two factions decided to bury the hatchet given the need
for unity to cope with communal riots, migration to India and general
insecurity to their life and property. In 1968, the Hindu faction
2
split once again, this time over the social acceptance of DJB , who 
had earlier become a Muslim but later wanted to be reconverted to the 
Hindu faith.
In 1972, after their return to Magura from India based refugee 
camps, the Hindus decided to reunite. They felt that they could cope 
better with the destruction carried out on their lives and property by 
Razakars and local Muslims, if they were united.
There are 5 Matbars and 13 sub-Matbars in these 5 village factions. 
Of them 14* (i.e. over 75%) belong to UMH to RH II classes, and the 
remaining k are from LMH to PH classes. There is no landless Matbar 
or sub-Matbar and none of the main Matbars are from classes below UMH.
Of the 18 Matbars and sub-Matbars, one is a graduate, two are 
matriculates, 5 had some schooling and the remaining 11 had no schooling 
and are virtually illiterate.
Most of the Hindu Matbars support the Awami League, obviously 
because of its secular policy and good relations with India. Before 
partition, it was invariably the Congress. Among the Muslim Matbars, 
the strategy appears to be to bend with the wind. Before 19^ 9* only 
two of the 13 Muslim Matbars had any link with the Awami League.
The rest were generally sympathetic to either the Muslim League or the
294
Jamati-i-Islam or were "non-political” • With the approach of the 
Awami League wave in 19&9i there was a positive swing in their 
political allegiance* Moreover, this was also the time when 
Naxalites were pursuing their "class annihilation" line in this sub­
division* As such they found in the Awami League a better alternative 
to the Muslim League* After independence, they all welcomed the 
Mukti Bahini. Those who had collaborated with the Pakistan army 
either tried to hide their past connections by maintaining a low
"I
profile or made compromises (for example, Ar ) with the victors.*
Only one Hindu Matbar was not a supporter of the Awami League* He 
did not consider any of these parties (i.e. Awami League or Muslim 
League) relevant to the rural poor* In general, the Matbars strongly 
hated the Naxalites, although some of them had to put up with them in 
1971 under duress.
The voting pattern in both union and national level elections is 
heavily influenced by the Matbars, who act as vote banks* In all the 
elections that have taken place so far, they have been the crucial 
contact points, and over and above the general campaign, either the 
candidate himself or supporters or activists on his behalf from the 
concerned political party approached the Matbars. Thus all the 
Matbars admitted to being contacted by the candidates during the last 
U.P. election. Similarly during the same election, of the k3 faction 
followers interviewed, only 7 were approached by the candidates alone 
sind the rest were approached either by the Matbar alone or by the 
candidate along with a Matbar (these seven were mostly from UMH and 
above classes). However, over the years, the grip of the Matbars on 
the vote bank seems to have slightly loosened in that some followers 
pretended to vote according to Matbar*s directive but actually voted
for candidates of their own choice. Also, unless pressed too hard, 
some followers generally did not turn up for voting (since Bangladesh*s 
independence, the faith in the ballot appears to be on the decline in 
this village).
At the Union level power struggle, the support of the Magura
2Matbars is presently divided among two groups, one led by BB the
present U.P. Chairman (other prominent members of this group are JUS ,
2
ex-U.P. Chairman from Charikhada, NGS , ex-U.P. member from Maizpara, 
etc.) and the other led by JA , BB*s contender in the last U.P. 
elections. In terms of economic and social standing and educational 
attainment, the two groups are evenly matched, although a more accurate 
assessment would perhaps suggest a greater strength in the former.
Their contention is over power at the Union Parishad, which, in turn, 
ensures a strong grip over developmental inputs and other facilities 
from the government for self-aggrandisement and patronage distribution.
During the last two U.P. elections, both groups claimed the backing of
2
the Awami League, then the ruling party. At Magura, the BB group
2
counted on Hindu Matbars and BB *s personal equation with Matbars of
1
the Mollah group. On the other hand, JA no longer claimed Awami
League patronage, now that it had been replaced by a Martial.Law
regime. At Magura, he was now raising two issues, namely domination
2
of the Maizpara Union Parishad and market place by Hindus led by BB ,
2
and discrimination showed by BB *s Maizpara group towards development 
activities at Magura (opposition of the Maizpara group to government 
recognition of Magura High School was specifically cited as an example 
in this regard).
The voting pattern in the last U.P. election revealed the 
following:
as e
a) All Hindus and some members of the Mollah faction (the
1 2 youth supported JA ) voted for BB . All members of the
1 1other three factions voted for JA . Ar , one of the Bagh
'I
para Matbars, openly canvassed for JA •
b) For membership of the U.P., there were six candidates from
the ward of which Magura is a part. Of them, 3 were from
RH I and II classes while the remaining one was from a
2
middle household (AA of Kathalbaria) • The Matbars of
1this village supported WA of Kalukhali, and he was easily 
elected.
Of the 18 Matbars and sub-Matbars, agriculture was the main 
occupation of 16. There were 3 who had more than one occupation 
which included teaching, trading and moneylending. In agriculture, 
12 were either sharecropping out or engaging agricultural wage labour 
or both. Even those who did manual labour in the field employed some 
agricultural labour, especially during peak seasons* Followers in 
the faction were clearly tied down to Matbars for sharecropping in 
land, wage labour, credit, etc., although this was not admitted by 
most of the LLH to MU followers in the survey conducted through 
direct interview.
Of the 18 Matbars and sub-Matbars, 3 were not associated with 
any committee/organisation, (of them, 3 were from LMH and PH classes). 
The remaining 13 have been/are office bearers of one or more of the 
following organisations/committees: 
i) U.P.
ii) Village Guards
iii) IRDP cooperative
iv) Fishermen*s cooperative
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v) Weavers' cooperative
vi) Magura High School Managing Committee
vii) Magura Primary School Managing Committee
viii) Magura Relief Committee*
ix) Magura Mosque Committee
x) Management Committee for Market place at Gor
xi) Maizpara Union Swanirvar Committee
xii) Maizpara Union Multipurpose Society.
As a result of this association, the majority of them come to 
acquire close access to various U.P*, thana and sub-Division level 
functionaries, and this is then utilised to obtain from them various 
inputs and concessions for both personal benefit as well as for 
patronage distribution among faction followers. Two of the Matbars 
also have ’'special'1 links with the police; they are known to harbour 
thieves and act as ’’brokers” between the police and the offenders.
All of the Matbars claimed that they served the faction members 
through support/security in times of crisis, recommendation/advocacy 
(Shuparish*) for help from Union/Central government functionaries, 
and that unless they did so-, there would have been either desertion 
from the faction or else retaliation by those not receiving help.
Of the k3 followers interviewed, only 14 (10 of them were LLH to 
MH) said they received no help from their Matbars last year. However, 
39 followers (which included 30 of the 3^ LLH to MH followers among the 
b-3 followers interviewed) thought that in distributing patronage 
within the faction**, Matbars were distinctly biased in favour of
* Formed in 1972, now defunct.
** All of the followers thought that patronage by Matbars did not go 
beyond the faction.
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persons with economic and social standing similar or higher than that 
of the Matbars, and that these persons generally turned out to be 
Matbars1 relatives or next door neighbours. On the other hand, last 
year, 2k of the k3 followers (including 18 of the 3k LLH to MH 
followers) claimed to have either rendered free services to their 
Matbars or help them during an election or support them in their 
fights/quarrels with their rivals. Fifteen followers thought that 
retaliatory actions could be taken by the Matbars if their followers 
failed to serve and help them (this was denied by all the Matbars).
On the other hand, only k followers (all MHs) thought that they could 
take retaliatory measures against their Matbars if they failed to help 
them. On the basis of personal observation and cross examination of 
selected informants, it seems that relationship between Matbars and 
their poor followers is much more unequal than has been brought out in 
the direct survey. Thus, in both exchanges between Matbars and 
followers and in the capacity for retaliation, the former definitely- 
enjoyed a far more advantageous position than the latter.
Only 20 out of the k3 followers interviewed considered their 
respective Matbars to be good. On the other hand, 25 (this included 
20 out of the 3k LLH to MH followers among the k3 interviewed) thought 
their Matbars were 11 just alright". No one thought that his Matbar 
was bad. Again, personal observation and cross examination of 
selected informants revealed a very different story: very few of the
poor (i.e. LLH to MH) followers (excepting the henchmen) considered 
their Matbars to be good. They were simply afraid to think aloud. 
However, they felt that they had little choice not to abide the 
dictates of the Matbars.
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Among the five Magura factions, the leader-follower relation 
appears to be without any tension in the Mollah faction* This is 
because of close kinship ties among members of this faction and the aura 
of •aristocracy* associated with this kinship group which, in turn, 
allows for a better equation between followers and leaders, as also 
smoother manipulation by the leadership in establishing faction 
solidarity. The situation is quite different (in varying degrees) 
in the remaining k factions* Firstly, there sire deep-seated rivalries 
among faction leaders (for example, caste rivalries among Hindu faction 
leaders and land disputes between 2 Madhya para faction leaders) which 
led to bitter fights and even spilling of blood in the past; 
consequently, their stranglehold over their followers is not very 
tight. Secondly, in these factions, kinship ties between leaders and 
followers are less prominent* Thirdly, Matbars of these factions 
are noted for their open partiality in patronage distribution and for 
ruthlessness in their economic relations with followers. As a result, 
there were some moments in the past when followers of different factions 
tried to cut across factional barriers and put up a common fight 
against the village rich (for example, during the 19^  Tabhaga struggle 
and in 1968, when sharecroppers demanded a better deal and in 1971» when 
they were politicised by the Naxalites). In such situations, the 
Matbars responded by closing their ranks, despite rivalries, and taking 
joint actions against such recalcitrance.
All the main Matbars and 75% of the sub-Matbars had a family
tradition in faction leadership. For eight of them, Matbari could be
traced back to at least two generations. If the sub-Matbars were poor
(i.e. MH or below), it meant they had one or more of the following
characteristics: (i) son of well known Matbar (MK ), (ii) good
-]
henchman of the main Matbar (MZM ), (iii) formed a powerful
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opposition within the faction, and hence had to be conceded some power 
and authority (BRB ). All the main Matbars and about half the sub- 
Matbars attend shalish within the village in their own authority. The 
remaining half are either specifically invited to a particular shalish 
or attend as assistants to the main Matbars, Three of the main 
Matbars are regularly invited to attend shalish in outside villages*
Four of the 5 main Matbars and 6 of the 13 sub-Matbars did not 
want any one from low families (Nichu Bangsha) to be Matbars, All 
the main Matbars have given or would like to give their sons and 
daughters in marriage to persons of either equivalent family (living 
in village or town) or of family of higher standing than theirs.
Three of the 5 main Matbars and 5 of the 13 sub-Matbars admitted to 
having obtained either free labour or support during fight/dispute 
with others, from their respective followers. All Matbars claimed to 
have helped their followers through money, advice, recommendation, 
relief goods, etc.
The following conclusions may now be drawn from the above 
discussion:
1) Although faction structure at Magura reflected, in the main, 
the economic dependence of the poor on the rich generated by 
sharecropping, usurious money lending, limited and non-free 
wage labour, speculative trade, low level of productive 
forces and production, superstructural elements such as 
religion, neighbourhood, kinship, caste, etc, (which were 
themselves again related to the underlying economic structure) 
were also freely invoked in the formation and maintenance of 
a faction.
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2) Factions serve two main purposes. Firstly, they provide the 
village rich with political power which is then used by them 
for access to/control over economic/other political 
resources in and outside the village, resulting in competition 
among themselves, with their poor followers ending up mainly 
as cannon fodder. Secondly, it helps demobilisation of the 
village poor in that it creates an illusion of solving their 
economic problems within the fold of the faction and prevents 
them from uniting with themselves, cutting across the 
factional barriers, and in the process, realising their 
objective position in the society and their possible role
in changing this reality.
3) Faction as an institution was not an insurmountable 
proposition in view of its weakening over time owing to 
reasons stated earlier. Also, middle households were 
relatively more independent and initially, they could provide 
an alternative leadership of the village poor, provided, 
however, the latter also became conscious of their objective 
position in the society and the need for changing this.
Samaj
Traditionally, the function of the Samaj (literally meaning 
society) has been regulation of two aspects of village life, namely 
personal/social conduct of its members in accordance with religious/ 
caste injunctions and practices regarding socio-religious festivals, 
rites, customs, etc.
Among the Hindus of this village, there are now 3 Samajes, based
on caste distinction, namely Brahmin-Kayestha Samaj, weavers (’Tanti*) 
Samaj and fishermen (’Jele*) Samaj. Before 19^7* all the three 
Samajes had two forms:
i) The extended Samaj consisting of same caste households of a 
large number of villages, some of which were as far distant 
as 10 miles from Magura. 
ii) The everyday Samaj of the same caste households of Magura and 
the immediate neighbouring villages. At present the extended 
Samaj does not exist, and in the case of fishermen, the Samaj 
now does not go beyond Magura.
Before 1950, the Muslims of Magura were part of a larger Samaj
(Chauhuddi Samaj) consisting of 5-6 villages. At present, this has 
been replaced by four Samajes in Magura, which are co-terminus with the
4 factions, discussed earlier. Eight households of the Dai para are
not members of any Samaj for the same reasons they are not included in 
any of the factions.
Before 19^ 7* the Brahmin Samaj was led by 10 persons, all of whom
were big gantidars. Three of them were also ’Pundits*, i.e. well
versed in religion. At present, the leadership rests with k persons
2all of whom are Matbars and from rich households. One of them, BB , 
is also the present U.P. Chairman. In 19^ 7* the fishermen Samaj had 
12 leaders and they were again from the richest and the most notable 
families within the Samaj. The Samaj is now led by two persons only. 
They are relatively more solvent than the rest of the Samaj members 
but none of them is a Matbar. In 19^ 7* there were 11 leaders in the 
weavers Samaj. Now the number has dropped to only Both now and
then, the leaders were Matbars and from among the community’s richest 
households. The same is true of the Muslim Samajes.
Over the years, not only has the extent of various Samajes shrunk 
but also Samaj control over the conduct of its members has loosened 
considerably. This is best illustrated by the following examples.
In 1935f a. highly educated Brahmin of this village had dared to take 
water from a Rishi (scheduled caste Hindu), inspired as he was by
Gandhi’s movement against untouchability. He was at once ex-
2communicated from the Brahmin Samaj* On the contrary, when A , wife 
2
of MB , another Brahmin of this Samaj returned to the village in 1972 
and expressed the desire to return to her husband, after having eloped 
with her Muslim lover in the thick of the 1971 war, she was accepted 
by her husband, with full consent of the Brahmin Samaj. In 19^5, 
a fisherman of this village eloped with a widow. As a consequence, 
his paternal family was excommunicated from the Samaj (that meant, 
complete economic, social and religious boycott including withdrawal 
of the services of priests and barbers) until such time as they found 
the runaway couple and produced them before the Samaj. After one 
and a half years, the family was able to locate and produce them 
before the Samaj leaders. His head was shaved and yogurt shake (Ghol) 
was poured over his shaven head as a redemption measure (Prayashchit). 
He had also to arrange a feast for the entire extended Samaj and 
forsake the poor widow, and in the process he became absolutely 
penniless. Thus, in the past, inter-caste marriages, dining and 
mixing, marriage without consent of Samaj leaders, widow marriage, 
love affairs, lack of purdah observance, failure to observe ceremonial 
rules (for example invitation to a marriage) etc., were severely dealt 
with in all the three Hindu Samaj es. In the weavers and fishermen 
Samajes, pursuit of the caste trade in partnership with persons of 
other religious/caste denominations is also forbidden. The punishment 
for breaking the embargos could be anything from prayashchit to
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excommunication from the Samaj. Now, all this is not totally gone, 
but there have been increasing instances of what Samaj leaders described 
as ’’religious and social indisciplines". Our interview with Samaj 
leaders indicated a unanimous lament for the "good old days". The 
general members of the Samajes also seemed to agree that Samaj control 
over their conduct had considerably loosened over time and that now 
many actions that were considered as serious offences in the past are 
no longer considered as such, or else even if considered so, these 
were nevertheless being committed, and the Samaj was able to do very 
little about it. Although Samaj code among the Muslims was, in 
general, far more liberal and egalitarian, it was particularly strict 
about purdah and man-woman relationships. Here again, and as attested 
by both leaders and members of the four Muslim Samajes, there has been, 
over time, considerable relaxation and decontrol.
A number of factors were responsible for this change. Firstly, 
during the last thirty years, deepening economic crisis, together with 
certain improvements (however peripheral) in education and mass- 
communication media and various political upheavals (such as partition 
and mass exodus in 19^7 i the 1968 uprisings, the 1971 war of 
Independence, etc.) all had their impact on the Samaj structure and 
changed the attitude of Samaj leaders and members towards many of the 
old Samaj rules and injunctions. Secondly, although governmental 
efforts during the last thirty years have on the whole favoured the 
rural rich, some of these nevertheless curtailed certain visible 
feudal excesses. For example, the EBSATA (1950) did away with 
statutory rent-receiving interests. This, together with the exodus 
of the Hindu zamindars and jotedars after 19^ -7* curtailed the powers 
of the old rich and as a result, their effectiveness as Samaj leaders 
was substantially reduced. Thirdly, for the Hindu Samajes, the
3 0 5
post-partition exodus to India not only affected their size and 
composition but also reduced their effectiveness by generating 
despondency and frustration among Hindus who stayed back. Moreover, 
the establishment of Pakistan meant that for livelihood and survival 
they would now have to increase their economic and social intercourse 
with ascending Muslims; and that also demanded relaxation of many 
Samaj controls. Thus in the words of a lower caste Matbar: "if
a Muslim officer on tour could now be entertained by a Brahmin in his 
house, it was difficult for him to invoke Samaj discipline and prevent 
a scheduled caste from drinking water from the tube-well he was using".
It is clear from the above discussion that, in reality, the Samaj 
was called upon to play two roles. Firstly, it invoked "order and 
discipline", "common good and propriety", "religious sanctity", etc. 
to defend and legitimise various social inequities, and this in turn 
strengthened the perpetuation of the underlying inequitable economic 
structure which made possible the existence of an institution like 
Samaj. Thus, in the final analysis, the essence of the Samaj is that 
while the leaders are the economically strongest in the village the 
followers are poor and economically tied down to them as share croppers, 
wage labourers, creditors, etc. Secondly, the Samaj, so far it has 
been successful in dividing the villagers according to caste and 
religion, prevented the village poor from uniting among themselves.
In this sense, it has been, like the faction, an institution for their 
demobilisat ion•
In Magura, the Samaj, as an institution, is certainly showing 
clear signs of decay, though its existing control over the lives of 
the villagers can by no means be minimised. But while breakdown of 
the Samaj as an institution appears as a necessary condition for 
mobilisation of the village poor, it does not appear as a sufficient one.
Most of the respondents, irrespective of class, caste, religion, etc., 
seemed to agree that if this rot continued, the village could drift 
towards social anarchy. Maybe it is in the context of this 
apprehension, i.e. disintegration without any sign of a better alternative 
to replace the old order, that the old Samaj, despite its rigidities 
and cruelties, appeared as a lost haven to even many of the rural poor 
we interviewed.
Shalish
Justice administration at the village level takes place through 
what is known as the Shalish bench. As is the situation all over 
rural Bangladesh, the Shalish bench at Magura, despite its considerable 
authority, is not a formal legal institution. It deals with both 
criminal and civil matters (however, when these are of very serious 
and complicated nature, the parties generally resort to the formal 
courts). The bench consists of all the Matbars of this village 
(though not all of them are required to be present during the hearing 
of a particular case). Its jurisdiction is limited to disputes 
involving Magura residents. If a dispute involved a Magura resident 
and someone from another village, the Matbars of both the villages 
could constitute a special Shalish bench for the purpose. In case 
of an inter-village dispute the Shalish bench consists of IJ.P. Chairman/ 
members and prominent Matbars of the concerned villages. Prominent 
Matbars of one village are also invited to adjudicate in the internal 
disputes of other villages. The Shalish proceedings are as follows.
The aggrieved party approaches his own Matbar first and then other 
Matbars of the village. Someone, on behalf of the Matbars, then 
ensures the attendance of all concerned parties including witnesses and 
village notables at a certain place and time decided by the Matbars.
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One of the Matbars is elected chairman of the Shalish bench* The 
rest followsusual court procedures except that no lawyers are present 
and the court is held in the open air involving very few formalities*
The following were some of the important cases tried by the 
Shalish bench during the last five years:
1) In 1972, some young men of Bagh para and Madhya para stole 
the standing crops of a Hindu rich peasant-cum-Matbar. In 
the shalish that followed, the plaintiff did not accuse 
anyone specifically (although he knew who the offenders 
were) but requested the bench to investigate the matter and 
identify the offenders* Accordingly, 5 Matbars of Bagh para 
and Madhya para were deputed for the purpose* Nothing was 
actually done. One of the Matbars investigating the theft 
had actually planned and led the operation and the remaining 
offenders were close relatives of the other k Matbars.
2) In 197^1 2 LLH persons were caught red-handed while stealing 
standing crops from the field of an UMH. The bench fined 
each one of them Tk* 100/-. The fine and the stolen crops 
were promptly realised.
3) In 197^1 two UMH persons accidentally burnt their PH 
neighbour's standing crops, while trying to b u m  dead stubble 
in their own field* The compensation was fixed at Tk. 250/- 
to be paid to the plaintiff by the accused. The accused 
never paid the money. One of them is the brother of a 
prominent Matbar.
*f) In 1975, a LLH person stole some goods from the house of a 
BPH. During the course of the shalish, it was found that 
3 others (2. LLH and 1 PH) were involved in the theft. They
were fined Tk. 250/- and the fine was promptly realised.
In 1976, a LLH person was accused of stealing a tetron shirt
from the house of a PH. The bench fined the accused
Tk. 125/- plus the cost of the shirt (which had already been
sold and hence could not be recovered). It was decided
that the fine money would be donated to the school fund and 
1
SM , one of the prominent Matbars was entrusted with this
task. The money is still lying with him. In fact, SM
has in his custody Tk. 750/-, all raised through realisation 
of fines and to be donated to the school fund. Some of the 
teachers have approached him several times in this 
connection. It is unlikely that he will ever hand over 
the money.
The younger brother (who was almost penniless) of a Hindu 
R.H. came back to Magura from India in 197^ and demanded his 
share of the property. The elder brother not only refused 
to part with any property but also reported him to the 
police for illegal entry into Bangladesh. The police 
arrested him but later released him when someone from the 
village, on his behalf, bribed the police. After his 
release, he sought justice with the shalish bench, who 
awarded him 3*5 acres of the total land held by the elder 
brother. So far, he has received only 0.5 acres.
In 1977, J , an unmarried young daughter of a LMH was
'I
forcibly seduced by her brother-in-law (sister’s husband) R , 
(MH) from a neighbouring village. Consequently, she became 
pregnant. The seduction took place in the full knowledge 
of her sister who was mercilessly beaten up whenever she
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'I
tried to protect her sister from her husband. At R >s
insistence, J consented to abortion which did not succeed.
The subsequent delivery was arranged secretly, the baby was
murdered and buried in a nearby ditch. This information
1 1
was leaked by the first wife of R (R had two wives) and 
soon the whole village knew about it. In the Shalish held, 
an Alem (i.e. one well versed in religion) was also called in. 
It was decided to publicly beat her with a shoe 25 times and 
make her beg apology to the entire village. The verdict
'I
was duly executed. But nothing happened to R , the actual
culprit, because he was able to bribe the Matbars of his own
village into silence.
8) In 1977» a servant (LLH) of a RH was caught red-handed while
stealing jute from his master*s house. At the Shalish, the
servant disclosed that the stolen jute was lying with the 
sons of two Matbars of Madhya para and that it was they who 
had instigated him into stealing. The stolen jute was 
accordingly recovered but the accomplices received no 
punishment. The servant was fined Tk. 100/-. The person 
whose jute was stolen was himself a Matbar of Madhya para 
and he did not either press for punishment of his fellow 
Matbar*s sons.
9) In 1975> a dispute ensued between two Hindu rich households
over the ownership of a tree that had been felled by one of
them. In the Shalish that followed, it was decided that 
the tree actually belonged to the one who had felled it.
The plaintiff accepted the verdict of the Shalish bench.
From the above discussion, the following trend may be deduced.
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Firstly, the Shalish bench has always been composed of Matbars, who are 
also among the richest in the village, and conversely, the village poor 
have always been excluded from participating in the administration of 
justice. Secondly, in the resolution of disputes, * justice* tends 
to tilt in favour of the rich and the powerful: when the plaintiff is
poor and the offender is rich, the latter can either get off lightly 
or is able to defy the verdict of the Shalish. In the reverse 
situation (i.e. plaintiff is rich and the offender is poor), punishment 
is promptly awarded and executed. On the other hand, when disputes 
are between the rich, the outcome of the Shalish is generally compromise 
and amicable settlement. Also, some of the offences are committed 
by the poor at the instigation of powerful men but punishment is always 
reserved for the former. Finally, in sexual offences, the woman is 
treated much more harshly.
It may be mentioned here that not only in commission, but also 
by way of omission, the Shalish bench has shown definite bias in favour 
of village Matbars and rich. A number of examples may be cited in 
this respect:
1) Numerous cases of misappropriation and maldistribution of 
relief goods/development inputs by the leaders of various 
cooperatives/relief committees (see Chapter 8).
<1
2) Failure of SM (Matbar), despite numerous reminders by the 
teachers, to deposit the money, raised through imposition of 
fines,to the school fund.
3) Ar *s (Matbar and UMH) illicit relationship with his young 
and widowed aunt (the woman became pregnant and abortion was 
arranged secretly. A woman who helped in the abortion
3 1
leaked out the information* When the entire village came to
know of the matter, some rival Matbars insisted on a Shalish.
1
Ar retaliated by threatening the chief witness, i.e. the 
woman who helped with the abortion, with dire consequences.
As a result, she backed out and refused to depose before the 
Shalish bench. The Shalish did not take place and nothing 
happened to Ar or his aunt).
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*0 Theft by MM 's brother-in-law Sj in 197^ (he stole a cow
from village Ganga Rampur and brought it to his brother-in-
law's house at Magura. By the time the cow was slaughtered
and the meat was sold, with some of it being distributed
free among the Muslim Matbars, the owner of the cow found
out the thief, and was able to identify his cow from its 
1
skin which Sj took to the local market for sale. The
1
owner demanded a Shalish but MM and other Matbars intervened 
on behalf of Sj and no Shalish was held.)
5) Dispute between Magura and Maizpara over the establishment
of a High School at Magura in 1972. (The Maizpara based
Matbars and rich people, many of whom are also U.P.
2
functionaries, led by BB , in a written application to the 
District Education Officer, opposed government recognition 
of Magura High School on the plea that the distance between 
Magura and Maizpara High Schools was less than 2 miles and 
in the process were able to postpone the same by about 3 
years, during which time an enquiry took place and Magura 
based Matbars continued to influence the relevant officials. 
The real reason why Maizpara Matbars opposed the establish­
ment of Magura school was fear of loss of Maizpara*s
dominating position in the area, and student enrolment.
2
Some of the Magura Matbars requested BB for an amicable 
settlement through Shalish. This was not conceded, 
although the Union Parishad is expected to adjudicate in 
case of an inter-village dispute).
Kinship (Atiya-Sha.jon)
In terms of over all social, economic and political affinity and 
intercourse, patrilineal ties (which form the basis of the patrilineal 
group called goshthi) are more important than raatrilineal and 
matrimonial kinship relations. In this village only in 16 households 
of Mollah para do kinship ties cut across economic class lines to any 
appreciable degree. In other paras, the dominant trend was confinement 
of kinship relations within class boundaries, and only 26 landless to 
lower middle households of this village claimed blood (i.e. patrilineal 
and matrilineal) relations with rich households (i.e. UMH and above) 
of Magura and other villages. There was no LLH to LMH at Magura which 
had matrimonial kinship ties with the rich households of Magura or 
other villages. Interviews with selected informants brought out the 
following general picture: economic relations with richer relatives
were insignificant; the poor relatives were not given any special 
preference in the selection of sharecroppers or employment of wage 
labourers. This is also corroborated by survey data: last year,
in a sample of 38 sharecropping-out households, only 3 had relatives 
among their sharecroppers, and none of the 11 rich households from 
among these 38 had a relative among their sharecroppers. Similarly, 
in a sample of 38 wage labour employers, ^ (2 of whom were from UMH 
and above classes) among themselves employed 20 relatives as wage
labourers. However, selected informants confirmed that in times of 
crisis, the poor did obtain some help from their richer relatives in 
the shape of a loan, charity, influence for obtaining relief materials 
and other benefits from local/central government agencies, etc.
At the social level, intercourse and affinity appear to be a one-way 
traffic in that it is the poor who are eager to pay visits and renew 
contacts with their richer relatives and not vice versa. Sometimes, 
the richer relatives would not event want to recognise them socially 
and prefer matrimonial (Kutumbo) relations and neighbours of equal 
economic standing for social intercourse. All in all, the 26 
households interviewed bore a mixed attitude to their richer relatives: 
they were certainly resentful of the social neglect and for not 
receiving any special economic concessions but nevertheless derived 
considerable strength, even though mostly psychological, from the 
fact of having powerful and rich relatives. In this sense, such 
kinship ties helped their demobilisation and prevented them from 
organising on class lines and understanding their objective situation 
in the society.
On the other hand, the rich households invoked kinship ties with 
both poor and rich households in so far as these helped maintain their 
dominant position in the village life. Thus, kinship ties were used 
for creating and maintaining factions, as demonstrated clearly in 
Mollah para and to a lesser degree in Bagh para and Madhya para.
No less important is the role of kinship ties in mobilising support in 
times of election, dispute, etc. Thus, in the fight between faction 
leaders of Madhya para and Bagh para in 1971, kinship ties were 
extensively used on both sides. Kinship ties are also useful in 
protecting the village rich against collective and political
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expressions of the poor* As the Naxalite movement gained some
strength in this area after 19&9 i some relatives of the village rich
2 2 (son of UK of Magura, son-in-law of BB , the U.P. Chairman and son
1
of JUS , ex-U.P. Chairman from Charikhada, to cite a few prominent 
examples) managed to join the movement. Without even imputing 
conspiracy to their motives, it can be said that this considerably 
helped to defuse the situation, and indeed the '‘annihilation" of the 
village rich that followed did reveal a pattern, i.e. exclusion of 
those who were relatives of the "cadres". Finally, kinship ties 
are freely used in exerting influence to obtain employment, relief 
materials, developmental inputs and other benefits from the local/ 
central governmental agencies. Since all village and union level 
organisations and institutions are controlled by the rural rich, and 
most of their relatives are also rich, kinship ties help cement and 
strengthen their economic interests.
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TABLE 8
Government Constituted Committee for Urani-Maizpara Hat*, 1977
Names Land Owned 
(in acres)
Occupation other 
than Agriculture
Membership/Office bearer of 
Organisations/Committees, etc.
2BB 15.0 Quack doctor U.P. Chairman, President, 
Swanirvar Committee, Member 
School Committee, Thana A.L., 
SubrDiv. Red Cross, Chairman, 
School Hat Committee, was 
Juror, Chairman, Zilla 
Minority Board, etc.
NGS2 20.0 Primary School 
Teacher,
Money Lender, 
Trader
Secretary, Multi-purpose 
Cooperative Society, 
Ex-Member, U.P•
2
US 5.0 Owner of 
Grocery Shop
Holds Trading Agency, 
Commander, Bazaar Committee
1
AH 2.0 Tailor/Trader Commander, Bazaar Committee.
1
JUS ^5.0 Owner of 
permanent shops 
in the Bazaar
Ex-U.P. Chairman, Member 
Awami League, Well connected 
with the Police
Responsibilities: ensure maintenance of the market area and
collection of tolls according to government approved rates.
TABLE 9
Maizpara School Constituted Hat Committee*, 1977
Name Land Owned 
(in acres)
Occupation other 
than Agriculture
Membership/Office bearer of 
Organisations, Committees, 
etc.
2
BB 15.0 See Table 8
GRM1 15.0 M.R. Dealer Ex-Chairman, Village Relief 
Committee, Ex-Member, Rural 
Works Programme Project 
Committee, Member, A.L.
1
WM 50.0 Trader -do-
MR 4.0 — Ex-Chairman, Village Relief 
Committee, Ex-Vice Chairman, 
U.P.
SR 5.0 Teacher Ex-Chairman, Village Relief 
Committee
1
JUS 45.0 See Table 8
1
MB 8.0 - Member, Muslim League, Matbar
HCM2 55.0 - Manager, Cooperative
1
SM 2.0 - Matbar, Member, Swanirvar 
Committee
AR1 15.0 Teacher U.P. Member, Member Sub-Div. 
Sec. Teachers Association
DS2 5.0 See Table 8
Organises the collection of tolls as a lessee.
TABLE 10
Maizpara Bazaar Committee*, 1977
Name Land Owned Occupation other Membership/Office bearer of
(in acres) than Agriculture Organisations, Committees, 
etc.
2
KB
(Chairman) 12#Q Trader -
2DS
(Vice- 5.0 See Table 8 -
Chairman)
PKS2
(Secretary) 15.0 Trader/Money
Lender
Member, Awami League
AKK2
(Commander) 16.0 Trader -
LMM1
(Cashier) 5.0 Trader Ex-Chairman, Village Relief 
Committee
AS1
(Member) 5.0 Trader Member, Muslim League
AS2
(Member) 12.0 Trader Commander, Village Guards
AKS2
(Member) 10.0 Trader -
AHS1
(Member) 5.*0 Trader and 
Mechanic
Ex-Member, Village Relief 
Committee
Raises subscriptions from its members, guards and maintains the 
bazaar premises, collects tolls as a sub-lessee#
TABLE 11
Management Committee for the Market Place at Gor, 1977*
Name Land Owned 
(in acres)
Occupation
1
FA 15.0 Agriculture, Teaching
1
FB 6.0 Agriculture, Trade
1
TR 7.0 Agriculture, Teaching
STJ1 14.0 Trade, Agriculture
SH1 5.0 Agriculture
SM1 3.0 Agriculture
DA1 4.0 Agriculture
1
KM 6.0 Agriculture
AAM1 8.0 Agriculture, Trade
* The market committee was last formed in 1974. •
Management Committees of Market Places at Maizpara and Gor
As may be seen from Tables 8-11, more than 50% of the members 
in the various management committees of the two market places belong 
to RH IX class• On the other hand, there is no one on these
committees from PH and LLH classes* Also, those from LMH and MH 
classes are mostly associated with the richer committee members in 
their factional politics. It is, therefore, quite obvious that 
the richer people of the area derive the maximum benefit from these 
market places.
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The Union Parishad
Maizpara Union consists of 12 villages* The Union Parishad is 
an elected body consisting of a Chairman and 9 members. In 1977*
2 additional seats reserved for women (to be filled through nomination 
by the elected functionaries) were created* Its permanent employees 
are a clerk, k chowkidars (village police) and 3 Dafadars (messengers). 
Both the elected functionaries as well as the permanent staff are paid 
salaries from out of the central government exchequer, U,P, 
jurisdiction covers 'residual' matters in various areas such as law and 
order, justice, local tax, and developmental activities, etc. Over 
the years, and especially during the Ayubian decade (i.e, 1958-68), 
the U,P,'s powers, functions and funds increased considerably, and the 
U.P, Chairman also came to be an ex-officio member of the next higher 
tier of local government, namely the Thana Council, However, in real 
terms, the U.P* still has little autonomy and the guardianship and 
controlling roles are firmly in the hands of central government 
bureaucrats at thana, sub-division and district levels. We could not 
obtain complete information on all the Union government functionaries 
between 1932 (i.e. the year of its inception as the Union Board) and 
1971 from official records. However, perusal of these and cross 
examination of selected informants revealed that during this period, 
the Union government was wholly dominated by males, sexwise, 
gantidars and rich peasants, in terms of class and by the Muslim League 
and the Congress politically, the latter depending more or less 
on the religious affiliation of the Union Council members.
Of the total number of 19 elected functionaries for the present 
and the last term of office (1972-77 and 1977-78) in the Maizpara U.P.,
1^ - are from RH II and RH I classes, 1 from UMH class, 3 from MH class 
and only 1 from PH class. Only two are females, that too by reservation
and nomination and also they were both from RH II class* Political
affiliation of the U*P. functionaries ranged, between the Muslim League
and the Awami League, the latter claiming about 80% of their support
between 1970 and 1975* After the fall of Sheikh Mujib and the
Awami League, the majority of the Awami League supporting functionaries
became 'neutrals', in other words, with the Awami League out of power
and Martial Law on, they were waiting for realignment with the emerging
faction of the ruling class* Other common characteristics of these
IJ.P* functionaries were their membership of large families and kinship
groups and record of considerable election expenditure (except in the 
2
case of BB who did not have to).
Thus the scenario changed very little, at least in terms of the 
class character of the Union Parishad, between these two periods.
Various factors have contributed towards bringing the U.P. 
functionaries/rural rich close to central government officials.
Firstly, U.P. functionaries, and especially the Chairman, have to 
maintain formal links with thana and sub-division level officials in 
the course of meetings, conferences, training programmes, etc.
Various government relief and development funds and activities are now 
channelled through the U.P. In this capacity, the latter is required 
to execute and supervise programmes and construction work, maintain 
records and accounts, etc. On the other hand, officials depend on the 
U.P. for various statistics, proposals and plans for local development 
activities, recommendations for employment, license/permits and 
various developmental inputs (fertilisers, credit, HYV, seeds, power 
pumps, etc.). Also the U.P. Chairman is an ex-officio member of the 
thana council of which sub-Divisional Officer is the Chairman,
Development Circle Officer is the Vice-Chairman and thana level officials
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of the so-called '’national building" departments are members (the thana 
council is the tier above the Union Parishad in the local government 
hierarchy).
Secondly, in the course of official tours to rural areas, 
government officers not only meet U.P. functionaries during work but 
also they generally end up by accepting the hospitality of the latter, 
although most officials are now provided with an additional daily 
allowance when on tour. Besides the attitude of bribe and "living 
off the land" which permeates the bureaucracy, such behaviour is also 
accentuated by the tendency to repeat upon the Union Parishad 
functionaries and the rural rich what they are obliged to do vis-^.-vis 
their seniors in the service. Also, there being little public 
facilities for food and accommodation in the countryside the officials 
gravitate often unconsciously to households where they can find the 
standards they are used to. Thirdly, corrupt officials and U.P. 
functionaries must come close to one another in order to obtain bribes, 
misappropriate government funds and indulge in nepotism, etc.
Fourthly, unlike most thana and sub-divisional level officers (under 
the present rules, field officers cannot be posted anywhere in the 
home district), the subordinate staff in these offices, consisting of 
clerks, typists, assistants, accountants, store-keepers, etc., are 
generally locals and connected to the rural rich/U.P. functionaries 
by birth and marriage. As such, often through the latter's mediation, 
officers and the rural elite come close to one another. Finally, 
there is the overriding compulsion of similar class background and 
hence also similar ideological orientations and values. Thus, in a 
sample of 35 sub-divisional and thana level officials of Narail, 33 
were of rural origin. And of these 33, families (i.e. either the 
nuclear family consisting of the official, his wife and children, or 
the joint family including the official's parents and brothers and
o pO l~ J  h *
sisters) of 2h owned agricultural land beyond 7*5 acres in their 
respective villages. In a considerable number of cases, they were 
total absentees, arranging the cultivation of their land through 
sharecroppers. In a sample of ^7* consisting of 12 U.P. Chairmen 
of Narail thana and the above mentioned 35 thana and sub-divisional 
level officers of Narail, Vf (i.e. 93.6%) considered lowering of land 
ceiling to 7-5 acres/family and free distribution of excess land 
arising therefrom among the land poor classes as completely undesirable. 
Similarly, kZ of the k-7 respondents thought that "over-population" 
was the main cause of poverty, even though, leaving aside the unmarried 
and those married for less than 3 years from among them, the rest all 
had more than 2 children. Finally, k3 of the k-7 respondents considered 
foreign aid as essential for the country*s economic development.
In this context of similar class background and ideological orientations, 
it is only natural that rural and bureaucratic elites would be bound 
together by common interests. The implications of this closeness are 
obvious. Firstly, this leads to massive plunder of the economy, 
of both governmental resources as well as through bribes and extortions, 
the ultimate price of which has to be paid by the rural poor. In
9
some cases, it is a direct appropriation, with the rural elite acting 
as "brokers"/"intermediaries" while in others, it begins with bribes 
from the rural rich, who in turn, make it up by raising prices and 
flouting at random various governmental measures (for example, on 
hoarding, money lending, toll collections, etc.) for regulating the 
economy. Secondly, this closeness strengthens the political power of 
the rural elite and hence their stranglehold over the rural society. 
Thirdly, whatever development policies are ultimately implemented in 
the countryside favour the rural rich. In Chapter 8, empirical 
evidence has been presented to substantiate the above.
We also interviewed 52 male household heads or adult male 
members* (i.e. a female was household head or the male household head 
was sick or away) from landless, poor, lower middle and middle 
households drawn through stratified random sampling.** 72.5% of the 
LLH and PH respondents (category III) and 76% of the lower middle and 
middle household respondents (category II) thought that, on the whole 
the U.P. functionaries they have known so far were corrupt and served 
only their own personal interests. 16.5% of category III and 12.6% 
of category II respondents did not have any complaint against the U.P. 
functionaries they have known so far, and the remainder of both the 
categories pleaded lack of knowledge on the subject. On the question, 
"what do you think should be done to rectify the situation?", addressed 
to those who were unfavourably disposed towards the U.P* functionaries, 
the responses were as follows: 50*8% of category III and 61.6% of
category II respondents wanted the central government to rectify the 
situation. Only 2 from category III and 2 from category II confided 
to us that unless the poor people fought hard, they would never have 
a government to represent their own interests. The rest avoided any 
definitive answer.
Recreation and Entertainment
The common entertainments for the residents of Magura are: 
story telling, vocal music, jatra, fair and cinema.
Story telling sessions generally begin in summer evenings and 
continue till midnight. In Magura, these are held in the courtyards
* Females were left out of the sample because during preliminary 
enquiries, their responses were found to betray a total lack of 
comprehension of our questions.
** This was the sample used for land reform implementation interviews 
(Chapter 8).
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of 6-7 well-to-do households. The listeners are generally children 
and adult females. The story tellers are mostly elderly persons 
again from well-to-do households. Compared to 1970, story telling 
sessions are now less frequent, and attendance has dropped by at 
least 50%•
According to our informants, the following reasons account for 
this change, firstly, the fight to stay alive is now more acute and 
people, in general, have less time to spare and less peace of mind 
for stories. Secondly, the war of 1971 has changed the villagers* 
attitude considerably in that they now look for more realistic and 
tangible pursuits. Thirdly, the increasing influence of the cinema 
has taken away some of the young audience from the story telling 
sessions*
Most story themes are woven around religion, mythology, miracles, 
fairy tales, etc. However, of late, owing to the increased influence 
of the cinema, man-woman love in a modem setting has also found some 
place in these stories. Most stories create a make-believe world: 
sure rewards for the honest, punishment to the oppressor and the 
unjust either automatically or through intervention of some super­
natural force, Cinderella model romance between poor girls and rich 
boys (and vice versa), in which after overcoming a few social hindrances 
the lovers get married and live happily thereafter, etc* Needless to 
say, such ideology acts against any change in the existing social 
order, and more importantly, raising the consciousness required for 
bringing about such a change.
From time immemorial, rural Bangladesh has been the cradle of 
rich folk music and songs, and this region is no exception. For the
Hindus, no Puja (worship) is complete without the accompaniment of 
music. Among Hindu devotional songs, the more prominent ones in this 
area are Kirtans, sung by the Baishnava Hindus in praise of Radha and 
Krishna, In the dominant interpretation of Islam, music is looked 
down upon. However, under the influence of the Sufi order in Bengal, 
Marfati, Murshidi, Jari, etc. came to be very popular with the rural 
Muslim masses. In terms of form, these devotional songs of Hindus 
and Muslims, by their melody, natural freshness, simplicity and lack 
of excessive ornamentation, constitute a rich cultural heritage for the 
entire country. However, when it comes to content, both types of 
songs are characterised by idealism and resigned attitude towards life 
herein. At a more secular level, certain common songs to suit 
occasions like marriage, harvest, boat racing, etc. are also sung and 
enjoyed by people of both the communities.
Since 1972, however, songs of rural origin, especially those with 
religious overtones have been yielding place somewhat to modern Jatra 
and film songs, whose themes are mostly man-woman love bordering on 
crude permissiveness. In particular, the younger generation of the 
village seems to have been considerably permeated by such songs. In 
terms of developing the political consciousness of the poor people, 
the content change, i.e. from fatalism to crude sex is like embracing 
the devil in preference to the deep blue sea, since both help divert 
poor people*s attention from the real issues facing them.
About 10 annual fairs are important for this village. Of them,
6 are held to celebrate one or the other Hindu religious festival 
while ^ are held on the occasions of boat racing, horse racing, wrestling 
and Independence Day, These fairs are held at nearby villages/market
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places at various times of the year. Apart from the speciality 
associated with a specific fair, the common items of all these fairs 
are circus, dances and songs, puppet shows, Jatra, gambling, stalls 
selling sweets, toys and other commodities. In some fairs, 
concealed prostitution is an added attraction. In none of these 
fairs, is there any emphasis on exhibitions to promote production.
About 75% of the villagers attend these fairs, and of them the 
younger generation constitute about 50%. For the young, the main 
attractions are gambling and other entertainments. For the elderly 
among the Hindus, a visit to a religious fair is like a holy pilgrimage.
The fairs are serving two undesirable ends. Firstly, they 
encourage wasteful consumption and some of the main fairs are held 
immediately after the harvests. This is a time when villagers have
some money in their pockets and as such a tendency to overspend.
Even the poor, through demonstration effect, are tempted into the 
wasteful consumptions provided for by the fairs. Secondly, they 
exert a degrading effect on the morals of the people, especially the
younger generation, through the provision of gambling, obscene
dances, prostitution, etc* In fact, since independence, the 
provisions which help demoralisation are becoming more acceptable 
constituents of the fairs. Thus, while the fairs are providing a 
venue for entertaining the villagers, they are also encouraging wasteful 
consumption as well as helping to demobilise the poor people.
The nearest cinema hall for Magura is in Narail town (11 miles).
In 1976, 46 persons from this village saw 42 films at the Narail 
cinema hall. Since the common practice here is to narrate film 
stories among friends and relatives several times (often with
exaggerations), the total effect goes far beyond the direct cinema 
goers. Of the total cinema goers, were males and 39 belonged to 
the 1A—30 age group. There was no significant difference among them 
in terms of class and religion. Compared with 1970, cinema going 
has considerably increased owing to relatively cheap tickets, improved 
accessibility of Narail town and change in the villagers attitude 
under the impact of education and the liberation war.
An analysis of the kZ films seen by the villagers brought out the 
following. Firstly, Vl were comedies and only 10 were based on 
popular folk tales (the rest had a contemporary setting). Secondly,
90% of the film stories were unreal, that is quite impossible in real 
life. Common examples are: the rich man*s daughter falls in love
with the poor man*s son (or vice versa), the villain is always found 
out in the end and punished, the police promptly come to the aid of 
justice and crush the crime syndicate, the factory owner has a change 
of heart and is greatly concerned for the well-being of his workers, 
the rich man's son defies his father and chooses to live and work in 
the slum, etc. Thirdly, almost all the film stories crudely exploit 
sex; vulgar dances and suggestive songs are forcibly interwoven into 
the plot with the clear intention to hit the box office.
As such, the total effect of films on the villagers is a perverse 
modernisation which attempts to replace the opium of fatalism by the 
opium of class harmony and sex, and in the process help maintain the 
existing status quo through demobilisation of the poor*
The Jatra is a speciality in the cultural life of rural Bangladesh. 
It is a theatre, with an open stage placed at the centre of the 
audience. The musicians form a ring round the stage and provide 
instrumental music at various stages of the play. The costumes and
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make-up are simple and cheap# The light is generally provided by 
hazack lamps but nowadays dynamo electricity is also being used#
Except for a few ’'honoured'* guests, the rest of the audience are seated 
on the ground, and the openness of the stage provides tremendous 
communication between the actors and the audience# The play begins 
with a prologue, and between the Acts, interludes consisting of songs 
and dances are provided# The Jatra is held in the winter, following 
the main harvest, that is, when the weather is agreeable, 
communication is easy and there is both time and money to spare#
The Jatra is organised by various mobile companies consisting of 
owners, managers, trainers, artistes, etc#
At present, most Magura residents see Jatra, and no religious 
sanction seems to be working against it# However, Muslim women 
generally do not see Jatra as much as their Hindu counterparts*
Fifty years ago, many Muslim males would also shun the Jatra#
Compared with the situation fifty years ago, there has been a 
considerable change in the content of the Jatra shown in this region# 
The majority of the past Jatra stories were borrowed from religion and 
mythology# Man-woman love in a contemporary setting is now a more 
common theme, although the old mooring has not been totally discarded# 
Despite the thematic difference, the ideology of the contemporary Jatra, 
like other entertainment media, serves as a poor people's tranquiliser 
in that it creates a world of false consciousness where love, justice, 
fair play, etc# transcend class barriers# Besides, the modern Jatra 
is also the vehicle for obtuse taste and crude sex in the countryside: 
the so-called "dances" provided during the interludes of most Jatras 
are obviously deliberate tantalisers to draw crowds# Even the Jatra 
titles are twisted to produce the desired effects. Thus, the
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mythological Hindu epic "Mahabharata" is now advertised under the 
title "The Undressing of Draupudi". One reason why the Jatra has 
adopted this strategy is that it has to, for survival, compete with 
the cinema which can exhibit more "saucy" stuff and has, at its 
disposal, better technology, organisation and finances*
From the above discussion, the following may be summed up*
Firstly, the superstructure, consisting of dominant religious, social, 
political, cultural, administrative, juridical institutions/practices/ 
ideology/values, is still a very powerful force in the life of the 
villagers; there are no indications to show that it has undergone any 
appreciable qualitative transformation during the last fifty years* 
Secondly, the existing superstructure is clearly dominated by the 
village rich; through propagation of false consciousness, and 
manipulation of ideological and power apparatuses to their own 
advantage, often accompanied by use of naked force (see also Chapter 9)* 
the rich have so far been successful in legitimising the existing low 
production and highly inequitable distribution of the social product; 
and conversely, counter consciousness, challenging the status quo, 
has not as yet been able to take hold of the poor people and thereby 
emerge as a "material force"** In other words, the existing 
superstructure's main role has so far been to maintain and legitimise 
poverty and inequality at Magura*
Marx wrote, "Material force can only be overthrown by material 
force; but ideology itself becomes a material force when it has 
seized the masses" (Marx, 1963 * 59)*
CHAPTER EIGHT
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
. TO ■ POVERTY' AT MAGURA
Of all the superstructural elements, the state occupies the most 
crucial role„ In the Marxist tradition it is seen, in the last analysis, 
as a structure specific to and in the service of the economically dominant 
classes for perpetuating their economic, political and social domination 
over the rest of the society (Miliband, 1965). In the Third World 
situation, the state assumes added importance because of its pervasive 
involvement in the direct control and management of the economy„ There-5 
fore, the need to focus on state economic policies in the rural sector 
and their implications for rural poverty can hardly be overemphasised,,
In this regard P„Co JoshiTs 0970, 11-12) distinction between "ideology" 
and "programme" of such policies (i.e. between what is stated on paper 
and what ultimately gets implemented) and Dasguptafs (1979, 48-9) point 
that the class character of the state should be deduced ultimately from 
the class character of the actual long-term beneficiaries of state economic 
policies, need to be particularly borne in mind0 In this Chapter, an 
attempt^7 is made precisely in this direction,,
Ideology of State Rural Development Policy
The ideology of state rural development policy in post-independent
document,
♦ • \\ • • *Bangladesh is stated thus m  a government. ^ .».Having all these m  view,
poverty-oriented rural development has been designed to fulfil five 
basic objectives, namely, increase of agricultural production at an 
accelerated pace, creation of new employment opportunities for the rural 
poor, more broad-based spread of incremental benefits, strengthening of 
rural institutions for effective delivery of development services supplies
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to all irrespective of their present economic and social status, and 
improvement of rural infrastructure’1 (GOBD, 1977, 2)0 In the same 
document (p. 3) specific anti-poverty measures identified are development 
of rural institutions with direct involvement of small and marginal 
farmers and landless labourers not only as a receiving mechanism of 
development services, but also ' to- - ensure. ;
equity in the distribution of income, delegation of increasing
responsibilities to the local bodies as a step towards decentralisation
and
of people1s participation, undertaking some target group-oriented 
programmes to benefit small peasants and landless labourers through 
development of productive activities and promotion of rural industries 
for diversification of employment opportunities, As may be seen, there 
is hardly anything in this strategy which may be described as "radical". 
However, keeping this stated policy in view, let us now see concretely 
the effect of various anti-poverty and development measures adopted by 
the state over time on the poverty situation.at Magura,
Agricultural Co-operation
The Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP), which is 
basically an attempt at agricultural co-operation, grew out of the 
experience of the Comilla co-operative experiments conducted in the 
1960s under the personal guidance of Dr, Akhter Hamid Khan, founder- 
Director of the BARD (Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development),
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Following Bangladesh1s independence, the IRDP expanded,* and Magura 
also came under its purview. The Narail-based IRDP officials came to 
the village in 1973 and carried out a propaganda campaign among the 
villagers to start an agricultural production co-operative. They 
offered, by way of incentives, easy loans, power pumps, insecticides, 
fertilisers, HYV and training in the advanced methods of cultivation. 
Consequently, a co-operative was established that same year.
Agricultural Production through the Co-operative
In 1973, the Co-operative decided to cultivate IRRI in 25.0 acres 
of land, A block was formed and it received a 2 cusec pump, diesel 
oil, HYV, fertiliser, etc,, from BADC** at subsidised rates and a loan 
of Tk,1,000/- from the IRDP, The project failed miserably for a 
number of reasons. Most of the land in the block belonged to rich 
households, so that poorer members showed little interest in the project. 
Since the land was not of the same level and the co-operative was 
unwilling to do anything about it, the area actually cultivated was only 
10 acres. In the face of allegations that the land of the Hindus did
* In 1970, the IRDP covered only 23 out of the 400 Bangladesh thanas 
(GOBD, 1972, 65). The programme expanded rapidly after 1972, By 
1978, there were 26,847 IRDP primary co-operative societies, covering 
250 thanas (M,Abdullah, 1979, 82), A committee, appointed by the 
Government in 1975, reported thus on these co-operatives: "(i) Since
membership was restricted, benefits of subsidised inputs reached only 
the richer landowners; (ii) by and large, co-operative management was 
monopolised by rich farmers; (iii) the co-operatives rendered no 
assistance to the poor and landless, and in effect, sharpened the 
disparity between the poor and the rich farmers, and even if well 
suited for a 'green revolution1, these could not ensure equitable 
distribution of the social product" (GOBD, 1975C*?6, 10), Similarly, 
in the assessment of the Planning Commission, "these co-operatives 
have turned into closed clubs of the Kulaks", and elsewhere, "the 
entire structure of the IRDP co-operatives seems to have become 
dominated by rural elite,,,,in conspiracy with the urban elite"
(GOBD, 1974, 11 and 4),
** Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation,
TABLE 1 : Performance of Magura Agricultural Co-operative, 1973-77
NOoOf Total IRDP Area in Yield/ Number Number
Co-op Shares* Loan** acres acre in of of
Members and to actually mds o Crops Shares
Savings members culti­ ob tained raised
in Taka of this vated from from
Co-op through Co-op Co-op
in Taka o 0 1 o ►£} culti­
vated
land
culti­
vated
land
1973 20 300 1,000 10 10o00
(70 o80)***
1(3)*** 20
1974 55 3050 25,000 35 20,00 
(70o 80)
2(3) 55
1975 50 4050 16,0G0 13
O 
00
o 
•
00 
o
 
o 
o 1(3) 55
1976 39 4250 14,000 - - 55
1977 39 1550 16,000 - - 55
AA Terms of Loan *0ne share = Tk.10/—
a) Land is mortgaged against loan
b) Interest rate is 17„5 per cent
c) The loan is for a crop season; return of the loan in time
makes a co-operative member eligible for another loan in 
the next crop season»
d) Loan is given at the rate of Tk.100/** per 0.33 acres up
to a maximum of Tk.900/-.
aaa ihe figures in parentheses indicate the amount (in mds0) and
the number of crops that could be raised if the new technology 
was adopted,.
Source: Magura Co-operative records0
TABLE 2 : Class background of General Members and Office Bearers 
of Agricultural Co-operative, 1977
Category Total Hindu Muslim Class Background
Humber
.. LLH..PH LMP. MP . UMH RHI RHII
General
Members 39 13 26 2 5 1 1 ^ 6  5 7 3
(55)* (.20) (35) (5) (6) (15) (10) (7) (9) (3)
Office
Bearers 6 1 5 - - 4 1 - 1 1
* The figures in parentheses are for 19740
The present office bearers consist of a President (RHI), a Manager (LMH), 
an "ideal farmer" (LMH) and 3 Directors (IRHII, IUMH and ILMH)0 Of 
three LMH office bearers, one is from the fishing community, while two 
are sub-Matbars and related to rich households0
not receive as much water as that of the Muslims, there was considerable 
friction, misunderstanding and even withdrawal from the co-operative„
The diesel oil required to run the power pump was to be bought through 
subscriptions by the landowners of the block0 Subscriptions raised 
were small and irregular; as a result, the supply did not match the 
demand. Moreover, the manager of the co-operative allegedly sold some 
of the diesel oil procured at subsidised rates on the black market0 
Finally, the land was cultivated individually and the boundary lines in 
the block land were maintained0
In 1974, both president and manager of the co-operative were from 
1 2rich households (AW and CCK )„ The area to be cultivated was set at 
42 acres; ultimately only 35 acres were cultivated and the actual 
cultivation was carried out on a share-cropping basis involving 15 share 
croppers. A number of difficulties were faced that year» Firstly, 
the co-operative members did not pay their subscriptions regularly, so 
that the diesel oil supply was short of requirement to a considerable 
degree (in fact, two quotas of diesel oil could not be lifted owing to 
fund shortage)0 Since many of the owners of block land failed to pay 
their subscription, six members (four RH and two PH) raised subscriptions 
among them and bought one quota of diesel oil0 They used the oil for 
irrigating only their own lando This was contested by others, resulting 
in friction and misunderstanding; later, subscriptions were raised from 
other members and their lands were also irrigated„ Secondly, this year 
also, the boundary lines were kept intact and cultivation was carried 
out on an individual basis through share croppers0 Thirdly, the BADC 
officials had to be bribed for the inputs suppliedo
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In 1975, against a target of 35.0 acres, only 13 acres were 
actually cultivated. The office bearers of the co-operative remained 
unchanged,, The difficulties faced in 1975 were:
a) The poor members paid their subscriptions regularly, but the
richer ones defaulted. It was decided that the land of only
those members who paid their subscriptions would be irrigated.
However, when eight members (four PH and four MH) did buy the diesel,
the RH members forcibly used the power pump to irrigate their lands»
This resulted in severe friction and oil purchase was discontinued.
2 2b) The manager CCK (son of NK the big landowner-cum-moneylender-cum-
speculative trader of the village) left for India in April 1975,
. . .  1 2leaving the responsibility to MBM . After CCK left, it was
discovered that he had sold four barrels of the diesel oil on the 
black market and taken the money. Similar behaviour was repeated 
by the next incumbent, MBM*. While a van was carrying diesel oil 
to Magura, one barrel suddenly disappeared; the general suspicion 
is that MBM* must have sold it on the black market„
In 1976, the new manager JUM* (LMH) called a meeting; the co­
operative members refused to be drawn in block cultivation any more, in 
the light of their bitter past experience0 Since then, the co-operative 
has not been engaged in production directly, its productivity being 
confined to disbursing IRDP loans among its members„ Thus, it is now a 
credit r ather than a production co-operative. From time to time, IRDP 
officials exhort the co-operative members to increase production and savings. 
Nothing of the sort seems to have happened. Since the loans come through 
the office bearers of the co-operative, some of them not only take some 
advantage from the members before giving them any loans, but also 
distribute among themselves the lion's share.
In 1977, of the total outstanding loan of Tk.16,000, only Tk.7,000 
had been recovered. Members from richer households and office bearers 
defaulted much more than those from poor, lower-middle and middle house­
holds, because the former could get away with it through their good 
connections with loan disbursing officials. It was also noticed that 
most loans found their way into trading activities and various consumption 
needs. The "production plan" submitted in respect of a loan application 
was a mere formality, and production followed the usual traditional 
methods of cultivation (i0e0 lacking investment in modern inputs). In 
a few cases, such loans obtained at a relatively low interest rate were 
being recycled into high interest rate money-lending.
There are 111 households in Magura with agriculture as the main 
occupation. Of them only 39 (i.e. 35.1 per cent) households are now 
represented in the co-operative. The rest (i.e. 64.87 per cent) did not 
join or dropped out of the co-operative for reasons enumerated in 
Table 3 below*
The discussion on agricultural co-operation may be summed up thus. 
Firstly, over the years, the co-operative degenerated from production to 
mere credit distribution. Even when production was carried out, it was 
on an individual basis, lacking the spirit of co-operation and plagued by 
friction, nepotism, non-payment of subscriptions, misappropriation, etc*
As a result, yield per acre, cropping intensity, area under cultivation, 
etc*, remained very low. Secondly, the richer members made the most 
out of the co-operative through misappropriation, nepotism, links with 
IRDP officials and tight grip over co-operative management. Thirdly, 
very little of the disbursed credit has gone into agricultural production* 
Finally, the co-operative had little place for the landless and the near 
landless* On the other hand, owing to poor performance, leadership
TABLE 3 : Extent and Causes of Non-participation in Magura 
Agricultural Co-operative, 1977
Reasons for not Total Class background
joining/ Number
dropping out LLH PH LMH MH UMH RHI RHI I
No land/asset 17 17 - - - - - -
Little land/asset 12 - 9 3 - - - -
Canno t s ave to 
buy share 10 - 2 8 - - - -
Corruption 7 - 1 2 4 - - -
Poor performance 8 - - 3 5 - - -
Land outside scheme 2 - - 2 - - - -
General dislike of
Co-operative
activity 10 _ _ _ 5 3 1 1
Leadership conflict 6 - - - 3 3 - -
All reasons 72 17 12 18 17 6 1 1
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conflict, corruption, etc., the present co-operative could not attract 
sufficient membership even from middle and rich households„
fishing Co-operative
There is a fishing co-operative for the entire Maizpara Union. This 
was again established (in 1972) through governmental intervention. After 
independence, the Sub-Divisional and the Thana Co-operative Officers 
advised fishermen to form fishing co-operatives in every union, and a 
directive to this effect also came through the UP Chairman. As incentive, 
the government promised regular supply of fishing net and thread through 
co-operatives, their exclusive leasing rights in open fisheries (as 
mentioned earlier, before 1972 fishing right went to the highest bidder, 
who in turn, sub-let these to individual fishermen at exorbitant rates) 
and cash loans.
Four fishermen of the Union took the initiative, and the co-operative 
came into being. It automatically became affiliated to the Central 
Fishermen Co-operative Society located at Chittagong.
TABLE 4 ; Class Background of General Members and Office Bearers* 
of Maizpara Union Fishing Co-operatibe, 1977
Category Total Fishing Gear Ownership Position
Number Poor (no Middle (with Rich (with
fishing gear) insufficient sufficient
fishing gear) fishing gear)
General
Members . .100 59..... 25 16
Office
Bearers 9 4 4 . 1 .
Of the nine office bearers, there is one President, one Secretary, 
one Manager and six Directors. One of the Directors is from 
Magura. By landownership criterion, the class positions of the 
nine office bearers are as follows: four RHI and II; four UMH, 
and one LMH.
Of the 100 members, 23 were from Magura covering 16 fishing 
households, i.e. five households were outside this co-operative. The
major reason for their not joining was that they were too poor to pay 
the initial membership fee; while, even if they could pay the fee and 
become co-operative members, they did not have the money to buy thread 
supplied to the co-operative at subsidised price0 Of the 16 households 
in the co-operative from this village, seven were from LLR, eight were 
from PH and one was from LMH„ In terms of their occupational assets,
two had sufficient, 12 had some and two had no fishing gear0 (See
Chapter 5)0
Performance of the Fishing Co-operative
Since ijaradari was abolished and the co-operative became the sole 
bidder, since 1972, the co-operative was able to obtain fishing rights in 
all the open fisheries of this Union.,
TABLE 5 : Receipts* of Pishing Net Thread by Maizpara Fishing
Co-operative, 1972-77
Year Amount Received Percentage of the Requirement 
met by Government Supplies •
1972 73 bundles +
123 lb of nylon
50.00
1973 26 bundles + 12 lb of nylon 15.00
1974 4 bundles 1.00
1975 12 lb of nylon 0o5
1976 - -
1977 - -
* No 
Source:
cash loans have been received 
Co-operative Records.
There were two main causes for this extremely meagre supply0 
Firstly, government supplies were very inadequate to begin with, and 
came as a once-and-for-all rehabilitation measure in the wake of the 
1971 war. There was no attempt made to find out the real requirements., 
Secondly, government supplies were channelled through the central co- 
operative (whose office bearers were neither fishermen nor persons 
directly elected by the fishermen) which then distributed these to the 
regional co-operatives, and finally the regional co-operatives 
distributed the thread among Union-level co-operatives. In the process, 
there were not only delays, but also a substantial portion of the 
supplies were misappropriated and diverted into the black market.
As pointed out earlier, the representation of the rich fishermen in 
the co-operative managing committee was disproportionately higher., And 
it is they who have reaped the benefits, for whatever these were worth,, 
There has been no increase in membership during the last five years„
The management was, in fact, nominated in the meeting of general members 
and no voting took place.
The co-operative had no collective fishing fear. Fish catching 
was strictly on an individual basis and no pooling of available assets 
took place. In other words, it was an input distribution co-operative 
rather than a production unit. Consequently, the deteriorating situation 
in respect of both fishing gear and fish catch could not be checked.
Also, owing to backing by powerful people, the co-operative was helpless 
against forcible catching of fish from fisheries on which it had 
exclusive fishing rights.
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TABLE 6 : Capital Accumulation by Magura Fishing Coperative, 1972-77
Year Total.of Shares and.Savings(Tk).
1972 1,265.00
1973 1,70.0,00
1974 1,700.00
1975 1,730.00
1976 1,730.00
1977 1,730.00 ........
Source: Cop-operative records
Of this amount, perhaps Tk.1000/- has been misappropriated (the 
ex-secretary has so far failed to submit any account in respect of this 
amount, and has successfully doged any public hearing on the matter, 
despite the agitation among general members). This means that the 
actual saving is no more than Tk.730/-.
Weaving Co-operative
The weaving co-operative was first established in 1945. Following 
the war there was a general scarcity of yarns, and supply through the 
dealers was insufficient. Government decided to supply yarn through 
weavers1 co-operatives. Three rich persons of the village took the 
initiative and formed the co-operative. The arrangement with the 
government was that the co-operative would lift its quota of yarn from 
the government office at Narail at a controlled price, and in return 
the weavers would sell the finished cloth to the government who would 
then sell it to the public.
This arrangement was very favourable for the weavers in that
their looms did not lie idle and as such they were saved from unemployment.
In 1945, there were 45 co-operative members from among the 60 weaver
households of the village0 The co-operative was then able to sell 40-45
2pieces of cloth to the central office m  Narail daily. In 1945, SSK
2
was the President and his brother NK the Secretary of the co-operative.
In 1948, the government dissolved the co-operative on charges of rampant 
corruption,, By showing 40 extra looms in operation on paper, the two 
brothers were able to obtain a higher quota of yarn. This they sold in 
the black market at exorbitant prices, given the high demand for yarn.
Every month the\|sold about 40-50 bales of yarn, and earned a handsome 
profit. However, they violated their promise to share 40 per cent of 
these profits with other co-operative members. They were able to 
continue with their blackmarketeering up to 1948, and in this they were 
protected by the then Sub-Divisional Officer of Narail0 Since the 
dissolution of the co-operative more or less coincided with the abolition 
of the control system (in view of the greater availability of y a m  in 
the open market), those involved in the corruption did not lose much.
In 1973, the weaving co-operative was re-established and it also 
became affiliated with the Momin Nagar Co-operative Society, which is 
at the apex of about 175 village-based primary co-operatives. The co­
operative formation this time was also motivated by government supply of 
yarn at controlled prices, which became essential after 1972 in view of 
the paucity of supply in the open market.
As an apex co-operative, Momin Nagar Society also became a 
distributor of yarn received from the government. The terms of supply 
were: for every bale of yarn supplied, the primary co-operative would
have to sell four pieces of cloth to Momin Nagar at a fixed price (one
3 4 4
bale of yarn is sufficient to product 12 pieces of cloth)„ However, 
such supply was short-lived, and the crisis in supply took a serious 
turn, especially after 1975„
TABLE 7 : Performance of Magura Weaving Co-operative, 1973-77
Year Number of Shares and Percentage of Total
Members Savings Yarn Requirement met
in TkQ** by Government Supplies
1973 32 4,610 35
1974 26 2,833 10
1975 26 338 4
1976 26 338 2
1977 36 806 3
* The co-operative requirement/year is 1,476 bundles of yarn 
** The co-operative has not so far received any cash loan
Source: Co-operative records0
The co-operative has no office; records are not properly maintained, 
savings are withdrawn at the end of the year and not deposited with the 
co-operative fund; meetings are held only when yarn has to be 
distributed; the members, in general, have poor knowledge of co-operative 
laws and bye-laws0
Owing to inadequate yarn supplies, 20 out of 41 looms are not in 
operation0 Present output is far below the 1945 production level (see 
Chapter 4)0
The class background of members, on the basis of agricultural land 
and looms ownership, is as follows: 19 poor, 10 middle and 7 rich.
The present office bearers were elected by consensus and consist of one 
president, one vice-president and seven directors. Their class back-
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ground is as follows: three MH, two LMH, one PH and three LLH0 This
is then one co-operative where persons from richer households are not 
on the managing committee,, Two factors explain this situation 
Firstly, yarn supply being insignificant, RH weavers are not interested 
in the co-operative„ Many of them have given up weaving for all
practical purposes„ Secondly, the reputation of the richer weavers, and
2 . particularly of NK , is very poor owing to his past corruption and breach
of promise. Consequently, corruption has not been reported in this
co-operative and distribution of whatever materials received appear to
have been fair0
Land Reforms
Reaction to Past and Proposed Land Reform Measures (Table 8)
While 80 per cent of respondents supported the J950 land reforms, 
the degree of support decreased with increase in landownership„ It
was quite possible that support by the richest was because the 1950 
land reforms were now a matter long past, and directed against only 
statutory landowners (i0e. zamindars) and intermediary rent-receiving 
interests Q
Only 18 per cent of respondents supported the 1961 legislation 
enhancing the ceiling limit from 33„3 to 125 acres per familyo The 
degree of support decreased, however, from 30 per cent with 
Category X to 25 per cent with Category II to 8 per cent with 
Category III0 The implications were clear„
* For a detailed study of land reforms in Bangladesh during both the 
post and pre-independence period, see Siddiqui Cl980)0
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Seventy-six per cent of all respondents supported the 1972 land 
reforms, the degree of support increasing as one moved from 
Category I to Category IIIQ The support by the richest might have 
again been linked with the fact that these reforms ‘ were not 
implemented anyway0 However, while 70 per cent of Category I 
supported the 1950 land reforms, the support from the same category 
dropped to 58 per cent with respect to 1972 reforms, although in 
the most important aspect, namely the ceiling limit, both the 
legislations had the same provision0 Thus, their real attitude 
became apparent when confronted with questions on a more recent 
land raform0
Only 50 per cent of respondents supported the proposed (hypothetical) 
land reforms o Eighty-eight per cent of Category I disapproved of 
the proposalso While 75 per cent of Category II respondents were 
enthusiastic about these radical proposals, the support from 
Category III (i0e„ the poorest who would have been the real 
beneficiaries of these changes) amounted to only 68 per cento This 
perhaps indicated that Category III respondents had not as yet 
become fully conscious of their objective interests as a classo
Disapproval of 1950, 1972 and proposed (hypothetical) land reforms 
rested mainly on the argument that it was "unfair"/"morally 
indefensible" to give away one person's land to another„ On the 
other hand, those who approved of the above and disapproved of the 
1961 legislation generally felt that both social justice and increased 
production would have resulted from a lower ceiling and land 
redistributionQ
34^
It is quite possible that at both ends of the spectrum some of the 
responses might not have represented what the respondents actually 
thoughto This seemed, however, more true of Category I than of any
othero
TABLE 9 : Reaction of Mode of Implementation in Principle and Past 
Implementations of Land Reform Measures by 5Q Selected 
Respondents
Number responding from 
Categories
Percentage of the 
total Respondents 
responding
Response Classification I
Thought that 1950 -LR were 
fully implemented -
Thought that 1950 LR were 
not implemented or only 
peripherally implemented 
(bordering on non­
implementation) 17
Thought that 1972 LR were 
fill ly . imp lemented
Thought that-1972 LR were 
not implemented or only 
peripherally implemented 
(bordering on non­
implementation) 17
Supported land distribution 
through the Union Parishad 12
(70%)
Disapproved of land 
distribution through the 
Union Parishad 5
(30%)
II
2
(25%)
6
(75%)
25
25
9
(36%)
16
C64%)
Q
1Q0
10Q
46
5 4
3  y o
20 Reaction to Mode of Implementation and Past Implementation 
Performance (Table 9)
All respondents thought that both 1950 and 1972 land reforms were 
only peripherally (bordering on non-implementation) implemented® 
Answering more specifically, many of them pointed out that only two 
provisions, namely (i) abolition of statutory intermediary rent 
receiving interests from among 1950 land reform measures, and ;
(ii) exemption of land revenue for families with less than acres 
of land from among 1972 reforms, were implemented with any success0 
This was also corroborated by selected informants: in 195Q, at
least 4 households and in 1972 at least one household, had land 
above the ceiling® But none of them surrendered any land0 Of 
the available khas (^government) land, nothing has so far been 
distributed., In fact, most of it is under unauthorised occupation 
of the village rich in collusion with local revenue officials0 
Category III respondents complained that although they did not have 
to pay land revenue any longer, various cesses and rates had still 
to be paid, and since these were on the increase, the effect of land 
revenue exemption stood to be largely neutralised,, Also, since 
they were still required to visit the Tehsil office (i®e® to pay the 
cesses), they could not, either, escape the traditional extortions 
by the Tehsildar and his staff® Refusal to pay bribes was countered 
by non-receipt of the cesses, and this could then easily lead to 
auction sale of property for "default"®
Forty-six per cent of respondents approved of land redistribution 
through the Union Parishad®* The degree of approval was 70 per cent
In 1978, the Union Parishad was, in fact, vested with this power®
3 4k* -i-
with Category I, obviously because they were the ones who dominated 
the rural power structure,, Interestingly, while 75 per cent of 
Category II respondents disapproved of land distribution through 
the Union Parishad, the degree of disapproval dropped to 64 per cent 
with Category II, which was perhaps indicative of the greater 
dependency of Category III on the richer people„ Those who 
disapproved thought that the Union Parishad was corrupt and tended to 
uphold the interests of the rich, and hence no land reforms 
implementation should take place through itQ Those supporting the 
Union Parishad considered it better than the central government 
apparatus on the grounds that the Union Parishad was an elected body 
and was fully conversant with local problems„
TABLE 10 : Reasons for Poor/Non-implementation of 1972 Land Reforms
Number responding from Percentage of the
Categories total Respondents
responding
Response Classification I II III
Pressure by the rich on 
the Government 1 6 10 34
Government did not want/ 
try to implement 3 - 7 20
Government was sincere but 
constrained by short stay 
in power^ lack of competent 
and honest staff, etc„ 10 2 8 40
Government abandoned its 
reforms because it later 
realised that these were 
not in the best interests 
of the country . .. 3 .......6
17 8 25 100
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3. Reasons for P0or/N0h-implem6ntatioh of 1972 Land Reforms (Table 10) 
While the majority in Categories II and III squarely blamed the 
government and the rich for non-implementation, the rich people, in 
general, explained non—implementation in terms of technical constraints 
such as short stay in power by the government undertaking reforms, 
lack of competent and honest staff, etc0
Compared with the poorest, Category II respondents explained non­
implementation more in terms of fundamental constraints, which again 
showed that the poorest were not necessarily conscious of their 
objective interestsQ
TABLE 11 : Implementation of Proposed (hypothetical) Land Reform - 
Response of Those who supported in Principle
Response on the best Number Responding from Percentage of total
implementing Agency Categories Respondents
I II III . responding
1o Through combining
association of the poor 
and the landless with 
Central Government 2 3 10 60
20 Through Central 
Government only - 1 4 20
3o Through combining 
Central Government 
with the Union 
Parishad 1 4
40 Through the Union 
Parishad — — 1 4
5o Through combining 
Union Parishad with 
association of the 
poor and the landless 2 8
6. Through village 
.. factional leaders - 1 . . ... 4 ......
2 6 17 . 100
40 Mode of Implementation of Proposed Land Reforms (Table 11)
Sixty per cent of respondents thought that land reforms could best 
be implemented through combining the central government apparatus 
with associations of poor and landless people,, However, some 
respondents pointed out that although this was an ideal way to 
implement land reforms, it was still a very hypothetical proposition 
since, by implication, the central government had to represent the 
interests of the poor, and the association of poor and landless 
peasants had to be formed, before putting this combination into 
practice,,
Very few respondents thought that either the Union Parishad or the 
Matbars Cvillage factional leaders) should be entrusted with the 
work of implementation„ On the other hand, 20 per cent considered 
the central government as the only machinery which could possible 
implement these radical proposalsa This perhaps betrayed a 
"looking upwards" mentality, and hence lack of faith in their own 
ability, among a considerable number of respondents.
Family Planning
It was around 19.66 that some people of Magura first learned about 
modern family planning methods and governmental family planning programmes 
Following independence, government emphasis on family planning increased 
considerably, and by 1975 it was declared as the government's top priority 
The entire media were mobilised for propaganda, and a massive programme 
for bringing down the population growth rate was launched,, The target 
was, "Boy or girl, two are enough"„ At the organisation level as well,
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several significant changes occurred: a separate family planning
division was created within the Health Ministry, the Directorate of 
family Planning was reorganised and expanded, and massive staff 
recruitment at the lower-down units was undertaken to intensify pill/ 
condom distribution, IUD insertion and vasectomy operations. Provision 
was also made for substantial incentives to family planning organisers 
and doctors and persons undergoing IUD/vasectomy. It may be mentioned
here that since its inception, the family planning programme in Bangladesh 
has been financed, planned and advised by foreign organisations like 
the USAID, World Bank, World Population Council, ODM, etc„*
Despite the existence of government family planning programmes for 
over a decade, as well as recent intensification of family planning 
programmes, the actual performance in this village remains at a negligible 
level (although, awareness about family planning methods and programmes 
has increased significantly since the 1960s), and this is brought out in 
Tables 12-14 below0 These tables clearly show that despite the wide 
awareness of family planning methods and practices, the actual acceptance 
of family planning by the villagers was insignificant0 In fact, the 
number now practising family planning is slightly less than the number 
who ever practised family planning,. Of the 22 persons who now practise/ 
or ever practised family planning, 15 belong to LLH and PH classes,, It 
is, of course, unsafe to generalise on the basis of such a small sample. 
However, it can be said that as far as this village is concerned, the 
richest and the educated were not necessarily the most family planning 
conscious.
* See World Bank 29-30) for details on foreign financial
commitment in this regard since 1975.
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TABLE 12 : Extent of Family Planning Practice, 1977
Religious Group Number of married Number now Number ever
persons in the practising - practised FP
reproductive age FP
group/
..; m ; .. .f ...:...... m   f .....  m  ... f
Muslim 98 115 10 o02)* 4(3o48)* 1 4
Caste Hindus 11 13 2C18.18)* 1 (7o 7)* 2 3
Scheduled Caste 
Hindus . . 36 . .39 ~ 2(5o12)* 2
All Villagers. . . 1 4 5 167 3(2o06)* 7(4.19)* 3 9
*The figures in parentheses indicate percentages with reference to 
corresponding number in the reproductive age group.
the
/For females between 14 and 45, for males between 16 and 55.
a*********
TABLE 13 : Class background of Persons Practising Family Planning, 1977
Category Number
LLH
Class Background 
PH LMH MH UMH . RHI . RHII
Males ever 
practised FP 2 — - -  —  — 1 1
Males now 
practising FP 3 • 1 - - 1 1
Females ever 
practised FP 9 3 4 1 1 -
Females now 
practising FP 8 .4 . 3
All categories 22 . 8 . 7 1 . . 2 - . 2 2
TABLE 14 : Family Planning Awareness among Married Women below the age of 45* 
Response Total .. LLE PH LMH ME... XJMH. RHI RHII
Aware of family
planning practices 46C90o2)** 12 7 11 5 4 4 3
Not aware of 
family planning
practices.......... 5(9.8)** .1 3 1 . -
* 51 respondents were chosen on the basis of stratified random sampling.,
**Figures in parentheses represent percentage of total respondents0
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In order to understand the ineffectiveness of government family 
planning programmes and the consequent results thereof, two sets of 
factors need to be considered:
a) socio-economic structure and the ideology underlying the 
existing reproductive pattern, and
b) bottlenecks associated with the family planning implementing agency0 
The existing reproductive pattern in this village is brought out
in Tables 15-17 below.
TABLE 15 : Family Size Distribution, .1977
Size of Family 
(in number of 
persons)
Number of HH Percentage of HE
1-3 29 18 o50
4-6 65 41 o67
7-9 42 26o92
10 and above 20 1 2a 82
All sizes 156 100
TABLE 16 : Family Size, Classwise, 1977
Class Number of HH Number of Persons Average Family Size
LLH 41 201 4o9G
PH 29 172 5 093
LMH 34 199 5o85
MH 26 168 6 o 46
UMH 11 88 80QG
RHI 10 78 0 00 o
RHII 5 55
ooo 
•
f
All Classes 156 .....961 6 o 16
TABLE 17 
Class
A* A* A •k'k Aft* A
: Distribution of Youthful Population,
Number of HH Number of Persons
in the 0-16 age 
group
Classwise, 1977
Number of Persons of 
age 16 years and below 
per household
LLH 41 124 3o02
PH 29 89 3,07
LMH 34 102 3,00
MH 26 100 3,84
UMH 11 46 4,18
RHI 10 43 4,30
RHII . 5 26 5 o20
All Classes 156 540 3,46
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Thus it is clear that (a) family size and (b) number of persons 
of age 16 years and below per household at Magura increase with increase 
in household landownership, Although this correlation must take into 
account a greater tendency towards nucleation and a higher child mortality 
rate among the poorer households, it at least indicates that the poor are 
not necessarily the most reproductive group in the village, as is 
popularly held. However, the fact that the proportion of youthful 
population in the poorer households is quite high (three and above;
Table 17) shows that they have not, either, become family planning * 
conscious. This is also clearly brought out in the response to son 
preference and the number of children considered desirable, A total 
of 132 respondents drawn on the basis of stratified random sampling 
(see Chapter 7) were interviewed for the purpose. Their responses 
were solicited on the following: (a) desirability of "too many'1 children;
(b) the most desirable numher of children that a couple should have, and
(c) desirability of son preference. All respondents considered "too many" 
children as undesirable. However, their concept of "too many" children 
differs significantly from the official policy of promoting no more than 
two children,
TABLE 18 : Attitude towards the most desirable Number of Children
Number of Children Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of
considered most total Number Category I Categories II & III
desirable of Respondents Respondents Respondents
. .(.132) (18) . C114) .. .
1-2 31.9 29,4 4,9
3-4 45o5 45,1 45,6
5-6 22,6 34,5 20,5
7 and above - -. -
Cross-examination of selected informants confirmed the validity of 
the above data. Table 18 clearly shows that although, in general, the 
poor, compared with the rich, preferred a smaller number of children, the 
majority among them (66.1 per cent) were in favour of more than two 
children (which was in contradiction to the official policy). On son 
preference, 90,2 per cent of respondents considered it desirable and 
justified.
On the basis of personal observations as well as cross-examination 
of selected respondents, a number of factors were found to be working 
behind the above reproductive pattern and behaviour. Firstly, the poor 
clearly understood the dire implications of too large a family, and yet 
they were caught up in a situation which did not allow them to accept 
the official prescription of two children only. More children, especially 
sons, meant cheap and easily disciplinable labour and old age insurance.
As far as they were concerned, their children needed only the barest 
minimum of food and clothing, and as such their upbringing, provided they 
survived, was as cheap as possible. Secondly, for the village rich, the 
poverty implications of a large family appeared as a false alarm, not to 
be’ taken seriously. On the contrary, more children (especially sons) 
meant scope for proliferating kinship ties with other rich households 
and in this way extending power and influence and deriving economic gains 
out of these. Then there was also the question of inheritance. Sons 
were necessary to keep the property within patrilineal channels. Finally, 
given their command over and access to resources, they could increase 
the value of their children through education and thereby strengthen their 
social and economic positions, as the latter obtained employment in 
urban/rural professional positions (i,e, teachers, civil servants, 
doctors, engineers, etc.).
Thirdly, son preference among both the poor and the rich was also 
influenced by the preponderance of the dowry system, which affected the 
father of a daughter as badly as it benefited the father of a son. The 
strong son preference meant that a couple would continue trying to have 
a son if the first few children were female.
Fourthly, religious propaganda against family planning methods also 
had an influence, even though only peripherally. About 10 persons, 
all Muslims, belonging mostly to middle and above households were openly 
resentful of family planning practices on religious grounds. Since 
some of them were connected with this or that religious institution, 
their voices did not altogether go unheard. In the last Waz Mahfil 
(religious meeting) held at Magura, strong words were used against modern 
family planning methods.
The above analysis thus bring out the structural impediments to 
family planning and shows that the relationship between high population 
rate and poverty was not a one-way traffic as the Neo-Maithusians* would 
want us to believe.
At the implementation level, a number of bottlenecks were encountered 
in Magura and the region. Firstly, family planning materials were either 
not available or available extremely irregularly. Secondly, there was 
little prerfamily planning check-up and post-family planning follow-up.
Two women of this village had bitter experiences in using the plastic coil. 
In one case, it was inserted two months after she became pregnant and the 
doctor did not bother to carry out a pregnancy test before inserting the
For a critique of the Neo-Maithusian position and alternative 
explanations, see Mamdaui (1972), Hofsten Q974, 17-30), Valenty 
(1978, 23-48), de Janvry and others (1977, 212-5).
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coil. As a result, the child died an hour after its birth. The 
other woman became sick and anaemic soon after coil insertion. She 
took out the coil later, but she is still bedridden and in fact, Tk.1,500 
has already been spent for her treatment. The family planning staff 
never followed up the post-family planning developments in her case.
These two negative examples have seriously affected the villagers1 attitude 
toward family planning. Thirdly, family planning motivation work was 
organised as a top-down process with a government functionary in charge. 
There was no one from among the villagers doing this work within the 
community. In 1976, there was only one male Family Planning Assistant 
(FPA) for the entire Union. He was able to visit Magura only four times 
in the year. His general complaint was that villagers were generally 
non-co-operative, while interested villagers complained about his 
failure, despite repeated requests, to maintain a regular supply of 
family planning materials.
In 1977, three female FPAs were recruited for this Union. They are 
all local girls Cone of them is married). Their recruitment story 
revealed corruption and nepotism of various kinds. Officials in charge 
of recruitment took bribes from several candidates in the process of 
filling the same post. One of the three female FPAs for this Union paid 
TK.500/- as bribe to the relevant official. The male FPA was recruited 
in 1976 because of strong recommendations by a senior army officer. It 
is generally believed that one of the recruiting officials seduced a 
number of female candidates for the FPA vacancies on the promise of giving 
them jobs. Finally, one of the female FPAs got the job because her 
husband is the local UP member, and as such well connected with the local
bureaucracy. Thus, recruitment was decided by bribes in cash and 
"kind", and links with the administration, and not according to any 
rational criteria.
There are three wards in this Union, and each one of the three 
female FPAs is assigned to a ward. They are required to visit 20
households in a day and motivate a certain number of females into 
accepting FP methods in a month; they are unable to fulfil the targets, 
and for this they are often threatened with dismissal. In drawing their 
salaries, they have to travel to Narail (8 miles) at least three times 
a month., and as if this is not enough, they have each to pay 
"bakhsheesh" (tips) of Tk.5/- per month to the disbursing staff before 
they can put their earnings in their bags. Given such recruitment and 
work conditions, the performance of the FPAs can easily be deduced.
The family planning drive is concentrated in the winter when roads 
are dry and the village is conveniently accessible for the FP officials. 
But this is also the peak agricultural season, involving harvesting and 
post-harvesting operations. A visit by family planning personnel now 
is a waste of time and annoying-to the villagers.
Promotion of Education
Both the primary and the high schools of Magura were established (in 
1947 and 1972, respectively) at local initiative. Over the years, 
government measures for development of these two institutions have been 
rather intermittent and insufficient, depending more on the ability to 
lobby the bureaucracy than as the outcome of a clear-cut educational 
policy. The following is an account of the grants received by these 
two institutions so far.
TABLE 19 I
Year
1947-56
1957
Since 1962
1965-68
19.70
1972
1973
1977
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Assistance Received by Magura Schools, .1947-77
Magura Primary School 
Nil
Magura High School*
SDO provided one bundle of CX 
sheet for construction of the 
roof
^Government is paying the 
salaries of the teachers 
(salaries were doubles in 
1973 and certain fringe 
benefits were given)
UNICEF provided free milk 
for the students
Education Department provided -
Tk.700/- for shifting the 
school to the present site
***Government provided text- -
books for free distribution 
(discontinued in 1974)
UNICEF provided:
i) Tk.3,600/- for construction 
of tin shed
ii) Clothes for free 
distribution among 
students
Government provided Tk01,000/- -
to purchase furniture
UP provided 10 mds of wheat to Government provided
pay the labour charges of Tko2,300/- as one-
constructing the school wallo time lump grant
The wheat was given to the UP 
by the Central Government out 
of assistance received under 
World Food Programme,
For Notes see following page
Notes on Table'1$
* Government recognition of the school came four years after 
its establishment® However, the situation was quite 
different when an educational institution was backed by an 
Awami League MP or local Awami League bossD In fact, 
following independence, a large number of educational 
institutions came into being overnight, and were recognised 
by the government without any verification as to whether 
or not they met the minimum conditions set by the government®
In a large number of cases such institutions were mere sign­
boards for building up political image rather than an honest 
attempt at promoting education® The reason why Magura 
school obtained government "recognition" (recognition ensures 
yearly government grants) so late, was that it was opposed by 
the power elite or Maizpara (See Chapter 7) ®
** According to the primary school teachers of this village,
unless the Education officials were regularly bribed, salaries 
were held up for months at a stretch®
*** The textbooks did not reach their destination in time, were
full of mistakes and there was great bungling in their
distribution® Nevertheless, free textbooks distribution was 
a positive incentive for increased enrolment® However, this 
programme was suspended in 1974 owing to lack of funds, 
corruption, inefficiency and delay in printing and distribution®
As will be evident from the above table, foreign resources figure 
prominently in the help received from the educational institutions. It 
may be mentioned here that apart from UNICEF and WFP help, the free 
textbook programme was entirely financed out of USAID grants.
There has so far been no governmental effort toward promotion of 
adult, agricultural and vocational education in this village. Briefly, 
governmental efforts at educational development in this village have 
faced the following constraints:
a) Government help has been meagre, intermittent and has followed 
no clear-cut policy;
b) since teachers and students of these institutions are mostly from 
the rich class, the benefit, if any, of government and foreign help 
has gone towards "oiling the oily heads";
c) since the help has been directed toward an education devoid of any 
technical content, useful for agriculture or any other productive 
vocation, it has, in fact, promoted the proliferation of a group of 
"educated" youths who can be of little use to the society (see 
Chapter 6, Table 18).
d) There has been no effort at mobilising local resources (which is, 
of course, dependent upon structural transformation of the rural 
society)® In such circumstances, help from the government and 
particularly from foreign sources, however meagre, has only 
inculcated despondency and a beggar mentality among teachers and 
students, and in the long run their pernicious effects are likely 
to more than neutralise whatever little good they may appear to 
have done in the short run®
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ROAD CONSTRUCTION
Two roads connect Magura with the outside world: (a) the Narail-
Magura road via Maizpara, and (b) the Magura-Kalukhali road® Both are 
non-metalled® The former is far more important because (i) it connects 
Magura with the township of Narail, and (ii) the Chitra, connecting 
Narail with Magura, is properly navigable only during the high monsoons 
owing to silting, and preponderance of water kyacinth and underwater 
foliage. However, the condition of this road is far from satisfactory® 
During the monsoons, it becomes very muddy and as such negotiable only 
on foot® In the winter the rickshaw van is used extensively for 
carrying both goods and passengers. At this time motorcycles and jeeps 
(driven mostly by government officials) can also run on this road®
Earth work on the Narail-Magura road first began in 1932 under the 
auspices of the Union Parishad (then known as Union Board) using both 
government funds as well as local contributions. Earth work was completed 
between 1935 and 1938 by bringing it under test relief work schemes®
This simply meant that the government provided food as a relief measure, 
but this was not given away completely free to the rural poor, but in 
exchange for earth work on this road® In the sixties, the road was 
repaired twice under the Works Programme,* In 1978, the road was once 
again repaired, this time with wheat provided by the US and other Western 
countries under the so-called World Food Programme, The Magura-Kalukhali 
road was built in 1913-4® The central government provided most of the 
funds, while work was supervised by the local government. In 1962-5,
* The fund for which was created by selling wheat donated by the US 
under PL-480, in the open market.
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certain improvements such as construction of a culvert and a kettle 
drum were undertaken under the Works Programme. In 1975, the government 
provided TK,1,000/- for repairs on this road®
Like most roads in rural Bangladesh, these are highly circuitous®
Two factors appear to be prominent in this respect® Firstly, Union 
Parishad Chairman and members, actively involved in drawing up the road 
plan, belong to or are supported by the rural rich® Since the latter 
are physically located in various villages in the Union, the road actually 
built can never be straight, and the windings, to a considerable extent, 
reflect the outcome of their contentions and compromises® Secondly, if 
the planned road is to pass through the land of a rich man, it is only 
obvious that the actual road will consume the land of a less powerful 
neighbour® As such, these roads have taken up more space, distance and 
consequently more funds than they should have®
These roads have served the rural rich and the bureaucrats in several 
ways® Firstly, these have given them the scope to amass government 
funds through outright corruption® This is as old as government-sponsored 
road building in this area, and is clearly illustrated by what happened 
during the latest repair work on the Narail-Magura road in 1978, with 
wheat provided under the World Food Programme. The responsibility for 
repairing four miles of this road (i®e® the portion passing through 
Maizpara Union) rested with three of the Maizpara UP members. They had 
before them three specific tasks: (a) to lift wheat from the C0Ts
office at Narail; (b) to pay out, at the rate of one maund of wheat for 
1,000 cu ft of earth work, to the construction workers through a proper 
muster roll, and (c) to organise and supervise the work® The four miles 
were divided into three sections® There was, for each section, a
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Project Committee headed by one of these three UP members® Eighty'.per
cent of the UP and Project Committee members were drawn from RH to UMH
background® In all, 2,300 maunds of wheat were received by these Project
r
Committees. About 500 maunds (woth about Tk.20,000) were misappropriated
A
outright by the Project Committee through submission of false muster rolls. 
In fact, this story was leaked by those very coolies who were employed to 
carry this wheat at dead of night to the purchasers1 godown at Maizpara 
market place® Later the UP Chairman also confirmed this story. His 
explanation was that this had to be done in order to bribe relevant 
officials since otherwise they would have withheld either wheat or bills 
submitted in respect of the wheat drawn® Secondly, when these roads 
were completed and became negotiable, maximum benefit was derived by the 
local rich because it is they who frequent Narail, Maizpara, Kalukhali and 
other important places in this thana and sub-division for jobs, trade, 
social visits, etc. Thirdly, the roads have been useful to the state 
in its "law and order" pursuits. The villagers, in fact, thought that 
but for these "roads built by Ayub Khan", the Rajakars* and the Pakistan 
army could never have penetrated deep into the countryside in 1971. 
Similarly, during the 1978 "combingrout operation" asainst the 
"Naxalites", these two roads must have proved very useful to the police.
On the other hand, the village poor benefited from these roads, if 
at all, only marginally® During the construction phase some of them 
were provided with employment, but then it was a one—shot affair.
After construction, a few persons of this area were employed as rickshaw 
pullers on these two roads, but since these are not all-weather roads, 
such employment almost ceases during the monsoons® Therefore, the 
employment generated by these roads is extremely meagre compared to the
* Para-military forces raised by the Pakistan army in Bangladesh in 1971.
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actual needs„ During construction, the government prescribed wage rate 
was one maund of wheat for 1,000 cu ft of earth work. As it is, this 
is very low compared with peak season wage rates. Given the 
misappropriation, the actual rate was even lower (there was no overt 
protest because it was the lean employment season and many of the 
construction workers would have starved without the work)a Thus, in 
effect, the two roads have been built by the cheapest possible labour 
of the village poor to serve the interests of the rural rich and the 
state machinery. Since construction work is supervised by the rural 
rich (i.e. the Project Committees headed by UP members), it provides 
them with the opportunity to distribute patronage selectively, and in 
this way their stranglehold over their poor clients is strengthened. 
Although the actual employment benefit derived out of these roads is 
insignificant, these have acted as a palliative in the sense that road 
construction and repair take place in the post-harvest season, when, 
given the lack of employment avenues, the discontent potential is very 
high among the poor villagers. On the other hand, road construction 
and many other infrastructure building work could have been performed 
through the organisation of massive voluntary labour, since labour 
supply is relatively abundant and such work requires little capital 
investment. But this also assumes a radical restructuring of rural 
society (for example, thoroughgoing land reforms) so that the rural poor 
have a real stake in the outcome of activities for which they were 
rendering voluntary labour. In so far as road building in rural 
Bangladesh has been and is being financed mainly out of foreign aid 
(as illustrated in these two roads), the latter is doing positive 
disservice to the Bangladeshi rural poor in two ways: by helping the
maintenance of a status quo that is highly detrimental to enhanced 
production and equitable distribution of the social product, and by
stifling the potential for self-reliant economic development through 
organised voluntary labour, in the countryside. There is, moreover, no 
reason to assume that foreign assistance for rural road building does 
not contribute anything to metropolitan economic interests* Under the 
present national and international order, there is a net outflow of 
resources from the developing to the developed countries* Various 
mechanisms are operating to ensure this, and one of the major methods 
is unequal trade (i*e* through a worsening of the terms of trade; see 
Chapter 11)* Therefore, in so far as road building serves to mobilise 
the export sector, it also helps net outward transfer of resources from 
th © country.
Compulsory Paddy Procurement from surplus Producers
Compulsory paddy procurement at fixed government rates from surplus
producers started in 1953 (although the levy laws were enacted in 1948)*
The idea was to build up government stocks for release at lower prices
in times of scarcity0 It is plausible that the 1943 famine and the
chronic food deficit in the post-1947 period prompted the adoption of
this policy* However, as with any policy with the slightest possibility
of hurting the rural rich, the levy system simply could not work*
The Union Parishad Chairman was entrusted with the task of drawing
up the list of surplus producers, and one of the thana-level officials was
designated as the levy officer whenever government decided to go in for
compulsory paddy procurement. At the time of the first levy fixing,
2BB was the UP Chairman* He was himself a surplus producer* As such, 
far from drawing up the list, he collected Tk.500/- from the Union1s 
surplus producers to bribe the levy, officer* Thus, in that year, no 
one in this Union was declared a surplus farmer, and hence nobody had
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to sell paddy to the government at "unfavourable1' prices. The
second time that levy law came into operation was in 1959= On this
occasion, also, the surplus producers obtained exemption by donating to
the so-called "Jinnah National Defence Fund". In 1974, i.e. during the
famine year, levy was again imposed<, Since the paddy price in the open
market was very high, those likely to be included in the list of surplus
producers once again took to bribing the levy officer and, in the process,
2
got off lightlyo For example, NK paid him Tko500/-, and he was 
required to sell only ten maunds of paddy to the government„ According 
to selected informants, in that year he sold at least 200 maunds in the 
open market at prices ranging between Tko200/- and Tk.300/- per maund. 
Owing to the rich peasant pressure on the government, the levy has been 
abandoned and instead the government now builds up its food stocks 
through price incentives to the rural richo This means that the 
government's purchasing prices are higher than its selling prices, and 
it. incurs thereby considerable losses in its present paddy procurement 
programme,,
There is no government paddy purchasing centre in the Maizpara 
Union. The nearest one is located in Narail town, so that producers 
interested in selling paddy to the government have to travel about 
11 miles with their loads. This acts as a strong disincentive to the 
small producer, since it is generally not worth carrying small amounts 
so far, although the price offered may be lucrative,. There is also 
the corruption of the government purchasing agent to put up witho His
modus operandi is generally as follows: he lines up with a trader.
When a small producer approaches the purchasing centre with his paddy, 
he is told either that his paddy is not up to the standard quality, or 
that purchase is over for the season. It is no small inconvenience for 
him to return home with the load on his back, especially after having
already undertaken a long and tedious journey. Moreover, his staying 
power is low, and he must sell paddy to meet many of his pressing 
requirements. Thus, he ends up by selling his paddy at much below the 
government price to the government agent1 s trader accomplice, whose job 
is to tap those turned down by the government agent. The trader then 
hands his purchases over to the government agent, and the margin is 
shared between the two.
Relief and Rehabilitation
Soon after Bangladeshs independence, the government took up a 
massive relief and rehabilitation programme for the country devastated 
by nine months of war. About 90 per cent of this aid was provided by 
the Western countries (mainly the US) through the United Nations Relief 
Operations Bangladesh (UNROB). Relief committees were formed at 
District, sub-Division, Thana, Union, and even village level. The 
Relief Committee for the Maizpara Union came into being in January 1972, 
and itwas composed of the influential members of the Union, who had links 
with the Awami League. For Magura village, the relief committee 
consisted of a chairman (RHI), a secretary (RHI) and five members 
(one RHII, two RHI, one UMH and one LMH)„ Thereafter^relief committee
membership underwent several changes, but it was always a case of one 
upper stratum household member replacing another. The village relief 
committee worked under the supervision on the Union Relief Committee.
Up to 1974, Magura residents received the following goods through 
the relief committee:
Wheat 12.25 mds Dhuti 11 pieces
Rice 25.50 mds Lungi 20 pieces
Sugar 0.65 mds Shirt 33 pieces
373
Paddy seeds 2 <>88 mds Trousers 4 pieces
Jute seeds 0„38 mds Mosquito nets 3 pieces
Blankets
Sari
17 pieces Utensils 10 pieces
35 pieces
’one Hindu returnees (i.e. refugees who had taken shelter in
India in 1971) and affected Muslim households were each to be provided 
with Tko300/- and one-and-a-half bundles of Cl sheets0 Corruption 
took place in several ways:
misappropriated relief goods openly, despite public confrontation 
on this account;
b) an amount of Tk.25/- was deducted per household receiving the cash 
and Cl sheet to establish a college at Maizpara and for "expenses'* 
at the Development Circle Officer^ office. In effect, it was 
divided between the CO office and some of the union and village 
relief committee members;
c) nepotism was rampant in the selection of recipients,, The relief 
committee members freely utilised the distribution in helping their 
kith and kin, and in strengthening the factions they led or were 
members of.
d) Muster rolls were freely manipulated., For example, the amount of
cash grant for distribution to one person was actually given to
two persons, but the recipients signed or placed thumb impressions
for double the amount received. Corruption was at a low level
during the tenure of the first relief committee chairman (a school
teacher and reputed to be honest); however, his tenure was very
2short, for only three months; following him CCK became chairman. 
He was notorious for all the corruption noted above. After his
1 2  2a) Some committee members, for example, MZ and CCK (son of NK )
resignation at the end of 1972, he was replaced by DM* (RHI) .
He was an incompetent man, and the village touts got the upper 
hand.
e) A good portion of the materials meant for Magura never reached
the village; it was misappropriated by some thana-level officials, 
Union Relief Committee members and local Awami League bosses.
In the UP election of 1974, JUS* of Charikhada (RHII) became the 
Chairman of Maizpara Union. During his tenure of office (up to
28 February 1977), Maizpara Union received a good quantity of relief
goods. Even after searching the UP office thoroughly, no accounts of 
these could be tracedo According to the villagers, at this time 
misappropriation and nepotism in regard to relief goods reached an all- 
time high level, and there was no remedy. For example, in 1975 some 
Magura villagers complained to the UP Chairman against corruption by LR* 
(UP member from Magura) in respect of relief wheat0 The Chairman took 
no action, ostensibly because he was also a party to the misdeed.
At the end of 1974, a severe famine swept across the country (the
last famine was in 1943). Although there were no deaths (in 1943 two
villagers died of starvation), about 100 households (mostly landless and 
poor peasants, weavers, fishermen, etc.) were on an inhuman diet, 
consisting of a gruel of wild leaves mixed sparingly with flour, for 
more than three months. This was a time when cloth prices had also 
rocketed, and some women could not come out into the open owing to 
lack of clothes. There were also widespread distress sales. A gruel 
kitchen was opened by UP from supplies provided by the government. But 
it was closed down within two weeks owing to corruption by those 
responsible for running it (in 1943 the Narail Zamindars opened a gruel 
kitchen in Magura for three days).
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Between January 1976 and April 1977, CARE, a private foreign 
relief organisation* distributed wheat, powdered milk, powdered fish, 
etc,, among the relief-deserving children of Magura:
Wheat 30 lb per head per week
Powdered 0o66 lb per head per week
Powdered fish 0o44 lb per head per week 
Relief was given for about 60 weeks„ The number of recipients was 
12 (four from LH and eight from PH backgrounds)0 Children did not 
take the powdered fish owing to its bad smell0
There was no corruption, because the list of recipients was drawn 
up by CARE officials themselves, and not by the UP, and there was also 
CARE supervision during distribution..
On the basis of personal observations and cross-examination of 
selected informants, these relief distributions were found to be harmful 
in the following ways:
J0 Relief strengthened the rural rich in several ways: first, they
appropriated to themselves the liofs share of the relief0 Second, 
they used the relief distribution to strengthen their exploitative 
relationships with the poor people0 On the other hand, relief 
made them more anti-productive in that it gave them a good 
opportunity to increase their resources without having to pay any 
price for it, which they could not escape in a productive activity 
(where they had to put in labour, capital, management, etco)0 
2 a Relief helped demobilisation of the rural poor0 Although the 
relief ultimately trickling down to them was insignificant in 
comparison with their needs, it acted as a palliative by taking 
the steam out of a difficult situation, and at the same time
* In 1975 there were over 100 such "relief-giving organisations 
operating throughout the country□
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inculcating a "beggar mentality" among the recipients0 This 
also means loss of faith in themselves and contamination by 
corruption and nepotism generated during relief distribution.
This loss of faith is accentuated when relief distribution is 
supervised directly by a foreign organisation (CARE, for example)e*
We were, in fact, appalled by the extent of a beggar mentality 
among the poor villagers0 Not one day passed during our stay in 
this area when someone did not turn to us either to beg directly, 
or to enquire if we were a government relief agency.
Modified Rationing System
Government first introduced a rationing system in Maizpara Union 
in 1942o It was the year preceding the Great Bengal Famine: 
governments massive food procurement for troops fighting the Japanese 
on the Burma front, together with the "denial policy" (i.e. seizure and 
destruction of country boats so that in case the Japanese occupied 
Bengal they were to have no access to the indigenous riverine transport; 
in effect it played havoc with the distribution of food grains, especially 
on the normal outflow of food grains from "surplus" districts to areas 
of scarcity) and rampant hoarding and black marketeering by traders soon 
became the order of the day.** It was against this background that the 
government introduced a rationing system in Bengal's countryside. Rice, 
salt and kerosene, were supplied by the government through the Union 
Parishad (then known as the Union Board) appointed dealers at fixed prices.
It was found that most local and central government officials were 
vociferously opposed to direct distribution of relief goods and 
developmental inputs by foreign organisations on "nationalist" grounds. 
On the other hand, they were equally ardent supporters of foreign aid 
so long as responsibility for distribution was with them. The 
underlying "logic" is not difficult to deduce.
See Akhter Hamid Khan (1973, 3-5) for a fuller account.
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The "deserving persons" (popularly known as DP) list was prepared by 
the Union Parishad Chairman in consultation with his Parishad members, 
Union Parishad tax payment was the criterion used for preparing such a 
list, Taxation was based on a household1s economic position, to be 
assessed by the Union Parishad, The households were thus classed as 
follows:
Class Annual Tax
A Tk,0
B Tk.Oa 50-3o00
C Tk.3,01-8.00
D Tk,8;.(Mand above
The first two categories (A and B) were entitled to receive rationed 
goods and this arrangement, with some modifications, still applies.
In the sixties, the government directive in regard to UP tax was 
to fix it according to valuation of the household residence,, The 
UP Chairman and members were entrusted with the taskQ This practice 
still continues. However, several changes have taken place in the 
DP listo Firstly, the tax rate has increased considerably0 The
total Union tax collected from Magura in 1930 was Tko100/-o At present 
it is Tk.1,075/-, i.e. almost eleven times moreQ Thus, 35 families who 
were eligible to receive rationed goods three years ago have now been 
dropped from the DP list since they were assessed for a higher tax rate, 
while the criterion for inclusion in the DP list remained unchanged. 
Secondly, the DP list does not reflect the actual poverty situation (this 
is because the criterion for taxation is not valuation of total assets, 
but of the residence, and also malpractices are quite common). This is 
reflected in the class backgrounds of the hoseholds included in the DP 
list.
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TABLE 20 : Glass Background of "Deserving Persons" at Magura, 1977
Category Total Number LL PH LMH MH UMH RHI & II
............of Households
Category A 23 15 5 1 2 - -
Category B 23 1 5 3 3 2 -  -
There are 41 landless and 29 poor households in Magura0 The DP 
list includes only 30 landless and eight poor households, although it 
contains four lower-middle and four middle households0 The implication 
is obviouso According to government directive, both A and B categories
are eligible to receive rationed goods in times of normal supplies«, In
case of insufficient supplies, only category A households are entitled 
to receive goods„ When supplies are abundant, C and D categories can 
also buy these goods. The items generally supplied are paddy/rice, 
wheat, sugar, cooking oil, salt, etc0 Disbursement depends entirely 
on the supply by the food office at Narail, since it decides how much of 
what items will be allotted per Union0 The Union Parishad Chairman 
distributes the quotas decided by the food office among the appointed 
dealers, and the latter lift the goods from the food godown at Narail
accordingly. There is no ration shop at Magura and the relevant
dealers/ration shops for Magura area are located at the Maizpara market 
place. Preliminary selection of dealers is done by the UP Chairman 
and members and the final approval is given by the food office,, Various 
corrupt practices could be detected in the rationing system0 All the 
seven dealers for this Union are rich and influential people (two RHI, 
four RHII and one UMH). All of them bribed the UP and food office 
functionaries in order to obtain a dealership0 They are also required
to bribe the food office functionaries at the rate of Tk,50/- per normal 
allotment, and Tk,100/- per special allotment. Consequently, the 
dealers generally sell most of the allotted goods in the black market, 
distributing only a fraction of these among the "deserving". The poor 
are not even informed of the availability of the goods, and if they do 
notavail themselves at the first opportunity, they are usually told that 
supplies are exhausted. In these activities, connivance of the UP 
functionaries is quite explicit, and in return for this they receive 
a share,
.which
This is clearly a case of chain corruption m  UP functionaries, 
food department officials and rich dealers are closely linked. As is 
evident, the modified rationing system caters very little for those for 
whom it was introduced,
Swanirvar (Self-reliance) Movement
In 1975, the government launched the so-called "Swanirvar" (i.e, 
"self-reliance") movement. The moving spirit was an ex-Foreign Service 
officerwho gave up his job in 1965 to take up farming in his home village 
(at this time he added the title "Chashi", i.e, farmer, to his name).
Later he came to hold, the new title notwithstanding, important government 
positions such as Foreign Secretary, Secretary of the Rural Development 
Ministry, Vice-President of the Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, 
Principal Secretary to the President, etc. At the time of launching the 
"Swanirvar", the government created a new post for him - "Special 
Secretary, Swanirvar",
The movement aims at increased agricultural production and self- 
reliance. As the posters indicate, its main motto is "convert the 
beggar’s hands into those of the worker". However, it is conspicuously
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vague on its notions of self-reliance. Thus, it is totally silent on 
Bangladesh’s ever-increasing dependence on foreign assistance. It 
considers massive co-operation and rural mobilisation as the only means 
of enhancing production, but never even discusses the role that land 
reforms can play in this strategy. It did not arise from the masses, 
but came from above in the form of directives, and to be manned by 
existing central and local government functionaries whose pro-rich bias, 
corruption and apathy for the common man are well known (see Chapter 9), 
And yet the "Swanirvar" envisages massive rural mobilisation for 
development work through these very elements.
In early 1975, S,D,0o*Narail asked the present and the outgoing UP
Chairmen in writing to become members of the Sub-Divisional Swanirvar
Committee, which is, of course, headed by the S,D.O, himself. Later, as
per the directive of S.D.O,, Narail and Development Circle Officer of
Narail Thana, the Maizpara Union Swanirvar Committee was constituted.
Of the twelve Committee members (Chairman, BB ), one was from a middle
household, one from an upper-middle household, and the rest were drawn
from rich households,** There was no member from Magura to begin with,
2
but later NK , a rich peasant-cum-moneylender-cum-speculative trader, 
was co-opted into the Committee.
The first Swanirvar workshop in Maizpara was held in April 1975.
It was attended by the A.D.C.*** (General), Jessore, the Swanirvar
Co-ordinating Officer, all thana and sub-divisional level officers and
representatives from all Unions of Narail sub-division. In all, 225
* Sub-Divisional Officer, head of the administrative unit Sub-division,
which is below the District, but above the thana.
** An in-depth survey of three Swanirvar villages in another area
revealed that whereas Swanirvar leaders, on average owned around 8,0
acred of land, the average amount of land owned by all other households 
in these areas varied between 1,54 and 3,0 acres (Hossain, M,, 1978, 
Table 5, 31),
*** Additional Deputy Commissioner, i,e, officer next to chief executive of 
the district, known as Deputy Commissioner,
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persons attended the workshop. The senior officers all came in official 
jeeps and motorcycles (eight jeeps and five motorcycles). This meant 
considerable expenditure to the government exchequer on account of 
petrol, wear and tear on the vehicles, services of government drivers, 
not to mention the alternative uses to which these vehicles could have 
been put, Tk,5,000/- was raised by the local Swanirvar Committee to 
organise the workshop and to provide free food and accommodation to the 
officers. This was despite the fact that officers, when on tour, are
provided with travelling and daily allowances, over and above their
2 .
normal salary. According to BB^ this was raised through subscriptions
from the local gentry. The workshop lasted for about four days. The 
leading figures made trite speeches, repeating the common platitudes they 
usually churn out when on tour: "hard work", "honesty", "increase
production., "self-reliance", etc. And in turn, the local elite came up 
with a long list of demands and requested the "authorities" to sanction 
more funds in the future. Out of 225 participants, only about 5 per cent 
were from lower-middle to landless households. In any case, they were 
at best silent spectators at this "august" gathering of local and 
bureaucratic elites. The official attendance in the subsequent workshops 
at Maizpara (i,e. in 1976, 1977 and 1978) came down sharply and the local 
response also became limited to the Swanirvar Committee members. It was 
the same story all over again, raising funds to feed "distinguished" 
guests, speech-making, long meetings, and at the end of the day, a few 
more sub-committees and decisions for more future meetings. Local people 
complained that during the four workshops, some officers were more 
interested in procuring local specialities than in the workshop proceedings.
Apart from these "organisational activities", tne Maizpara Swanirvar 
Committee can boast of very few concrete contributions in the field of 
rural development. In 1977, the Swanirvar Committee distributed improved
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poultry among 6Q households of the Union. Of the recipient households,
80 per cent (including the two Magura households) belong to the rich 
classes. Some Swanirvar Committee members claim that they were 
instrumental in the introduction of improved fish varieties in this 
Union. This claim was found to be completely untenable. In 1975, the 
Swanirvar Committee set up a night school at Kathalbaria (the village 
next to Magura). The school functioned for only three months, which was 
perhaps the limit of the rural gentry's enthusiasm for "self-reliance11.
In 1978, the Swanirvar Committee undertook the construction of the one- 
mile-long Hossainpur-Maizpara road. All villages within Maizpara Union, 
Maizpara High School, Narail Victoria College, all UP chairmen and members 
of Narail thana and all officers of Narail thana and sub-division, were 
required to participate in the construction of this road, and accordingly 
earth work quotas were assigned. The Sub-Divisional Swanirvar Committee 
contributed 100 spades and 100 baskets towards operational expenses.
A special grant of Tk.5,000/- each was also made available to Maizpara 
High School and Narail Victoria College. These funds were ultimately 
provided by the Rural Development Ministry out of foreign assistance.
Eight villages, including Magura, abstained from the«work. The teachers, 
government officials and UP functionaries did not work either. Some of
them got their share of the work done through hired labour, while others
tr . . .
did not both to do even this. Some students from Narail Victoria College
and Maizpara High School worked, but their labour was hardly voluntary, 
because these institutions received special grants on this account. 
Finally, the work, on the whole, was highly disorganised and halfhearted 
and as such, although the road is "complete", its quality is very poor.
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In short, despite catchy slogans, "Swanirvar" is at best old wine 
in a new bottle. It does not constitute, as is often claimed, a point
of departure from past rural development ideas and programmes floated 
by Tagores and Gandhis, R.L. Braynes+ and Guru Saday Duttas+, N0M. Khans+,
* * "1" 4 4Akhter Hamid Khans and Nurunnabi Chowdhurys, etc., m  that these, m  the
last analysis, are all bound together by the common thread of social
tinkering within the existing power and property relations in the 
society.
Development of Market Places at Gor and Maizpara-Urani
So far the government has spent nothing on the development of 
physical facilities at Gor market place. However, at Maizpara-Urani, 
the following development has taken place in recent years:
a) between 1963 and 1965, the UP constructed three wharves* on the
river Chitra around the market place at a total cost of Tk.10,000/-,
under the Rural Works Programme;
b) in 1977, the Central Government (through the Land Administration and
Reforms Ministry, which is the legal owner) sanctioned Tk.40,000/- 
for construction of two large sheds, a 500 feet-long, semi-metalled 
road and a metalled drain at this market place. Work on these 
projects was in progress even in 1978.
As pointed out earlier, in respect of leasing-out arrangements, toll 
collections, weights and measures, storage, licensing, hoarding, etc., 
either there were no government measures, or even if there were any, they 
were not implemented, so that powerful people continued to have a free 
hand over the market places.
The wharves could not generate increased use of water transport 
because the river itself was becoming unusuable for water transport 
in the dry season.
Members of the Indian Civil Service
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Changes in the Local Government System
Since 1977, Government has seriously been contemplating the 
introduction of village government, i.e. replicating the UP structure at 
the village level. The main argument in this regard is that the Union 
as a unit of area and population is too unwieldy to represent adequately 
the interests of constituent villages in the development effort through 
the local government system, and hence further decentralisation.
Perhaps there is a grain of truth in this. However, it is a superficial 
view in so far as it fails to identify development obstacles properly, 
i.e. in the context of the class character of the power structure under­
taking development programmes. Under the present order of things, 
village government is bound to have power structures exactly similar to
those that one finds at the Union level: that is, the power and
authority of the present village faction leaders (who are mostly from 
the richest households) will be legitimised through administrative fiat. 
Far from promoting "development", village government may ensure more 
organised and exclusive use of governmental resources by the rural rich,
and tougher "law and order" at the lowest level.
In fact, steps have already been taken to fulfil the second 
objective, in that although the full village government has been formed 
in only some villages of Bangladesh on an experimental basis, village 
guards (Gram Rakhi Bahini) have been formed in all villages of Bangladesh, 
including Magura. There are now ten members in Magura's Gram Rakhi 
Bahini. Of them seven are from rich households, one is from UMH and the 
remaining two are from LMH. It is headed by MS (LMH). He belongs to 
the Mollah Gushti, the most powerful patrilineal kinsh;p group in Magura. 
Despite his lower-middle class background, he is a staunch supporter of
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his Gushti and his faction leader. There are seven captains and two 
group commanders. The recruitment, conducted by the local police bo ss, 
was on the criterion that members were to be drawn from among "notables" 
of various religious communities and neighbourhoods. They now carry 
sticks, and when on training at Narail and Jessore, put on uniform. It 
has been suggested that they be given real weapons. The Home Ministry 
has the overall responsibility for their recruitment, training and 
utilisation. It is, therefore, quite likely that with the introduction 
of a full-fledged village government, the "law and order" arm of this 
government will be further strengthened and equipped.
It is also possible that beyond a limited period, village government 
may backfire. Thus, in the long run, it may also sharpen class 
contradictions in the village, in that it may demystify the poor 
peoples' illusions about their faction leaders once and for all, and 
drive them into an organised protest. And it is this long-term 
implication which might ultimately persuade the government not to go ahead 
with this plan.
Miscellaneous Development Efforts
Practically no governmental effort has been made for livestock 
improvement in this village. In 1972, 14 villagers received Taccavi 
loan (interest free, supplied by the government directly) for the purchase 
of improved foreign breed poultry from the livestock office at Narail. 
Twelve of them were from RH to UMH classes, and the remaining two were 
from middle households. There is no artificial insemination centre 
(i.e. cross-breeding arrangement for improving the existing quality of 
dairy and draught animals) in the entire thana. The government 
veterinary doctor is located at Narail, but he is available only when
38 S
paid a fat fee (although he is supposed to render free services), and 
the cost of medicine is also exorbitant. He has, in fact, set foot in
this village only once so far, and that was when paid a handsome fee by
2 .
KPD , a rich person of this village.
The nearest post office is at Maizpara. This was established in 
1900 at the initiative of a big gantidar of Maizpara. Until 1971, the 
post office was located in the residential premises of one or the other 
rich men of the village. In 1972, it was shifted to the Union Parishad 
building and a public telephone was also added to the post office. The 
latter could be obtained because of the good relationship between the 
present UP Chairman and the then SDO, Narail. A new structure for the 
post office at an estimated expenditure of Tk.6,000/- is now almost 
complete. This was financed out of BIDS donations, which came in the 
wake of the author's Rural Poverty Survey of this area in 1977. In the 
same year, a commercial bank (all Bangladeshi banks belong to the public 
sector) opened a branch at the Maizpara market place. In the whole of 
1977 only ten calls were made from the public call office at Maizpara. 
Eight of them were by bureaucrats on tour in this area, and the remaining 
two were made by UP functionaries. Most poor people of this area 
thought that this was necessary only for the rich and influential.
The post office at present serves the rural rich exclusively, because it 
is mostly they who maintain urban connections in pursuit of education, 
employment, trade, etc., and who can communicate through the written word. 
The same is true of the bank. So far only 20 persons have opened 
accounts with this bank, and four of them are from Magura. All the 
account holders are rich persons of this area. On the other hand, some 
of these modern facilities, for example the telephone, under the present 
circumstances, can be effectively used for "law and order" purposes, and
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hence also for demobilisation of the rural poor. Most villagers seemed 
to know that in case of "trouble", it now took only a minute to pass on 
the information to the "law and order" establishment at Narail.
At present a number of government/semi-government credit programmes 
are in operation in the rural areas0 Those obtained through the co­
operatives have been discussed earlier,, Taccavi loan is administered 
directly by the SDO, but the UP selected the recipients within its area 
of jurisdiction. The operation of the latest Taccavi loan in Magura 
has also been indicated earlier. In 1977, the government suddenly 
announced its decision to disburse Tk.100 crore credit among the 
agriculturists. The government did not disclose the source* of this 
credit, although it was an extra-budgetary allocation. The government 
directive was for speedy disbursement. Accordingly, every thana was
given a quota, and even commercial banks were mobilised for this purpose.
was
Our investigation revealed that it , mostly used either for consumption 
or trade, but only very little for the purpose for which it was provided, 
namely agricultural production. In all, six persons from this village 
have taken this credit so far (five RH, one MH). In taking the loan, 
they had also to "satisfy" bank officials at the rate of Tk.5/- for every 
Tk.100/- borrowed.** There has so far been no governmental measures, 
even on paper, to set up any rural industries in this ares.
From the above discussion, the following may be concluded. Firstly, 
central government efforts at rural development have consisted mainly in 
attempting to increase productive forces, with little or no emphasis on 
changing existing production relations, which are, in effect, holding back
* It is understood that this credit programme was financed out a grant 
from a certain sheikhdom in the Persian Gulf.
** Commenting on this credit programme, the World Bank (1978j», 3) noted: 
"As usual for such programmes, the small farmers demonstrated a 
better repayment record but did not get a large share of the credit 
outlays".
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the development of the former. Secondly, government resources have been 
channelled through the rural elite and local officials of the central 
government. There was no local planning, and the rnass of the people had 
no say in either the formulation of a development programme or in its 
implementation.
Thirdly, the lionfs share of these resources could not "trickle down" 
to "target groups" because of their rampant misappropriation by the rural 
rich and the bureaucratic elites. On the other hand, whatever measures 
were ultimately implemented benefited mainly the strong and the sturdy 
in the countryside. Thus, in the last analysis, government development 
measures, despite pious intentions, helped strengthen the political and 
economic stranglehold of an unproductive rural rich over the rural society. 
Fourthly, for the rural poor the outcome was further pauperisation, 
increased dependency on the rural rich, a "beggar mentality" and 
demobilisation. Finally, since the Western countries, and in particular 
the US, were involved in these efforts in both roles as providers of 
resources and as approvers of this particular set of policies,* their 
complicity in this "development of under-development" in rural Bangladesh 
cannot be ignored.
Multilateral aid is obtained on a year-to-year basis through 
submission of a detailed memorandum for aid to the Bangladesh Aid 
Club, consisting of the US and West European countries. In the 
case of bilateral aid also, aid agreement is preceded by threadbare 
negotiations and after donors are satisfied with the purpose for 
which aid is sought Cinterviews with officials of the External 
Resource Division, Ministry of Finance, in July 1979).
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE RESPONSE OF THE PQQR TO POVERTY
In this chapter, the response of the poor to poverty is discussed 
in some detail. In doing so, three levels of response have been 
identified, at the risk of some over-simplification: (a) individual,
(b) collective, and (c) political At the lowest level, such response 
consists of individualistic, spontaneous reaction to a reality that is 
instinctively unacceptable, and takes the shape of various social and 
economic adjustments, including what some Western sociologists describe 
as "socially deviant behaviour"„ At another level, the limitations of
individual response are grasped and response flowers into collective 
action around removal of immediate grievances„ Collective bargaining 
by, say, a farm workers' union, for better pay and living conditions would 
be a good example in this regard. At yet another level, response assumes 
a definite political character under a vanguard party and seeks allies 
in other exploited classes in the society; it now becomes possible for 
the poor to link their objective reality with the fundamentals of the 
existing power and property relations in the society. At this stage, 
collective bargaining for immediate benefits may not altogether ruled out, 
but now it is essentially a tactic, a means to an end, rather than an end 
in itself. In Marxist parlance, this amounts to a transition from 
"class-in-itself" to "class-for-itself" position.,*
* For Marx's own writings on this subject, see Marx (1965a) and 
Marx (1967<>X * For critical review and commentary, see
Hal Draper (l9T8?40-4l) »¥estergaard a&d-Resl6:r;Cl976t 2-3) a&d 
Messaros(l97'IiJl04-Il5).
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Response at the Individual Level
a) Occupational and Employment Responses
In the village, the normal options open to the rural poor within the 
agricultural sector are wage labour, share cropping in land and more 
intensive cultivation of one's own land. In the non-*agricultural 
sector, the choice is limited to wage labour in fishing, weaving, 
trade, transport etc,, and construction work undertaken sometimes 
by central and local governments during winter. It is the case 
that one occupation or one role within an occupation is simply 
inadequate. Hence, one major poverty response is multiplicity in 
roles and occupations. Thus, over 80 per cent of middle to 
landless households had either more than one occupation (for example, 
were engaged in both agriculture and fishing) or more than-one role 
within an occupation (for example, share cropping in land as well 
as agricultural wage labour)„ The same was true of the rural rich, 
but for entirely different reasons, as discussed earlier. While 
such a response was logical, under the given circumstances, it acted 
against the division of labour and specialisation that 
characterises a more organised production system.
There is no scope for industrial work since there is no worthwhile 
industry within a 30 mile radius of this village. However, about 
15 persons (background ranging from LLH to LMH) go out to South 
Khulna as wage labourers during the main paddy harvesting season 
(October-December). The wages they receive are almost double 
(i.e. Tk.10/- per day) what they would normally receive in the 
village, but after deducting transport costs and extra living expenses 
in a distant place, the gains are hardly spectacular. In any case, 
the demand for such labour is purely seasonal and insignificant 
compared to supply.
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b) Raising Livestock oh at. Share Basis
This means that the calf or the kid has to be raised and looked after, 
and in return the person raising it is allowed to retain half the 
share of the milk, and when it matures and gives birth, one of its 
offspring. Although this is not very profitable in view of the 
scarcity and rising cost of animal feed, it is one way in which a 
poor villager can acquire some milk and livestock. About 20 HH of 
LM to LL background, are engaged in raising livestock on a share 
basis.
c) Child Labour
This is a normal affair with all poor households of Magura. Generally, 
all children of such households above the age of six have to work. In 
about 40 households, child labour involves cowherding, agricultural 
work, permanent hired agricultural labour in the rich man's household, 
carrying loads to the market place for sale, etc. In another 80 
households, child labour is confined to household chores, which are 
also no less onerous. Such work obviously has unhappy consequences 
for their health, education and general upbringing. In one case, we 
found an eight year-old boy of a poor household being sent by his 
widowed mother to a far-off market place in preference to the local 
one because rice was selling slightly cheaper in the latter. His
mother, of course, did not know that in terms of the calories that
her young boy would lose walking such long distances, the gain from 
buying rice slightly cheaper may not, after all, be worthwhile. In 
another case, we found a 10 year-old boy from a landless family 
selling peanuts at the market place at Gor. His total capital was
nuts worth Tk.5.0, and at the end of a busy market day, he had earned 
a profit of only Tk.0.50, which was perhaps insufficient even to 
regain the loss of energy from the continuous shouting he had to do in
the course of selling his merchandise.
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d) Female Labour outs ide the Household
In general, working outside the precincts of the household is 
considered degrading for women. However, poverty has by now driven 
the women of Magura's poor households outside their homes - to earn 
money in rice dehusking, hay and grain collection, jute processing, 
as permanent hired labour in the rich man's household, tending live­
stock, work the vegetable garden, etc. The foregoing are the usual 
outside home activities of 90 per cent of poor women.
e) Collection of Grain, Hay Caw Dung, Firewood, etc.
After the harvest is over, children, old men and women of about 100
poor households go over the fields and collect every little bit of 
grain that is still lying about. On an average, a day's hard labour 
can yield no more than one seer (2 lb) of paddy. Similarly, husk, 
cow dung and firewood are collected for animal feed, fuel and 
fertiliser. In recent years, demand for these materials has 
registered a sharp increase, and rich people were themselves collecting 
th estthrough their servants from their property. As a result, 
poorer peoples' access to these materials has declined.
f) Adjustments in Cultivation Arrangements
In general, share cropping out is resorted to only by richer house­
holds, but for about 2 poor households share cropping out is a 
necessity because they lack either the labour power (i.e. the house­
hold head is old ■ and/or a woman, and family members are minors) 
or the necessary cultivation inputs (i.e. bullocks, plough, etc.)
In the absence of the latter, five poor and landless households have 
also taken to what is known as "Anguri". Under this arrangement,
they have to work in the owner's land for two days, and in return 
they are allowed to use the owner's cultivation bullocks and plough
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on their own land (or share-cropped in land) for one day. This 
amounts to under selling,,their labour, given their weak economic 
position. But under the circumstances, this is a logical response0
g) Permanent Migration from the Village
Since 1947, permanent migration has been taking place to (i) India 
and (ii) other villages. Migration to India, consisting entirely of 
Hindus, was concentrated in three phases, 1948-54, 1954-71 and 1974-
77.0 In the first two phases, migration was caused largely by lack 
of security, both real and imagined0 After BangladeshTs emergence 
as a secular state at the end of 1971, the insecurity of the minority 
community was largely removed, so that their migration in the third 
phase constituted a clear poverty reaponse. Of the ten households 
migrating at this time, eight were from lower middle to landless 
classeso They could no longer cope with the galloping prices in 
Bangladesh and their only hope was help from relatives who had 
migrated to India earlier., Between 1947 and now eleven households 
involving 46 persons migrated to other villages. Of them, nine 
were landless and one belonged to the PH class0 In all these 
cases migration was caused by a search for better economic opportunity 
elsewhere. In the midst of the 1974 famine, one landless household 
left the village for the town in search of foodo No one knows 
where or how they ended up<,
h) Recourse to Lumpen Occupations
Theft, begging and prostitution were some of the important lumpen 
poverty responses at Magura. There were two types of thefts, namely 
(a) petty thefts carried out now and then (ioe0 stealing vegetables, 
fruit, etc0 of the rich whenever an opportunity arose., Such thefts 
were very common, and there were very few among the poor in Magura
who were not given to such thefts), and (b) theft as a profession. 
Three persons (two PH and one LMH) are considered to belong to the 
latter category. This means that whenever a big theft is committed 
in and around the village they become the obvious suspects. As is 
the case generally, they have the protection of one important matbar 
of this village. In the not too distant village of Charikhada 
another matbar is also notorious for receiving stolen goods and 
protecting such thieves through his excellent police connections. 
During the last five years (1972-77), five thefts were detected and 
brought before the village judicial bench (shalish)9 involving 
standing paddy crops, jute and household valuables of the village 
rich. Of the nine accused, five were from LLH, three from PH and 
one from LMH.
There are again two types of beggars in Magura:
a) casual beggars, i.e. those who sought help from time 
to time - 15, and
b) professional beggars - four (two women). For one household 
it was the main occupation.
Four cases are discussed below in order to illustrate prostitution 
as a poverty response:
Case I:
TT, St and M 1 are three sisters of a poor household. The brother G 1 
is a professional thief. The father is dead. The mother, in her 
youth, was noted for extra-marital sex. All the three sisters are 
now engaged in prostitution as a means of livelihood. In ensuring 
this, some of the village powerful have to be quetened through 
providing them with free sexual pleasure.
2AoKo is head of a poor household., He is an old man, suffering
from TBo His land is of very poor quality and yields only one
crop a yearn He has no sons, and the land has, therefore, to be
share cropped out0 He has a bamboo grove and some fruit-bearing
trees. The income from all this property is able to feed the
2
family consisting of himself, his wife and his daughter N (aged 20)
for about only two-three months. Thus the family has to borrow
2from the village rich; m  obtaining the loans, obviously N had to
go from door to door, and it all started this way. Some of the
village rich took advantage of the family1s helpless position and
made a prostitute out of her. She was married for a brief period.
After some time the husband deserted her in disgust and left for
India. In 1977, she tried to obtain a family planning assistant's
job. One official promised her the job in lieu of sex. She
fulfilled her part of the bargain but the official did not.
Case III:
2
B (aged 22) is the daughter of a landless household. At 16 she
2came to work m  the house of ,-UK (EH II; also moneylender-cum-
speculative trader), Taking advantage of her helpless situation,
2 . . .  irNK forced her into a sexual relationship with him. In the
2
process B became pregnant. To save himself from embarrassment
2
and at the same time to maintain his control over her, , EfK forced
2her into "marriage" with JD , an eighty year-old man (LMH). Since
2 2 . . . . .  .JD is heavily dependent on NK for his livelihood, his "wife", in
2reality, is ,TNK 's permanent mistress.
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Case IV:
2After being deserted by her husband m  1968, A , along with her
. . .  2two children, started living with her father JD (see Case III
above). While at this house, she started visiting her brother- 
2
in-law RD. (PH) who introduced her to prostitution,, In the
process she became pregnant„ She died while undergoing abortion,,
2 2 2 UK rescued JD and RD from the law by bribing the police.
i) Borrowing at high Interest Rates
Loans among neighbours for daily necessities like salt, kerosene, 
rice, vegetables, etc„ are quite common, but only when they are of 
equal economic standing„ The rich are clearly reluctant to make 
such loans to their poor neighbours because of the latter1s inability 
to repayo As discussed elsewhere, the scope of institutional 
credits for the poor is extremely limitedo Thus, in a dire poverty 
situation, the poorfs only borrowing source is the village money­
lender. About 37 households are now indebted to various money­
lenders. The rate of interest varies from 120-240 per cent. In 
most cases collateral consisting of a valuable asset (fishing net, 
utensil, gold, land, etc., to cite the most common collateral) has 
to be deposited before obtaining the loan (there are five money­
lenders in this village). In most cases, the collateral cannot 
be retrieved from the moneylender0 
j) Distress Sale
In 1977, about 400 maunds of paddy (i.e. about one-fifth of the 
gross marketed surplus) constituted distress surplus, i.e. forward 
sales (i.e. of standing crops - this was restricted to Aus Paddy) 
and sales immediately after harvest (when prices are low) in order
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to repay outstanding dues and loans, purchase kerosene, salt, 
cloth and other essentials and to meet emergency medical expenses.
In 1977, forward sale of Aus paddy took place at Tk.25-30/- per 
maund, i.e. Taka 75/- below the highest price obtained for a maund 
of paddy that year. Similar was the fate of sales immediately 
following harvest. About half the distress surplus was bought 
back later at higher prices. The entire distress surplus was 
marketed by middle, lower-middle and poor households. As with 
agricultural produce, distress sale of assets has also been an 
important poverty response in Magura. During the 1974 famine, 
nine of the houses, built with C.I. sheets given as relief in 1972 
and eight acres of land were sold out by middle, lower-middle and 
poor households, 
k) Pleading with the Rich
The village poor were found constantly appealing to the rich man's 
sense of justice and fair play to improve their terms as wage 
labourers, share croppers, creditors, etc., even though these 
yield them nothing or only peripheral concessions. In 1974, for 
example, when food prices soared, the wage labourers approached the 
landowners individually for an increase in their wages. The land­
owners^ response was typical, "When the price of paddy was only 
Tk.100/- per maund we paid you these wages. We did not then 
resent your 'high1 earnings and request you to return the excess1". 
Similarly, the village poor have lodged many verbal protests in the 
past against misappropriation of relief goods and development inputs 
meant for them, without any effect.
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1) Divorce and Wife-beating
During the last five years, there have been seven divorces on
account of poverty„ In all these cases the husband and wife
belonged to below MR classes„ According to selected informants,
all these divorces were preceded by regular quarrels arising out of 
s
economic „hardhip. The typical story is: the husband is unable
to provide for the family's bare minimum requirements, the wife
reacts, the husband after a hard day's labour is already in a bad
mood and beats her up0 After this is repeated day in and day out
for some time, separation and divorce are the obvious consequences,
especially since in Islamic divorce the husband has only to utter 
word
the "Talaq" (the Bengali equivalent of divorce) thrice in front of 
a witness in order to execute a divorce<, 
m) Disintegration of Joint Families
During the last five years 16 joint families (ten Muslim and six 
Hindu) have disintegrated into nuclear ones0 Of these 16 house­
holds, 13 belong to MH and below classes <, This phenomenon at Magura 
is clearly related to poverty„ Frequent quarrels among family 
members, sometimes on very petty matters, are beginnings of these 
break-ups„ In reality, these manifest the differences in the 
contribution to the family income made by various members, As the 
quarrels intensify and real differences become obvious, the family 
breaks up and asset division follows„
A typical example is that of SM*'s household,, SM^ is a poor vendor,,
He is now 65, and severely handicapped by rheumatism0 He makes, 
therefore, no contribution to the family's income„ His son A* got
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married about six months ago. He has recently separated from his
father to form his own nuclear family, obviously because he wants
to avoid maintaining his father although this means that SM* has
to pass the last years of his life in utter destitution,
n) Change in Religion and Increase in Religiosity 
2JBD (LMH) became a Muslim m  1968. This was not prompted by his
love for Islam, but by his poverty situation., But for the trickery
2
of his elder brother, SND , his share of the landed property
inherited from their father would have placed him in the upper-
middle classo He tried to sort out the matter in the village
judicial bench (Shalish)„ When this failed, he became a Muslim in
order to increase his strength in the fight to retain his rightful
share, At this turn of events, all the Hindus of the area
2 .assembled m  a meeting and decided to persuade JBD into reconversion., 
Accordingly, they approached him collectively and promised help in 
the restoration of his land if he agreed to become a Hindu once 
again,, He yielded to their request, but the land was never 
recoveredo Although Hindu to Muslim conversion is a rare phenomenon 
nowadays (there were a few forcible conversions in 1971), this is 
a reminder of what happened in Bengal a few hundred years ago, when 
as a protest against social and economic deprivation there was mass 
conversion of lower caste Hindus to Islam., The Christian 
missionaries operating from their regional headquarters in Khulna, 
are quite active in this area. In two villages of this thana 
(about 10-12 miles from Magura), some poor low caste Hindus have 
already become Christians0 It seems that the present target of 
the Christian missionaries is the poverty-stricken fishermen 
community of this region., They have not so far made any overt 
moves in this respect.
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Under the existing circumstances (i,e, lacking persistent efforts 
at making the poor conscious of the real causes of poverty), one 
of the obvious responses to poverty is increased religiosity and 
fatalism. It is retribution for sins committed in a past life 
for the Hindus, while for the Muslims compensation is sought in 
the good things that would follow in the life hereafter. In both 
cases, the purpose is the same: to rationalise existing objective
reality. However, despite this religiosity, the poor are unable 
to participate fully in many of the religious rites like the Puja, 
Idd, etc,, which demand considerable expenditure,
o) Role as Paction Followers
The structure and composition of the five factions at Magura have 
already been discussed. Their creation and continued existence 
can also be regarded as a poverty response in that in the absence 
of any other od>temative, the poor people are driven into the role 
of faction followers (given the various ways in which they are 
economically dependent on their leaders) and in the process are 
manipulated for furtherance of economic and political gains of rich 
peasant/moneylender/trader faction leaders. In other words, their 
response to be faction followers leads them into a vicious circle 
of increased pauperisation and dependence,enhancing the political 
and economic power of those very people who live by exploiting them, 
p) Consumption Response to Poverty
Consumption responses to poverty in Magura were of two types, namely 
recourse to cheaper alternatives and lowering the quantum of 
consumption to a bare minimum.
i) Recourse to Cheaper Alternatives
At present, for more than 80 per cent of poor households of 
Magura, wheat has replaced rice as the staple food0 In the 
1950s it was inconceivable that a Bengali peasant would 
regularly consume wheat flour nrotiIT instead of cooked riceQ 
In the 1960s, government propaganda imploring a change in 
dietary habits was intensified. This had little effecto 
Those who could afford to continued their traditional diet0 
On the other hand, the poor could not afford to for very long0 
By 1974, rice prices had rocketed to staggering levels, so that 
the price mechanism was able to achieve what government 
propaganda had failed to do for so long0 Similarlyj there has 
been a change in clothing consumption as well0 The traditional 
apparel of the rural poor consisted generally of the coarse 
products of the handlooms and the mills0 The prices of these 
have also registered sharp increases. Meanwhile, imported 
secondhand clothes*found their way into the local market, and 
many of the rural poor have switched over to these since they 
are relatively cheaper„ Most of these are secondhand, synthetic
materials, rejects from hospitals, prisons, asylums, old 
peoples* homes, etcOJ of Western countries, meant to have been 
converted into pulp for paper production., As such, these 
may be carriers of dangerous diseases, doing more harm than 
good to the poor in the long run„
ii) Lowering of Consumption
Normally, about 70 households take only two meals a day,
40 households only one meal a day, and the only daily meal of 
ten households consists of a gruel made of wheat flour, wild
A large amount was imported under the Wage Earners' Scheme, 
introduced in 1974.
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roots and leaves<> (It is difficult to ascertain the extent 
of food intake in the 1960s, but . indirect evidence points 
to a significant fall in the food intake since then0) The 
situation obviously assumed very serious proportions during 
the famines of 1943 and 19740 In 1943, more than 75 per cent 
of Magura. people starved for more than three months, resulting 
in the death of two poor weavers0 In 1974, about 100 house­
holds (60 Muslims) starved for about two months, eating wild 
leaves and roots, which were often unfit for human consumption., 
As has been brought out in Chapter VII, of late the poor are 
also responding to poverty by cutting down their expenses in 
cultural/religious rites/festivals to the bare minimum., Thus, 
no poor Muslim family in Magura can now indulge in new clothes, 
sweets, etCo on the occasion of Eid, and similarly, no poor 
Hindu family can perform Puja individually. Fifty years ago, 
most of the village poor could easily afford what are now 
"luxuries" for them, 
q) Reproduction Response
The village poor were clearly caught up in a dilemma over the 
question of reproduction., 100 per cent of the 114 MH and below 
respondents considered too many children as a curse, and they were 
able to appreciate the poverty implications of a large family. And 
yet, their concept of too many children differed from the official 
line, "boy or girl, 2 are enough" significantly. 68„I per cent 
of the MH and below respondents considered 3-6 as the desirable 
number of children a couple should have (see Table 18, Chapter VIII),
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and the number of children in the 0-16 age group per household was 
above three for MH and below classes (see Table 17, Chapter VIII)„
81,1 per cent of these respondents also considered son preference 
completely justified,. Cross examination of selected informants 
yielded similar indications0 During the last five years there 
were, in fact, three examples of poor people pledging animal 
sacrifice/special Puja if they were blessed with sons0
As discussed in Chapter VIII, the following reasons account for the 
poor people's son preference and desire for more than two children,, 
Firstly, children, especially sons, meant increased earning 
capacity, help in agricultural/household work, old age "insurance", 
etc„ With a son there would also be no dowry problem at the time 
of marriageo Secondly, for the poor, consumption by children was 
limited to the bare minimum requirements of food and clothing, and 
extra expenses on account of their education, recreation, housing, 
medical treatment, etc., were almost non-existento
Response at Collective and Political Levels
For the middle, lower-middle, poor and landless people of Magura, 
the objective conditions required to generate response at the collective 
and economic level are more than fulfilled,, In fact, the various acts 
of "violence" - overt, extra legal* and structured** - being committed on ' 
the poor constitute quite a list:
i) highly unfair wages and terms of share cropping;
ii) extraction of free services from poor and landless share croppers 
by jotedars;
* I0e0 against the law, but not necessarily overt - for example, hoarding 
and money lending0
** Does not violate the law but imbedded in the existing socio-economic 
structure, for example, low wages„
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iii) non-access to institutional credit and reliance on the moneylenderTs 
credit at high interest rates and on deposit of collatoral 
consisting of productive and valuable assets;
iv) exorbitant prices of essential commodities bought by them owing to
speculative trade and hoarding on the one hand, and low prices for 
the commodities sold by them owing to lack of staying power, on the 
other;
v> Pilfering and maldistribution of relief goods and developmental
inputs by the village rich and the bureaucracy;
vi) extortion, bri' bes, etcn, by various local officials, Union 
Parishad functionaries, etc*,, and
vii) outrages on women belonging to poor households by the rural rich 
and officials, taking advantage of the formerTs helplessness0
If the poor co-operated among themselves by pooling their resources 
and carrying out joint farming, they could improve their economic lot 
substantially and increase their bargaining power vis-a-vis the rural 
richo They do not, however, do so„ And the reasons lie in the very 
structure of poverty in which they are enmeshed (as we shall suggest, 
briefly, below).
Let us now review their actual responses at collective and political 
levels. Narail sub-division has a long record in peasant uprisings and 
protestso As pointed out earlier, this sub-division was created in 1859, 
as a response to the outbreak of the so-called "Indigo Disturbances" in 
that year0 In the 1930s, Narail witnessed two important peasant
movementso The first was the "Hat-tola" movement directed against
illegal exactions, especially from middle and petty traders by Zamindar*s 
toll collectors at the market placesQ The second was a share croppers1
protest against the existing terms of share cropping,, This was led by 
Congress leader Syed Nausher Ali, and followed Gandhi's Vnon-co- 
operation" tactic: the share croppers decided to withdraw from share
cropping until the owners yielded to their demand® The movement failed 
miserably, and the landowners retaliated by refusing land to those who 
had withdrawn from share cropping earlier and later wanted land for 
share cropping0 There was no evidence to suggest that Magura peasants 
were in any way connected with these movements,,
Then, in 1946 the Communist Party of India organised the famous 
Tebhaga Movement„* This was again a share croppers1 struggle for a 
two-thirds share of the produce,, This time, however, the share 
croppers were organised on clear militant lines and there were also some 
attempts to politicise the peasantry: the share croppers discarded the
non-violent line to counter violence of the police, the Zamindar and the 
jotadar with revolutionary violence and forcibly to take away the share 
of the produce they considered as just and fair0 Large areas of.Narail 
sub-division were engulfed by the movement, and in fact, one of its 
storm centres was located at Raghunathpur, only eight miles from Magura,,
The Tebghaga did to some extent open the eyes of Magura's share croppers,, 
Though late, they started organising themselves, pressing their demands 
and linking themselves with local Tebghaga leaders like Noor Jalal and 
Mudasser Munshi„ However, the ten Gantidars, who among themselves then 
owned most of Magura, were equally adamant in their determination not to
* Literally, Tebhaga means three shares: the main economic demand of
the movement was to ensure for the share croppers two out of the three 
shares of produce from share-cropped land. However, as the movement 
gathered momentum, other economic and political demands were also 
voiced„ It may be mentioned here that the main demand of the movement 
had been recommended for implementation in the 1940 Land Reforms 
Commission's Report (popularly known as the Floud Commission Report 
after the name of the Commission's Chairman)„ For a detailed account 
of the Tebhaga Movement, see Dhanagare (1976), Umar (1974), Sunil Sen 
(1972), etc„
yield to the Tebhaga demands, and, in fact, threatened the share 
croppers with dire consequences if they took the "law in their own 
hands"o Meanwhile, the Tebhaga was called off by the CPI leadership,
following a mere gazette notification of the Bargadar's Control Bill in 
early 1947 (this recognised the share croppers' right to two-thirds 
share, but was never enacted, and was never meant to be; in effect, it 
proved to be a ruse to take the steam out of a difficult situation and 
apparently the CPI failed to see through this trick)„ As a result, a 
struggle with great promise simply petered out. In 1968, emboldened 
by the countrywise demonstrations, "Gherao" (i.e0 to lay siege to), 
and "Jalao" (i0e. to set fire to), the Magura share croppers once again 
demanded a better deal from their landowners„ When negotiations failed 
they (15 Muslims and 10 Hindus) collectively refused to carry the land­
owners' share of the produce from the field to the latter's house (which 
constituted one of the terms of share cropping)0 However, the latter 
part of this story is more or less a repetition of 19460 The 1968
movement started as an anti-Ayub agitation for "democratic rights"; but 
with the spontaneous participation of workers and peasants, the movement 
not only spread all over the country, but also radical demands and 
militant forms of struggle started to surface,, This obviously frightened 
the rising Bengali urban and rural propertied classes„ They were in the 
movement only to obtain the maximum concessions for their class from the 
Pakistani ruling class, but as things started to "slip out of control", 
they responded by crying for "law and order" and "constitutional" methods, 
and, in fact, came to an understanding with the establishment„ Since 
the left was in disarray, it could not shape the discontent of the 
rural masses into revolutionary channels, so that 1968's promise for the
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countryside was brief, and receded into the background with the clamping 
down of Martial Law for the second time0 Thus, against the background 
of a countrywide political relapse, the share croppers' struggle in 
Magura failed to take offQ The landowners, in their turn, retaliated 
by employing share croppers from the neighbouring villages and with­
drawing land from the defiant ones0 After a year of irregular wage 
labour and cultivation of their tiny plots of land for survival, the 
defiance broke down, and they fell on their knees to ask their land­
owners for land under old terms« The landowners agreedo In the words 
of one of the landowners, "we had to retaliate in order to teach them a 
proper lesson"„
The left-dominated peasant movement in the meantime veered towards 
an extremist line, which included among others withdrawal from mass 
political actions in favour of secret physical elimination of perceived 
class enemieso* In the absence of adequate political education, there 
were also serious gaps between the perception of party workers and that 
of the masses0 Therefore, although the general objectives of the left 
movement had mass support, their methods were often not appreciatedo 
The strongest position the leftists held in this village and area was 
during 1971 when a temporary power vacuum was created as a result of the 
retreat of the Awami League cadres to India and of the Pakistan Army to 
the citieso With independence in December 1971, and the subsequent
In popular parlance, this is known as the "Naxalbari line", propounded, 
among others, by ChariAMajumdar, leader of the CPI(M-L)0 For details 
on the Maxalbari uprising and subsequent political line pursued by the 
Naxalites, see Mohan Ram (1969) and Dasgupta (1974)0 Whatever might 
have been the compulsions for the Naxalbari line in the context of 
West Bengal, it had no relevance for Bangladesh, given that by 1970, 
West Pakistan-based domination had emerged as the main contradiction 
for the people of Bangladesh*, It was thus a clear case of blind 
acceptance of a political line, formulated by a foreign communist 
party 0
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return of the Awami League-dominated Muktibahini (freedom fighters), 
backed by the Indian Army, the leftists were thrown out of their dominant 
position and subjected to systematic repression*,
At present, most of the poor appear apathetic to any political 
activity and filled with despondency over what was to be done to achieve 
their economic and political emancipation*,
This may be explained in terms of two factors0 Firstly, inactivity 
and costly mistakes by the left, and failure to correct these in good 
time, along with continuous splits in their ranks, especially since the 
early 1960s, prevented them from emerging as a major alternative 
political force, from giving a concrete shape to the various spontaneous 
political responses of the rural poor and from providing the rural poor 
with genuine political education*,
Secondly, in the absence of a visible alternative, dependence of 
the rural poor on village faction leaders, U„P. functionaries, central 
government bureaucrats, political parties like the Muslim League and the 
Awami League became unavoidable,, These operated through raising false 
hopes in order to achieve their own class interests (for example, during 
both the Pakistan Movement in the 1940s and the Bangladesh Movement in 
the 1970s uplift of the poor was liberally promised)„ In the process, 
a great deal of apathy and frustration was generated among the rural 
poor, when the true colours of these parties on achieving political 
power became apparent„
In this regard, the attitude of two peasants of this village was 
quite revealing*, The first one, about 65 years old, is a poor peasant 
who has never been politically involved„ According to him Pakistan was 
better than Bangladesh, and British rule was still better because the poor
man's lot deteiorated progressively as one moved from independence in 
1947 to independence in 1971 and the present time*, The second one is 
a middle-aged landless peasant, who was at one time under the influence 
of the Naj<alites0 His understanding of poverty was as follows: "the
rich are like the banyan tree0 At one end there are strong roots spread 
all over to suck the juice of the earth, and at the other, there is the 
huge foliage to block sunlight for its exclusive use„ You see, nothing 
can grow under a banyan tree,, It has to be uprooted and removed if the 
smaller plants are to survive"„ He was, however, not sure of the 
strategy and tactics for its eradication,, Of his political teachers 
from Pulum, he had the following to say, "when they first told us that 
there were countries in this world run totally by workers and peasants,
I did not believe them0 Then we hoped,, But when real trouble came, 
some of them fled to the cities and took shelter with their relatives„
I told one of them to think of us who had no place to go in this world"„
A number of factors hinder the growth of co-operation among the 
village poor for increasing production. Firstly, in the existing 
circumstances their asset position was so hopeless that scope for 
co-operation was extremely limited,, Secondly, the village poor were 
tied down to the rich through various dependency relationships (as 
discussed elsewhere), and these did not permit co-operation among thems- 
selvesa Thirdly, so far government efforts at co-operation have been 
directed towards general co-operatives, membership of which, in practice, 
is limited to owners of land/asset„ The experience of these co­
operatives has been very negative for the rural poor, and as such they 
nurture an instinctive suspicion for any co-operative activity*,
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The only form of economic co-operation among the poor people of 
Magura is "Badli", that is, in peak agricultural seasons, the poor people 
help one another with their work0 However, this practice is limited 
now to only four households0
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CHAPTER TEN
THE URBAN DIMENSION OF RURAL 
POVERTY IN BANGLADESH
Introduction
We have so far tried to explain rural poverty in Bangladesh in terms 
of the forces located within Bangladesh's rural society„ However, it is 
our contention that one cannot understand fully the nature, determinants 
and implications of rural poverty unless one looks out of the countryside 
to both urban Bangladesh and beyond the confines to Bangladesh's borders*, 
It is all the more necessary to conduct the former exercise, in as much 
as recently an influential attempt to "explain" the persistence and 
growth of rural poverty - which looks as if it is already becoming a part 
of the "conventional wisdom" throughout the Third World - has portrayed 
this as the result of "urban bias" (Lipton, 1977; for a critique see 
Byres, 1979), This chapter addresses the issues raised by such an 
explanation., The latter exercise is also necessary, however, if we are 
to comprehend adequately the co-ordinates of rural poverty in a Third 
World situation,, It is all the more necessary because it is ignored so 
completely in Third World poverty studies. This will be the subject of 
the next chapter„
In the chapter on government response to rural poverty, it was 
observed, firstly, that in general the benefits of governmental anti­
poverty and development measures in the countryside accrued mainly to
ou .
the rural rich; and secondly, that in ensuring this, there was distinct 
cession between the rural rich and central/local government functionaries 
responsible for implementation of such measures at the lower levels of 
administration*, In this chapter we propose to examine if there is a 
distinct "urban bias" transcending class bias, in the manner in which
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resources ultimately get allocated between the urban and the rural
sectors in Bangladesh^ In so Aoing the following issues are closely
scrutinised:
a) Agriculture1s terms of trade vis-a-vis industry;
b) the bias of (i) government developmental expenditures,
Cii) government credit policies, (iii) government food rationing 
policies;
c) the burden of taxation on the rural sector vis-a-vis the urban 
sector;
d) the condition of the rural poor vis-a-vis that of the urban poor, 
and
e) the bias of the highest policy formulators and implementors0
1o Class Analysis of the Urban Sector
Before examining the urban dimension of rural poverty, it is in 
order to attempt a brief class analysis of Bangladesh’s urban sector«, 
However, given the lack of a clear-cut survey in this respect, it 
has necessarily to be constructed by mainly piecing together evidence 
from secondary sourcesa* Between 1961 and 1974, the percentage of 
total population residing in urban areas increased from 502 to 8078, 
which meant about a 138 per cent change in urban population during 
this periodo The principal reason for this phenomenal increase was 
the heavy influx of rural population to urban centres (Choudhury, 
et al., 1976, 870)0
The urban population in. Bangladesh may be divided into three main 
classes:
Given the limited secondary evidence, some of the information stated 
in this section is based on interviews with urban sociological 
research workers and personal observations0
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a) the urban rich
b) the urban intermediate classes, and
c) the urban poor*
a) The Urban Rich
During the British period, the East Bengal economy was dominated 
by mostly mercantile capital, British, Marwari and Bengali Hindu,, 
The same groups also owned the meagre industrial capital that 
was developed in this region (sugar, textiles and tea plantations)„ 
In the urban sector, it was only in the petty bourgeois class* 
and below that Bengali Muslims were numerically significant 
(Mukharjee, 1973, 405-6)„ The 1947 partition replaced British 
by Pakistani colonial rule* This meant, among other things, 
a general neglect of industrialisation in East Bengal because 
of West Pakistan-based development with surplus extracted from
East Bengal; and the gradual displacement of Bengali Hindus
. . ^  .and Marwari interests by most West Pakistani or Muslim
A
immigrant bourgeoisie now settled in West Pakistan* Thus,by 
the end of the 1960s, West Pakistan-based capitalists owned most 
of the fixed assets in whatever manufacturing, financial and 
foreign trade sectors that existed in East Bengal*** A section 
of the Bengali Muslim petty bourgeoisie was, of course, able to 
to reap some benefit from the post-partition vacuum created 
by the mass exodus of Hindu and Marwari traders and professional 
(Sobhan and Ahmed, 1979, 14; Mukherjee, 1973,
408). However, it was during the Ayub decade, especially
* Small traders, businessmen, professionals, government officials, etc*
** According to Umar (1974, 388), about 70 per cent of industrial and
business interests belonged to the non-Bengalis before 1971*
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during the latter part, that there was a conscious effort by 
the Pakistani ruling class to create a big bourgeoisie out of 
the Bengali petty bourgeoisie in order to counter the tide of 
discontent among the Bengali masses, and to ensure exploitation 
of East Bengal on a sounder footing* This was achieved, 
inter alia, through "contacts and contracts", a proliferation
of local agencies for West Pakistan-based industrial and 
commercial houses, opening the doors of the civil-military 
bureaucracy to the educated Bengali youth, the introduction of 
a large dose of unaudited PL48Q funds in the countryside in the 
name of a rural works programme, liberal credit facilities for 
Bengali entrepreneurs by banks in general, and government credit 
organisations in particular (Alavi, 1973, 168-9; Nations, 1971, 
5-6; Abdullah, A*, 1972)* Thus, on the eve of independence, 
the Bengali urJaan rich consisted of the following (Sobhan and 
Ahmed, 1979, vl5-16): 81 "industrialists", owners of 16
big jute exporting and 12 water transport firms, big share­
holders of 12 insurance companies and one bank; 39 large 
importers; successful contractors, indentors and commission 
agents; top civil servants and professionals, owning cars and 
houses, and generally enjoying the social standards of the 
upper bourgeoisie*
The last category was more numerous and perhaps more able 
because given a colonial situation of limited opportunities, 
government service and professional jobs attracted the best 
talents of the petty bourgeoisie* They, especially, the civil 
servants, were an extremely important group, and they were able
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to enhance their economic position far beyond legal emoluments 
because of their control over state patronage0 Most of them 
also became owners of several houses in the best urban areas, 
and as such,rentiers. On the other hand, the upper bourgeoisie 
in industry and commerce were drawn for the most part from that 
section of the petty bourgeoisie which was either given to 
surplus extraction, but little interested in enterprise, 
innovation and production, or which had been unsuccessful 
educationally and had failed to get into elite administrative/ 
professional positions CSobhan and Ahmed, 1979, 5-17).* In 
any case, they were more involved in trade and commerce than 
in actual industrial production (Blair, 1978, 67), and were 
only small to medium entrepreneurs even by Pakistani standards, 
often lacking financial viability„ Despite these differences 
there were several common factors binding the entire upper 
bourgeoisie together,, Thus, firstly, they came from the same 
origin, i0eo, the petty bourgeoisie, and were closely tied to 
one another by birth and marriage„ Even as a petty bourgeoisie, 
they were relatively new in the urban sector. They had strong 
rural ties, and owned landed property in the rural sector 
(Ahmad, Q„K<,, 1979, 11)„ Secondly, they were all comprador 
in character, i0e0, they were created through patronage, 
goodwill and collaboration with the Pakistani ruling class,
This situation, it may be noted, is quite opposite to the case 
obtaining in advanced capitalist countries0 See also Siddiqui (1975, 
42-4) and H0 Papanek (1969). The latter study refers to an earlier 
period in the development of the Bengali upper bourgeoisie.
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whether in business or government, (Sobhan and Ahmed, 1979, 
v-17)0 Thirdly, they had little association with production, 
and they had graduated to the ranks of the upper bourgeoisie 
overnight and effortlessly0, (See A Correspondent, 1976 
15—9 for details on the anti-productive modus operandi of the 
Bengali rising bourgeoisie after independence0) They now 
constitute no more than three per cent of the total urban 
population,
b) The Urban Intermediate Glasses
Between the urfcan rich and the urban poor, there were various 
layers of occupations similar to the urban rich, but differing 
from them in access to capital, incomes and political power. 
Thus, they were lower government servants and small businessmen 
who had not benefited from state patronage, district court 
lawyers who had not shared in the patronage of Pakistani 
business firms, school and college teachers who had not been 
sent abroad under government scholarships, etc. In other words, 
they were so far less successful in deriving benefits out of 
the narrowly-based colonial patronage. Like the urban rich, 
they were mostly divorced from production. In aspiration, they 
generally looked upwards, possibly because they had seen before 
their very eyes the spectacular rise of a section from their 
own class to the top of the social ladder three times within 
a span of 25 years0 (This was, of course, not true of the 
lowest layers among them.)* They were obviously far more
* This was because inflation had badly corroded their standard of 
living after 1972, and they were generally in such occupational 
positions as did not permit unearned income through graft, pilferage, 
kickbacks, etc.
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numerous than the urban rich, and very roughly they consisted 
of about 21 per cent of the total urban population, given that 
urban rich and urban poor comprised respectively 3 per cent and 
76 per cent of the population (see below) „
The Urban Poor
According to Alamgir (1978, 15) about 76 per cent of the urban 
population lived below the "poverty line" (based on a minimum 
consumption basket satisfying the requirements of 2,100 calories 
and 45 grains of protein,, At 1966 prices, the value of this 
basket was Tko298o0 in 1973-74). In the absence of any other 
estimate, this may be accepted as the percentage of urban poor 
in Bangladesho According to another survey (Centre for Urban 
Studies, Dacca University, 1979-18-9), the main occupational 
components of the urban poor are as follows: day labourers
(mostly in construction work); transport workers (generally 
rickshaw and cart pullers); lower-class government/semi-government/ 
private firm employees (e„g0 messengers, nightguards, peons, 
etc.); domestic servants; handicraftsmen; hawkers, vendors 
and very small shopkeepers and shop assistants; factory 
workers; skilled/semi-skilled persons; a lumpen proletariat 
consisting of beggars, prostitutes, vagrants and the generally 
unemployed. Except for office and factory workers and the 
skilled/semi-skilled group, they belonged to the so-called 
"informal sector", with no guarantee of either permanent 
employment or livelihood, and the percentage of the urban poor 
employed in the formal sector was far less than that of the 
urban poor belonging to the informal sector„ In times of
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crisis, they provide the most visible spectacle of poverty in 
urban Bangladesh (Rhandker, 1978, 18),
2° Bias of Government Development Expenditures
In the context of Bangaldesh, one major piece of "evidence" cited 
in favour of "urban bias" is the wide urban/rural disparity in public 
development expenditures CVylder, 1979, 26), Closely allied to it 
is the argument that income distribution being less egalitarian in 
the urban sector, such "bias" further accentuates the poverty 
situation in the economy (Lipton, 1977, 17)0
Let us consider the first point. The following table provides two 
estimates of the intersectoral distribution of government development 
expenditures 0
TABLE 1 : Public Development Expenditures, 1973/74-1977/78 (in m Takas)
Year Estimate I* Estimate II**
Urban Rural Urban Rural Expenditures
1973-74 1547 1570 (50,3) 1359 1758 (56.4) 3117
1974-75 2276 2005 (46,8) 2007 2274 (53,1) 4281
1975-76 3923 3292 (45,6) 3454 3761 (52,1) 7215
1976-77 5047 4133 (45,1) 4463 4717 (51.3) 9180
1977-78 6398 5209 (43,4) 5658 5949 (51,1) 1 1608
Source: GOBD (1979e, 302)
Figures in parentheses represent rural development expenditures as 
percentages of total development expenditures,
* Rural Sector = Agriculture, rural institutions, flood control and 
half of the expenditures in transport and communication sectors„ 
** Rural Sector = Agriculture, rural institutions, flood control and 
half of expenditures in all sectors except industry, power and 
natural resources, physical planning and housing.
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The above table clearly reveals that over time, on a per capita 
basis, development expenditure has been lower and declining for the 
rural sector, although it has not been as low as shown by Vylder 
(1979, 28) according to whom, only 29-30 per cent of the total 
development expenditure went to the rural sector. In fact, this 
raises the problem of estimation. Government statistics are not 
broken down by urban and rural sectors. Also, it would be difficult 
to decide the criteria for such a breakdown. Although we have used 
physical location of expenditures as the criterion, it is insufficient 
because it disregards various important urban-rural links. Agro­
industries are a case in point. They could be included under both 
agriculture (hence rural) and industry (hence urban). However, it 
is safe to say that Vylder significantly underestimates the rural 
share of development expenditures, since he confines himself to 
expenditures on agriculture, flood control and rural institutions 
only.
Estimation problems notwithstanding, how does one explain the clear 
urban/rural disparity exhibited in our estimated? More importantly, 
is this evidence of "urban bias"? Firstly, such aggregates cannot 
(and do not) show which classes benefit from these expenditures.
Thus, for example, in the education sector, given the urban location 
of universities and other higher institutes of learning and a far 
higher expenditure on these than rural education, comprising primary 
and secondary level institutions (for details see Ahmed, S,, 197Sou^  
20-5), an "urban bias" would seem only too obvious. However, when 
this information is combined with the fact that about three-quarters 
of university students in Bangladesh are from rural areas (Jahan,
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1972, 44; Talukder, 1973),* it becomes clear that despite the 
location, the benefits of such education accrue to only the urban 
and rural rich, given the high cost of higher education, even after 
subsidieso Similar conclusions can be drawn also for urban located 
expenditures on health, social, welfare, transport and communication,, 
Secondly, as Vylder (1979,28) admits, on the average about 40 per 
cent of agricultural expenditures are subsidies on fertiliser and 
pesticides, and that this exclusively benefits the big farmers (as 
also corroborated by Blair, 3978, 71, and our own findings,
Chapter 8)„ This means that even with a higher urban share, the 
interests of the rural rich are well taken care of in the development 
budget,, Thirdly, a major portion of urban expenditure is in industry, 
where capital intensity is necessarily higher than in agriculture, 
and as such, these expenditures are not strictly comparable to those 
in the rural sector„ Finally, to prove an "urban bias", it also 
needs to be shown that the burden of raising such expenditures is 
more on the rural than the urban sectorQ
On the second aspect of the higher urban expenditure, Byres (1979,
219) cites the wellknown "green revolution" experience in the 
distribution of gains to show that even if the more egalitarian 
intra-rural income distribution assumption is true, it does not 
follow, ceteris paribus, that a shift in resources from town to 
country will increase welfareQ The table below presents the intra­
sectoral indices of income inequality in Bangladesh.
The former refers to a survey carried out in the early 1960s on, 
Dacca University and Polytechnic students, while the latter is 
the report of the survey conducted on Rajshaki University 
students in 19720
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TABLE 2 : Indices of Inequality in Bangladesh 
.tear ..Girii Coefficient....
Rural
1963/64 0.33
1973/74 0.38
Urban
1963/64 0.41
1973/74 0.39
Source: Alamgir, M., (1978, 15)
It seems clear from the above table that the very assumption 
(i.e. greater inequality in the urban sector) on which the Lipton 
argument rests, does not hold good, at least in the case of 
Bangladesh,,
3o The Bias in Government 
Credit Policy*
The following table presents the urban/rural distribution of credit 
and deposits for three years.
TABLE 3 : Percentage Distribution of Advances and Deposits by Areas
(urban and rural)
As on
31.12.75 ' 31.12.76 31.3.77
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban . Rural
Advances 96.61 3.39 96.53 3.47 95.50 4.50
Deposits 90.51 .,9.49 90.21 9.97 89.67 10.30
Source: A.M.A. Rahim (1978, 235)
In Bangladesh, the entire banking system is in the public sector.
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Rahim comments on the above table as follows: "The net difference
between deposits and advances in rural areas roughly measures the 
quantum of transfer of capital from rural to urban areas, and it has
been around a stable amount of 6 per cent, The conclusion that our
rural areas are being depleted of financial resources through
intermediation of banks seems, therefore, to be well founded" (p.235).
According to Vylder (1979, 29), "The entire credit system rather 
serves as a kind of vacuum cleaner which helps to transfer investihle 
surplus from the countryside to the cities". Similar inferences 
are also drawn by a government document (GOBD, 1978d, 62).
Before ascribing "urban bias" to the credit policy, it is necessary 
to point out that the rural-urban capital flight through the banking 
system does not capture the reverse impact caused by urban-rural 
remittances, especially those of the "pull* migrants" consisting 
of the rural rich. As Choudhury (1978, 16) points out, "an 
absolute majority (70 per cent) of the rural households from which 
someone has migrated claimed to have remittance from the migrant.
On the other hand, outflow of cash from family to migrant is 
concentrated among fewer households". As such, it is doubtful if 
there has been a net outflow of capital from the rural to the urban 
sector, given that between 1951-61 and 1961-74, the percentage of 
rural immigrants in the total urban population increased from 
15.56 to 40.82 (Choudhury, et al.,1976, 104).
Let us now delineate the beneficiaries of the government’s credit 
policies. As shown in an earlier chapter, the lion’s share of both 
credits and deposits in the country was due to the rural rich (rich 
peasants and rural traders) (see also Momen, A.K.A., 1977, 534-7;
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Hussain, M., 1979, 58; Jehangir, 1979, .376). However, since the 
rural rich have strong urban connections for trade, employment and 
children’s education, the capital transfer through the banking system 
represents their refusal to carry out productive investment in 
agriculture and rural industries, and their preference for urban- 
based trade and employment. Similarly, a sizeable section of the 
urban rich and middle classes are absentee landowners (Ahmed, Q.K., 
1979, 11) so that some of the rural-urban capital movement must also 
be due to the :pull effect exerted by them in obtaining rents and 
profits from the lands. Finally, the credit supplied to the rural 
sector is "sufficient” to the extent that this satisfies the rural 
rich requirements; on the other hand, articulation of poor and 
middle peasants’demands being weak, there is no pressure on the 
government to release further credits. Also, it is not in the 
objective interest of the rural rich to have the countryside flooded 
by cheap and easily available institutional credit. Without imputing 
conspiracy to anyone, it can safely be said that the level of 
institutional credit flow in the rural areas represents mainly the 
balance between the credit demands of the. rural rich, and their 
necessity to maintain capital scarcity in the rural sector in order 
to reap super-profits out of high interest rate and non-institutional 
credit.
Between 1972 and 1977, about 60 per cent of the bank advances in 
the urban sector went to the nationalised industries (Rahim, 1978 r34)« 
In the private sector by far the greatest share of credits was 
appropriated by big businessmen and industrialists, given the 
necessity to provide substantial collateral and also exert "influence" 
on the banking officials in order to obtain such loans. For the
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urban poor, in 1978 only 2.5 per cent of their credit requirements 
were met by bank loans (Dacca University, 1979, 26)0 By 
Bangladesh government admission (GOBD, 1975b, 1-7), there was 
massive misuse and plunder of nationalised industries between 1972 
and 1975, especially by "administrators” appointed for these 
enterprises by the then-ruling party„ This meant that the high 
dose of credit injected into the public sector not only helped the 
creation of a "noveau riche" overnight, rather than the urban poor, 
but also the resulting anti-production accentuated their poverty 
situation through hyper-inflation. Similarly, of the urban private 
sector credit, only 26 per cent went into manufacturing, whereas 
32 per cent financed commerce, and the remainder was taken up in 
house construction, road building and other activities (Ahmed, S0, 
1978b, 30-2)0 In other words, not only did the urban rich 
appropriate most of such credits, but they also used them in 
activities with little relation to production proper, so that the 
urban poor, with the least purchasing power, suffered most from the 
ensuing inflation of such anti-productive activities0
40 Bias in the Food Rationing Policy
Provision of rationed food (i0e0 at subsidised prices)* in the 
urban centres of Bangladesh is also taken as major evidence for 
"urban bias". The table below presents the off-take of food grain 
from Bangladesh's rationing system over timeQ
According to World Bank (1977, 87) estimates, the true costs of 
food grain subsidies ranged between 2o00 to 5o2 billion Taka 
annually between 1972 and 19770
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As may be seen from the above table, food rationing does not cover 
the entire urban sector„ Secondly, the "other priority groups" in 
column 2 consist of the following: the police and the armed forces;
white-collar employees of large-scale industrial enterprises outside 
statutory areas; students residing in university and college halls 
of residence; mills which sell flour to bakeries, and industrial 
workers employed by large-scale industrial enterprises„ Thus, 
except for the last category, none can be described as belonging to 
the urban poor. According to Food Ministry sources, of the total 
food consumed by "other priority groups", about 15 per cent goes 
to mills and about 60 per cent accrues to the police and the armed 
forces, and only about 15 per cent reaches the industrial workers,,* 
In the case of private enterprises, this subsidy to the workers, in 
effect, represents a subsidy to the owners because in the absence 
of such subsidy, it would have been difficult to maintain the 
existing low wage level (Gisselquist, 1979, 13) „ Among the 
ration card holders (i0e0 column 1) the proportion of the urban poor 
was far lower than their share of the urban population** owing to 
the simple fact that procurement of ration cards is ■extremely 
difficult for those lacking influence with the bureaucracy, or 
without the ability to bribe their way out. This "structural" 
discrimination against the urban poor is also augmented by overt 
selective measures directed against them0 Thus, the "anti-false 
ration card drives" and forcible eviction of squatter populations
Interviews with Ministry of Food officials in August 1979„ 
Interviews with Ministry of Food officials, owners and employees 
of 20 Dacca ration shops in August 19790
from the main cities since 1974, are two examples of government 
efforts so far to keep the urban poor out of the rationing system,,
To sum up, the principal beneficiaries of the urban rationing system 
are (a) members of the state machinery; (b) urban rich, and 
(c) urban intermediate classes„ As Clay (1979a, 129) and McHenry 
and Bird (1977, 75) point out, such concessions are politically 
expedient since they help to damp down the potential discontent 
of well-articulated and influential minority urban groups and 
government officials„
Columns (4) and (5) represent the amount of subsidised food meant 
for the rural sector„ As has been pointed out in an earlier 
chapter (see also Mukhopadhaya, 1979, 5; Hartman and Bo^ re, 1978, 5) 
although these are specifically meant for the rural poor, the actual 
benefits are reaped by the rural rich in collaboration with lower 
level functionarieso
The Bias of the Taxation Policy
From Tables 5-9 below, the following inferences may be drawn,, In 
general, firstly, the incidence of direct taxes is low in the country„ 
However, the share of rural direct taxes has not only fallen in real 
value over the years, but it has also been proportionately much 
lower than urban direct taxes„ Thus, whereas, urban direct taxes 
as a percentage of total urban income have registered a clear 
increase between 1958/59 and 1976/77, the reverse is true of rural 
direct taxes as a percentage of total rural income during the same 
period,,
42 8
Secondly, the urban rich pay more direct taxes than the rural rich, 
while the rural poor pay slightly more direct taxes than the urban 
poor. However, since the burden of indirect taxes is far higher 
on the urban poor, the latter end up paying more total taxes 
than the rural poor.
Thirdly, the direct tax rate is more progressive in the urban sector.
However, beyond a middle income level in both the sectors it-
progressively tapers off. According to the Taxation Enquiry Report
(GOBD, 1977d, V-13) this has been due to "allowances admissible to
higher income groups, fixation of the maximum marginal rate at low
income level and fixed land tax per acre beyond 803 acres of
agricultural land". An internal government document also admitted
the same: "The taxation system has not been able to capture the
incomes of well-to-do farmers and urban property owners" (GOBD, 1978c,
12-13). Added to this also is the fact that the effective direct
tax rate at the upper income levels is far lower than the nominal
liability owing to widespread tax evasion by the urban and rural rich
(GOBD, 1979d, IV-14; Ahmed, Q.K., 1979, 17). Fourthly, as with
“t**
direct. tax, the burden of indirect is proportionately higher on the 
urban than rural sector. Also, indirect taxes are far greater than 
direct taxes, consequently (i) the poor are proportionately more 
indirectly taxed than the rich, and (ii) the urban poor are more 
indirectly taxed than the rural poor (see also Ahmed, S., 1978a, 32).
Fifth, the net tax burden on the rural sector, after taking into 
account concealed taxes and public development expenditures, is either 
minimal or negative.
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These inferences t^ardily support the notion of ’’urban bias’’<, They 
bring out very clearly the class bias of the tax burden in both 
urban and rural sectors.
6. Condition of Ufban Pear Yis-a-vis Rural Poor
a) Per capita Rural/Urban Factor Incomes
The first attempt to estimate the rural/urban factor income 
differential in the context of Pakistan from GDP figures was made 
by Keith Griffin (1965). He was criticised for equating rural 
income with agricultural income, and hence underestimating the 
former. Bose (.1968) made another attempt to measure rural/urban 
income disparity for East Pakistan (ioe0 Bangladesh before 1971)o 
This time there was overestimation0 The table below presents the 
series calculated by Sadiqu* Ahmed, avoiding both over- and under­
estimation.
TABLE 10 : Per Capita Rural/Urban Factor Incomes (at 1969/70 factor
cost; Taka per annum)
Year V PR Y /Pu' u Index of Y_/P 1969/70=10(7 K
Index of Y../P 
1969/70=100 U
1969/70 291.7 3093o0 - -
1972/73 210o6 1421.6 72o20 45 o96
1973/74 243.6 1387.1 83.50 44 a 85
1974/75 252.0 1291.0 86o40 41a76
1975/76 252.9 1632.6 86.70 . 52o 78
1976/77 246o3 16 14a 4 84 a 40 52.20
Source: Ahmed, S., (1978a, 8)
Yr = Y + Y iQe. rural factor income series are derived from GDP figures 
by adding agricultural income to income from small-scale industries;
Yy = GDP - Yr ; Pr and P^ are rural and urban populations, respectivelya
The table clearly shows that while both rural and urban per 
capita factor incomes have fallen after independence, per capita 
urban income has fallen at a faster rate than per capita rural 
income. In other words, the disparity between urban and rural 
per capita income was reduced after independence. A closing-up 
of the urban/rural per capita income g:a.p _ does not, however, 
mean that personal income distribution improved,, It simply 
indicated that while the urban poor and the rural poor have both 
become poorer absolutely, the urban poor have now moved closer to 
the rural poor. This point is confirmed by Table 11 below on 
the movement of real wages of industrial and agricultural workers 
in Bangladesh during the same period„
Movement of Real Wages of Industrial and Agricultural Workers 
Table 11 below clearly shows that while urban (industrial) and 
rural (agricultural) workers have both become poorer, the standard 
of living of the urban workers has moved closer to that of the 
rural workers. As brought out in a recent study (Dacca University, 
1979, 25), 94.39 per cent of the urban poor households are unable 
to meet the minimum nutritional requirement.
In the light of the above trend, any suggestion of an alliance 
between the urban poor and the urban rich against the rural 
sector (as suggested by Lipton) would appear as a cruel joke0 In 
fact, following independence, there have been savage direct attacks 
on the urban poor, especially those belonging to the informal 
sector,, In 1974 and 19.75, the Bangladesh government set about 
"cleaning up" Dacca, the capital. This meant, more exactly,
436
forcible "removal” of shanty town and slum squatters to three
barbed wire "camps", ten to fifteen miles outside Dacca, and
allowing them to "live" there, according to OXFAM "In some of
the worst human conditions we have seen anywhere in the world"
(Guardian, London, 20 September 1975; see also Clay, 1979a,
m-
130)o The change of government August 1975 did not improve 
matters for the urban poor. Scenes of their forcible eviction 
from the cities were as commonplace as before, and in any case, 
those evicted during theliujib regime continued to be restricted 
within the "camps"D Added to the eviction is the constant
harassment that they have to suffer at the hands of officials, 
particularly the police, in the course of their economic 
activities as vendors, petty shopkeepers, rickshaw pullers, etc.
7. Bias of the top Policy Formulators and Implementors
One way of delineating the bias of governmental development policies is 
to examine the socio-economic background of topmost policy makers and 
implementors, although as Dasgupta (1979, 48) argues quite legitimately, 
such bias needs to be evaluated, in the last analysis, from the socio­
economic background of the beneficiaries (see also PoulantzaTs criticsm 
of Miliband on this point in Blackburn, 1972). However, the 
divergence between the two (i.e. class character of policy formulators 
or implementors on the one hand, and that of the beneficiaries on the 
othe^, cannot be very wide in the long run, if the Marxist position^
* "...it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being,
but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their 
consciousness..." (Marx and Engels, 1950, 329).
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that, in general, actions of individuals are bound to reflect their 
objective socio-economic standing, holds good.
In the light of the above, two groups have been chosen for close 
examination from among the top policy makers and implementors0 The 
first is Members of Parliament (MPs) who have so far legislated on 
various policies and from whom the top executives of the government 
have been chosen since Bangladesh's independence in 19720 (.In this 
respect, three general elections, i.e. of 1970, 1973 and J979 are - 
relevant. In the 1970 general elections, the Awami League obtained 
an absolute majority in then-East Pakistan for both the Pakistan 
National Assembly and the East Pakistan Assembly elections. After 
the 1971 war of independence, the Awami League members of both houses 
constituted the first government of independent Bangladesh. In the 
1973 elections, the Awami League once again swept the polls with a 
massive majority, conceding only a handful of seats to the 
opposition. Following the coup of 1975 and subsequent martial, law, 
general elections were held once again in 1979 0 This time the 
newly-formed Bangladesh Nationalist Party led by the present 
President, General Ziaur Rahman, won the elections with a big margin 
and formed the government.)
The second group is Bengali members of the erstwhile Civil Service of 
Pakistan (CSP),* who have been occupying the most dominant positionsin 
the permanent civil bureaucracy of Bangladesh since independence.
For evaluation and details on the Civil Service of Pakistan before 
the breakup of Pakistan, see Munir Ahmed (1964), Ralph Braibanti 
0966), Goodnow Q964) , M.A. Choudhury Q963), and K.Bo Sayeed (1967).
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(According to the formal rules of government business, they are 
basically implementors, and are supposed to advise the elected 
representatives holding ministerial position only when asked0 But 
as has been pointed out by Nurul Islam (1978, 52-62), Emajuddin Ahmed 
(1979), Salim Yunus (1976) and Talukdar Maniruzzaman 0979), their 
actual role in the decision-making process has always been far greater 
than allowed by their formal powers„ It would have been desirable to
include the officer cadre of the Bangladesh armed forces in our 
analysis, given the predominantly military character of the Bangladesh 
government since August 1975. However, owing to "security" 
considerations, it was decided to leave them out of our purview.
The following tables provide the socio-economic background of MPs and 
Bengali members of the erstwhile CSP.
TABLE 12 : Principal Occupations of MPs
Year Professionals* Trade & 
Commerce
Agriculture Indus try Politics Others*
1970 48.9 26,9 16.7 - 5.2 2.3
1973 41,4 23.6 17.6 - 12,4 5.0
1979 43.3 28.1 16,3 1 o 8 4,3 6.2
Source: 1970 and 1973 data from Raunaq Jahan (1976)0 1979 data from a
survey carried out by the author in July 1979a
*' Professionals include lawyers, teachers, executives, doctors, 
engineers, chartered accountants, journalists, etc, The most
prominent among the professionals are the lawyers. Thus in
1978, about 50 per cent of the professionals were from the legal 
profession,
** Includes, among others, housewives.
TABLE 13 : Annual Income and Agricultural Land Ownership of MPs
Year
Owning more than 10 acres With annual income Owning urban
of agricultural land of TK20,000/- and property**
and above*........
1970 54 o0 60o0 n0a,
1973 60o0 70=0 n„a<
1979 70 o9 89.3 54„9
Source: 1970 and 1973 data are from Raunaq Jahan (1976)0
1979 data were obtained through survey carried out 
by the dauthor in 19790
* For 1979 the figure indicated is actually the percentage of MPs 
with income of Tk40,000/- and above at current prices0 Given, 
the hyper-inflation since 1972, this may be taken as roughly 
equivalent to Tk20,000/- at 1973 prices0 Tk20,000/- represents
the annual income of about only one per cent of the population„
** I0e„ located within the limits of the municipal areas. The most 
important among their urban property is land and house0
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TABLE 14 Occupation of Father/Legal Guardian of Bengali Members* 
of the Erstwhile Civil Service of Pakistan at the Time 
of their Entry into the Civil Service
Category of Occupation Percentage
I a) Jotedar/Zamindar/Rich peasant 16o 75
b) Top government/non-government
professional job 31.8Q
c) Big businessman 4o20
IX a) Mi d-1eve1 government/non-governmen t
professional job 8.40
b) Medium businessman 1 o05
c) Middle peasant 5D25
III a) Poor peasant/menial jobs in rural area 
b) Petty government /non-government 
professional jobs
7.35
25o20
All occupations lOOoOO
Source: Survey carried out by the author in 19790
* Total number on whom information was collected was 187. This 
also includes those who have retired, died or were thrown out 
in 1971 and after.
TABLE 15 : Main Occupations of Fathers-in-law of Bengali Members of 
the erstwhile jSivil Service of Pakistan at the time of 
(/ Marriage (
1 2 Category of Occupation Percentage
I a) Top government servant/politician/
non-government professional job 63o 1
b) Big businessmen 16 Q 5
c) Jotedar/Zamindar/Rich peasant 10o9
II Urban mid-level Government/non-government ■a
professional job/businessmen 6 0 8
III Petty government/non-government 3
professional job 2o7
All occupations 100.00
Source: Survey carried out by the author in 1979o
1. Several of the CSP bureaucrats have been married more than once,
In their case, the background of only the first father-in-law has 
been taken into account.
20 In calculating the percentages for this table, unmarrieds and
those marrying foreigners have been excluded (i.e. 11 out of 187)0
30 Most marriages in categories II and III were not arranged
marriages, and as such,parental background of the bride did not
matter.
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From the above tables, the following inferences may be drawn.
Firstly, if we.assume that about 50 per cent of the professionals 
(for example, school and college teachers in the rural areas) and 
25 per cent of traders and businessmen from among the MPs were 
located predominantly in rural areas in the pursuit of their 
respective occupations, then it would appear that about 40-45 per 
cent of the MPs of all three years were from the rural sector0 On
the other hand, the percentage of MPs owning more than 10 acres of
arable land increased from 54o0 in 1970 to 70.9 in 1979, suggesting 
that the overwhelming majority of the MPs had rural interests despite 
their occupations, and were at the top of rural society in terms of 
the amount of land owned; and since only about 16 per cent of the MPs 
were engaged in agriculture as a main occupation, the majority of 
them were absentee agricultural landowners, which also meant they 
perhaps share-cropped out their land rather than cultivate it through 
wage labouro Fifty-five per cent of the MPs owned urban property. 
This suggests that the majority of the MPs had both rural and urban 
interests to look after0
Secondly, the percentage of MPs with annual incomes of Tk20,0G0/- 
and above (which represents the income level of one per cent of 
the population) increased from 60 in 1970 to 8903 in 1979<, On the
other hand, the percentage of MPs with industrial interests increased
from nil to only 108 during the same periodo Similarly, the 
percentage of. MPs with trade and commercial-interests also.increased 
from 26.9..in 1970 to 280 1 in-1979. - It is,^therefore^quite legitimate 
to infer that the MPs of Bangladesh, by and large, originate from the 
ranks of the urban and rural rich, and hence are hardly expected to 
pursue the interests of the urban and rural poor either as
parliamentarians or as government MinistersQ
Thirdly, Table 14 shows that whereas about 53 per cent of the top 
bureaucrats came from (urban and rural) rich families, only about 
32 per cent were of lower-middle to poor (urban and rural) background, 
thus belying the findings of Jahan (.1972, 96) and Ahmed, E„Uo, (1978, 
435-6), that the reverse was true.* On the other hand, if the back­
grounds of fathers-in-1aw of these bureaucrats are taken into 
consideration, their actual class situation becomes even more 
prominently visible» Thus, as Table 15 clearly shows, 90 per cent 
of these bureaucrats married into rich (urban and rural) families, 
suggesting that most bureaucrats originating from poor and lower- 
middle class families more than made up their initial class 
disadvantages through the institution of marriage. Although no data 
could be obtained on their rural land, it seems quite certain that 
they (as members of the "extended family" consisting of parents, 
brothers, sisters, in-laws, etcQ) were not significantly different 
from the MPs, although given their predominantly urban location, 
they themselves were more owners of urban than rural property„
However, as noted in Chapter 8, the background of central government 
bureaucrats at lower levels is more rural than urban. Thus-, the 
class background of MPs and bureaucrats suggests a marriage of urban 
rich interests with rural rich interests (see also Blair, 1978, 69-70). 
In any case, there is nothing at all to suggest that either the MPs or 
the top bureaucrats separately or together, represent the combined 
interests of urban rich and urban poor against the rural sector„
One reason for such a finding is that their sample was very small and 
included mostly senior members of the service0
Agriculture1s Terms of Trade vis-a-vis Industry
A clear test of the "urban bias" thesis may be obtained by examining 
agriculture1s terms of trade vis-a-vis industry over a sufficiently 
long period of time., If there is an urban bias (more appropriately 
industrial bias), it must necessarily be reflected in a secular 
deterioration in agricultureTs *b&rms of trade vis-a-vis industry,, 
However, even when agriculture1s terms of trade show an improvement, 
their effects are likely to be different for different rural classes„ 
Thurs, in the case of an improvement, a most likely outcome is a net 
gain for the large farmers as sellers of food grains (and raw 
materials) and a deterioration in the wellbeing of poor and landless 
peasants as purchasers of food grains„ It can, of course, be 
argued that an increase in the real income of large farmers owing to 
this improvement may cause an increase in the demand for both
manufactured goods as well as services performed by the poorer sections
of the peasantry. However, where the supply of agricultural produce 
is not very income or price elastic, and where the demand of large 
farmers is restricted to durable consumer goods as part of a wasteful 
consumption pattern, the demand for additional labour may be 
negigible (see Byres, 1974; Mitra, 1977; Khusro, 1967;
Thamarajakshi, 1969, for detailed theoretical discussion and Indian 
empirical evidence in this respect)„ In fact, as will be argued
later, it may even depress employment and wage levels„ Unfortunately,
empirical work on the terms of trade for Bangladesh is limited, and
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in any case, only net barter terms of trade* data are available,, 
Table 16 below presents the net barter terms of trade for Bangaldesh 
(then known as East Pakistan) for the period 1958-69=,
TABLE 16 : Index Numbers of Agricultural Manufacturing Prices and
* Agriculture1s Terms of Trade C three year moving averages) 
for Bangladesh, 1958-69
Year Agricultural Prices . . Manufacturing.Prices . , . AGR/MFG
1958/61 107.24 99 o 15 108o14
1959/62 111.34 100.01 111.41
1960/63 112„36 100„66 111.78
1961/64 101»93 100o57 101o 35
1962/65 105 o46 100.11 105o37
1963/66 112o91 1010 38 111.19
1964/67 129. 10 104o67 123„Q7
1965/68 134o03 108„62 123.41
1966/69 140 a 79 111.68 126 „ 13
Source: S„R0 Lewis (1970k,385)
The above table clearly shows that despite a downward trend for a 
few years, (a) the terms of trade always remained in favour of 
agriculture (i„e„ its value never fell below 100), and (b) it showed 
a clear increase for the period as a whole0
The only work that has been done on Bangladesh*s intersectoral
terms of trade since the Lewis study was by Atiqur Rahman (1979, 286-88)
I.e. prices received by agriculture for its marketings of commodities 
relative to prices paid by agriculture for the purchases it makes of 
manufactured goods, and the weights are the estimated sales and 
marketings of agricultural output and estimated purchases of 
manufactured goods by the agricultural sector„ However, the income 
terms of trade are more appropriate than barter terms of trade for 
comparing welfare at different periods of time. It is obtained by 
correcting net barter terms of trade for changes in values of 
agriculture*s "exports" arid "imports" vis-a-vis industry,,
,1 A
He took up two rural areas (Phulpur and Comilla), and estimated for 
these Cwith appropriate weights) not only overall terms of exchange 
series, but also terms of exchange by class* for the period 1952/53- 
1974/750 Since it was not possible to infer anything clearly from 
these series directly, he fitted linear time trends of the type 
Y = a+bt in order to examine goodness of fit and sign and magnitude 
of coefficient b for trend analysis„ From the results obtained he 
concluded the following:
a) "Over the greater part of the period we are concerned with, 
all terras of exchange of the rural households were gradually 
moving in their favour", and
b) "In the face of an overall betterment in the terms of exchange 
for all households, that of the small farmers nevertheless 
deteriorated over time".**
Thus, the above evidence not only explodes the "urban bias" 
hypothesis, but also lends support to the argument that overall 
improvement in agriculture's terms of trade may be harmful to the 
rural poor0 Also, as Khan (1976, 32) points out, in the specific 
context of Bangladesh, "The improvement in the sectoral terms of 
trade for agriculture was due mainly to a sharp rise in the relative 
price of rice. Within agriculture, the rise in the price of rice 
was much higher than that of jute, the competing cash crop0 Labour 
input per ctere is much higher for jute than for rice0 There was a 
sharp shift in acreage away from jute and in favour of rice which 
resulted in a lower aggregate demand for labour0 For the year
He divided owner-farmers into three classes, namely small, medium and 
large, and tenants into two classes, pure tenants and owner-cum-tenants. 
Similar results have been reported also for India by Bardhan (1970, 132). 
He found that over the period 1954/55-1964/65, the average price of 
cereals paid by the bottom 10 per cent of rural population increased 
faster than that of the top 10 per cent.
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as a whole, jute acreage is small but for the mid-monsoon season it 
is nearly a quarter of the total". Thus, while the overall demand 
for labour for the year as a whole may have declined only modestly, 
the effect on employment and wages in the mid-monsoon season as a 
consequence of improvement in agriculture's terms of trade,must have 
been very significant,, On the other hand, as Byres 0974, 139-40) 
argues, in the context of India, such improvement may be detrimental 
not only to the urban poor (as net purchasers of food) but also to 
that section of the urban rich interested in industrial production,, 
Indeed, the preponderance of merchants and traders as distinct from 
industrialists among the Bengali urban rich (as the urban class 
analysis in a preceding section showed) is quite consistent with 
this finding„
Summary
From the foregoing discussion, it is possible to establish a distinct 
class bias in state economic policies and the manner in which these are 
ultimately implemented, since the principal beneficiaries of such policies 
are the urban and the rural rich, to the almost total exclusion of both 
urban and rural poor,, In so far as these state policies support a 
basically anti-productive urban and rural rich, these also have clear 
adverse implications for increasing production, and consequently also for 
the total social surplus that can be made available for distribution,,
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' CHAPTER ELEVEN
•. THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION •
OF RURAL POVERTY IN BANGLADESH
This chapter deals with the external dimension of rural poverty in 
Bangladesh, particularly since 1972. More specifically, an attempt is 
made to assess firstly, the extent and mechanisms of resource inflows to 
and outflows from Bangladesh, and the level and implications (particularly 
for the rural sector) of net outflows, if any, and secondly, the effects 
of resource inflows on production and distribution, particularly in the 
rural sectoro
Direction and Level of Resource Movement
The major resource inflow mechanisms for Bangladesh are three: 
foreign aid, private foreign investments and remittances of 
Bangladeshis working abroadQ On the other hand, the principal ways 
of resource transfer from Bangladesh are debt servicing; 
repatriation of profits by foreign investors and earnings of foreign 
personnel working in Bangladesh; unequal (but legal) foreign trade; 
smuggling; brain drain, and plunder by foreign troops stationed in 
Bangladesh.
Foreign Aid
The following table provides an idea of the level of aid flow into 
Bangladesh since her independence in December 19710
TABLE 1 : Extent of Foreign Aid Flow into Bangladesh 1971/72-1977/78
(million dollars, current prices)
Year Total Amount Total Amount Col„3 as percentage
Committed Disbursed of Annual Development
  ...... Expenditure ......
1971/72 6270 1 24305 n„ a0
1972/73 940.8 5580 7 n„ a.
1973/74 553.5 480 „ 6 6Q0 7
1974/75 1282 o4 919.2 134.0
1975/76 930 „ 4 813o9 86.5
1976/77 657.0 502o2 87.4
1977/78 . .1159o0 . . . 796o 7 .......... 76.5.........
Total 6150o2 43.14 08 -
Source: GOBD (1978a, 12) and GOBD (.1979a, 89*90)
Thus on average, Bangladesh has been receiving foreign assistance 
worth $61604 million yearly since independence,, The importance of 
foreign aid is brought out sharply in the above table: on average,
it has accounted for above 75 per cent of the yearly development 
expenditures0 It has been observed, "Since the latter (i.e. 
development expenditures) normally include several items that should 
be regarded as current expenditures, the true figures are even higher0 
According to World Bank estimates, in which corrections have been 
made for this and several other factors that distort the real size 
of both revenues and expenditures in Bengladesh budgets, public 
savings have actually been negative during the last few years, which 
implies that external assistance has not only financed total public 
investment, but also some public consumption,, In other words, 
foreign aid actually finances over .100 per cent of public investment 
or almost 10 per cent of GDP" (Vylder, 1979.,3 5) one government 
document also admitted, "Bangladesh has remained under an Toxygen 
tentT far too long" (GOBD, 1975a, 28)0
However, it will be noticed that there is a significant gap between 
commitment and actual disbursement, the shortfall being to the tune 
of about 30 per cent. As will be observed from Table 2 below, the 
developed capitalist countries (i.e. USA, West European countries, 
Japan, Canada and Australia) and multi-lateral organisations financed 
mainly by them (e.g0 World Bank, UN system, Asian Development Bank, 
etCo), provided 82.3 per cent of the aid received by Bangladesh so far.
Private Foreign Investment
The level of private foreign investment (hereafter PFI) is very low 
in Bangladesh. According to one estimate, it accounted for only 
two per cent of the industrial capital of Bangladesh (Ahmad, Q.K.,
1978, 411)0 This was mainly because before independence, almost 
all foreign investment was located in the Western Wing of Pakistan, 
and West Pakistani capital, in turn, dominated commerce and industry 
in East Pakistan. The main areas where PFI is at present 
concentrated are motor assembly, pharmaceuticals, shoe making, 
banking and insurance, tea gardens and tobacco. The value of these 
investments is estimated to have totalled less than US$30million 
CNMJ, EPW, 25 March 1978). The owners of this capital are mostly 
US and UK citizens.
After Bangladesh’s independence, fresh inroads of PFI to Bangladesh 
were blocked by deliberate government policies aiming at sweeping 
nationalisation (however, interestingly enough, these did not touch 
the existing PFI in Bangladesh in any way. According to Umar (1975, 
3,) this was because of aid suspension threats from the USA, under 
the Hickenlooper Amendment), a very low ceiling for private investment 
and the requirements for PFI to be associated with the public sector
TABLE 2 : Sources of Eorie^, Aid Committed to and Received by- 
Bangladesh up to June J978*
Source Aid committed Percentage 
of total 
Aid
. committed ..
(m„dollars, 
Aid
disbursed
round figures) 
Percentage 
of total 
Aid
disbursed
Developued
capitalist
countries
(DCC) 3339 5 2 0 3 2447 53o 8
Multilateral 
organisations 
financed by 
DCC 1920 3Q0 1 1295 2 8 05
USSR and East
European
countries 461 7.2 261 5c7
OPEC and 
members of 
OPEC 242 3„ 8 200 4 03
India 311 4 0 9 291 6 06
Others 105 K 7 48 1.1
All sources 6378 100.0 4542 lOOoO
Source: Compiled from GOBD, 1978b, 19-280
Includes $227million of the aid burden for the pre-1971 period 
accepted by the government of Bangladesh0
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and under a minority equity participation of 49 per cent and below
(Kurul Islam, 1977, 220-2). However, since August 1975 Gi.e°
after the fall of the Mujib regime) not only have these restrictions
been scrapped one after another, but also a number of positive
incentives have been offered in order to attract PFI to Bangladesh,,
Among others, these include guarantees against future nationalisation,
tax holidays, a free trade processing zone at Chittagong, free
repatriation of profits and other earnings, and unrestricted entry
into any industry and activity CGOBD, 1979b, 14-5)„ However, despite
c. ,
these attractions, the PFI response so far has been neglgible0 Thus, 
between 1975 and 1978 the sanction of foreign investment proposals 
amoun-ted to about TK130o 8million, but very little of it has actually 
come in„ According to the Director-General of Industries, Bangladesh 
Government (interview with the author in August 1979), this situation 
has been caused by Bangladeshrs weak industrial infrastructure and 
tradition and administrative bottlenecks and also competition from 
other Asian countries in attracting PFI. This list will obviously 
remain incomplete unless it is added that PFITs shy response in 
Bangladesh is to be primarily accounted for by Bangladeshfs lack of 
"political stability" and lack of mineral raw minerals. Thus, the 
^ only big deal in which PFI shows an interest in Bangladesh is the 
construction of a massive liquified natural gas complex for the 
exclusive purpose of exporting liquid natural gas. In fact, in 1979, 
the government entered into agreement with a multi-national corporation 
to this effect. To sum up, during the period under study, the flow 
of PFI to Bangladesh may be taken as negligibleo
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‘ Remi11 aric e s of Barig 1adeshi &r Arirdad
There are, at present, two kinds of remittances, namely remittances 
for family maintenance and remittances under the Wage Earners'
Scheme, introduced in,the latter part of 1974. The latter consists 
of importing certain goods into the country instead of sending cash0 > 
The flow of remittances is ensured by allowing these to be exchanged 
at free market rates, which are appreciably higher than the official 
rate of exchange« The following table provides an idea of the level 
of such remittances since 19720
TABLE 3 : Level of Remittances to Bangladesh, 1972/73-1978/79
Year
Year....
Amount Received 
. Amount Received. ...
(million £s)
. Monthly Average
1972/73 
(11 months)
oONoVO 0.63
1973/74 4.35 0.36
1974/75 4.10 0.39
1975/76 25.53 2.08
1976/77 30.90 2.57
1977/78 54.30 4.52
1978/79 63.82 5.32
Source: GOBD (1976a,10-12) for data up to 1975/76; the rest
from DG Manpower Directorate
Thus, on average, Bangladesh has been receiving about £28.5million or
)
$71.25million yearly since independence via remittances. One notes 
that the remittance flow has increased sharply since 1975, and in 
1976/77, exceeded the government's yearly target of Tk200 crore 
(i.e. £50million), and that this has constituted invisible transfers 
which are second only to jute as a foreign exchange earner. This
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became possible owing to the introduction of the Wage Earners1 
Scheme in the latter part of 1974 and the enhancement of the exchange 
rate for these remittances to the free market level in 19760 
Debt Servicing
The extent of aid indicated in Tables 1 and 2 consists of both
grants and loans, and it is in respect of the latter that debt
servicing is requiredQ The table below indicates the relative shares
of grants and loans in the aid received.
TABLE 4 : Share of Loans and Grants in the Foreign Aid received
by Bangladesh up to June 1978
Source . ....... Loan/Total aid Ratio
DCCs 0.57
Multi-lateral countries 
financed by DCCs Qo49
USSR and East European 
countries Q0 86
OPEC and members 0o59
India 0.42
Others Q.27
Total 0.56
Source: Compiled from GOBD (1978a, 12-14)
The table below shows the alarming growth of the debt burden on 
Bangladesh since independence„
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TABLE 5 : Outstanding Amounts of External Public Dei.t (million dollars)
Tear Debt Outstanding at Beginning of Period
....... . . . .Disbursement only . Including undisbursed
1972/73 36 130.
1973/74 228 668
1974/75 . 500 1097
.1975/76 1366 2351
1976/77 1812 2712
1977/78* 2Q79 3060
1985/86* — 6000 . .
^Provisional; also includes $375million debt liability that Bangladesh 
Government had to assume in respect of pre-1971 foreign aid visibly 
utilised in Bangladesh
Source: Vylder (1979, 38)
Debt servicing terms have generally been soft and medium. However, 
as of December 19.77, about 8 per cent of the committed loans was in 
hard terms, i.e. the interest rate was 5 per cent or more (GOBD, 
1978c, 7).
The following table provides an estimate of the debt servicing burden 
on Bangladesh in respect of the loans contracted before and after 
1971.
TABLE 6 : Extent of Debt Service Burden on Bangladesh 1973/74—1979/80
(million dollars)
Year Debt Service 
(Interest + 
Principal)
. (2) .
Total Export 
Earnings
. . (3) . .
Debt Service Ratio (%) 
(2-3 x 100)
1973/74 17o5Q 3 72 0 91 4.69
1974/75 70.87 391.98 18.08
1975/76 55.62 3820 88 14.53
1976/77 98.71 422.QQ 23.39
1977/78 115.00 493.74 23.29
1978/79 131o00 600.00 21.82
1979/80 135o00 . . . 'nBa'' n0a
Source: GOBD (1978c, 13)
4 5 7
Thus, on average, $89.1 million has been the yearly debt service 
burden on Bangladesh. The debt service ratio has been on a steep 
increase, reaching nearly 25 per cent in 1977-78. A government 
document states, "This is surely not a comfortable situation”
CGOBD, 1978c, 5). That this is a gross understatement is borne out 
by the fact that between 1973 and 1977 the debt service ratio for non= 
oil-producing developing countries remained between 805 per cent and 
1105 per cent CSeira, 1979, 130).
Repatriation of PFI Profits and Eariiiilg of Foreign Personnel
working in Bangladesh
This is an area where hard statistics are difficult to come by. The 
Government of Bangladesh have no consolidated statistics on these 
matters. An attempt by the author to peruse the audited accounts of 
some of the foreign firms in Bangladesh failed owing to non-co-operation 
on the part of the management of these firms. However, in 1977 the 
Government of Bangladesh (Ministry of Commerce) computed the profit 
levels of foreign pharmaceutical companies operating in Bangladesh 
for 1975 and 1976 from audited balance sheets of the respective 
enterprises. These are presented below.
TABLE7: Profit Levels of Foreign Pharmaceutical Companies in Bangladesh
(millions takas)
Name of Company Equity
Capital
Post-tax
1975
Profits
.1976
Annual Profi-fcs 
Equity Capital 
1975
/
V ..
% of 
1976
M/S Hoecht 1.137 10.955 9.821 800 717
M/S Fisons 2.100 13.855 13.657 660 650
M/S Squib 2.378 12.137 5.546 510 233
M/S Pfizer 17.250 28o780 32.477 167 188
M/S BPI 7.500 11.393 9.876 152 132
M/S Pharmadesh 1.000 '1.135 1.286 115 129
M/S Albert David 3.200 3.729 2.222 114 68
M/S Square 0.423 n.a. 0.257 n.a. 61
M/S Nicholas 1.075 0.653 0.596 61 55
Total 36.376 82.637 75.738 227 208
Source: Obtained from Ministry of Commerce, Government of Bangladesh
in July 1979.
453
It may be pointed out here that the maximum profit proposed by the 
Cost and Price Consultative.Committee of the Bangladesh Ministry of 
Commerce for the pharmaceutical industry was 35 per cent on equity 
capital:* and that in India, the maximum profit allowed for 
pharmaceuticals is 14 per cent on equity capital (Moinuddin Ahmed, 
1978, 25 and 41)„ Also, as pointed out by the same author, the rate 
of profit shown above may reflect only the tip of the iceberg in view 
of the unified costing system followed by these companies, whereby 
some of the head office and parent company costs are charged to the 
account of the local subsidiaries; and raw materials, packaging 
materials, piant/machinery, patents, management and expatriate staff 
are imported from fixed sources Ci.e0 parent/associate companies) 
and as such, their costs are heavily padded<,** It was mentioned 
earlier that total PFI in Bangladesh amounted to about $30million in 
1972 and that there has been a negligible inflow of PFI subsequently0 
Now, assuming that on average the ye^arly profit rate of all PFI in 
Bangladesh amounts to 200 per cent, and that about 75 per cent of the 
profits are repatriated (allowing 25 per cent for capital 
replenishment), on average the amount of profit repatriated from
Bangladesh comes to $60million per year. We are also assuming here
\
that this figure includes the earnings repatriated by foreign 
expatriates employed in the foreign enterprises located in Bangaldesho
Let us now consider the earnings (and their repatriation) of foreigners 
obtained from public foreign aid received by Bangladesh* There are 
generally two ways in which such earnings are derived. Firstly, most
In one typical drug company, 76 per cent of the shares are owned by 
Americans, with 6 per cent of the shares distributed to local elite 
doctors and businessmen, thus ensuring both sale and a stake for 
influential circles in Bangladesh (Briscoe, 1977, 2)„
For discussion in this respect in general see Jalee (1969, 116),
Sau (1978, 62),
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foreign grants/loans have a component for financing shipping charges, 
employment of foreign "expertise" for actually running and planning 
projects and carrying out evaluation and feasibility studies, etc* 
Secondly, for certain projects/schemes whose major costs are borne 
by the loan/grant provider, the Bangladesh Government is required to 
meet, out of its own resources, "matching" costs to maintain foreign 
experts coming under such projects/schemes.
Except in the cases of private voluntary organisations like OXFAM,
CARE, IRC, Seventh Day Adventists, World Council of Churches, Food 
for the Hungry, etc., the involvement of foreigners in day-to-day 
administration of projects is minimal* They are employed mainly for 
providing "technical assistance". In recent times, with the growth 
of "project aid", they are also increasingly coming as members of 
foreign consultancy firms (such as M/S IECOofthe USA, M/S PQ and A* 
Management Consultants, and M/S EIU of the UK, etc.) since prior . 
feasibility and evaluation studies and getting such work done through 
international tender are generally insisted upon by the aid providers** 
Matching funds of the Bangladesh government spent on acquiring foreign 
services and expertise are much less than those provided by foreign 
grants/loans for such purposes. However, that portion of the foreign 
expertise/services funded out of foreign loans may be considered as 
derived from Bangladesh government resources, since such loans have to 
be repaid with interest*
It may be argued that in so far as these services/expertise could not 
have been provided by Bangladeshis, earnings of foreign personnel on
Interviews with Planning Ministry officials in June 1979*
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account of these should not be deducted from the gross foreign aid 
in calculating the net foreign aid received by Bangladesh,, However, 
except in the case of shipping, such an argument is hardly tenable 
for Bangladesh, since she is herself, as discussed later, an exporter 
of highly-skilled manpower. Thus, a 1976 government document 
claimed: "„ „ .Bangladesh. is fortunate to have a vast reservoir of
qualified manpower to man all activities normally undertaken in a 
modem economy" (GOBD, 1976b, 1). According to one estimate, it 
costs the Bangladesh Water Development Board about Tk20Q,00G per 
foreign expert per month, and not only could such work have been 
easily performed by Bangladeshis, but also at less than Tk4,00.Q per
expert per month, i.e. at one-fiftieth of the rate enjoyed by foreign
experts (Karim, 1980). Shipping is obviously one area where Bangladesh 
could not possibly have provided the required services, given her 
present tonnage„ But, on the other hand, Bangladesh has little 
manouverability in acquiring the cheapest services from the 
international shipping market, in view of the tied nature of foreign
aid. Thus, although US shipping charges are considerably higher
than international market prices, the Bangladesh Government is 
required to hire US shipping companies for the huge food shipments to 
Bangladesh from the United States.*
Government statistics on foreign aid utilisation do not provide any 
breakdown which might allow one to estimate the amount spent out of 
foreign loans/grants and domestic resources for hiring foreign
Interviews with officials of the External Resource Division, 
Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangladesh, in July 19790
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services/expertise that could have been replaced by those of 
Bangladeshis<, However, according to one rough estimate, which 
includes the differences between actual and ruling international 
freight and insurance costs, about 12 per cent of the total foreign 
aid received by Bangladesh is spent on hiring foreign expertise/services 
(Hossam Kasru, 1979)„ Even if we make a highly unrealistic under-
A
estimation based on the assumptions that (a) the amount spent out of
domestic resources for acquiring foreign expertise/services is
negligible, and (b) 40. per cent of the earnings of expatriates from
out of foreign aid/grants are spent within Bangladesh, the amount
repatriated by these expatriates annually comes to about $44million,
which is slightly above 60 per cent of the annual remittances sent
home by Bangladeshis working abroad.
Unequal Exchange in Foreign Trade
In order to evaluate the level of resource transfer through unequal
exchange in Bangladesh's foreign trade, it is important first to
locate the trend in the time series of Bangladesh's terms of trade.
These are presented in the table belowQ
TABLE 8 : Terms of Trade for Bangladesh, 1972/73-1976/77
Period . Commodity Terms of Trade* . Income Terms of Trade**
1972/73 100,00 1Q0,0Q
1973/74 62 053 63,38
1974/75 60o06 46o67
1975/76 52,19 50,57
1976/77 63,QQ   56,48 .
Source: Rahim and Haque (_1978, 157) and GOBD (1979c, 38) 0
* Ratio of prices of exports and imports, and measures the trend of 
the physical amount of foreign goods received in exchange for one 
physical unit of export goods,
** Measures changes in income earned on account of exports through 
changes in commodity terms of trade.
It is clear from the above table that Bangladesh/s.terms of trade 
have severely deteriorated over the years. Two sets of factors 
explain this trend. Firstly, as is the case with most Third World 
countries, Bangladesh1s main trading partners are the advanced 
countries of the world (of both Western and Eastern blocs) and this 
places Bangladesh in an inherently weak bargaining position vis-a-vis 
the monopoly power of these advanced countries Cfor details on the
v /  #
\ /  actual mechanisms of unequal exchange between developed and Third World
/ countries, see Ranjit Sau, J976, Ch.3; Emmanual, 1972, 160-3, and
Braun, 1972).* The second set of factors relate to the following 
specific situations pertaining to Bangladesh: currency devaluations,
over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports, tied nature 
of foreign aid and barter trade, and direct political pressures.
We may consider each of these in turn.
Currency Devaluations
The first devaluation came immediately after independence, 
lowering the value of the Taka by 53 per cent0 The second 
devaluation took place in May 1975, this time slashing the value 
of the Taka by 58 per cent with respect to the pound sterlingo 
This turned out to be 90 per cent with respect to the US dollar 
due to the deterioration of the value of the pound sterling
(World Bank, 1976, 234-5). There were four small revaluations
in 1976„ Despite these, the Taka-pound exchange rate in 1977 
was 121 per cent lower than it was in 1972. There were basically 
two reasons behind these devaluations. Firstly, heavy deficit 
finance, smuggling, plunder and anarchy in the economy following
independence sharply eroded the actual value of the Taka (there
For empirical evidence in the context of Third World countries for 
the 1950s and 1960s, see S0 Dell (1963, 184); Frumkien (1969, 132-6), 
and Jalee (1968, 45).
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being an abnormally high margin between black market and official 
rates of exchange) so that either economic management had to 
improve, or an administraviely less demanding option like 
devaluation had to be sought. Secondly, there were serious 
pressures from the Bangladesh Aid Consortium (consisting of 
Western countries) and the IMF in favour of the 3975 devaluation 
(Shafiqul Islam, 3978; Lindquist, 1978), and Bangladesh, being 
entirely dependent on aid from the West, could not but yield to 
such pressures. The actual effect of devaluation on foreign 
trade was that while the volume of exports increased marginally 
owing to cheaper export prices, the terms of trade sharply 
deteriorated since imports became costlier and exports became 
cheapero
Over-invoicing of Imports and Under-invoicing of Exports
Under-invoicing of exports and over-invoicing of imports are the 
two major techniques of resource transfer through official trade 
in Bangladesh (Rahim, 1977, 115; Faruque, 1976, 171; IMF, 1974, 
35)0 For both these operations, the main purpose is to hoard 
foreign exchange abroad, and obviously these cannot be carried out 
without the active collusion of foreign suppliers/importers (GOBD, 
1979d, VII, 10)o Such practices are not new to Bangladesh; they 
were quite rampant during the Pakistan period, and as Winston 
(1970) pointed out at that time, such a tendency was augmented 
by the Bonus Voucher Scheme under which industrialists were 
allowed to import certain machinery and goods at an official 
exchange rate which, was much lower than the black market exchange 
rate0 An exactly similar situation prevailed in Bangladesh 
between 19.72 and 3 975; despite the 1972 devaluation, the
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differential between official and free market exchange rates was 
considerable. However, the exchange rate differential is not 
the only reason in this regard. As in the case of smuggling, 
consumption sprees, educational expenses and greater security 
of capital abroad and tax evasions of black money at home are some 
of the important motives for such activities of Bangladeshi 
exporters and importers0 However, it is difficult to agree 
with Rahim’s 0977, 116) assertion that "with the nationalisation 
of jute export and handling of the bulk of imports by the TCB,* 
the scope of such clandestine transfer of resources is vastly 
reduced". On the contrary, nationalisation might have enhanced 
this tendency. The government bureaucracy taking over the 
export-import trade could be as Cif not more) corrupt as private 
exporters and importers, especially since their formal pay was 
disproportionately lower than their effective power and the fact 
that there was little public accountability for the trade 
negotiations they entered into with foreign suppliers and 
importers. It is impossible to quantify resource transfers on 
account of such under- and over-invoicing, given its highly 
clandestine nature. However, what is important is that -it is 
ultimately reflected in the terms of international trade.
Tied Nature of Foreign Aid**
An internal government document reports: "Commodity aid is
usually tied to sources of procurement except in the case of IDA 
funds and some allocations from FRG, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. 
The tying of aid creates two kinds of problem. First, the prices
Trading Corporation of Bangladesh, which is state owned.
As will be detailed later, there are three kinds of aid: Project aid,
food aid, and commodity aid (i.e. commodities other than food).
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turn out to be too high, and uncompetitive.... Secondly, knowledge 
of the market of the individual countries becomes very important 
in deciding the shopping list" (GOBD, 1978a, 3). This is also 
corroborated by the candid admission in a recent British government 
statement on overseas aid: "The greater part of our bilateral
aid is tied to procurement in the United Kingdom, and so provides 
valuable orders for British firms" (Guardian, 24 February 1980).
The effect of such aid on increasing import costs and hence 
depressing terms of trade hardly needs any elaboration.
Barter Trade
Bangladesh has considerable barter trade with India, the USSR and 
East European countries. As Rahim and Alam (1977, 42-5) argue, 
not only was the main objective of quick imports not met, but 
also such trade is detrimental to Bangladesh’s interests: barter
trade includes items which could have been readily sold in the 
international market; the prices offered by Bangladesh’s barter 
trade partners, in comparison with international market prices, 
are disadvantageous for Bangladesh in respect of both exports and 
imports. Thus, in 1974, green chillies bought by the USSR under 
barter from Bangladesh were resold to Iraq at much higher prices 
and, similarly, there are reports that pesticides and chemicals 
sold to Bangladesh under barter were bought from third countries 
at lower world market prices.
Direct Political Pressures
Two well-known cases may be cited in this respect. Immediately 
after Bangladesh's independence, China offered to lift 40,000 
bales of jute from Bangladesh at about 40 per cent above the 
international price. The deal failed to materialise owing to
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Indian intervention (Sen,Ayl974, 202; Ali, 19.73, 168). In the 
1975 Indo—Bangladesh. trade negotiations, the Bangladesh delegation 
was forced to agree to import Indian coal at $47 per ton, when 
only a year previously Bangladesh obtained Indian coal at only 
$.12 a ton, and that also not in hard currency0 A year later, 
with, the displacement of the pro-Indian government in Bangladesh, 
renegotiation led to fixing the price at $29 a ton (interview 
with the then Coal Controller of the Bangladesh Government in 
August 1979, and Evening Post, 18 February 1976)0
The deteriorating terms of trade as presented in Table 9 thus 
represent the cumulative effect of the factors enumerated above. 
Below we present an estimate of the deterioration in the balance 
of trade of Bangladesh (i.e. transfers through unequal exchange) 
due to adverse movement of the commodity terms of trade.
TABLE 9 : Transfers from Bangladesh owing to Adverse Movement in
the Commodity Terms of Trade, 1973/74-1975/76 (million dollars)
Period Deterioration in Foreign economic Col. 2 as %
the balance of assistance received of Col. 3
trade due to by Bangladesh
price movement
1973/74 -167.76 480.6 34.9
1974/75 -366.68 919.2 39.9
1975/76 -527.43 813.9 04.8
Total -1061.87 2213.7 47.9
Source: Col02 from Rahim and Haque (1978, 162) Col. 3 from Table 1.
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The above table suggests that, on average, the yearly outward 
transfers owing to deteioration in Bangladesh7s terms of trade 
constitutes about 48 per cent of the yearly foreign aid actually 
received. However, as Rahim and Haque, i.e. the authors of these 
estimates, point out: "Since the commodities covered in this
analysis constitute about 89 per cent of total exports and 64 per 
cent of total imports, the actual deterioration in the balance of 
trade due to price movement will be estimated around 70 per cent 
of the total disbursement of foreign economic assistance to 
Bangladesh" (p.161). In other words? on average, the yearly 
outward transfers due to deteriorating terms of trade amounts 
to about $431.48million, given that the average annual receipt 
of foreign aid amounts to $616.4million.
Smuggling
It is often argued that smuggling which is, in fact, free trade, 
must improve welfare since exchange takes place free of tariff 
and quantitative restrictions. However, in a situation of legal 
trade existing side-by-side with illegal trade (i.e. smuggling), 
government loses scarce foreign exchange and import duties.
But this, in itself,may not constitute resource transfer, merely 
more profits for a countryfs traders at the expense of that 
countryfs government. In order to understand the unilateral 
transfer of resources from Bangladesh through smuggling across 
the Indo-Bangladesh borders after 1972, it is necessary first 
to locate the main compulsions of such smuggling. Firstly, 
owing to the looting and plundering of the economy by Pakistani 
and Indian troops during 1971 and after, scarcity and resource- 
lessness became the dominant characteristic of the economy.
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Consequently, demand for consumer goods from neighbouring 
India rose sharply and Indian goods became over-priced in 
relation to Bangladeshi goods being exchanged,. Secondly, after 
assuming power, the ruling party cadres and bureaucrats, and
\
traders supporting them, took to "primitive accumulation": \  i
. ] ‘hoarding, currency racketeering, speculation, reselling permits
\
and licences obtained through political patronage, large-scale /
I
pilfering and forcible confiscation of aid and relief goods, 
assets of the nationalised sector, abandoned property, evasion 
of taxes and excise duties, taking "cuts" out of the stateTs 
foreign purchases, etc. (Siddiqui, 1975, 42-3; Umar, 1974,
186-91)o* In this way, vast quantities of "black money" were 
accumulating in the country (Mazumdar, E„, 1976)0 Considerations 
such as tax evasion, security (this was particularly important 
in view of the deteriorating law and order in the country and 
increasing armed political opposition to the ruling party), 
conspicuous consumption requirements, fear of further fall in 
value of the local currency and higher bank rates abroad (Rahim, 
1977, 11) created conditions ripe for capital transfer out of 
Bangladesh’s boundaries„ Given the ruling party's patronage 
(Umar, 1975, 142), this black money thus became the chief 
financier of smuggling, with the result that most of the proceeds 
of Bangladeshi goods sold in the Indian market found their way 
into Indian banks rather than returning to Bangladesh in the 
form of equivalent Indian goods„ Also, since the capital 
transfer motive was very strong and the capital being transferred
See also Emajuddin Ahmed (1979, 38) 0
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was in any case "easy money", the terms of transfer were found 
to be very adverse,, Thirdly, India used various means to 
depress the staying-power of Bangaldesh's exports, consisting 
mostly of agricultural products (some of which were perishable 
commodities such as fish, milk, eggs, vegetables, etc.). Thus, 
as pointed out earlier, India prevented Bangladesh from selling 
jute to China at highly favourable prices. More important,
India failed to lift Bangladeshi goods she had agreed to import 
under the official trade, and Indian officials were stiff-necked 
in buying jute from Bangladesh, offering a price much lower than 
the international market price (Hindustan Standard, 24 September 
1974). This glut also created favourable conditions for smuggling 
of Bangladeshi goods to India at throwaway prices. The abiding 
Indian interest, particularly in jute smuggling, was revealed by 
the fact that although for several decades India was neither able 
to export raw jute nor produce enough jute to feed her own 
industries, in 1973 she exported one million bales of raw jute, 
and by 1974, not only were her existing mills running at full 
capacity, but she had also started to set up new jute mills 
(Bongo Barta, 24 November 1973; Amrita Bazar Patrika, 5 September 
1974). Fourthly, devaluation of the Bangladeshi currency in 1972 
at par with the Indian rupee, and printing of huge amounts of 
counterfeit currency by Indian businessmen* crippled the purchasing 
power of the Bangladeshi taka. Finally the Bangladesh government 
deliberately fixed the minimum price of jute at a level much 
lower than the Indian minimum price, so that, given the 
administrative laxities, it became more profitable to smuggle
* The Groone Amsterdarner(Dutch Weekly), 15 August 1973; Naya Yug 
(Bengali Weekly) 6 April 1973; Gano Kantho (Bengali Daily),
11 March 1973.
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jute across the border than to sell the same to Bangladesh's 
nationalised jute industries (Siddiqui, 1975, 32)0
Thus, smuggling in the specific context of the Indo-Bangladesh 
border implied, by and large, a one-way resource transfer from 
Bangladesh. After the displacing of a pro-Indian government 
in August 1975, smuggling was reduced to a trickle (Clay, 1979a)„ 
However, by the beginning of 1977, smuggling had again begun to 
pick up, although it never came anywhere near the staggering 
proportions of the pre-1975 period. The Hindustan Times 
(overseas) reported on 24 January 1980: "Meanwhile, Mrs.
Gandhi's victory has softened the stern attitude of the 
Bangladesh Rifles and their tight grip on the border has all of 
a sudden become relaxed. Fish and other perishable commodities 
which used to come to the border markets in India have again 
started coming in full measure and freely".
What has so far been the resource transfer level through 
smuggling? Rahim's (1977) estimates of outgoing smuggling for 
1972-73 and 1973-74 based on the value of goods seized by the 
Bangladesh Rifles are as follows:
TABLE 10 : Estimates of Outgoing smuggling
(P«0oG007«probability of 
failure) ( m i l l i o n  takas)
Year Total outgoing goods 
seized by the
Total attempted 
C2tP)
Total smuggled 
out successfully 
. (nuTks) (3-2)
6794,29
9125,71
6789 o53
9 1 1 9 . 3 3
Source: Rahim (1977, 124-5).
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After the change of regime in August .1975, a government handout 
stated that between December 1971 and August 1975 (i.e, 3g years), 
goodsworth Tk60,000million were smuggled into India (Holiday,
28 March 1976). In other words, according to this calculation, 
the average yearly value of out-smuggling amounted to about 
Tkl4,280million during this period. On the other hand, according 
to Rahim's estimate, the average yearly valus of such smuggling 
is about Tk7,954million, almost half of the official estimate.
Let us accept the lower estimate. If we now assume that the 
average value of smuggled-out goods during the subsequent 3g years 
was one-tenth of what it was during the first 3^  years, then the 
average value of the yearly out-smuggling during the first seven 
years of Bangladesh's independence comes to about Tk8,750million 
or $437.5million0 If we accept Dahar's (1974, 25-40) estimate 
that goods worth only half the value of out-smuggling goods came 
back through in-smuggling, then the net outward transfer per year 
through smuggling works out at $218075million.
Brain Drain
Immediately following Bangladesh's independence, the brain drain 
took a serious turn. Although there were formal restrictions on 
the exit of professionals (especially doctors and engineers), the 
exodus was quite widespread. Also, many Bangladeshis who had 
gone abroad before and after 1972 for higher education on 
scholarships arranged by the government through foreign "technical 
assistance", did not return home on completion of their courses. 
The main factors operating in this regard were deterioration in 
law and order, a drastic fall in the standard of living, gross 
political patronage and interference, an inability to absorb
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trained manpower, etc, internally, and the attraction of better 
pay and facilities externally. In early 1976, i.e. after the 
installation of the military regime, formal restrictions on 
brain drain were withdrawn; in fact, a Bureau of Manpower was 
specifically created to handle manpower export, the grounds 
being that, "Manpower export, in addition to easing pressure 
on the home labour market,* has good foreign exchange earning 
prospects by way of remittance by those working abroad" (GOBD, 
1978d, 271). Between April 1976 and August 1979, 61,769 persons 
left for abroad on jobs arranged either by the Manpower Bureau 
or manpower export agencies recognised by the government Cue. 
at the average rate of 1,544 persons per month). Of these, 
only 17,232 (i,e. about 28 per cent) could be described as 
"unskilled",** The main countries absorbing Bangladeshi man­
power at this time were Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, 
Nigeria, Uganda, Malaysia and the Gulf States, The Manpower 
Bureau has no records for the legal/illegal exits taking place 
before 1976 (although it could confirm the widely held notion
that it was between 1972 and 1976 that the best of the professional
skills were drained out of the country and that during this period,
the main direction of flow was towards Western countries). Also,
* Implicit in this statement is the hint that there is "surplus" trained 
manpower in the country. Nothing could be further from the actual 
situation. Thus, Bangladesh was exporting doctors to the Middle East, 
although her doctor/population ratio was one of the lowest in the world 
and her health care system was in an appalling condition (Briscoe, 
1977, 1), Similarly, as a 1977 report points out, "Due to the 
unrestricted export of skilled manpower to Middle Eastern countries 
which the government has been encouraging over the last year, areas 
like Savar thana are suffering from a shortage of carpenters, plumbers, 
blacksmiths and electricians, to name but a few" (Gono Shyastha Kendra, 
Progress Report No,6 , December 1977, mimeo).
** Statistics supplied by Director-peneralj Bangladesh Manpower Bureau in 
September 1979, According to a World Bank report, the present rate of
manpower export to the Middle East alone is 3,000 per month (World 
Bank, 1978^49).
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there is no detailed information on private and public costs of 
education and training by different stages, courses and years, 
so that at this stage it is quite impossible to calculate the 
magnitude of the brain drain undergone by Bangladesh so far, 
especially in relation to remittances sent by exported manpower.
Plunder by Foreign Troops stationed in Bangladesh
According to a UN report, damage to the Bangladesh economy owing 
to the 1971 war amounted to $1.2billion (UNROB, 1972). These 
damages may be classified as follows: physical transfer of
public and private sector assets by respectively the Pakistani 
occupation administration and the individual West Pakistani 
industrialists and merchants who virtually controlled commerce 
and industry in Bangladesh before 1971; physical transfer of 
goods looted from the general population by the Pakistani 
occupation army, and materials destroyed as part of the denial 
policy, but not transferred. In so far as the last category 
ammounted to a dead loss to the economy, this may also be treated 
as amounting to transfer.
The Indian occupation army remained in Bangladesh between 
December 1971 and March 1972, The most damaging aspect of its 
presence, apart from casting serious doubts on Bangaldesh's 
sovereignty, was its involvement in the wholesale plunder of 
Bangladesh's material resources and their organised transfer 
across the borders in collusion with the Indian business class, 
Martin Woollacott reported in the Guardian of 21 January 1972: 
"Systematic Indian Army looting of mills, factories and offices 
in Khulna area has angered and enraged Bangladesh civil 
officials here. The looting took place in the first few days
4 7 4
after the Indian troops arrived in the city on December 17". In 
a protest note sent by the then Deputy Commissioner of Khulna to 
MrSo Gandhi, then India's Prime Minister, the estimate of the 
Khulna loot was put at $30million. Later, on it was found that
it
most district administrators had similar stories to tello 
According to one estimate based on actual deployment of the 
Pakistan army during 1971, Indian troops transferred arms, 
including 87 tanks, worth $750million C_Sen,A^974, 202). An 
Indian weekly puts the value of the entire Indian loot consisting 
of arms, resource food grains, raw jute, cotton yarn, vehicles, 
ocean-going ships, industrial plant, machinery and spare parts, 
durable consumer goods, etc0 at $lbillion (Aneek, December 1974)„ 
Although this appears as an underestimate, we may accept this 
figure in the absence of any other estimate0
On the basis of the above, the value of the total -took by foreign 
troops may be put at $2.2billion. Spreading it over seven years 
in order to facilitate comparison, the average ye^arly value of 
the direct plunder comes to $314million.
Balance Sheet of Inflows and Outflows
On the basis of the above discussion, we may now draw a very rough and 
ready balance sheet for the average yearly outflows and inflows of 
resources for Bangladesh between 1972 and 19770 This is presented
below.
* Interviews with the Deputy Commissioners posted to Chittagong, 
Dacca, Jessore and Comilla immediately after Bangladesh's 
independence.
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TABLE 11 : Balance sheet of Average Yearly Inflows and Outflows 
from Bangladesh between 1972 and 1978
Inflow/Outflow
Mechanisms
Amount gained/lost (million dollars)
 + ,...-. . .
Foreign aid
Private foreign investment
Remittances of Bangladeshis 
working abroad
+616 D 40 
nil
+71025
Debt servicing
Repatriation of profits by 
private foreign investment
Unequal foreign trade
Smuggling
Repatriation of earnings by 
foreign experts and difference 
between actual and international 
freight and insurance costs
Brain drain
Plunder by foreign troops 
stationed in Bangladesh
-89olG
-6Q0QQ
-431048 
-218„ 75
-44oQ0
Indeterminate
-314.0Q
Net outflow -469.78
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Thus, on average, it is quite plausible that Bangladesh, one of the 
poorest countries.of the world, has been financing someone somewhere 
to the tune of $5Q0million every year since 1972. Obviously, no 
claims can be made about the accuracy of the calculations made above 
in view of the paucity of relevant data. However, it may be noted 
that I have erred on the side of underestimating the outflows, so 
that the actual net outflow is likely to be higher than the amount 
indicated above. Another striking feature of the net outflow is 
that the principal beneficiary of outflows from Bangladesh since 
1972 has been India, and between Bangladesh and developed capitalist 
countries, inflows and outflows may have just cancelled each other 
out.
Although very little is known about BengalTs economy before the 
British period, available evidence suggests that throughout history 
Bengal has experienced a net outflow of resources, and that it was 
by no means confined to the British and post-British period. In 
fact, during Mughal rule, the Bengal tribute and land revenue* 
constituted a most important source of income for Delhi□ As 
JoN. Sarkar (1948, 401) suggests, but for the staggering Bengal 
tribute (i.e. Rupees 10 million per year for three years) it would 
have been virtually impossible for Aurengjeb to finance his Deccan 
campaignso A similar situation seems to have prevailed for most of
The revenue from crown lands went straight to the royal exechequer 
at Delhi, while revenue from Jagir lands went into the maintenance 
of imperial officers and troops stationed in Bengal„ From 1627 
onwards, a direct tribute to the emperor was also made compulsory 
(Roy, 1968, 326 and 338).
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the Sultanate rule in Delhi in the earlier c e n t u r i e s I n  addition 
to the tributes to Delhi, Bengal, from time to time, was also 
susceptible to plunder by Mogh, Portuguese, Arakanese and Maratha 
brigands during the pre-British period (Faruque, 1974, 30-2; Roy,
1968, 209 and 236-40).
In the mid-eighteenth century, the British defeated the troops of the 
ruler of Bengal and the French., and took control of this region. In 
fact, Bengal was the first British possession in India, and this does 
not appear to be a mere historical coincidence. At once the economic 
drain through outright plunder, rack renting and monopoly trade 
increased sharply. Various documents and authors have tried to 
evaluate and quantify this drain (Maddison, 1971, 63; R.C. Dutt,
1902, 47; Hansardrs Parliamentary Debates, Vol.25, 181; Cobbettfs 
Parliamentary Debates, 1806, Volc6; Levkovsky, 1966, Ch.I;
K.K. Dutta, 1961, Ch05, etc.). It can be said that it was so 
enormous that it might have constituted an important ingredient of 
Britain1s industrial revolution, and that, if these funds had been 
invested locally, they could have made significant contributions to 
raising income levels. Brooks Adams 0918, 254) wrote, "Very soon 
after Plassey (i.e. the battle that led to British rule in Bengal), the 
Bengal plunder began to arrive in London, and the effect appears to 
have been instantaneous, for all authorities agreed that the 
1 industrial revolution1, the event which divided the 19th century 
from all antecedent time, began with the year 176Q".** As the
* This is well expressed in the poetry of the contemporary Kankan
Chandi CCalcutta University, 1956, 13 and 16). See also Chicherov 
C1971, 81 )o
** The importance of the Bengal drain has been subsequently challenged. 
For details please see Bagchi Cl973, 44).
industrial revolution began to take root in England, "free trade" 
became the principal method of resource transfer whereby mass- 
produced goods of British industry could command complete sway over 
a captive and systematically de—industrialised economy (Lekovsky,
J966, 1-41; Marx, 19 65cl j 451; Lamb, 1955, 468). By the beginning 
of the twentieth century, repatriation of profits from British capital 
invested in India also came to augment resource transfer through free 
trade (Dutt, R.P., 1947, 129-44; Bagchi, 1973).
Apart from metropolitan transfers, British rule also paved the way
for East Bengal’s peripheral status within the Bengal economy. On the
one hand, colonial, uneven development ensured limited commercial,
industrial and cultural concentration in and around Calcutta (GOEB,
1954, 3)o On the other hand, British land policy (i.e. permanent
settlement) generally displaced Muslim with Hindu zamindars (Hunter,
1891; Mullick, 1961, 27-65; Qureshi, I.H., 1962, 212-24). The
urban,middle class of Calcutta had strong connections with these
zamindars. Also, there was no economic compulsion on the zamindars
to invest in agriculture, so that most of the surplus appropriated by
the zamindars and their employees in East Bengal ultimately found its
way into Calcutta (Mukherjee, 1973, 402-5; Qureshi, I.A., 1978, .£8).
was
As pointed out m  Chapter 2, after Pakistan established m  1947, 
resource transfer from East Bengal did not cease. Gradually, its 
direction changed from Calcutta to Karachi and Islamabad. To sum 
up, as far as East Bengal was concerned, outward resource transfer, 
in the broad historical perspective, had both regional and 
metropolitan dimensions. While it is easy to explain the drain to 
the metropolis in terms of the early dissolution of feudalism and the 
growth of the capitalist mode of production in Europe and its
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compulsion for ensuring profits and markets on a world scale, at 
the present level of our knowledge of pre-British South Asian 
economy, the regional aspect of the Bengal drain is difficult to 
comprehend*, It would be no more than tautology to suggest that 
this must be due to regional variations within the pre—British mode 
of production and superstructure of South Asia, unless these 
variations can be categorically pin-pointed with the help of concrete 
empirical evidence„ However, it seems that the answer to BengalTs 
continued drainage has to be sought mainly within the internal 
context rather than in external compulsions.
Whatever the explanation of such net resource transfer, its effects 
on production and distribution, in general, and on rural poverty in 
particular, are crucial„ Firstly, it hinders capital formation 
within the country and thereby reduces production and employment 
potentialities. Secondly, the depletion of internal resources 
strengthens scarcity responses like hoarding and speculative trade, 
usurious money lending, rack renting, and accentuates the fall in 
real wages, etc*, Since the rural sector occupies the commanding 
position in the economy in terms both of contribution to GDP as well 
as in the share of the total population, the poverty accentuating 
effect of such transfers is likely to be felt more acutely in the 
rural than urban sector„
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Effect of Resource Inflows on Production arid Distribution 
(with particular reference to the rural Sector)
A0 Foreign Economic Assistance
The following table provides a breakdown of foreign assistance
received by Bangladesh between 1971/72 and 19.76/77 by use„
TABLE 12 : Breakdown of Foreign Aid Actually Received by Bangladesh by Use
(million US dollars)
Year Food Aid Non-food :
. Commodity Aid
Project Aid
1971/72 113,3 (113,3)+ 123.3 (123,3)+ 6.9
1972/73 183.2 (782.3)*^ 291.5 (286,5)" 84,0
1973/74 233,2 109.4 138,0
1974/74 374,9 399,1 145,2
1975/76 305,9 378.1 129.1
1976/77 106,5 248.6 147,1
Total 1317,0 1440,0 650,3
Source: GOBD, 1978,12,
+ The figures in parentheses indicate grant components.
Thus, of the total foreign aid received by Bangladesh between 1971/72 
and 1976/77, the shares of food aid, non-food commodity aid, and 
project aid were respectively 38,6 per cent, 42.33 per cent and 
19.07 per cent. It may be noted that for the first two years, over 
95 per cent of both food and non-food commodity aid consisted of 
outright grants, directed towards the post-1971 relief and 
rehabilitation programmes.
Food Aid
The United States provides roughly one-third of Bangladesh1s
Food aid; the remainder is derived mainly from Canada, Australia
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showed
and the EEC countries. In Chapter TO, we that (a) although
about 90 per cent of Bangladesh's population live in the 
countryside, they received only about one-third of the government- 
rationed food grains, which is almost entirely dependent on 
foreign food assistance, and (b) it was the upper and middle 
classes in the urban areas who reaped the maximum benefit from 
the subsidised food, delivered through the rationing system. In 
Chapter $, it was observed that of the food going into rural 
areas through modified rationing, outright relief and food for 
works programmes, the major beneficiaries (both directly and 
indirectly) were the rural rich and the bureaucracy, although 
such food, in theory, was meant exclusively for the rural poor. 
This finding is also corroborated by other recent studies (Clay, 
1979a; Hartman and Boyce, 1978; Stepanek, 1979, 60). The 
Hartman and Boyce study, based on field investigation, reports 
thus on modified rationing: "The rural ration deal .erssiphon
off a substantial portion of the food grains and sell these on 
the black market. For this reason, a dealership is a key form 
of political patronage. The local dealer in our area received 
the job because his father-in-law had been head of the local 
administrative body, the union council" (p,5). Similarly,
Asplund (1979, 191-212) in a detailed study shows that the 
maximum benefits of the food-for-works programmes accrues to 
the rural rich through development and higher productivity of 
their lands, salaries and profits through their roles as 
contractors, misappropriation of rural works funds as union 
parishad/project committee members, etc. In other words, such
foreign food assistance has ensured that the "higher the income, 
the less price one pays for food in Bangladesh" (FAO/UNDP 
Agricultural Mission, 1977, Food Policy, Working Paper II, p021).
The effect of food aid on domestic agricultural production is 
viewed thus by the Dacca Embassy of the United States, the 
largest single provider of food aid to Bangladesh, "The 
incentive for Bangladesh government leaders to devote attention, 
resources and talent to the problem of increasing domestic food 
grain production is reduced by the security provided by US and 
other donors' food assistance" (quoted in McHenry and Bird, 1977, 
79)o In fact, as suggested by Vylder (1979, 45) and Clay (1979a) 
food aid has not only failed to meet its distributive objective, 
but also may have helped to hold back measures like land reforms 
and progressive agricultural taxation, geared towards domestic 
resource mobilisation for greater agricultural production. It 
has been suggested by Rahman Sobhan (1980) that in 1974, the 
United States used food as a political weapon against Bangladesh, 
His main contention is that the USA coerced Bangladesh over her 
jute trade with Cuba at a time when floods had caused serious 
crop damage in Bangaldesh and that the consequent delays in food 
shipments contributed to the 1974 famine. It is difficult to 
agree with such an assertion because one could equally argue that 
famine might have been averted if massive leakage through 
smuggling had been plugged and a more equitable distribution 
practised. However, the arm twisting incident of 1974 clearly 
demonstrated that within the existing structures of property 
and power in Bangladesh society, heavy padding of food aid simply 
postponed rather than solved any problem.
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Non-food Commbdi ty Aid
As mentioned earlier, food and non-food commodity aid in 1971 
and 1972 came as part of the post-1971 relief and rehabilitation 
programme, and was meant specifically for the weakest sections 
of the society. Eowever, as seen in Chapter $, the lion's 
share of what ultimately reached the rural sector was 
appropriated by the rural rich and the local bureaucracy, while 
the rest trickled down to the rural poor in a manner which only 
strengthened their dependence on the rural rich. It is worth 
quoting here Lifschultz (1979, 41) on the "use" of relief goods 
in general: "The most notorious example of the style of primitive
accumulation indulged in by members of the new regime was that of 
Gazi Ghulam Mustafa, MP, President of Dacca City Awami League and 
Chairman of Bangladesh's Red Cross Society*. Mustafa established 
a multi-million dollar black market operation in relief goods..», 
At one stage, the Director of the United Nations Relief Operation 
in Bangladesh CUNROB) observed that it had become so bad that 
only one in seven tins of baby food and one in thirteen blankets 
donated to relief ever reached the poor!* Similarly, the Far 
Eastern Economic Review (September^l974), reported that one 
European official from the United Nations' transport division, 
which at one point controlled the import and shipment of millions 
of dollars' worth of goods into the country, was himself reported 
to have made over a million dollars and to have purchased an hotel 
in Sardinia from Bangladesh earnings.
Of the "developmental" non-food commodity aid, the most important 
items are fertiliser, oil, cement, cotton and other industrial 
raw materials (Clay, J979b)0 The main non-food commodity going
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to the rural areas is.obviously fertiliser, which like food, is 
also heavily subsidised. In 1977, urea, triple super-phosphate 
and maureate of potash were subsidised by respectively 32 per 
cent, 71 per cent and 64 per cent CBRRI, 1977, 263). As shown 
again in Chapter^ , like food it is the rich fanners who have 
exclusive access to fertiliser and other agricultural inputs„ 
This finding is corroborated also by Stepanek (1979, 82-3J and 
Clay. ^1979b)0 And as Hartman and Boyce Q979, Chs„ 5 and 7) 
correctly argue, this means not only inequitable distribution, 
but also inefficient use of such inputs since small farmers use 
capital, land and labour more intensively than rich farmerso 
Project Aid
As may be seen from Table 12, project aid has been steadily 
increasing over time. Table 13 gives a breakdown of project 
aid provided by the World BankTs IDA, the foremost donor of 
project aid to Bangladesh,,
TABLE 13 : IDA Project Aid to Bangladesh (as of December 1977)
(million dollars)
Agricultural and rural development 215.9
(of which irrigation is) (113„9)
Transport and communications 67.1
Industry 28o0
Cyclone rehabilitation 25 o0
Education 22.6
Urban water supply 22„1
Population planning 15.0
Miscellaneous   . . . .  49 o0
Total .   444.7
Source: IDA, statement of Development Credits,
30 November 19770
As may be seen from the above table, the major portion of IDA 
project aid was directed to the rural sector„ The following 
passages from the Hartman and Boyce (’1978, 6-7) study illustrate 
the actual use of project aid: "Project aid reached our village
in the form of a deep tube well, one of 3,Q0Q installed in 
north-western Bangladesh in an IDA projecto The tube well, 
designed to produce enough water to irrigate 60 acres of land, 
is a valuable asset.oo°0n paper, the tube well will be used by a 
farmers1 co-operative formed especially for the purpose. But in 
reality, the tube well in our village was considered the personal 
property of one man, Nafis, the biggest landlord of the area0 
The irrigation group, of which Nafis was supposedly the manager, 
was in fact no more than a few signatures he had collected on a 
scrap of papero..0Though each tube well had cost the donors and 
the government more than $12,000, Nafis paid less than $3Q0 for 
his, mostly in bribes to local officialsD The tube well sits in 
the middle of a thirty-acre tract of Nafis1 best land. Since it 
will yield enough water to irrigate twice the area, Nafis says 
that he will rent out water to the smaller farmers adjacent to 
his land. But the hourly rate he intends to charge is so high 
that f*7ew of his neighbours are interested. As a result, his 
tube well will not be used to its full capacity0 The 
inefficiency of this arrangement is compounded by the fact that 
large landowners like Nafis tend to cultivate their land less 
intensively than small owners"0 Similarly, ai SIDA (1977) 
evaluation of the tube well project, after examining 270 tube 
wells, concluded thus: "It is not surprising that the tube wells
have been situated on the land of the well-to-do farmers, or 
that it is the same well-to-do farmers who are the chairmen and
4 8 6
managers of the irrigation groups, It would have been more 
surprising if the tube wells had not been located on their land, 
with the existing rural power structure, maintained largely 
because of the unequal distribution of land".
The village potentates were not the only beneficiaries of the 
tube well project. Corrupt officials took their share in the 
form of sundry bribes and kickbacks (SIDA, 1977). However, 
according to Hartman and Boyce Cl978, 9) and the Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 7 February 1977), the main beneficiary of the 
tube well project was a private businessman named Islam, reputed 
to be Bangladesh’s richest citizen* He won the contract for 
supply of pump sets for the IDA tube well project at $J2million, 
although another company had reportedly offered to provide them 
at the World Bank's original cost estimate of $9million* At 
this point, the Dacca staff of the World Bank urged that the 
project be postponed or cancelled altogether, but they were 
overruled in Washington, so that Islam's extra $3million was 
"easier than robbing a bank"* To sum up aid utilisation in 
Bangladesh, it is worth quoting a Government White Paper 
published in September 1975, "Unfortunately, much of the aid 
and grants were not properly used. Corruption and nepotism 
were so rampant that many donor countries insisted on their 
own arrangements for distribution" (GOBD, 1975f>?2).
B. Remittances by Bangladeshis working Abroad
There has so far been no comprehensive survey on the utilisation of 
remittances* However, interviews with Bangladesh Manpower Bureau 
officials Csee also Ahmad, Q*K., 1979) suggests that most of the
remittances were going into acquisition of real estate property, 
import of luxury goods, commerce and family maintenance, so that 
these might have simply contributed to price spiralling (with adverse 
consequences for those who have the least purchasing power) besides 
aggravating the already skewed income distribution in the country* 
Referring to Bangladeshis working abroad for a couple of years, a 
Dacca weekly (Illustrated Weekly of Bangladesh, 13 August 1978), 
reported thus: "These people who have become rich almost overnight
are purchasing huge agricultural land, residential land in Dacca 
and other towns, erecting magnificent buildings, collecting valuable 
immoveable properties of modern civic life and thus they are leading 
a very sophisticated life in this poor country.*0oThis is surely an 
economic injustice of a grave nature". Moinul Islain's (J976, 
301-11) study of the Bangladeshi immigrant workers in the UK also 
points to a highly anti-productive use of remittances sent to 
Bangladesh*
We may conclude by positing that resource flows hetween Bangladesh 
and outside - official and unofficial, legal and illegal - have served 
to underpin the structures within which rural poverty is maintained*
Where their express aim has been to diminish rural poverty (as in the 
case of foreign aid) far from achieving that aim they have served to 
exacerbate poverty* Our analysis of rural poverty in Bangladesh cannot 
be complete without explicit consideration of this crucial point*
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TABLE 2 : Estimate of Agricultural Production* and Per Capita 
Agricultural Production 1969/70-1978/79
Year Gross value of 
agricultural 
(million Tk.) 
production at 1972-73 
constant prices
Col.2 as 
percentage 
of GDP
Per capita 
agricultural 
production 
(in Tk0)
1969/70 32352 62042 480 0 7
1972/73 26100 59.40 352 o 7
1973/74 28827 58o50 377.3
1974/75 28537 56o00 3640 7
1975/76 31865 55o20 3980 7
1976/77 30899 52.60 373.8
1977/78 33823 5304 396o 1
1978/79 34993 55o23 402.6
* Includes crop production, fisheries and forestry0
Source: Government of Bangladesh, Bureau of Statistics, Bangladesh,
Bangladesh Year Book, p0149, and Government of Bangladesh, 
Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh, Economic Survey, 1978/79, p0l0
TABLE 3 : Output of Nationalised Industries (at 1973-74 
prices ,• in million Tk0) and Indices of Total 
Production, 1969-70 to 1977/78
constant
Industrial
Years Value of NI 
output
Index of NI 
production
Index of total 
ind.production
Per capita 
value of NI 
output (in Tk.)
1969-70 5660 100.00 100.00 84.10
1972-73 4446 78o55 80.87 60.08
1973-74 5220 97.52 94.70 72.25
1974-75 5463 96.53 85.98 69.83
1975-76 5536 97o82 93.86 69.25
1976-77 6074 107.33 99.69 73.44
1977-78 6664 117.74 106.50 78.32
Source: Columns 2 and 3 from Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of
Finance, Bangladesh Economic Survey, 1977-78, pQ113 and 
Column 4 from Government of Bangladesh, Bureau of Statistics, 
Bangladesh Year Book, 1979, p.236.
TABLE 4 : Livestock 
Type
Population,
1972-73
1972/73-
1973-74
■1976/77 CT000)
1974-75 1975-76 1976-77
Cattle 28,247 28,552 28,851 29,054 29,331
Buffalo 1,279 1,291 1,305 1,320 1,335
Goats and sheep 12,019 12,150 12,280 12,412 12,544
Poultry 76,884 77,786 78,615 79,537 81,323
Total livestock 118,429 119,779 121,051 122,423 124,533
Per capita 
livestock 106 1056 1<,54 1.53 1 o50
Source: Director of Livestock, Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock,
Government of Bangladesh„
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TABLE 5 : Fish Production, 1972/73- 1976/77 (*000 metric tons)
Type 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77
Inland 731 732 732 734 736
Marine 87 88 89 89 90
Total 818 820 822 823 826
Per capita 
fish
production
(in kg) 11 o05 10o 7 10 05 10 o03 9o9
Source: Director of Fisheries, Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries,
Government of Bangladesh0
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TABLE 6 : Bangldesh's Per Capita Availabilityyof Selected 
Essential Commodities, 1973/74-1977/78
Commodity 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78
Pood** 360.72 336o89 359.30 324.99 352.00
Onions " 4o 10 3o 86 3.92 3.40 3.60
Pulses " 5o54 5.76 5.54 5.68 5.40
Sugar " 3.62 2.74 4.32 3.98 3.34
Salt u 18.44 19.16 18.16 17.52 18.08
Meat ,f 7.36 7.28 7.16 7.10 7.24
Milk 11 16 o34 26.98 16.62 26.26 26.72
Molasses 11 140 82 15.21 13.49 12.65 12.00
Newsprint " 0.47 0.58 0.42 0.19 0.53
Paper ,T 0.60 0.76 0.46 0.62 0.76
Mild steel " 3o67 3.06 2.09 2.64 3.90
Electrical 
energy (kw) o 0 00 10.71 11.66 12.79 13.37
Eggs (number) 15o 71 15.55 15.35 15.51 15.64
Cloth (yds) 7.06 6.68 6.71 6.71 7.44
* Domestic production plus imports
** Wheat, rice, millet and other cereals
Source: Government of Bangladesh, Bureau of Statistics, Statistical
Year Book of Bangladesh, 1979, ppQ463-80
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APPENDIX F : A Synopsis of Survey Questionnaires
The major survey questionnaires administered in the village were 
as follows:
Community Survey Questionnaire
This was the first questionnaire to be administered and 
concentrated on aggregate data (e.g. total village land) and 
information of a general nature (e.g. links of the village 
with the outside world). It was divided into two parts, one 
to filled in through interview of males and the other through 
interview of females. In each case, the investigators sat 
with a large assembly of males/females assembled for the purpose, 
so that cross-examination could take place.
II. Preliminary Household Questionnaire
This was again divided into two parts, one to be filled through 
interview of the household head (generally male) and the other 
through interview of the most important female of the household. 
The first part consisted of questions on family structure, 
education level, ownership and use of land and other assets, 
occupation (and role within occupation), housing, asset 
transaction, migration, wage labour share cropping, indebtedness, 
involvement in litigation, etc., while the part filled in through 
interviewing females concentrated on marriage, divorce, death, 
disease, female labour^ family planning, durable consumer goods 
in the household, institutional education and drop out, etc.
Income-Expenditure Questionnaire
This contained questions on all incomes, operating expenses, 
debts, investment/disinvestment, production and exchange, 
distress and forward sales, consumption (especially in respect 
of what are described as "basic human needs") etc. This was 
filled in through interview of only the household head.
Fertility Questionnaire
This contained questions exclusively on fertility and family 
planning, to be completed in respect of every married female 
and females above the age of 14 in the household. It was 
administered at the very end because of the resentment it was 
likely to generate.
Questionnaire on Money Lending, Share Cropping, Wage Labour 
and Factions
This was fille~"din through interview of moneylenders, loanees, 
share croppers, sharecropping-out persons, wage labourers, 
wage labour employers, faction leaders and faction followers.
Questionnaire on Attitude Toward and Extent of Importance 
of Various Social, Religious, Cultural Practices in the Village
This was filled in through interviewing a group selected on
the basis of stratified random sampling, taking into consideration
age, sex, class and religion.
5 0 C
VII. Nutrition Survey Questionnaire
The sample consisted of only 21 households, with three 
households drawn from each of the seven land-holding categories 
(see Chapter 5). Two points in time were chosen, namely 
February, that is harvest time, and June-July, the leanest period 
of the year in respect of food availability. The survey 
consisted of recall of food consumed by household members a day 
earlier.
VIII. Family History Questionnaire
This was administered to one-third of the households in each 
of the seven land-holding categories, subject to a minimum of 
three households from any category. The questionnaire was 
mainly concerned with the economic position and activities of 
the household over three generations.
All questionnaires were pre-tested, so as to minimise errors and 
omissions of important information. Pre-coding was limited to 
Preliminary Household, Income Expenditure and Fertility questionnaires only 
However, computation of the data for this study was carried out manually 
since the computer used by the ELDS was not in working condition at the 
required time.
Together, the questionnaires (and codes) run into no less than 200 pages. 
Also, these were prepared in Bengali, in order to facilitate data collection 
As such, these have not been included as appendices.
SOI
APEEHDIX G 
Glossary of Local
A.D.C.
A.L*
Akika 
Anna (As)
Anna Prarsanna 
Aratdar 
Atiya-Shajon 
Badli
B.A.D.C.
Bakhsheesh
B.A.R.D.
Barga
Bargadar
Bazaar
Benami
Bepari
Bhumi Hin Chashi 
Bhai-Phota
B.I.D.S.
Bigha
Brahmin
C.A.R.E.
C.E.S.I.
Terms and Abbreviations Used in the Text
Additional Deputy Commissioner, i.e. Officer 
next to head of the District administration.
Awami League; one of the dominant political 
parties in Bangladesh.
Muslim equivalent of christening.
1/16th of a Rupee, the unit of paper 
currency in India and Pakistan.
Hindu equivalent of christening.
Stockist.
Relatives.
Labour exchange.
Bangladesh Agricultural Development 
Corporation.
Tips.
Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development. 
Share cropping.
Share cropper.
Daily Market.
Proxy ownership.
Merchant.
Landless peasant.
Occasion to mark brother-sister relationship. 
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies. 
^ of an acre.
The topmost Hindu caste.
Foreign voluntary relief organisation.
Cross Examination of Selected Informants.
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Challisha
Chandni
Chashi
Chauhuddi Samaj 
Chotolok 
Chowkidar 
C.O. (Dev.)
C.P .1.
C.P.I. (M-L)
C.S.P.
Dafadar
Dal
Dalai
D.A.N.X.D.A.
D.C.
D.I.
District
Division
D.P. list
E.B.S.A.T.A.
"Enemy Property"
F.A.O.
Fakir
F.P.A.
Faria 
Gantidar 
Garib Chashi
Commemorative feast to mark death.
Toll for occupying a place in the market place. 
Farmer.
Greater Samaj.
Lowly person.
Village police under the Union Parishad.
Circle Officer (Development) of Thana.
Communist Party of India.
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).
Civil Service of Pakistan.
Village messenger employed by the Union 
Parishad.
Faction.
Broker*
Danish International Development Agency.
Deputy Commissioner, Head of District 
Administration.
Direct Interview.
Administrative Unit above the Sub-Division.
Administrative Unit above the District.
Deserving Persons list.
East Bengal State Acquisition & Tenancy 
Act, 1951.
Property of Indian nationals seized by the 
government after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.
Food and Agriculture Organisation (U.N. body).
Faith healer.
Family Planning Assistant.
Itinerant trader.
Stratum below the zemindars.
Poor peasant.
Gherao
G.O.B.
G.O.B.D.
G.O.E.B.
G.O.E.P.
G.O.I.
G.O.P.
Gram Rakhi Bahini
Guru
Gushthi
Hat
Haj
Haji
H.E.S.
I.C.S.
Idul-Fitr
Idul-Azha
Ijaradar
I.L.O.
Imam
I.U.D.
Jalao
Jamai Jashhti 
Jamat-i-Islam 
Jatra
Jharu Bakhsh
Jele
Jotedar
To lay seige to*
Government of Bengal*
Government of Bangladesh.
Government of East Bengal.
Government of East Pakistan.
Government of India.
Government of Pakistan.
Village Guards.
Hindu religious teacher.
Patrilineal Kin group.
Bi-weekly market.
Pilgrimage to Mecca. *
Pilgrim returned from Mecca.
Household Expenditure Survey.
Indian Civil Service.
Muslim festivity following month-long fasting
Muslim festivity involving animal sacrifice.
Lessee; also intermediary.
International Labour Organisation (U.N. body)
Person who leads congregational prayers in 
the mosque.
Intra-uterine Device.
To set fire to.
Occasion to honour son-in-law.
Right wing religious political party.
Open air theatre*
Part of toll meant for maintaining sweeper 
in the market place.
Fisherman.
Large landowner.
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Kaestho
Khal
Khas
Khatna
Kishen
Krisak Sramik Party 
Lakh
l l h
LMH
L.R.
Madhobitto
Maghipurnima
Mahabharata
Mahajan
Mahat
Maktab
Maulvi
Maund
m
Mela
M.L.
M.R.
Muazzin 
Mu jib Bahini
Naib
Naxalite 
Nichu Bangsha
Caste below the Brahmin.
Canal.
Belonging to government.
Circumcision.
Landless agricultural worker.
Right of the centre political party.
One hundred thousand.
Landless household.
Lower Middle household.
Land reforms.
Middle class.
Bathing in the Ganges.
Hindu epic.
Money lender; trade financier.
Rich peasant.
Religious school.
Muslim equivalent of Priest.
Unit of weight; l/27th of a ton.
Middle household.
Fair.
Muslim League, right wing political party.
Modified rationing.
One who calls for prayers.
Paramilitary force raised by the Awami 
League in 1971•
Rent collector.
Popular name for adherents of C.PoI. (M-L). 
Low family.
O.D.M.
Qxfam
Para
PH
Pie
PL 4-80
Prayaschit 
Puja 
Purohit 
Q.S.0.C.E.C.
Rajakar
Ratha Jatra
RH I
RH II
Rishi
Roza
Rupee
Ryot
Samaj
Sayyar
Scheduled caste 
S.D.O.
Seer
Shabe Carat 
Shad Bakhan
Overseas Development Ministry.
Foreign Voluntary Relief organisation. 
Neighbourhood.
Poor household.
1/12th of an Anna.
Public Law 480 of the U.S.A. (with respect 
to food aid).
Penitence.
Hindu worship of deity.
Hindu equivalent of priest.
Quarterly Surveys of Current Economic 
Conditions.
Paramilitary force raised by Pakistan array 
in 1971.
Occasion to mark the chariot ride of Radha 
and Krishna.
Rich household I (up to 12.5 acres of land). 
Rich household II (above 12.5 acres of land). 
The lowest Hindu caste in this region. 
Fasting.
Unit of currency.
Peasant•
Society.
Levies/tolls imposed on goods brought to the 
market place.
Low caste.
Sub-divisional Officer.
1/40th of a maund; two lbs.
Muslim religious occasion.
Occasion to mark pregnancy.
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Shalish
Shuparish
S.I.D.A.
S.S.C.
Sub-Division
Swanirvar
Taccavi loan
Taka
Tanti
Tebhaga
Tehsil
Tehsildar
Thak Survey
Thana
Thana Council
Tolah
U.F.
UMH
U.N.I.C.E.F.
U.N.D.P.
Union
U.N.R.O.B.
U.P.
U.S .A.I.D*
W .A.P .D.A.
Waz
W.F.P.
Dispute adjudication.
Advocacy.
Swedish International Development Agency. 
Secondary School Certificate (*0* level). 
Administrative Unit below the District. 
Self-reliance•
Government interest free loan.
Same as Rupee.
Weaver.
Three shakes, literally.
Land revenue collecting unit.
Land revenue collector.
Survey carried with bamboo pole.
Administrative unit below Sub-Division.
Local government body at Thana level.
Toll.
United Front.
Upper Middle household.
United Nations Childrens Emergency Fund. (U.N. 
body)
United Nations Development Programme (U.N. body).
Administrative unit below Thana.
United Nations Relief Operation in Bangladesh 
in 197R«
Union Parishad; also known as Union Board.
Local government body at Union level.
United States Agency for International 
Development•
Water and Power Development Authority.
Religious meetings.
World Food Programme.
W.H.O.
Zakat
Zemindar
World Health Organisation (U.N. body). 
Muslim poor tax.
Landlords created by Permanent Settlement 
in 1793.
Ziafat Same as Challisha.
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